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PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS



PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY · CALCUTTA
INDIA · DECEMBER 19 · 21 · 22 · 1925



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EDITOR
SATISCHANDRA CHATTERJEE
(*Calcutta University*)

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THE CALCUTTA PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY,
SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA

1927




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The Executive Committee of the First Indian Philosophical
ess desire to express their grateful indebtedness for
us contributions to the authorities of the Calcutta Univer-
the Calcutta Philosophical Society and the Mysore
sity. The co-operation of scholars interested in philo-
from all parts of India helped to make it a success and
thankful to them for it. Our special thanks are due to
wart Greaves for his constant encouragement and generous
ance.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN,
Chairman, Executive Committee.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS (ARRANGED BY SECTIONS)¹

OPENING MEETING

- Opening Address
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- Welcome Address
The Hon'ble Sir Ewart Greaves, Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, Chairman, Reception Committee
- Presidential Address
Dr. Rabindranath Tagore.

SECTION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

- A Point of Agreement between Indian Philosophy and Western Science—Carlo Formichi, Rome
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CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

ORGANISATION OF THE CONGRESS

1. Working Committee

At a meeting of the Calcutta Philosophical Society held in February, 1925, it was decided that a conference of persons interested in Philosophical studies should be convened at the Calcutta University before the following Christmas holidays. The gathering was to be called 'the Indian Philosophical Congress,' to which all the educational institutions in India and persons pursuing philosophical studies were to be invited. The following *Working Committee* was appointed for making necessary arrangements :

Chairman : Prof. S. Radhakrishnan.

Secretaries : { Dr. P. D. Shastri,
 { „ N. N. Sen Gupta.

Members : Principal J. R. Banerjea, Prof. H. L. Halder, Dr. W. S. Urquhart, Principal Adityanath Mookerjee, Prof. Krishnachandra Bhattacharjee, Prof. Khagendranath Mitra, Dr. B. M. Barua, Rai Yatindranath Chaudhury, Mr. Harimohan Bhattacharjee, Mr. Satischandra Chatterjee, Mr. Sarojkumar Das, Mr. Bepinbehari De, Mr. Ajitkumar Ghose, Dr. Surendranath Das Gupta, Mr. N. C. Ganguly, Mr. B. K. Mallick, Mr. Haripada Maity.

The idea of the Congress was received with enthusiasm by educational institutions and individual scholars alike. The Universities of Calcutta and Mysore contributed five hundred rupees and two hundred rupees respectively towards the general expenses of the Congress. In addition to this, the Calcutta University Press undertook the publication of the proceedings, free of cost. Scholars from different parts of India rendered the task of the Working Committee easy and agreeable by their kind advice and assistance. The daily press all over India helped the Committee by giving prompt publicity to its notices and circulars.

2. Reception Committee

A local Reception Committee with Sir Ewart Greaves, the Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, as its Chairman, was organised in July, 1926. Members of the general public and teachers of Philosophy in and outside Bengal became members of this body on payment of a membership fee. A considerable sum, which was utilised towards the expenses of the congress, was thus realised. A list of members of the Reception Committee is given below. The Working Committee regret that the list is not complete ; in several instances, the membership fee was collected by one or the other member of the Working Committee who forwarded the money without the name of the contributor.

Members of the Reception Committee

Chairman : Sir Ewart Greaves.

Secretaries : { Dr. P. D. Shastri.
 { „ N. N. Sen Gupta.

Members : Prof. U. C. Bhattacharjee, Mr. Haridas Bhattacharyya, Principal D. N. Sen, Rai Yatindranath Chaudhury, Mr. Benimadhab Das, Dr. Mohendranath Sarkar, Prof. Susilkumar Maitra, Miss A. L. Halder, Mr. Haripada Maity, Mr. U. N. Gupta, Prof. G. H. Langley, Dr. I. J. S. Taraporewala, Mr. Sarojkumar Das, Mr. Nirmalkumar Das, Mr. B. K. Mallick, Mr. J. N. C. Ganguly, Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, Mr. Sureshchandra Dutta, Mr. Satishchandra Chatterjee, Prof. Panchanan Mitra, Mr. Hari-mohan Bhattacharjee, Mr. Moheschandra Chatterjee, Dr. Abhayakumar Guha, Dr. G. S. Bose, Dr. Gouranganath Banerjee, Mr. C. P. N. Sinha, Mr. Sisirkumar Burdhan, Dr. B. B. Dutta, Mr. Satishchandra Ghose, Mr. Jatindranath Mitra, Mr. Ashananda Nag, Pandit Rajendranath Vidyabhushan, Mr. Joygopal Banerjee, Prof. Radhakamal Mookerjee, Pandit Sitanath Tattvabhushan, Mr. Haritkumar Dev, Mr. Suhritchandra Sinha, Dr. P. D. Shastri, Dr. W. S. Urquhart.

The Working Committee, which henceforth became a part of the Reception Committee, completed its arrangements early in December 1925. A band of volunteers, who were students at the University, looked



after the comfort of delegates and contributed in a very large measure to the success of the gathering. The Registrar of the University, the Secretary of the Post-Graduate Council in Arts and his assistants rendered every help in their power. Many of the teachers of the Calcutta University co-operated with the Reception Committee in receiving and entertaining the visitors. The Working Committee desire to express their gratitude to all who made their labours easy.

3. Program of the Congress

Saturday, December 19

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Opening Meeting, Senate Hall.

OPENING ADDRESS

His Excellency the Earl of Lytton, Governor of Bengal.

WELCOME ADDRESS

The Honourable Sir Ewart Greaves, Chairman, Reception Committee.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Dr. Rabindranath Tagore.

2-30 P.M. to 4-30 P.M. Lecture Hall, Asutosh Building.

Section of Indian Philosophy.

President—Professor Ranade, Bombay University.

A point of agreement between Indian

Philosophy and Western Science ... Carlo Formichi, Rome.

A Sketch of Indian Materialism ... G. Tucci, Rome.

Sankara's Doctrine of Maya ... Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya,
Calcutta.

Maya of Sankara and his followers ... Surendranath Das Gupta,
Calcutta.

Monday, December 21

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Section of Logic and Metaphysics.

President—Professor A. G. Hogg, Madras.

Suggestions of a new approach to

the problem of Philosophy ... Basantakumar Mallik, Calcutta.

Is Change Ultimate? ... A. R. Wadia, Mysore.

One or Many? ... Phanibhushan Adhikari, Benares.



2-30 P.M. to 4-30 P.M. Asutosh Building.

The Problem of Truth	...	G. R. Malkani, Amalner.
The Voluntaristic Outlook	...	Haridas Bhattacharyya, Dacca.
The Problem of Mind in Contemporary Thought	...	Upendranath Gupta, Dacca.
The Quest of Truth	...	Jitendrakumar Chakravarty, Rajshahi.

Monday, December 21

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Section of Philosophy of Religion.

President—Professor Langley, Dacca.

The Monistic Spell in Philosophy and Religion	...	Sitanath Tattvabhushan, Calcutta.
The Doctrine of God common to the Bhagavad Gita and the New Testament	...	G. Howells, Serampore.
An Aspect of Religion	...	Kshirodchandra Mookerjee, Dacca.

2-30 P.M. to 4-30 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Hindu Philosophy oriented to Modern Science	...	Enola Eno, Lucknow.
Spiritual Experience : its Function and a Criterion for its Value	...	G. H. Langley, Dacca.
The Principle of Authority	...	W. S. Urquhart, Calcutta.
Transmigration and Immortality	...	Umeshchandra Bhattacharyya, Dacca.
Immortality	...	K. H. Kelkar, Poona.

Monday, December 21

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Section of Indian Philosophy.

President—Professor Ranade, Bombay University.

Ramanuja's Theory of Knowledge	...	M. Hiriyanna, Mysore.
Badarayana's Philosophy	...	P. P. S. Sastri, Madras.



A Synthetic Study of the Vedanta	P. N. Srinivasachari, Madras.
The Ethical Theism of Ramanuja	R. Ramanujachari, Chidambaram.
The Nature of the Self ...	V. B. Shrikhande, Indore.
Atman, the Ulfimate Source of All Reality	N. Venkataraman, Vizianagram.
Some Realistic Aspects of the Philosophy of Sankara ...	Dhirendramohan Dutt, Calcutta.

2-30 P.M. to 4-30 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Adwaitavada in the Rig-Veda ...	Kokileswar Sastri, Calcutta.
The Jaina Instrumental Theory of Knowledge ...	G. Hanumanta Rao, Mysore.
The Jaina Conception of Truth and Reality ...	Harimohan Bhattacharyya, Calcutta.
Vedantic Intuition ...	Nalinikanta Brahma, Krishnagar.
The Philosophy of Vasishtha ...	B. L. Atreya, Benares.
Percept and Idea ...	Harisatya Bhattacharyya, Calcutta.
One of India's Contributions to Philosophic Thought ...	V. Subrahmanya Iyer, Mysore.
Is Adwaitism an Adequate Answer to Buddhism ? ...	R. Nagaraja Sarma, Madras.
The Conception of Self in the Upanishads ...	Srischandra Sen, Lucknow.

Tuesday, December 22

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Section of Logic and Metaphysics.

President—Professor A. G. Hogg, Madras.

Interest and Interpretation ...	Ashalatika Haldar, Allahabad.
Degrees of Reality ...	P. S. Ramanathan, Amraoti.
The Nature of Sensa ...	Rasvihary Das, Amalner.
The Philosophy of Sir Oliver Lodge	Bepinbehari Roy, Cuttack.
The Concept of Individuality ...	Haridas Bhattacharyya, Dacca.



PROGRAM OF THE CONGRESS

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Tuesday, December 22

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Section of History of Philosophy.

President—Professor Phanibhushan Adhikary, Benares.

Unamuno's Ideas on Immortality	...	P. G. Bridge, Calcutta.
Dilthey's Method	...	S. K. Maitra, Benares.
Plato on Beauty	...	Abhayakumar Guha, Calcutta.
The Relation of the Gaudapadiya- karika to Badarayana's Brahma- sutras	...	S. K. Belvalkar, Bombay University.
The New Spiritual Movement in Germany	...	Hans Koesterp, Calcutta.
Pragmatism	...	P. D. Shastri, Calcutta.
Vacaspati's Account of the Buddhist view of Error	...	Saileswar Sen, Calcutta.

Tuesday, December 22

11 A.M. to 1 P.M. Asutosh Building.

Section of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

President—Professor A. R. Wadia, Mysore.

Social Perfection and Personal Immortality	...	A. R. Wadia, Mysore.
The Role of Traditions	...	Radhakamal Mukherjee, Lucknow.
Vedic Theory of the Common Mind	...	N. C. Ganguly, Calcutta.
Capital Punishment in relation to the Theory of State	...	S. K. Maitra, Calcutta.
The Theory of Moral Goods	...	K. R. Srinivasiyengar, Mysore.

2-30 P.M. Lecture Hall, Asutosh Building.

A general meeting of the members of the Congress to consider the question of the constitution and the venue of the next Congress.

4. Minutes of the Business Meeting of the Congress

The following constitution was adopted at the General Meeting held under the presidentship of Vice-Chancellor G. H. Langley of the Dacca University.

(a) THE STATUTES OF THE CONGRESS

1. The association shall be called the Indian Philosophical Congress.

2. *The aim* of the association shall be (i) to meet every year for a specified number of days for the discussion of Philosophical problems ;

(ii) to devise ways and means for the development of Philosophical studies in India ;

(iii) to raise funds and to make proper investment of the same, and to do all other things necessary for the carrying out of the aims (i) and (ii).

3. The membership of the Congress shall be open to those persons who are interested in the study and teaching of philosophy, on their paying a yearly subscription of Rupees five only, at least *two months* before the meeting of the Congress.

4. For the first year, the undermentioned persons shall be deemed as having enrolled as members :—

(a) Delegates.

(b) Contributors of papers.

(c) Members of the Reception Committee who have already paid their dues.

4A. All members of the Congress (a) shall be invited to the meetings of the Congress, (b) shall have the right to vote for such matters as are hereinafter mentioned, (c) shall receive the publications of the Congress at favoured rates, (d) shall have the right to submit papers to the Congress.

5. The membership of a person shall cease (a) upon his non-payment of subscription for two consecutive years, (b) upon his pursuing a course of conduct injurious to the interests of the association



when a motion to effect the termination of membership is passed by a majority of members present at the meeting of the Congress.

6. The work of the Congress shall be carried on by an Executive Committee consisting of twelve members with a Chairman and a Secretary to be elected by the Congress. The Chairman may nominate not more than three members to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee shall hold office for three years.

7. The Congress shall initiate new proposals and policies by passing resolutions which the Executive Committee shall try to carry out.

8. The Executive Committee shall be responsible for carrying out the aims of the association. It shall elect the President and the Sectional Presidents. It shall receive and select papers to be read at the sessions of the Congress.

9. The Executive Committee shall co-opt, at least six months before the date of the meeting of the Congress, two members representing the seat of the following session of the Congress. These members shall hold office for one year.

10. The Chairman and the Secretary shall, with the general approval of the Executive Committee, frame rules and by-laws for carrying on the work of the Congress.

(b) RULES UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE CONGRESS

1. Each Session of the Congress will ordinarily be held for not less than three days.

2. Each forenoon meeting will be a general one and will be devoted to the discussion of set topics. The Executive Committee shall declare the subjects and select men to start the discussion.

3. Each afternoon meeting will dissolve into sections when not more than three papers will be taken up for discussion at each sitting of 2 hours' duration.

4. The session of the Congress will ordinarily be held in the week preceding Christmas.

5. The papers intended for the Congress should reach the Secretary by the 15th August and each paper should be accompanied by a short synopsis. The paper and the synopsis should be type-written. As a rule no paper shall exceed 8 type-written foolscap pages.

6. Nominations for the offices of President and Sectional Presidents should reach the Secretary not later than April 1, of each year.

(c) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

President—Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, Calcutta University.

Secretary—Dr. N. N. Sengupta, Calcutta University.

Members—Prof. P. B. Adhikari, Benares Hindu University; Prof. G. C. Chatterjee, Lahore; Prof. Hiralal Halder, Calcutta University; Prof. A. G. Hogg, Madras; Mahamahopadhyaya Ganganath Jha, Allahabad University; Prof. G. H. Langley, Dacca University; Prof. John Mackenzie, Bombay University; Prof. J. B. Raju, Nagpur University; Prof. R. D. Ranade, Bombay University; Prof. S. S. Suryyanarayana Sastri, Madras University; Prof. Ahmed Shah, Lucknow University; Prof. A. R. Wadia, Mysore; Prof. G. R. Malkani, Amalner; Prof. Abdul Hakeem, Osmania University, Hyderabad.

(d) ORGAN OF THE CONGRESS

It was the desire of the members that the Congress as a permanent organisation should have an organ. The Executive Committee was authorised to enter into negotiations with the Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, in order that the Quarterly Journal of Philosophy, published by the Institute, might be adopted as the organ of the Congress. A board of Editors was appointed for the Journal, should the scheme materialise.

The list is given below :

Prof. S. N. Das Gupta, Calcutta.

„ R. D. Ranade, Poona.

„ P. P. S. Shastri, Madras.

„ W. S. Urquhart, Calcutta.

Mr. G. C. Chatterjee, Lahore.

„ S. K. Maitra, Benares.

It was decided that for the first year persons of the undermentioned categories should be regarded as members :

- (1) Delegates, (2) Contributors of paper, (3) Members of the Working Committee, (4) Members of the Reception Committee.

5. List of Members of the Congress

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Address.</i>
1. Prof. G. H. Langley	... Dacca University, Dacca.
2. Mr. Umeshchandra Bhatta- charjee.	" "
3. Mr. Haridas Bhattacharyya	" "
4. Principal D. N. Sen	... B. N. College, Bankipur.
5. Rai Yatindranath Chaudhury	Taki.
6. Mr Benimadhab Das	... Calcutta.
7. Dr. Mohendranath Sarkar	... Sanskrit College, Calcutta.
8. Miss A. L. Halder	... Crosthwaith Girls' College, Allahabad.
9. Prof. Susilkumar Maitra	.. Calcutta University.
10. Mr. Haripada Maity	... " "
11. Mr. U. N. Gupta	... Dacca University.
12. Dr. I. J. S. Taraporewala	... Calcutta University.
13. Mr. Sarojkumar Das	... " "
14. „ Nirmalchandra Ghose	... Sheorapuli, Hooghly.
15. „ B. K. Mallick	... 15 B, Raja Navakissen St., Hatkhola Calcutta.
16. „ J. N. C. Ganguly	... Kalighat, Calcutta.
17. „ Sureshchandra Dutta	... Cotton College, Gauhati.
18. Prof. S. Radhakrishnan	... Calcutta University.
19. The Hon'ble Sir W. E. Greaves	" "
20. Mr. Satischandra Chatterjee	... " "
21. Prof. Panchanan Mitra	... " "
22. „ Harimohan Bhattacharjee	Asutosh College, Calcutta.
23. „ Moheschandra Chatterjee	" "
24. Dr. N. N. Sengupta	... 7, Vidyasagar Street, Calcutta.
25. „ Abhayakumar Guha	... Calcutta University.
26. „ G. S. Bose	... 14, Parsibagan, Calcutta.
27. Dr. Gauranganath Banerjee	... Calcutta University.
28. Mr. C. P. N. Singh	... Surshand.
29. „ Sisirkumar Burdhan	... Hooghly College.
30. Dr. B. B. Dutta	... Calcutta University.



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|-----|--------------------------------------|---|
| 31. | Mr. Satishchandra Ghosh | ... Calcutta University. |
| 32. | " Jatindranath Mitra | ... Deputy-Chairman, Howrah Municipality. |
| 33. | " Ashananda Nag | ... Calcutta. |
| 34. | Prof. Joygopal Banerjee | ... Calcutta University. |
| 35. | " Radhakamal Mookerjee | Lucknow University. |
| 36. | " Pandit Sitanath Tattva-
bhushan | ... Calcutta. |
| 37. | Mr. Suhritchandra Sinha | ... 15/1/1, Ramkanta Bose Lane, Calcutta. |
| 38. | Prof. H. K. Ghose | ... Calcutta. |
| 39. | Dr. P. D. Sastri | ... Vice-Principal, Hooghly College. |
| 40. | Dr. W. S. Urquhart | ... Scottish Churches College, Calcutta. |
| 41. | Prof. G. C. Chatterjee | ... Govt. College, Lahore. |
| 42. | Prof. R. D. Ranade | ... Bombay University. |
| 43. | Mr. M. N. Tolani | ... Institute of Phil., East Khandesh, Amalner. |
| 44. | Mr. Ahmad Shah | ... Lucknow University. |
| 45. | Dr. A. G. Hogg | ... Christian College, Madras. |
| 46. | Mr. A. K. Trivedi | ... Baroda. |
| 47. | Rambhador Ojha | ... Inspector General of Education, Alwar. |
| 48. | Mr. R. M. Oak | ... Maharajah's College, Jaipur. |
| 49. | Prof. S. K. Maitra | ... Hindu University, Benares. |
| 50. | " B. L. Atreya | ... " " |
| 51. | " I. Tewari | ... " " |
| 52. | " Belvalkar | ... Bombay University. |
| 53. | " J. Mackenzie | ... " " |
| 54. | Mr. Kokileswar Sastri | ... Calcutta University. |
| 55. | " K. R. Sreenivasienger | ... Mysore University. |
| 56. | " Bepinbehari Roy | ... Cuttack College. |
| 57. | " S. Sankara Menon | ... Vakil, High Court, Trivandrum. |
| 58. | " Shribas Pandey | ... " " " Partabgarh (Oudh) |
| 59. | " P. S. Ramanathan | ... King Edward College, Amraoti. |
| 60. | " Jitendranath Chakravarti | ... Rajshahi. |
| 61. | " Dhirendramohan Dutta | ... Jadavpur, P. O. Dhakuria. |
| 62. | " Nalinikanta Brahma | ... Krishnagar College. |
| 63. | " N. Venkataraman | ... Maharaja's College, Vizianagram. |
| 64. | " Jwalaprosad Singhal | ... D. A. V. College, Dehra Dun. |
| 65. | " Rasbehari Das | ... Institute of Phil., Amalner. |

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 66. | Miss Enola Eno | ... Lucknow University. |
| 67. | Mr. Hemantakumar Basu | ... B. M. College, Barisal. |
| 68. | " D. G. Londhe | ... Rajaram College, Kolhapur. |
| 69. | " Harisatya Bhattacharjee | ... 1, Kailas Bose Lane, Howrah. |
| 70. | " Khirodechandra Mookerjee | ... Dacca University. |
| 71. | " G. Hanumantharao | ... 263, Weaver's Lane, Mysore. |
| 72. | " Bhabataran Chakravarti | ... B. M. College, Barisal. |
| 73. | " P. M. Rambhadra Iyer | ... Melapavoor Pavor Chattram P.O.
(South India). |
| 74. | " P. P. S. Shastri | ... Supdt. of Sanskrit Schools and
Colleges, Madras. |
| 75. | " R. Ramanujachari | ... Sriminakshi College, Chidambaram. |
| 76. | " G. R. Malkani | ... Institute of Phil., Amalner. |
| 77. | " K. H. Kelkar | ... Deccan College, Poona. |
| 78. | " V. B. Shrikhande | ... Holkar College, Indore. |
| 79. | " Rajendranath Basu | ... Mayurmahal, Burdwan. |
| 80. | Prof. A. R. Wadia | ... Mysore University. |
| 81. | Mr. M. Hiryan | ... " " |
| 82. | Prof. Krishnachandra Bhatta-
charjee. | ... Bethune College, Calcutta. |
| 83. | Dr. P. G. Bridge | ... St. Paul's College, Calcutta. |
| 84. | Mr. Nagaraja Sarma | ... Presidency College, Madras. |
| 85. | " C. V. Swaminathan Iyer | ... Lalitalaya Mylapore, Madras. |
| 86. | " V. Subrahmanya Iyer | ... Mysore University. |
| 87. | " P. B. Adhicary | ... Hindu University, Benares. |
| 88. | Dr. S. N. Dasgupta | ... Presidency College, Calcutta. |
| 89. | Mr. P. N. Srinivasachary | ... Pachiappa's College, Madras. |

HIS EXCELLENCY'S OPENING ADDRESS

GENTLEMEN,

You have been good enough to invite me to open the first of what I hope may become annual meetings of the All-India Philosophical Congress and I thank you for the honour you have done me. I realize that you have invited me as Chancellor of the University under whose auspices it is held rather than for any personal qualifications. I would not like to say that I was not a Philosopher, but I must confess that I have never made a special study of philosophy. I am not more competent to address a conference of philosophers than a conference of engineers or of doctors or any other professional assembly. I speak only as a layman, but as such I can bid you all a very cordial welcome and express the hope that your deliberations may prove of value to yourselves as they certainly will be of interest to others.

A lady of my acquaintance used to keep a book in which she asked her friends to write down—not their favourite quotations, not their opinions of her hospitality, but their definitions of philosophy and metaphysics. It was not a popular request! This book revealed a very wide divergence in the conception of philosophy and that is why I suppose it amused her to keep it. One professor of my acquaintance has defined philosophy as "the science which investigates the nature of reality or the

problem of the universe"—another has called it "the account which the human mind gives to itself of the constitution of the world." I am not particularly interested in any definition of philosophy for such verbal feats can at best describe the methods of those who are seeking for truth in this particular way. What does interest me is not what others may think of philosophy, but what philosophers themselves conceive to be the goal of their studies. I asked a friend of mine the other day what he considered to be the ultimate goal or object of philosophy and he replied "the ennobling of the ideals of life." This definition left me unsatisfied. I want to be told,—is not this what we all want to know? What is the highest ideal of life, what is the goal of existence, what is the problem of the universe? These questions, I suppose, have been asked in every age and I marvel that we should still be left without a satisfying answer. May I suggest to you that the goal of all existence is the attainment of perfect happiness and, therefore, the object of philosophy should be to bring mankind to a true understanding of what happiness consists of and how it may be attained. Why is it, then, that the moralists in all lands and of all creeds have tried to frighten men into the belief that happiness is either a false or an unattainable ideal? So great apparently is the risk of confusing happiness with pleasure or mere physical well-being that suffering has come to be represented as a blessing and sacrifice has taken the place of service as the highest human ideal. Here it seems to me is an error from which mankind needs to be rescued and if philosophy can save us from it your labours, gentlemen, are, indeed, of vital interest to the whole world. Moralists have taught us to regard egoism and altruism, happiness and duty, as mutually antagonistic. They represent the world to us as a scene of warring interests and urge us to do battle for what *they* tell us is right in opposition to what *they* tell us is wrong. But the inherited instincts of the human race being in conflict with their standards mankind is still tortured by doubt and uncertainty as to the



nature of right and wrong. "We look abroad," writes Stevenson, "even on the face of our small earth and find them change with every climate, there is no country where some action is not honoured as a virtue and none where it is not branded for a vice. We look in our experience and find no vital congruity, but at the best a municipal fitness." The philosopher, who seeks for unity rather than for difference, whose attention is concentrated upon the oneness of all human thought and experience rather than upon the diversity of their varied expression, should prove a better guide. He should be able to teach us how to reconcile these apparent opposites. If perfect happiness is only to be found in the physical, mental and spiritual welfare of the individual, then the complete satisfaction of the ego should be the highest ideal to be aimed at. But as no happiness can be complete which involves the unhappiness of another or the neglect of a duty, then the service of others is the only road to complete happiness. Such service may involve sacrifice even of life itself, but the sacrifice is incidental to the pursuit of the ideal, not the ideal itself. The surrender of the unessential for the attainment of the essential can be made without bitterness only by the true philosopher. Perfect egoism and perfect altruism are then found to be one and the same thing,—no longer antagonistic, incompatible, but complementary, inter-dependent and inseparable. To our doctors, our engineers, our economists, our producers, we may turn for our physical well-being, but you, gentlemen, are those to whom we must turn for our mental and spiritual health. You belong to the class whom Emerson has described as most precious of all "who have nothing in their hands; who have not cultivated corn, nor made bread; who have not led out a colony nor invented a loom; who from the intellectual kingdom feed the thought and imagination with ideas and pictures which raise men out of the world of corn and money and console them for the shortcomings of the day and the meannesses of labour and traffic."

Stevenson, who I always maintain, borrowed most of his ideas from Emerson, has expressed the same idea in a still more beautiful passage. "There is one fable," he writes, "that touches very near the quick of life: the fable of the monk who passed into the wood, heard a bird break into song, hearkened for a trill or two and found himself on his return a stranger at his convent gates; for he had been absent 50 years and of all his comrades there remained but one to recognize him. All life that is not merely mechanical is spun out of two strands. Seeking for that bird and hearing him. And it is just this that makes life so hard to value, and the delight of each so incommunicable. And just a knowledge of this and a remembrance of those fortunate hours in which the bird has sung to us that fills us with such wonder when we turn the pages of the realist. There to be sure we find a picture of life in so far as it consists of mud and of old iron, cheap desires and cheap fears, that which we are ashamed to remember and that which we are careless whether we forget; but of the note of that time-devouring nightingale we hear no news. The true realism always and everywhere is that of the poets; to find out where joy resides and give it a voice far beyond singing."

If poets and philosophers have this in common that they are both seekers after joy and both help mankind to find it, you can imagine with what pleasure I learnt that you, who are the most eminent philosophers of India, had chosen the greatest living Indian poet to be the President of your Conference, one who has himself made such valuable contributions to the creative philosophical thought of India and who has, especially in his "Sādhana," indicated so beautifully and impressively some of its characteristic qualities.

In Europe, such conferences in philosophy have been frequently held. In England, the Mind Association has met annually since 1902. International Philosophical Congresses met in Paris, Geneva, Heidelberg and Bologna before the war and again since the war at Paris in 1921 and at Naples last



year when India was, for the first time, represented by Professor S. N. Das Gupta from Calcutta University. It is fitting that a similar conference should now be held in India which three-quarters of a century ago Cousin described as "the native land of the highest philosophy" and in regard to which Professor S. N. Das Gupta in his recently published work on Indian Philosophy makes with justification the more modest claim that "most of the problems still debated in modern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent form to the philosophers of India." It is not a new or borrowed idea, for in Indian villages and towns pundits have always been accustomed to meet and discuss problems of philosophy on the occasion of marriages and *sradhs*. Theirs is the old method familiar to us in the writings of Plato and illustrated over and over again in the life histories of the famous philosophers of India. The only novelty in the present gathering is that philosophers have assembled from all parts of India and they number among them representatives of various schools both in the East and in the West. It is, therefore, an International Conference in miniature. I see that you are hoping to make the Congress annual and that you propose to decide upon its constitution at this meeting. I sincerely hope that its permanence will be secured and that it will help to make the work of Indian philosophers better known throughout the world.

These conferences prove that in their search for the fundamental unity of life philosophers recognize the necessity for divergence of method and welcome the researches of all schools. Both the East and the West have contributions to make all the more valuable because owing to the nature of their geographical situation, their respective philosophical studies have developed on different lines. The civilization of the East and the civilization of the West grew up independently of one another, because there was no easy communication between the two until a comparatively late stage in history. Their independent growth and the different tendencies of their philosophy were the natural

outcome of this mutual isolation. Western civilization grew up around the shores of the Mediterranean where it was cut off from any direct influence from the ancient civilization of the East. It was largely the product of the fusion of Hebrew and Greek cultures in the early Christian Church and within the Roman Empire, and until comparatively recent times there was little inter-communication between East and West. Such historical contacts, as may be traced, were isolated and unsustained. Mutual influence was not continuous, and communication occurred only at long intervals so that the East developed on lines of its own and its thought may be regarded as an autonomous growth. It seems a mistake to minimise differences or to strain historical evidence so as to establish connections where none, or practically none, exists. Neither is it advisable that the philosopher should abandon his claim to universal citizenship and seek to establish the indebtedness of the East to the West or of the West to the East. Far better is it to say, with Professor Radhakrishnan that "the question of the affiliation of ideas is a useless pursuit" and that "Indian thought is an independent venture of the human mind." "It would," as the President of this Congress has so well said, "be an utter waste of opportunities if history were to repeat itself exactly in the same manner in every place. It is best for the commerce of the spirit that people differently situated should bring their different products into the market of humanity, each of which is complementary and necessary to the others."

In the West, which delights in definition, philosophy has been a study, in the East, which loves infinity, it is a practice. Professor Urquhart has distinguished between the Eastern and Western point of view by saying that "their conception of knowledge is different," that "the Indian mind leans to the intuitive, the Western mind to the discursive," that the former is naturally philosophical and the latter naturally scientific.



Philosophy and religion both investigate the nature of reality and, in the East, they are largely interconnected. Nowhere is the border-line between religion and philosophy—if there be a border-line—crossed more easily than in India. Reason and faith, or, rather religion and intuition, mingle with one another and religious aspiration becomes a penetration into the inmost secrets of Being. In the West, philosophy and religion have viewed the ultimate reality from different angles, and there has been too abrupt a division between philosophy as the sphere of reason, and religion as the sphere of faith, although nothing has been more striking in recent developments of thought in the West than the rapprochement between reason and faith. The intellectual atmosphere has been entirely changed. The scientific dogmatism of a Spencer is no longer possible. The philosopher seeks an alliance between reason and intuition and the theologian acknowledges the rationality of faith.

No department of human thought can be segregated from all others and made the subject of isolated research. Religion, philosophy, science, politics, are all inter-dependent. Though we ourselves may have no training in science, we are profoundly affected in our daily lives by the scientific researches of others. Though we may never have studied philosophy, the trained intellects of those who have, supply all unknown to us the foundations of our own spiritual happiness. In the modern world, therefore, no man can live solely for himself, his thoughts, his work, his actions belong also to the community in which he lives. You, gentlemen, represent the producers of philosophic thought—I represent the consumers, the beneficiaries of your labours. The man in the street whom you have roused from the lethargy of ignorance, whom you have taught to think for himself and of whose existence I am here to remind you demands with ever-increasing intensity that life shall be made rich for the many as well as for the few—that the changing experiences of everyday life should

embody enduring values, and that the solution of life's problems shall be found not by escape to another more perfect world, but by the attainment of greater happiness in this. The satisfaction of that demand, gentlemen, is as much within your power as that of Government. Mere material prosperity can never satisfy it and from politics and science material well-being only is to be derived. The world of action tends to diversity and antagonism. That of speculation to unity and synthesis. The men of commerce and industry, the financiers, the economists, the politicians, even the priests, may teach us the infinite variety of life which makes for strife. The efficiency which we may learn from them is but a preparation for conflict and leaves us the slaves of unsatisfied desire or rivals contending for success. It is to you, therefore, that we must turn for the knowledge that will purge our hearts of enmity, for the sympathy that will enable us to recognize ourselves in others, for the illumination that will reveal to us the presence of God in all creation, for the peace of mind in which alone true happiness is to be found.

I have now much pleasure in declaring this Conference open.

VICE-CHANCELLOR'S WELCOME ADDRESS

I am very glad to have an opportunity of saying on behalf of the University a few words of welcome to the delegates and members of the first Philosophical Congress and of echoing the greetings which have just fallen from the lips of His Excellency the Chancellor of the University.

The University of Calcutta deems itself fortunate indeed that the first Philosophical Congress has chosen this University as its meeting place and I hope that your labours may be profitable and the results of your discussions fruitful of good. I was a humble student of Philosophy many years ago at Oxford and I only regret that a life devoted to the study of the Law, which is a jealous and exacting mistress, has left me no leisure to pursue these studies in after-life. Since I became Vice-Chancellor I have been the fortunate recipient of many books on Indian Philosophy and I hope in the leisure which the advancing years will bring to have an opportunity of studying a branch of Philosophy with which I am but little acquainted.

At Oxford in the early nineties our pabulum was, so far as ancient philosophy is concerned, the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle or the Republic of Plato. We had some acquaintance with the doctrines of Bacon, Berkeley, Locke and Kant. John Stewart Mill we studied closely and I still remember with pleasure my studies in that delightful book, the Prolegomena to Ethics of Thomas Hill Green, but the vast storehouse of Indian Philosophy was then a closed book so far as the ordinary Oxford student was concerned.

It would be presumptuous on my part amidst a body of experts like yourselves to formulate for your consideration any philosophical problems or to detain you, from the serious fare which awaits your consumption. I should like however

to detain you for one moment more, by referring you to a recent Rectorial address delivered by the Prime Minister of England at Edinburgh University in which he speaks of Philosophy as the ultimate science, the science of sciences and in which he seems up the virtues and uses of Philosophy in these words :

“ Philosophy forces the student to examine the assumptions on which all the other sciences rest, the hypotheses by which they all work.

“ You ask not only How? but Why? You challenge all appearance ; You doubt science itself in your search for reality.

“ Magic, myth, ritual, religion ; the mysterious and emotional story of human belief ; the theological speculations of mankind ; the very instrument by which man knows anything at all—all are cross-examined as facts of experience, and an attempt is made to interpret them and fit them into some coherent explanation of our life and destiny. You cannot go any distance on this road without arriving at the distinction between true assertions and false ones, and you will not need to travel much farther before reaching the distinction between right and wrong.”

Dr. Tagore, I am glad to say, has agreed to preside over the Congress and we count surely indeed fortunate in having him in our midst this morning.

RABINDRANATH TAGORE'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

My timidity makes it difficult for me properly to enjoy the honour you have done me to-day by offering a chair which I cannot legitimately claim as my own. It has often made me wonder, since I had my invitation, whether it would suit my dignity to occupy such a precarious position on an ephemeral eminence, deservedly incurring anger from some and ridicule from others. While debating in my mind as to whether I should avoid this risk with the help of the doctor's certificate, it occurred to me that possibly my ignorance of philosophy was the best recommendation for this place in a philosophers' meeting,—that you wanted for your president a man who was blankly neutral and who consciously owed no allegiance to any particular system of metaphysics, being impartially innocent of them all. The most convenient thing about me is that the degree of my qualification is beyond the range of a comparative discussion,—it is so utterly negative. In my present situation, I may be compared to a candlestick that has none of the luminous qualities of a candle and, therefore, suitable for its allotted function, which is to remain darkly inactive.

But, unfortunately, you do not allow me to remain silent even in the circumstance when silence was declared to be prudent by one of our ancient sages. The only thing which encourages me to overcome my diffidence, and give expression in a speech to my unsophisticated mind, is the fact that in India all the *vidyās*,—poesy as well as philosophy,—live in a joint family. They never have the jealous sense of individualism maintaining the punitive regulations against trespass that seem to be so rife in the West.

Plato as a philosopher decreed the banishment of poets from his ideal Republic. But, in India, philosophy ever sought alliance

with poetry, because its mission was to occupy the people's life and not merely the learned seclusion of scholarship. Therefore, our tradition, though unsupported by historical evidence, has no hesitation in ascribing numerous verses to the great Shankarácharya, a metaphysician whom Plato would find it extremely difficult to exclude from his Utopia with the help of any inhospitable Immigration Law. Many of these poems may not have high poetical value, but no lover of literature ever blames the sage for infringement of propriety in condescending to manufacture verse.

According to our people, poetry naturally falls within the scope of a philosopher, when his reason is illumined into a vision. We have our great epic Mahábhárata, which is unique in world literature, not only because of the marvellous variety of human characters, great and small, discussed in its pages in all variety of psychological circumstances, but because of the ease with which it carries in its comprehensive capaciousness all kinds of speculation about ethics, politics and philosophy of life. Such an improvident generosity on the part of poesy, at the risk of exceeding its own proper limits of accommodation, has only been possible in India where a spirit of communism prevails in the different individual groups of literature. In fact, the Mahábhárata is a universe in itself in which various spheres of mind's creation find ample space for their complex dance-rhythm. It does not represent the idiosyncrasy of a particular poet but the normal mentality of the people who are willing to be led along the many branched path of a whole world of thoughts, held together in a gigantic orb of narrative surrounded by innumerable satellites of episodes.

The numerous saints that India successively produced during the Mahomedan rule have all been singers whose verses are aflame with the fire of imagination. Their religious emotion had its spring in the depth of a philosophy that deals with fundamental questions,—with the ultimate meaning of existence. That may not be remarkable in itself ; but when we find that these songs are not specially meant for some exclusive pundits' gathering, but that they are sung in villages and listened to by men and women who are illiterate, we realise how philosophy has permeated the life of the people in India, how it has sunk deep into the subconscious mind of the country.

In my childhood I once heard from a singer, who was a devout Hindu, the following song of Kabir :

पानीमें मीन पियासी रे,
मुकी रूत सुनत लगे हंसी रे ।
पूरन ब्रह्म सकल घट भरने, का मथुरा का काशी रे ॥

*When I hear of a fish in the water dying of thirst, it makes me laugh.
If it be true that the infinite Brahma pervades all space,
What is the meaning of the places of pilgrimage like Mathurá or Káshí?*

This laughter of Kabir did not hurt in the least the pious susceptibilities of the Hindu singer ; on the contrary, he was ready to join the poet with his own. For he, by the philosophical freedom of his mind, was fully aware that Mathurá or Káshí, as sites of God, did not have an absolute value of truth, though they had their symbolical importance. Therefore, while he himself was eager to make a pilgrimage to those places, he had no doubt in his mind that, if it were in his power directly to realise Brahma as an all-pervading reality, there would have been no necessity for him to visit any particular place for the quickening of his spiritual consciousness. He acknowledged the psychological necessity for such shrines, where generations of devotees have chosen to gather for the purpose of worship, in the same way as he felt the special efficacy for our mind of the time-honoured sacred texts made living by the voice of ages.

It is a village poet of East Bengal who in his songs preaches the philosophical doctrine that the universe has its reality in its relation to the Person. He sings :

मम आँखि रहने पयदा आसमान जमीन

The sky and the earth are born of mine own eyes.

शरीर करिलो पयदा शक्त आर गरम,
आर पयदा करियाहे ठाण्डा आर गरम ।
नाकि पयदा करियाहे खुशबोय बदबोय ।

*The hardness and softness, the cold and the heat
are the products of mine own body ;
The sweet smell and the bad are of mine own nose.*

This poet sings of the Eternal Person within him, coming out and appearing before his eyes just as the Vedic Rishi speaks of the Person, who is in him, dwelling also in the heart of the Sun.

रूप देखिलाम रे, नयने आपनार रूप देखिलाम रे ।
आमार माझत बाहिर हृदया देखा दिलो आमार ।

*I have seen the vision,
The vision of mine own revealing itself,
Coming out from within me.*

The significant fact about these philosophical poems is that they are of rude construction, written in a popular dialect and disclaimed by the academic literature ; they are sung to the people, as composed by one of them who is dead, but whose songs have not followed him. Yet these singers almost arrogantly disown their direct obligation to philosophy, and there is a story of one of our rural poets who, after some learned text of the Vaishnava philosophy of emotion was explained to him, composed a song containing the following lines :

फुलिर बने के टुकिछे रे सोनार जहरी,
निकछे घषये कमल, आ मरि मरि ।

*Alas, a jeweller has come into the flower garden !—
He wants to appraise the truth of a lotus by rubbing it
against his touchstone.*

The members of the *Bāūl* sect belong to that class of the people in Bengal who are not educated in the prevalent sense of

the word. I remember how troubled they were, when I asked some of them to write down for me a collection of their songs. When they *did* venture to attempt it, I found it almost impossible to decipher their writing—the spelling and lettering were so outrageously unconventional. Yet their spiritual practices are founded upon a mystic philosophy of the human body, abstrusely technical. These people roam about singing their songs, one of which I heard years ago from my roadside window, the first two lines remaining inscribed in my memory :

खाँचार मध्ये अचिन्त पाखो कम्ने आगे जाय ।
धरते पारले मनो-वेडि दितेन तारि पाय ॥

*Nobody can tell whence the bird unknown
Comes into the cage and goes out.
I would feign put round its feet the fetter of my mind,
Could I but capture it.*

This village poet evidently agrees with our sage of the Upanishad who says that our mind comes back baffled in its attempt to reach the Unknown Being ; and yet this poet like the ancient sage does not give up his adventure of the infinite, thus implying that there is a way to its realisation. It reminds me of Shelley's poem in which he sings of the mystical spirit of Beauty :

The awful shadow of some unseen Power
Floats, though unseen, among us ; visiting
This various world with as inconstant wing
As summer winds that creep from flower to flower.
Like moonbeams that behind some piny mountain shower,
It visits with inconstant glance
Each human heart and countenance.

That this Unknown is the profoundest reality, though difficult of comprehension, is equally admitted by the English poet as by the nameless village singer of Bengal in whose music vibrate the wing-beats of the unknown bird,—only Shelley's utterance is for

the cultured few, while the *Bául* song is for the tillers of the soil, for the simple folk of our village households, who are never bored by its mystic transcendentalism.

All this is owing to the wonderful system of mass education which has prevailed for ages in India, and which to-day is in danger of becoming extinct. We have our academic seats of learning where students flock round their famous teachers from distant parts of the country. These places are like lakes, full of deep but still water, which have to be approached through difficult paths. But the constant evaporation from them, forming clouds, is carried by the wind from field to field, across hills and dales and through all the different divisions of the land. Operas based upon legendary poems, recitations and story-telling by trained men, the lyrical wealth of the popular literature distributed far and wide by the agency of mendicant singers,—these are the clouds that help to irrigate the minds of the people with the ideas which in their original form belonged to difficult doctrines of metaphysics. Profound speculations contained in the systems of Sánkhyā, Vedānta and Yoga are transformed into the living harvest of the people's literature, brought to the door of those who can never have the leisure and training to pursue these thoughts to their fountain-head.

In order to enable a civilised community to carry on its complex functions, there must be a large number of men who have to take charge of its material needs, however onerous such task may be. Their vocation gives them no opportunity to cultivate their mind. Yet they form the vast multitude, compelled to turn themselves into unthinking machines of production, so that a few may have the time to think great thoughts, create immortal forms of art and to lead humanity to spiritual altitudes.

India has never neglected these social martyrs, but has tried to bring light into the grim obscurity of their life-long toil, and has always acknowledged its duty to supply them with mental and spiritual food in assimilable form through the medium of a variety of ceremonies. This process is not carried on by any specially organised association of public service, but by a spontaneous social adjustment which acts like circulation of blood in our bodily



system. Because of this, the work continues even when the original purpose ceases to exist.

Once when I was on a visit to a small Bengal village, mostly inhabited by Mahomedan cultivators, the villagers entertained me with an opera performance the literature of which belonged to an obsolete religious sect that had wide influence centuries ago. Though the religion itself is dead, its voice still continues preaching its philosophy to a people who in spite of their different culture are not tired of listening. It discussed according to its own doctrine the different elements, material and transcendental, that constitute human personality, comprehending the body, the self and the soul. Then came a dialogue during the course of which was related the incident of a person who wanted to make a journey to *Brindāban*, the Garden of Bliss, but was prevented by a watchman who startled him with an accusation of theft. The thieving was proved when it was shown that inside his clothes he was secretly trying to smuggle into the garden the *self*, passing it on as his own and not admitting that it is for his master. The culprit was caught with the incriminating bundle in his possession which barred for him his passage to the supreme goal. Under a tattered canopy held on bamboo poles and lighted by a few smoking kerosene lamps, the village crowd, occasionally interrupted by howls of jackals in the neighbouring paddy fields, attended with untired interest, till the small hours of the morning, the performance of a drama, that discussed the ultimate meaning of all things in a seemingly incongruous setting of dance, music and humorous dialogue.

These illustrations will show how naturally, in India, poetry and philosophy have walked hand in hand, only because the latter has claimed its right to guide men to the practical path of their life's fulfilment. What is that fulfilment? It is our freedom in truth, which has for its prayer :

Lead us from the unreal to Reality.

For *satyam* is *ānandam*, the real is joy.

From my vocation as an artist in verse, I have come to my own idea about the joy of the real. For to give us the taste of reality through freedom of mind is the nature of all arts. When

in relation to them we talk of æsthetics we must know that it is not about beauty in its ordinary meaning, but in that deeper meaning which a poet has expressed in his utterance : " Truth is beauty, beauty truth." An artist may paint a picture of a decrepit person not pleasant to look at, and yet we call it perfect when we become intensely conscious of its reality. The mind of the jealous woman in Browning's poem,* watching the preparation of poison and in imagination gloating over its possible effect upon her rival, is not beautiful ; but when it stands vividly real before our consciousness, through the unity of consistency in its idea and form, we have our enjoyment. The character of Karna, the great warrior of the Mahábhárata, gives us a deeper delight through its occasional outbursts of meanness, than it would if it were a model picture of unadulterated magnanimity. The very contradictions which hurt the completeness of a moral ideal have helped us to feel the reality of the character, and this gives us joy, not because it is pleasant in itself, but because it is definite in its creation.

• It is not wholly true that art has its value for us because in it we realise all that we fail to attain in our life ; but the fact is that the function of art is to bring us, with its creations, into immediate touch with reality. These need not resemble actual facts of our experience, and yet they do delight our heart because they are made true to us. In the world of art, our consciousness being freed from the tangle of self-interest, we gain an unobstructed vision of unity, the incarnation of the real which is a joy for ever.

As in the world of art, so in God's world, our soul waits for its freedom from the ego to reach that disinterested joy which is the source and goal of creation. It cries for its *mukti* into the unity of truth from the mirage of appearances endlessly pursued by the thirsty self. This idea of *mukti*, based upon metaphysics, has affected our life in India, touched the springs of our emotions, and supplications for it soar heavenward on the wings of poesy. We constantly hear men of scanty learning and simple faith singing in their prayer to Tára, the Goddess Redeemer :

तारा, कीन् अपराधे दीर्घं मेयादि संसार गारदे याकि वन् ?

For what sin should I be compelled to remain in this dungeon of the world of appearances ?



They are afraid of being alienated from the world of truth, afraid of their perpetual drifting amidst the froth and foam of things, of being tossed about by the tidal waves of pleasure and pain and never reaching the ultimate meaning of life. Of these men, one may be a carter driving his cart to market, another a fisherman plying his net. They may not be prompt with an intelligent answer, if questioned about the deeper import of the song they sing, but they have no doubt in their mind, that the abiding cause of all misery is not so much in the lack of life's furniture as in the obscurity of life's significance. It is a common topic with such to decry an undue emphasis upon *me* and *mine*, which falsifies the perspective of truth. For, have they not often seen men, who are not above their own level in social position or intellectual acquirement, going out to seek Truth, leaving everything that they have behind them ?

They know that the object of these adventurers is not betterment in worldly wealth and power,—it is *mukti*, freedom. They possibly know some poor fellow villager of their own craft, who remains in the world carrying on his daily vocation, and yet has the reputation of being emancipated in the heart of the Eternal. I myself have come across a fisherman singing with an inward absorption of mind, while fishing all day in the Ganges, who was pointed out to me by my boatmen, with awe, as a man of liberated spirit. He is out of reach of the conventional prices which are set upon men by society, and which classify them like toys arranged in the shop-windows according to the market standard of value.

When the figure of this fisherman comes to my mind, I cannot but think that their number is not small who with their lives sing the epic of the unfettered soul, but will never be known in history. These unsophisticated Indian peasants know that an Emperor is a decorated slave remaining chained to his Empire, that a millionaire is kept pilloried by his fate in the golden cage of his wealth, while this fisherman is free in the realm of light. When, groping in the dark, we stumble against objects, we cling to them believing them to be our only hope. When light comes we slacken our hold, finding them to be mere parts of the all to which we are related. The simple man of the village knows what freedom is—freedom from the isolation of self, from the isolation of things which



imparts a fierce intensity to our sense of possession. He knows that this freedom is not in the mere negation of bondage, in the bareness of belongings, but in some positive realisation which gives pure joy to our being, and he sings :

जि जन डुब्लो सखि तार की आँखे बाकि गो ?

To him who sinks into the deep, nothing remains unattained.

He sings :

मन रे आमार, मनेर साथे मिलिबि यदि, आय,
दुइ मनेते एक मन होये आनन्द-गहर च'ले जाइ ।

*Let my two minds meet and combine
And lead me to the City Wonderful.*

When the one mind of ours which wanders in search of things in the outer region of the varied, and the other which seeks the inward vision of unity, are no longer in conflict, they help us to realise the *ājab*, the *anirvachaniya*, the ineffable. The poet saint Kabir has also the same message when he sings :

By saying that Supreme Reality only dwells in the inner realm of spirit we shun the outer world of matter and also when we say that he is only in the outside we do not speak the truth.

According to these singers, truth is in unity and therefore freedom is in its realisation. The texts of our daily worship and meditation are for training our mind to overcome the barrier of separateness from the rest of existence and to realise *advaitam*, the Supreme Unity which is *anantam*, infinitude. It is philosophical wisdom having its universal radiation in the popular mind in India that inspires our prayer, our daily spiritual practices. It has its constant urging for us to go beyond the world of appearances in which facts as facts are alien to us, like the mere sounds of a foreign music ; it speaks to us of an emancipation in the inner truth of all things in which the endless *Many* reveals the *One*, as

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the multitude of notes, when we understand them, reveal to us the inner unity which is music.

But because this freedom is in truth itself and not in an appearance of it, no hurried path of success, forcibly cut out by the greed of result, can be a true path. And, an obscure village poet, unknown to the world of recognised respectability, untrammelled by the standardised learning of the Education Department, sings :

નિટુર ગરજી, તુઃ કિ માનસ-મુકુલ ભાજ્વિ આગુને ?

તુઃ ફુલ ફુટાવિ, વાસ કુટાવિ, સવુર વિહુને ?

દેખના આમાર પરમ ગુરુ સહિ

જે યુગયુગાને ફુટાય મુકુલ, તાઢા-હુઢા નાઢા ।

તોર લોભ પ્રચણ્ડ, તાઢા ભરસા દણ્ડ,

પર આહિ કોન્ ઉપાય ?

કય જે મદન શોન્ નિવેદન, દિસ્ને વેદન, સેઢ યોગુરુર મને,

સહજ ધારા આપન-હારા તારિ વાણી યને, રે ગરજી ।

O cruel man of urgent need, must you scorch with fire the mind which still is a bud ? You want to make the bud bloom into a flower and scatter its perfume without waiting ! Do you not see that my lord, the Supreme Teacher, takes ages to perfect the flower and never is in a fury of haste ? But because of your terrible greed you only rely on force, and what hope is there for you, O man of urgent need ? Prithce, says Madan the poet, Hurt not the mind of my Teacher. Lose thyself in the simple current, after hearing his voice, O man of urgent need.

This poet knows that there is no external means of taking freedom by the throat. It is the inward process of losing ourselves that leads us to it. Bondage in all its forms has its stronghold in the inner self and not in the outside world ; it is in the dimming of our consciousness, in the narrowing of our perspective, in the wrong valuation of things.

The proof of this we find in the modern civilization whose motive force has become a ceaseless urgency of need. Its freedom is only the apparent freedom of inertia which does not know how and where to stop. There are some primitive people who have put



an artificial value on human scalps and they develop an arithmetical fury which does not allow them to stop in the gathering of their trophies. They are driven by some cruel fate into an endless exaggeration which makes them ceaselessly run on an interminable path of addition. Such a freedom in their wild course of collection is the worst form of bondage. The cruel urgency of need is all the more aggravated in their case because of the lack of truth in its object. Similarly it should be realised that a mere addition to the rate of speed, to the paraphernalia of fat living and display of furniture, to the frightfulness of destructive armaments, only leads to an insensate orgy of a caricature of bigness. The links of bondage go on multiplying themselves, threatening to shackle the whole world with the chain forged by such unmeaning and unending urgency of need.

The idea of *mukti* in Christian theology is liberation from a punishment which we carry with our birth. In India it is from the dark enclosure of ignorance which causes the illusion of a self that seems final. But the enlightenment which frees us from this ignorance must not merely be negative. Freedom is not in an emptiness of its contents, it is in the harmony of communication through which we find no obstruction in realising our own being in the surrounding world. It is of this harmony, and not of a bare and barren isolation, that the Upanishad speaks, when it says that the truth no longer remains hidden in him who finds himself in the All.

Freedom in the material world has also the same meaning expressed in its own language. When nature's phenomena appeared to us as manifestations of an obscure and irrational caprice, we lived in an alien world never dreaming of our *swaraj* within its territory. With the discovery of the harmony of its working with that of our reason, we realise our unity with it and, therefore, freedom. It is *avidyá*, ignorance, which causes our disunion with our surroundings. It is *vidyá*, the knowledge of the Brahma manifested in the material universe that makes us realise *advaitam*, the spirit of unity in the world of matter.

Those who have been brought up in a misunderstanding of this world's process, not knowing that it is his by his right of intelligence, are trained as cowards by a hopeless faith in the ordi-



nance of a destiny darkly dealing its blows, offering no room for appeal: They submit without struggle when human rights are denied them, being accustomed to imagine themselves born as out-laws in a world constantly thrusting upon them incomprehensible surprises of accidents.

Also in the social or political field, the lack of freedom is based upon the spirit of alienation, on the imperfect realisation of *advaitam*. There our bondage is in the tortured link of union. One may imagine that an individual who succeeds in dissociating himself from his fellows attains real freedom, inasmuch as all ties of relationship imply obligation to others. But we know that, though it may sound paradoxical, it is true that in the human world only a perfect arrangement of interdependence gives rise to freedom. The most individualistic of human beings, who own no responsibility, are the savages who fail to attain their fulness of manifestation. They live immersed in obscurity, like an ill-lighted fire that cannot liberate itself from its envelope of smoke. Only those may attain their freedom from the segregation of an eclipsed life, who have the power to cultivate mutual understanding and co-operation. The history of the growth of freedom is the history of the perfection of human relationship.

The strongest barrier against freedom in all departments of life is the selfishness of individuals or groups. Civilisation, whose object is to afford humanity its greatest possible opportunity of complete manifestation, perishes when some selfish passion, in place of a moral ideal, is allowed to exploit its resources unopposed, for its own purposes. For the greed of acquisition and the living principle of creation are antagonistic to each other. Life has brought with it the first triumph of freedom in the world of the inert, because it is an inner expression and not merely an external fact, because it must always exceed the limits of its substance, never allowing its materials to clog its spirit, and yet ever keeping to the limits of its truth. Its accumulation must not suppress its harmony of growth, the harmony that unites the *in* and the *out*, the end and the means, the *what is* and the *what is to come*.

Life does not store up but assimilates; its spirit and its substance, its work and itself, are intimately united. When the non-living elements of our surroundings are stupendously dispropor-

tionate, when they are mechanical system and hoarded possessions, then the mutual discord between our life and our world ends in the defeat of the former. The gulf thus created by the receding stream of soul we try to replenish with a continuous shower of wealth which may have the power to fill but not the power to unite. Therefore the gap is dangerously concealed under the glittering quicksands of things which by their own accumulating weight cause a sudden subsidence, while we are in the depth of our sleep.

But the real tragedy does not lie in the destruction of our material security, it is in the obscuration of man himself in the human world. In his creative activities man makes his surroundings instinct with his own life and love. But in his utilitarian ambition he deforms and defiles it with the callous handling of his voracity. This world of man's manufacture with its discordant shrieks and mechanical movements, reacts upon his own nature, incessantly suggesting to him a scheme of universe which is an abstract system. In such a world there can be no question of *mukti*, because it is a solidly solitary fact, because the cage is all that we have, and no sky beyond it. In all appearance the world to us is a closed world, like a seed within its hard cover. But in the core of the seed there is the cry of Life for *mukti* even when the proof of its possibility is darkly silent. When some huge temptation tramples into stillness this living aspiration after *mukti*, then does civilisation die like a seed that has lost its urging for germination.

It is not altogether true that the ideal of *mukti* in India is based upon a philosophy of passivity. The Íshopanishad has strongly asserted that man must wish to live a hundred years and go on doing his work; for, according to it, the complete truth is in the harmony of the infinite and the finite, the passive ideal of perfection and the active process of its revealment; according to it, he who pursues the knowledge of the infinite as an absolute truth sinks even into a deeper darkness than he who pursues the cult of the finite as complete in itself. He who thinks that a mere aggregation of changing notes has the ultimate value of unchanging music, is no doubt foolish; but his foolishness is exceeded by that of one who thinks that true music is devoid of

all notes. But where is the reconciliation? Through what means does the music which is transcendental turn the facts of the detached notes into a vehicle of its expression? It is through the rhythm, the very limit of its composition. We reach the infinite through crossing the path that is definite. It is this that is meant in the following verse of the Īsha :

विद्याश्चाविद्याश्च यस्तदेदीमयं सह ।

अविद्याया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्यायाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥

He who knows the truth of the infinite and that of the finite both united together, crosses death by the help of avidyā, and by the help of vidyā reaches immortality.

The regulated life is the rhythm of the finite through whose very restrictions we pass to the immortal life. This *amrtam* the immortal life, is not a mere prolongation of physical existence, it is in the realisation of the perfect, it is in the well-proportioned beautiful definition of life which every moment surpasses its own limits and expresses the Eternal. In the very first verse of the Īsha, the injunction is given to us : *mā grdhaḥ* *Thou shalt not covet.* But why should we not? Because greed, having no limit, smothers the rhythm of life—the rhythm which is expressive of the limitless.

The modern civilisation is largely composed of *ātmahano janāḥ* who are spiritual suicides. It has lost its will for limiting its desires, for restraining its perpetual self-exaggeration. Because it has lost its philosophy of life, it loses its art of living. Like poetasters it mistakes skill for power and realism for reality. In the Middle Ages when Europe believed in the kingdom of heaven, she struggled to modulate her life's forces to effect their harmonious relation to this ideal, which always sent its call to her activities in the midst of the boisterous conflict of her passions. There was in this endeavour an ever present scheme of creation, something which was positive, which had the authority to say : *Thou shalt not covet, thou must find thy true limits.* To-day there is only a furious rage for raising numberless brick-kilns in place of buildings. The great scheme

of the master-builder has been smothered under the heaps of brick-dust. It proves the severance of *avidyá* from her union with *vidyá* giving rise to an unrhythmic power, ignoring all creative plan, igniting a flame that has heat but no light.

Creation is in rhythm,—the rhythm which is the border on which *vidyáncha avidyáncha*, the infinite and the finite, meet. We do not know how, from the indeterminate, the lotus flower finds its being. So long as it is merged in the vague it is nothing to us, and yet it must have been everywhere. Somehow from the vast it has been captured in a perfect rhythmical limit, forming an eddy in our consciousness, arousing within us a recognition of delight at the touch of the infinite which finitude gives. It is the limiting process which is the work of a creator, who finds his freedom through his restraints, the truth of the boundless through the reality of the bounds. The insatiable idolatry of material, that runs along an ever-lengthening line of extravagance, is inexpressive ; it belongs to those regions which are *andhena tama-sāvrtáh*, enveloped in darkness, which ever carry the load of their inarticulate bulk. The true prayer of man is for the Real not for the big, for the Light which is not in incendiarism but in illumination, for Immortality which is not in duration of time, but in the eternity of the perfect.

Only because we have closed our path to the inner world of *mukti*, has the outer world become terrible in its exactions. It is a slavery to continue to live in a sphere where things are, yet where their meaning is obstructed. It has become possible for men to say that existence is evil, only because in our blindness we have missed something in which our existence has its truth. If a bird tries to soar in the sky with only one of its wings, it is offended with the wind for buffeting it down to the dust. All broken truths are evil. They hurt because they suggest something which they do not offer. Death does not hurt us, but disease does, because disease constantly reminds us of health and yet withholds it from us. And life in a half world is evil, because it feigns finality when it is obviously incomplete, giving us the cup, but not the draught of life. All tragedies consist in truth remaining a fragment, its cycle not being completed.

Let me close with a *Báül* song, over a century old, in which

the poet sings of the eternal bond of union between the infinite and the finite soul, from which there can be no *mukti*, because it is an interrelation which makes truth complete, because love is ultimate, because absolute independence is the blackness of utter sterility. The idea in it is the same as we have in the Upanishad, that truth is neither in pure *vidyá* nor in *avidyá*, but in their union :

हृदय-कमल चलतेके फटे कतौ युग धरि,
ताते तुमि-ओ बांधा, आसि-ओ बांधा, उपाय को करि ।
फटे फटे कमल, फटार ना हय शेष ;
एइ कमलैर जे-एक मधु, रस जे ताय विशेष ।
केहे जेत लोभो भ्रमर पारो ना जे ताइ,
ताः तुमि-ओ बांधा आसि-ओ बांधा, मुक्ति कोथा-ओ नाइ ॥

It goes on blossoming for ages, the soul-lotus in which I am bound, as well as thou, without escape. There is no end to the opening of its petals, and the honey in it has such sweetness that thou like an enchanted bee canst never desert it, and therefore thou art bound, and I am, and mukti is nowhere.

RABINDRANATH TAGORE.

A POINT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND WESTERN SCIENCE

Allow me, first of all, worthiest representatives of Indian philosophical thought, allow me to convey a solemn salutation from a people to a people, from Italy to India. I fully realize the privilege of being able to attend this Congress that has gathered here almost all the deepest thinkers of this land, the traditional home of meditation. What other language in the world has got two words like *dhyāna* and *samādhi*, to evidence the pre-eminence of a people in its love for thinking and meditating? Your sages of yore deemed that not only they themselves were given to meditation, but that also earth, air, sky, water, and mountains meditate. I do not know any lyrical flight that can come near to that of the passage in the Chândogya-Upanishad telling us that "dhyâyatīva pṛthivī, dhyâyatīvāntarikṣam, dhyâyatīva dyaur, dhyâyantīvāpo, dhyâyantīva parvata.....atha ye prabhavo dhyānāpādāmçā ivaiva te bhavanti, dhyānam upāsva." I needs must respond to this call of the Chândogya-Upanishad by saying :

"Upāsya bhavanto 'ham khalu dhyānamupāse." I should feel extremely perplexed, I should hardly venture to speak on a subject of Indian philosophy among you, if I had not to state a simple fact that is likely to have escaped your attention and whereon I already anticipate you will fully agree. Our Western science lately, through the mouth of one of its most authoritative representatives, has proclaimed to the world a truth which on this sacred soil of India is almost two thousand years old.—

There are so many *little* truths that man is allowed to know, but the *great* truths are only very few. Unfortunately, these very *great* truths are not likely to assert themselves universally in all times, as they ought to be. Men, too often, lose sight of them, and they go, then, grovelling in the darkness. One of these great truths is that science has the external

world for its domain, which obeying to fixed laws is for ever precluded from the possibility of being the abode of any miracle. Every effect has got and must have got a cause. If we do not know this cause, we have to seek for it but never to think that we are in the presence of something transcendental or supernatural. The law of causality holds good in the whole range of nature, and the achievements of science conforming to this principle are such as to make ludicrous every objection, silly and vain every endeavour of resistance. On all the miracles cherished by ignorance and superstition, science with the excellence of her method, with the irresistibility of her reasonings founded on observation and experiment, has made havoc, spreading civilization and its unvaluable blessings throughout mankind.

But the blessings of civilization do not exhaust man's needs, I should say, man's noblest and imperious aspirations. In the domain of the law of causality there is no place for free will, for God, for soul. Where to find, then, the realm of metaphysics and religion? Is science to dominate alone and to brand as superstition every attempt at showing that this great world and man are more than a machine liable to be analyzed, decomposed in its parts, minutely described and accounted for, and, why not, set in motion one day or other? Is there in this Universe no impenetrable mystery, no miracle that announces the spirit of God? And if there is such a miracle, where to find it, that the all-important landmark between religion and science may be definitely and for ever traced, that, namely, the conflict between these two queens may be definitely and for ever avoided?

I think that in the history of philosophy no word has ever been uttered more important and epoch-making than the word *âtman* which we find for the first time in the hymn of the Atharvaveda x, 8, 44 :

"Akâmo dhîro amṛtaḥ svayambhâ rasend tîpto na kutaṣ-
canonaḥ tam eva vidvân na bibhâya mṛtyor âtmânam dhîram
ajaram yuvânam."

• “Knowing the *âtman* that is free from desire, that is steady, immortal, self-existent, satiated with sap, not wanting in anything, man needs no longer fear death, no, no longer, when he only does know the steady, unaging, young *âtman*.”

• While in Greece philosophers were vainly speaking of water, fire, atoms, as the starting point of the philosophical research, India revealed the great truth of *Atman* as being the one point in the whole range of Nature which can claim independence of the iron law of causality and which is the mystery that announces the spirit of God. The Self, indeed, is the knower; and the knower, logically, cannot know himself. • Every knowledge presupposes a duality. The notion of *âtman* implies unity of both subject and object, a transcendent unity which, however, is a tangible, positive fact.

To this truth India climbed only after many vain attempts at finding God, outside the Self, in this or that force or principle of Nature. *Âtman* is at the head of quite a retinue of Gods: Indra, Varuṇa, Agni, Soma, Prajâpati, Brâhmaṇaspati, Rohita, Anadvân, Vaçâ, Ucchiṣṭa, Kâla. Indian mind was altogether mature when it found out the real centre of metaphysics and religion, for it had gone through all possible religious experience: polytheism, kathenotheism, monotheism, pantheism; it had enthroned and dethroned many a god, many a principle.

I grant that before grasping the real value of the notion of *âtman*, I was at a loss to understand that it could be the favoured theme, the all-dominant note of the Upanishads. These appeared to me too uniform and monotonous, too much sticking to the one and exclusive idea of *âtman*. I was tempted to discover a kind of obsession in the repeated celebrations of *âtman*. And, indeed, the seers of the Upanishads are beset by this one idea. The reason is that they realize to be in possession of a great truth, the greatest, perhaps, that mankind can attain to. I, now, quite understand that “*etasya vâ akṣarasya praçâsane dyâvâprthivyan vidhṛte tiṣṭhata etasya vâ akṣarasya praçâsane nemiṣâ muhûrtâ ahorâtrâny ardhamaṣâ māsaḥ ṛtavaḥ*

samvatsarâ iti vidhrtâs tiṣṭanty etasys vâ akṣarasya praçāsane prâcyo 'nyâ nadyaḥ syandante çvetebhyaḥ parvatebhyaḥ prati-
cyo 'nyâ yâṃ yâñcd diçam anveti.....:tad va etad
akṣaram adrṣṭam draṣṭr açrutam çrotr amatam mantr avijñâ-
tam vijñâtr nânyad ato asti draṣṭr nânyadato ~~asti~~ çrotr nânyad
ato asti mantr nanyadato asti vijñâtr etasmin nu khalu akṣare
âkâça otaçca protaçca."

• While India remained more or less faithful to this spiritual treasure, the West was passing through many a religious and philosophical experience until now-a-days, after the triumph and the decay of evolutionist, materialistic, pragmatistic doctrines, science honestly acknowledges to be inadequate in the solving of the mystery of Self. .

• Two years ago Professor Max Planck, the celebrated physicist to whom the whole scientific world is ready to pay homage, delivered a lecture in Berlin on the law of causality and free will, a lecture that coming from such an authoritative scientist, has a decisive importance and is worthy of the attention of those of you who might still ignore it. At page 43 of the printed lecture we read •

"If blind hazard and miracle are to be excluded from science on principle, science is, therefore, more bound than ever to account for the belief in miracle. That this belief, since the remotest times, has had the broadest expansion among the whole of mankind, is a well-known fact that under numberless forms is repeating itself through all ages, and as such urgently claims a scientific, namely, causal explanation. Belief in miracle, we know, in the history of human civilization, represents a force of paramount importance ; it has proved largely beneficial ; it has kindled lofty hearts for the greatest heroical feats, though, on the other hand, it has also wrought infinite mischief, laid waste countries and sacrificed many an innocent, especially when it degenerated into fanaticism.

We should expect that scientific knowledge, gradually improving and more and more spreading among the civilized

peoples on earth, ought to have succeeded in setting a dam to the belief in miracle, a dam destined to grow and consolidate more and more as time goes on. On the contrary, it is just in our days, which boast so much of being advanced, that belief in miracle, under the most various forms, as for instance Occultism, Spiritualism, Theosophism and so on, is more and more asserting itself among cultured and uncultured people, in spite of the stubborn resistance opposed to it by men of science, while, on the other hand, the league of the monists, started several years ago with loud flourish, have had in comparison very scanty and meagre results in their endeavour of popularizing a cosmology founded on a purely scientific basis.

How are we to account for this strange fact? Is there not some valid element to be found at the bottom of this belief in miracle, in spite of the awkward and absurd shapes it chooses to assume? Are we to think that science is not allowed to say the last word on many an important question? In other words, have we to admit that there is a point which offers an unsurmountable barrier to the scientific mentality?

There is, in fact, a point, only one point in the vast and measureless world of Nature and Soul, which, not only practically, but also logically, remains and will always remain inaccessible to every science, to every endeavour of causal explanation: this point is our own Self. A poor point in the midst of the domain of the worlds, but after all, a whole world on its turn, the world that comprises all our feelings, wills, thoughts, the world that contains side by side to the deepest sorrow the loftiest joy, the world that is our own and which no power of fate can snatch from us until we ourselves give it up with our life."

The German Professor, as you see, speaks quite in the style of the Upanishads, and, without perhaps realizing it, points out where the agreement between the philosophy of the West and that of the East is to be found. We should



not ascribe so much weight to his words if these did not come from a physicist, a man, namely, altogether brought up in the atmosphere of scientific method.

The West, then, seems to have glanced, at last, at the real boundary between religion and science, and cannot but honestly acknowledge that India finds herself in advance as to the conquest of this truth of truths. The possibilities that are likely to derive from this point of agreement between East and West are infinite and cannot but be greeted as auspicious as the dawn is to the lark. What humanity chiefly needs is science on one hand, religion on the other, emancipation from the fetters of the ignorance of physical laws and emancipation of the Self. In order to attain to this last goal, you Indians, will show us the path.

CARLO FORMICHI

A SKETCH OF INDIAN MATERIALISM

It will seem strange enough that among the multiplicity of Indian philosophical schools and systems I have chosen as the subject of my paper the Çārvāka—or Lokāyatamata which as a particular school has disappeared long ago from India and which was so much looked down upon that according to brahmanical orthodoxy no sin could be compared with *nāstikya*.

Nevertheless it is necessary to pay attention to it because the study of it sheds a new light on this many-sided activity of Indian mind which had and has so many aspects and tendencies that there is perhaps no western thought that was not anticipated in India. We are proud of our absolute idealism which seems to us to be one of the greatest conquests of the European mind, because it veils the materialism and the practical mechanicism which constitute the real essence of our civilization.

Evidently it is ignored that Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were the greatest and unsurpassed forerunners of the same principles which Hegel started and our contemporary Italian school with Benedetto Croce, and Giovanni Gentile at its head has emphasized. On the contrary our colleagues of China and Japan are quite right when they assert that the East has its own idealistic philosophy which is far better than any other western system as it is born in their own country and harmonizes therefore with their spiritual exigencies, and when they consider as their text-book the Vijñaptimātrasiddhiçāstra of Vasubandhu. In fact, this book is one of the greatest monuments of Indian thought; and I hope that in a near future the collaboration of Chinese scholars and Indian Pandits will restore the Sanskrit Text which seems hopelessly lost.



But if it is difficult to find an European philosopher who rightly appreciates the value of Indian philosophy nobody would deny that the fundamental characteristic of Indian thought was an idealistic one.

In fact India is usually believed to have been the country of thinkers and yogins, Brahmins and ascetics, a country which plunged in the dreams of mysticism and abstraction denied life and any form of activity. Still now this is the more current opinion on India we have in Europe.

But they ignore that even according to the more orthodox Indian conception, life is considered the result of *kāma*, *artha* and *dharma*. As in individuals there is a time when *kāma* and *artha* predominate, so in the history of Indian civilization side by side to Upanishads and Buddhism we find Lokāyatas and Cārvākas, hedonists and politicians who were so outspoken in the defence of that *Wille zum Leben* which mysticism seemed to check, that perhaps we ourselves in the West cannot vie with them.

But India was not only a country of saints and hermits: she not only prayed and meditated but she had also her struggles and her history. Without men working in this life and for this life it is not possible that this eternal drama of which God only knows the end and the goal and which we call history can take place. Those who know only an ascetic India do not understand India, that India who is revealed by her poems, her dramas, her *nītis*. On the contrary you find that this home of idealism has produced the crudest form of hedonism and political science that we know, a political science compared with which the principles of Machiavelli or Hobbes would appear quite soft.

In my new book, *History of Indian Materialism*,¹ I think that I succeeded in giving a general idea of what Indian materialism was. But as this book is written in Italian, that is, in a language which is not yet largely known in India, I shall try to expose some of the results about the principal

materialistic schools I could gather from the philosophical literature I have perused.

It is well known that no Lokāyata text has come down to us ; therefore the principal tenets of the school can be restored only on the basis of the more or less detailed exposition of the Lokāyatomata that is to be found in the *pūrvapakṣa* of many Brahmanical or Buddhist philosophical works and in some quotations we can meet with in books on *Nyāya*. But from this to assume, as some scholars did, that Lokāyata texts never existed, means to go too far. I cannot give all the arguments which I have collected to refute this opinion without taxing your patience ; I only shall briefly expose some of the facts which, as it seems to me, clearly point out that Lokāyata texts were known in ancient times. A Lokāyata *Āstra* is quoted in Candrakīrti's commentary to *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, or rather to the *Prajñācāstra* as its original title seems to me to have been ; in Āryadeva's *Ācācāstra*, recently translated by me from the Chinese,² there is a quotation from the *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* ; according to the unknown author of the marginal notes to the apabhramṣa work, *Tisatthimāhāpurisa guṇālankāra* of Pupphadanta, the Purandara named in the text was a *Cārvākamate granthakartā*³ ; according to Kṛṣṇamiśra, *Cārvāka* was an ancient master of the school, to whom *Bṛhaspati* transmitted his doctrine. And in an ancient well known authority, namely, the *Vārtika* of Patañjali we find a *nāstika* master named Bhaguri expressly mentioned. Moreover, the tradition attributes to *Bṛhaspati* himself the first treatise of the system called after him *Bārhaspatya*, and I do not know why we should not accept it : of course, we cannot assume that the *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* edited by Prof. Thomas is the original book of the school in as much as it bears a clear Brahmanical character : but in spite of that you will find some quotations in it on the Lokāyata, which are likely to have been taken from an ancient but now lost compilation having a peculiar Lokāyata character. Certainly we cannot accept the tradition when we are told

that the author of this book was Bṛhaspati himself who according to the Maitrî up. (Ed. An. Aç. s.s. p. 466) Viṣṇupurâṇa (III, 17, 41), Matsyapurâṇa (47, 184,) conceived this devil doctrine in order to spread untruth and disbelief among the asuras; but what must chiefly interest us is only that Brahmanical authority also, that should have had some interest to free their heavenly representative from such a responsibility, did not object the authorship of the doctrine and the book to Bṛhaspati. How, moreover, can we explain the similarity in many a quotation from the Lokāyatamata which can be found in the most different texts? This similarity besides is not only to be met with in the recent philosophical literature but also in ancient texts, as for instance, between the tenets attributed to Ajita Kesakambalin in the Dighanikāya and the principal school of the Akiriyāvāda in the Jaina Sūyagadaṅga in which the commentator Ćilāṅka recognizes the Lokāyatika or Bārhaspatya.

But from which school did the first Lokāyata text issue? This is a question difficult to answer; because materialism is a general name under which we can collect many tendencies and systems, as the multiplicity itself of the names for materialist seems to point out: nāstika, Cārvāka, Lokāyata, Bārhaspatya, Svabhāvika, Bhūtavādin, Icchāntika. Without discussing here the etymology and the different meanings of all these names I shall point out that even if in later times they became almost synonymous we are not authorized to assume that the same thing happened in ancient times. But of course it is evident that there must have been a common store of general and fundamental principles which characterized these heretical schools and distinctly diversified them from the Brahmanical ones: so that owing to such a connection even among their own peculiarities they went under the general name of nāstika. But what did they deny? What was their nāstikya? To answer this question it is necessary to remember two things. First, that materialism means either a conception of the reality which

explains everything on the basis of mechanical laws and denies the existence of every transcendent being or in the usual vulgar sense, an epicurean manner of life which ignores every religious feeling and of which the goal is only to enjoy life. The theory of Viṣṇuabhadra in the Daṣakumāracarita (p. 193, Nirṇaya Sagara edn., Bombay 1898) can be considered a peculiar type of this kind of hedonistic conception. Secondly that Indian religious conception differs in some points from ours. Certainly, according to Brahmanical sources it was sufficient not to admit of the authority of the Vedas in order to be called a nāstika: these are the vedavādāpaviddha of Mahābhārata (XII, 2, 15), the Vedanindaka of Manu, (II, 11) the aṣṭadadhāna of Gītā (IV, 40)⁴

And according to orthodox theism or pantheism a nāstika can be also one who does not believe in any God. But even if to some strict Brahmans disbelief in Īṣvara seemed to be *nāstikya*, atheism is so often to be met with in India that it cannot be considered as the principal characteristic of the Lokāyatamata. Buddhism was atheistic—I do not speak of course of later mahāyāna Buddhism, and Buddhist literature is full of treatises aiming at refuting the Īṣvaravāda. I quote the *Īṣvarakartṛtvānirākṛtviṣṇorekakartṛtvānirākaraṇa* attributed to Nāgārjuna, the *Īṣvarabhūṅgakārikā* of Kalyāṇa Rakṣita, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Cāntideva (IX, 119-126). The Jainas followed their example and the refutation of God made by Mallisena Sūri in his *Syūdvādamāñjarī* can be well considered as a standard work of Indian atheism. It is quite useless for me to remind you that Sāṅkhya—although included among orthodox systems—was atheistic, at least in its ancient form. And that the same thing is to be said for Vaiṣeṣika was already pointed out by Faddegon and it is demonstrated by a very important treatise of Āryadeva on the nirvāṇa of heretics recently translated by me from the yet extant Chinese text. Mīmāṃsakas also did not believe in a personal God and they owed their epithet of ⁵ (*prāyeṇaiva hi loke mīmāṃsā*

lokāyatīkṛtā) Lokāyatika to the refutation of the personal God as we can see in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of *Çālikanātha*⁶ or in the *Çlokavārtika* of Kumārila.

Therefore the peculiar characteristic of the Lokāyata must be found elsewhere. They denied just what is the turning-point around which Indian philosophy, theology, theosophy, religion ever moved; they consequently opened a chasm between themselves and the other orthodox schools giving birth to this *nāstikya karmāṇam* already quoted in Manu (II, 65) and which is so characterized in some Buddhist texts: *n'atthi sukaṭa-dukkatāṇam kammāṇam phalaṇ viṇāko*.

This is the central idea of Indian materialism and the principle of many important consequences. If there is no *karman* there is no *ātman*, there is no *paraloka*. King Prasena-jit who is a supporter of the natthikadiṭṭhi, in the *Dīghanikāya*, tries to defend his thesis that there is no *ātman*, and that our *ātman* is only our body.

The analogies which the *Payāsisuttanta* shows to have with the Jaina *Rāyapaseṇiya* and some passages of *Samaraicchakaha*⁷ cannot be explained as mutual borrowings but rather as various derivations from real doctrines followed in ancient times.⁸

But as a consequence of this rejection of every transcendence and of the coming back to the enjoyment of life a tendency began in India which we can call a realistic one.

The conception of *saṃsāra* had contributed to give a colour of pessimism to the Indian vision of life; our aim is not to be attained in this life but in a higher world: not *loka* but *nirvāṇa* is to be sought for.

The Lokāyatikas represent a reaction to this thought as they teach that what can be perceived *pratyakṣeṇa* only exists, direct experience is the only *pramāṇa* for men: what we cannot see is mere fancy: so that one may be induced to consider them as the forerunners of scientific research: and it is what Mr. Rhys Davids⁹ and Prof. Franke¹⁰ did, as they believed

that the Lokāyatamata, to be met with in Buddhist texts, was a doctrine specially aiming at studying the nature and the laws of nature. But I cannot accept their opinion. Loka never had in Sanskrit the meaning of nature for which it is used *pradhāna*, or *prakṛti* or *svabhāva*; so that Buddhist texts, when discussing cosmological questions, in order to avoid misunderstanding, are obliged to prefix to *loka* the word *bhājana*, when they conceive the cosmos as a material thing: while *loka* in itself has rather the meaning of human world or class of beings, *lokayātrā*, *lokokti*, *lokavāda*, *devaloka*. Therefore the interpretation we have to give to the name Lokāyata is quite different. It is but a science which has for its only object the *loka*, that is this world; and this interpretation is quite in accordance with the Chinese translation of the word by Shun she or Shun su: "those who follow the world or the customs of the world." Therefore this Lokāyata which has for its aim the *lokayātrā* is the forerunner of *nīti* and *arthaśāstra* that is of a science which was attributed by brahmanical sources, also to Bṛhaspati from whom Lokāyata is called Bārhaspatya as well as *Bārhaspatyamata* had the meaning of *nīti*; in his translation of Lalitavistara Devākara in order to render the name of the *Bārhaspatymata* included in the list of sciences known by the Young Bodhisattva, uses the Chinese expression: *wang lung* that is the doctrine of the king; *Khattavijjā* Kṣatradidyā according to which *attano attho kametabbo*¹¹ as Lokāyata teaches that *arthakāmau* are *puruṣārthau*. Āryaṣūra¹² and the Milindapañha¹³ include this science among the philosophical systems as before the Kauṭilyārthaśāstra had quoted the Lokāyata along with Sāṅkhya and Yoga.¹⁴

At its very beginnings this doctrine represented the science of the *purohita* who on earth assisted his King as in heaven Bṛhaspati assisted Indra: *artha* and *dharma* for a certain period followed the same way. So that we find the Lokāyata included in the list of the sciences studied by Brahmans in the stereotyped formulas of the Pali or Sanskrit Buddhist

texts: and according to the Vinayapitaka there were also some Buddhist monks who endeavoured to study it were it not that Buddha prevented them.¹⁵ But political intrigues and religious purity cannot go together and in fact signs of a real contrast between artha and dharma can be traced back to the times of Yājñavalkya¹⁶ and of Nārada.¹⁷ Vijñāneśvara, quoting Bṛhaspati, distinguishes the *Lokajña* from the *Dharmajña*.¹⁸ In course of time among the masters of this political science there were some who refused to acknowledge any authority to dharma and proclaimed that in this world of men, God and priests had not interfere: Trayī samvaraṇamātram. As it happens in such a case the reaction of the *artha* against the *dharma* went further on: *artha* not only broke up any relation with dharma but rose against it. From this time we have therefore two artha schools: The orthodox one which remained under the authority of dharma and generally included in the dharmaśāstra; the other following its heretical principles until the end asserted artha and kāma to be the only goal of humanity (*arthakāmau puruṣā rthau*), *daṇḍanīti* and *vārttā*, the only science, simply denied God and *karman*, and assumed more and more a materialistic hedonistic character, splitting by and by in a number of schools and sects.

But India was a country where everything had to be demonstrated: it was not sufficient to assert a principle but it was necessary to defend it with logical arguments against the attacks of the opponents. Two specially were the things to be demonstrated.

(1) That no *karman* exists.

(2) That *pratyakṣa* is the only means of knowledge.

As to the first point this assumption offended the well known principle *karmanā sarvam idaṃ tataṃ* generally admitted, and to which orthodox schools found good support in the *vaicitrya* which can be seen in the world. The Lokāyata sought to escape this difficulty raised by their opponents appealing to the

Svabhāva theory which, evolved from the same principles that brought about the formulation of Sāṅkhya, is sufficiently attested in the epics, and which can be traced back to the aupaniśadic times: Makkhālī Gogāla and Purāṇa Kassapa were strictly related to it. This Svabhāvavāda, although having with the Lokāyatamata only one, but the most important point in common, that is the negation of karma theory, had striking analogies to the fatalistic schools of Kālavāda or pariṇāmavāda in as much as it maintained that everything which happens on earth is only the effect of the various combinations of the material elements: human effort is useless: not enjoyment therefore of life, but the accomplishment by destiny of its own ends. The Lokāyata accepted this theory; it is not necessary to assume karman in order to explain the *vaicitrya*: everything happens svabhāvena, according to the various combination of the four elements which constitute the body of every being. As to second point, that is that which is demonstrated *pratyakṣeṇa* only exists, they had to have recourse to every logical subtleties to support it.

Logical works from general expositions of Indian philosophical schools like the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, or the Saḍdarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra with the commentary of Guṇaratna, to all special treatises on Nyāya are pregnant with arguments aiming at refuting their assumption and which are of the greatest interest to the history of Indian logic as concerning particularly the syllogism and the theory of *vyāpti*.

So by and by ancient lokāyata lost its original character; it was no more a *nīti* like we presume it was at its very beginnings but became a *hetuvidyā*, a *tarkavidyā* full of logical subtleties. The *dhūrta* *Ārvāka* became a *suṣikṣita* *Ārvāka*. Those who did not recognize any value to *pramāṇas* other than *pratyakṣa* were obliged, as justly the Bhāmatī (III, III, 54), the Nyāyatātparyadīpikā (p. 88), the Nyāyakandalī (p. 259) and other nyāya works remark, to have recourse everywhere to inference.

Later on the Lokāyata seems to have disappeared ; but its doctrines still remained occasionally accepted by disbelievers or materialists who always exist in every country, even in a country which can be called the fatherland of idealism.

If later gāstrakāras on nyāya begin their treatises with the reputation of the Ćārvākamata even if this as a school was really dead, this is owed only to a traditional custom.

G. TUCCI

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(1) *Linee di una storia del materialismo indiano*, in memorie della R. Accademia dei Lincei, Ser. V, Vol. XVII, fasc. VII, 1924 (Part 1).

(2) *Studie materiali di storia delle religioni*, 1925 fase I-II, p. 76.

(3) *Bhavisayattakahā*, ed. by C. D. Dalal (Gaekwad's Or series. XX), p. 42.

(4) According to Ćaṅkara the agraddadhāna are those who believe that for mokṣa sacrificial karman only is sufficient.

(5) Ćlokavārtika 1, 10.

(6) Pp. 137-140 (Chow. S. S.)

(7) Pp. 113-117 (*ibid*).

(8) Pp. 170 ff.

(9) A later refutation of ātman is contained in the commentary of Guṇaratna to the *Ṣaḍdarṣanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra. (Bibl. Ind., pp. 139 ff.

(10) *Dialogues of Buddha*, I, p. 168.

(11) *Dīghanikāya in Auswahl übersetzt*, Göttingen, 1913, p. 19, n. 3.

(12) *Jātaka*, V. 228.

(13) *Mahābodhijātaka*, 20, 21.

(14) P. 3 (S. B. E. I, p. 6).

(15) One might object that in this book Lokāyata is not the Bārhaspatya because Bṛhaspati along with Uṇas is

quoted before as one of the masters of the artha-school which seems therefore to be quite distinct from the Lokāyata. But it must be observed that here we have to do more with methods than with systems. In fact interference between philosophy and other sciences is ascertained in the same chapter when Kauṭilya says that *ānvīkṣikī* is the best guide in every discipline, in *vārttā* as well as in *daṇḍanīti*, and *ānvīkṣikī* according to Vātsyāyana had two aspects. It is not only an *ātmavidyā*, but also a *hetuvidyā*.

(16) Cullavagga V, 33, 2.

(17) II, 21.

(18) E. 39.

(19) To Yājñ. II, 2.

SANKARA'S DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ

(Sankara's doctrine of *Māyā* is the logical pendant to his doctrine of *Brahman* as the undifferentenced self-shining truth. Both *māyā* and *Brahman* are taken to be incapable of being established by reason, by any natural *pramāṇa*. They are believed to be scripturally revealed, though they are claimed as intelligible contents of pure consciousness. (They are in fact to be accepted in faith and only interpreted by thought.) For purposes of philosophy, we may generally substitute in place of faith in scriptures, spiritual experience and in this connexion the feeling of the vanity of life and the demand for absolute certitude. (The doctrine of *māyā* and *Brahman* may be regarded as the conceptual formulation of this feeling and demand.) The value or validity of the experience, feeling or faith is not to be questioned within philosophy which should start with it and seek only to interpret it. The present paper confines itself to the enquiry how far the interpreting concepts are intelligible and at what precise point, if at all, logical thought can make room for the faith in the illusoriness of things other than *Brahman*.

Is the theory of the illusoriness of the world the necessary formulation of the feeling of the vanity of life? The feeling implies the evanescence of value from the objects that interest us. Does the lapse of value mean lapse of reality? If the value of an object lapses to our consciousness, the given form of the object, it may be said, need not disappear or change into some other form. Even if the given form changes, the formless given-ness of the object may be said to persist, for the new form is not felt to be separately given. It may be supposed that the given form is turned with the lapse of value into a mere subjective idea but then the reality of the idea has

to be admitted as given. Or it may be that the form is realised to be not a given idea but only the subjective activity of forming or constructing it; but even this free activity is given as the presented process of the becoming or defining out of the idea. The lapse of value does not mean the lapse of all given-ness: some given reality has apparently to be admitted, whether objective or subjective, determinate or indeterminate. The acosmism of Sankara goes beyond both realism and idealism by reducing the world to absolute illusion, by interpreting the vanity of life as implying the denial of all given reality. Is such absolute denial of given-ness, with the correlated notion of truth as utterly ungiven, *i.e.*, as self-luminous (*svayamprabhā*) intelligible?

(The denial or the illusoriness of the given would be inconceivable but for the fact that the illusory itself is given or experienced as such.) Were it not for the experience of *prātibhāsika* or illusory being, the possible unreality of the *vyavahārika* or empirically real world—the elimination of its given-ness—would be utterly unintelligible. The presentation of an object as illusory is, as will appear presently, fundamentally different from the presentation of a fact, objective or subjective. The difference between the given-ness of the illusory as illusory and that of fact, objective or subjective can only be expressed as a difference in the felt quality of reality, the former being less real than the latter. The quality of reality is explicitly felt only when it is experienced as dissipated in an illusion. The experience of illusion thus marks an actual step towards the elimination of given-ness and is as such a unique datum for epistemology.

(The metaphysical doctrine of *māyā* is best approached through the epistemology of illusion. We may analyse the stock Vedantic example of illusion—mistaking a rope for a snake—in three stages. The snake is first presented, it is next corrected, and then it is contemplated as corrected. It

is in the first place presented and believed as real, though it is not affirmed or judged as real, its reality being only not denied. The belief is next corrected by the perception of the rope as rope. The correction has to be accepted as an ultimate fact of consciousness : it is not yet a negative *judgment*. The rope is indeed affirmed or judged to be real but the snake remains a presentation though invested with a new immediate quality of unreality. The affirmation of the rope and the peculiar presentation of the snake presuppose each other. The affirmative judgment need not presuppose a negative judgment ; it presupposes only the presentation of immediate unreality.) Illusion or the corrected and degraded percept is at least one form, if not the sole form, of the presentation of unreality. In the present example the rope is affirmed as real in explicit contrast with the illusory snake ; and the first percept of the snake is degraded into an illusion in reference to the affirmation of the rope. The affirmative judgment and the illusion emerge together—as fact and not by any thinking necessity—as mutually implicated. Mutual implication is but a name for confusion which however in this stage is not realised as such. The attitude is still objective and the cognition does not appear as confusedly dual because the objective content that is known—*viz.*, 'rope, not snake'—is a related unity. The relation, it may be noted, is unique : (the unreal implies the real but the real does not imply nor is it in any way affected by the unreal.) The rope is a complete content which does not require to reject the content snake and is neither the better nor the worse for having rejected. The snake however in the context is there *as* rejected or corrected by the other content, as illusory in its presence. The real has the unreal here as its free implication.

(In the second stage we are directly concerned only with this objective content. The rope is affirmed as real and the snake though presented as unreal is still regarded as objective. Though corrected, the snake is neither forgotten nor presented

as a mere subjective fact: it persists as an objectively presented no-fact.) It is still a possible object and the past perception of it as a subjective fact is not yet questioned. The unreal object however here is a subordinate or implied element in the known content, the real object being the principal element. (In the third stage the unreal is made the principal element, the direct object of contemplation.) The snake is known not only as non-existent now but as non-existent even when it appeared to be perceived.) It is not now felt to be remembered and that means a doubt even about the past perception of it as a subjective fact. As now felt to be neither perceived nor remembered, is it a possible object at all? Snake no doubt is a possible object but that snake appearing at the previous moment to the particular observer is no possible object, as it never existed, does not exist and will not exist: existence is denied of it absolutely. The judgment in fact—'it does not exist' is inadmissible: its subject *it* lacks existential import, standing as it does now for what was only apparently existent. The absolute denial of existence annuls the starting subject altogether and no judgment about the snake appears to be left over. The unreal snake which was still an object in the second stage now turns out to be no possible object at all. Not that however it is known now as a mere subjective image: it is known as what appeared to be perceived. (The qualitative difference between what is perceived and what is imagined does not disappear even when the former is known to be perceived wrongly.)

But it is still believed that the wrong perception of the previous moment was a real subjective fact? If it was a fact it must be vouched for by memory which however only tells us here that the snake was felt to be perceived, not that it *was* perceived. The past perception is known as a fact, only if its object is now felt to be remembered. The snake is not so felt and so the facthood of the past perception is at least not known. The facthood is not denied when the snake is taken

to be an unreal *object* in the second stage. But now that its objectivity itself is called in question, the facthood of its perception becomes open to doubt. That is why memory testifies apologetically that it was only felt to be perceived. (It means on the one hand that it is not felt to have been merely imagined and on the other that the facthood of the perception cannot be affirmed with certainty.) Thus the objectivity of the unreal snake, as persisting in the second stage, is now reduced to what is determinate neither as objective nor as subjective, to bare given-ness.

In the third stage then the implied unreal object of the second stage turns out to be no possible object at all, to be incapable of being presented as the subject of a judgment of which existence can be denied. (While existence is denied of the starting subject absolutely, non-existence is not now predicable of it, for no possible object remains.) The snake now is referred to not by a negative judgment but by a self-contradictory judgment which is no judgment. The judgment 'that snake is unreal'—the implication of the cognition 'rope, not snake'—is now realised to be a contradiction. The contradiction however is still felt to be given, unlike a contradiction like square circle which is but a verbal or thinking sport. (All contradiction is in a sense given: the failure to think is not thought but only felt. The illusion—that unreal snake—which is a contradiction in the sense of being indescribable either as existent or as non-existent (*sat-asat-vilakshana*) is given in a deeper sense.) Square circle is sought to be only imagined, not known and the feeling of the failure tells us that it is absolute nought (*tuchchha*). But 'that unreal snake' is sought to be known, being felt to be perceived in the first instance. The problem of thinking is itself given or forced upon us and it is given as insoluble in the feeling of the failure to think. (That snake then, shorn of its reality in the second stage and now of its bare objectivity also, is still given to us as a positive (*bhāva-rupa*))

unthinkable (*anirvāchya*): it cannot yet be rejected as absolute nought.)

(There is a difference between the contradiction between existent and non-existent and that between 'not existent' and 'not non-existent.' The unreal object of the second stage might be taken as at once existent and non-existent but the 'indescribable' of the third stage is what is neither existent nor non-existent.) Strictly speaking, the latter is no contradiction at all: 'the concepts 'not existent' and 'not non-existent' do not get related at all to contradict one another, being predicable of no assignable subject. At the same time they have been brought together not arbitrarily or accidentally, but under the constraint of a given presentation. They are not indeed thinkingly related but are *given* as related in the way of contradiction. As given, the relation may be regarded as a symbolism for thought-contradiction, as a problem or demand to realise the given-ness as false. The 'indescribable' should be nought but is still given in absolute mockery of thought. It marks in a sense the frontier between thought and faith, being the given limit of thought on the one hand and the promise of the annulment of given-ness on the other.)

* * * *

(The snake in the three stages of illusion is given respectively as implicitly real object, as unreal object and as the indescribable. The last stage may be regarded as leading to the realisation of absolute nought which is not given at all; and each of the first two stages may be viewed as leading to the next stage. We may thus speak of three processes in illusion as presented to uncritical thought, critical thought and faith respectively. (They would roughly correspond to the three views of *māyā*—viz., as concrete (*vāstavi*), as unthinkable (*anirvachaniya*) and as nought (*tuchchha*).)

The first process in illusion is the reduction of an implicitly real object to appearance. The reduction cannot be regarded as merely subjective process. If the magic transformation of

the presented snake into an appearance to a particular mind could be taken as an objective process, it would mean the opening up of a new dimension of becoming in which objects come to acquire or lose reality. The hard reality of a world once and for all given would give place to a perpetual swing between dream and waking manifestation. The world would be intelligible as a system of appearances materialising and dematerialising to individual spirits, as a play of cosmic imagination or *lila*. The emergence of the new in causality would be understood as the emanation or *vivarta* of an appearance from the timeless cause, the law of causality would be a law of appearances—the effect-appearance being as real as the causal appearance and so a *parināma* of it, and causal power would be a name for cosmic magic. Thus the first process in illusion renders intelligible the pictorial conception of *vāstavi māyā*, the inexplicable world-process creatively turning up the unanticipable (*aghaṭana-ghaṭana-paṭiyasi*)—an analogue of the Bergsonian real time.

✓ The second process in illusion, viz., the reduction of objective appearance to the given unthinkable, furnishes the clue to the conception of *māyā* as unthinkable free power, the freedom to put forth and retract objective appearance. It is because we thinkingly reduce objective appearance to the given un-objective or unthinkable that we can conceive or intellectually apprehend freedom—freedom of willing, for example, which is a process from the un-objective to the objective—as real. *Māyā* as the *anirvachanīya* power of the Lord means His absolute freedom, freedom to create or put forth as also to destroy or retract objectivity. It is the freedom of retraction that we first understand through the analogy of the dissipation of objectivity in an illusion. Creative freedom is intelligible as the reversed process of the retractive freedom. The common conception of creative freedom without destroying freedom, of the Lord being able to put forth will but not to retract it is not the conception of absolute freedom.

✓ (The third process in illusion is the reduction in faith of the given unthinkable to absolute nought, the elimination of the indescribable given-ness. The corresponding cosmic conception would be that of *Tuchchhā māyā* which the Vedantist would accept as revealed or presented in faith. The conception of *māyā* as absolute nought is necessary for the vigorous monism of the Sankarite school.) The monism implies not merely that the world is an appearance and that this appearance is retractable but also that the retraction itself is unreal, is not even real as the free nature of *Brahman*. *Brahman* is not like *Īśvara* detached from or free in respect of a *māyā* that is present to him but has not *māyā* before him at all. He not only need not exercise free power : power is not real to him. *Brahman* is the truth and is not merely real. Neither the real nor the true as content requires to deny the opposite to be itself ; but while the *knowledge* of the real as such depends on the correction of the unreal, the knowledge of the true as such is not dependent on the correction of the false. The knowledge of the falsity of the world is no necessary element of the knowledge of *Brahman*. The knowledge of *Brahman* is no mediate affirmation but an intuition which is not a result that is reached but is felt when it comes to have been eternally there. That means that the ignorance of *Brahman* was itself unreal, to the last vestige of which the correction of the world as false and its cosmic obverse, the retraction of free power appeared real. (The conception of eternal truth implies the falsity or *tuchchātva* of given cosmic unreality, the *mithyatva*, of given *mithyatva*, not only rejection of the world as unreal but absence of any reference to it by way of rejection.) Such a conception is possible only through a consideration of what we have taken as the third process in illusion.

We have shown so far how the consciousness of illusion renders the conception of *māyā* intelligible. (Our experience

of illusion—as about the snake—supplies in its different stages not only *an* analogy but the only analogy for the conception of cosmic *māyā* as magic, as freedom and as nought. It remains however to show definitely where the transition is effected from a particular illusion to cosmic *māyā* and how the faith in the latter fits in with logical thought. For this, a farther analysis is required of the consciousness of illusion in the stage where the given unthinkable appears to faith as absolute nought.

What is neither *sat* nor *asat* should be a chimera but persists as given in the illusion. It is instructive to ask what this persistence implies and whether and how it can be got rid of. It was pointed out that when the objective appearance of the snake is known to be not objective at all, to be beyond affirmation and denial, the subjective facthood of the past perception of it itself becomes doubtful. The snake is not felt to be remembered, *i.e.*, to have been perceived. At the same time it is not felt to be merely imagined but as given, though not to present perception or memory. It is given as an unreal but not as being subjectively constructed nor as what had but has lost reality. Though not objective, it is referred to a real point in the objective world as where it is *not*. It is not only contradictory but nonsensical to say that the square circle is or is not there; and yet we have such unthinkable nonsense actually presented in the illusion—‘the unreal un-objective snake *there*.’ The illusion has no longer to be logically or objectively corrected, that correction being finished: there is demand only for the correction of the hidden subjective defect through which it is still given. The nonsensical here is presented not through the mere caprice of a verbal combination as in the case of square circle but through a deeper subjective distemper. To say that the snake is nought though not felt as such is to express a faith and a demand for its realisation by a cure of this distemper.

If the snake is not **even** an apparent object, it should be known as what was not perceived. It is not actually so known:

we cannot get rid of the belief that it was perceived, though as it is not felt to be remembered, it is not known to have been perceived. (To faith there was no perception of it, to reason the past perception is unproved while to immediate belief it is a fact.) There is belief now in the past perception as a subjective fact without the object of it being felt to be remembered, *i.e.*, without a belief through memory in the snake having been perceived. It means then that the past appears to be now directly perceived, that the snake, as past *percept* and not as a past objective fact, is presented to consciousness without an empirical psychosis or *vritti*. To say however that the snake is now presented as a past percept is not to admit that it is consciously presented as a real subjective fact. A percept is never like an image distinguished actually as subjective from the object perceived, being so distinguished only in name. In the case of an illusion indeed, it is actually distinguished but not as an assured subjective fact. The pastness of the percept does not mean that it was present, *i.e.* was a fact having a position in the objective time-order. Pastness here is but a *quality* of the percept, a name for the presented unreality of the subjective fact, which as timeless is presented to a timeless consciousness, is *sākshi-bhasya*—‘lighted up by pure consciousness.’

We may say then that the snake as a given unthinkable is but a percept presented as an unreal subjective fact to an eternal consciousness. A subjective fact is but the subject with an empirical *vritti*, not the *vritti* with the form of the subject. It is the subjective act of identifying with the *vritti*, not the presentation of the subject as objectified in it. A subjective illusion is an ethically (or spiritually) wrong act rather than a logically false cognition: it is the subject wrongly working through the *vritti*, not knowing the *vritti* but knowing the object through the wrong act of identifying with the *vritti*. The identifying is a pure act of the self, the heart of will and is implied in all knowing short of the ecstatic intuition of the self. Now it is only as a

subjective illusion is corrected that it is known as such, that the identifying act is known, that the distinction of pure consciousness from the empirical *vritti* and the unreality of this *vritti* are suspected. That suspicion of the distinction is already a distinguishing or self-freeing act of the subject; it is only by *being* free that the subject *knows* its freedom, detachment or distinction.

To suspect however the distinction of the subject from the *vritti* is not to get rid of it altogether. It is to be free in a measure and yet to be identified. A contradiction like this is real to the spiritual will but not to thought, being intelligible only as a subjective act of incomplete self-freeing or realisation. Such freedom however as is already realised in the suspicion of distinction implies a faith in continued realisation, in the spiritual possibility of progressively retracting the act of identification. Now the snake as a given unthinkable corresponds to the suspicion of the self being free from the perception of it, a suspicion that does not yet exclude a belief in or identification with the perception as past or unreal. The given unthinkable again is in faith absolute nought. The faith corresponds on the subjective side to the faith in the practicability of progressively realising the subject's freedom from the past perception and of annulling the identification that the belief in it implies. But for the faith in subjective or spiritual practicability, that the given unreal should be nought would be no living faith but only a dreamy suggestion of it; and absolute certitude would be deemed unattainable.

That a given object, stripped first of its reality and then of its objectivity, should still be a *given* unthinkable is a standing scandal to human reason. The faith that the given-ness is only apparent does not effectively remove the felt fact. So long as it is not removed, absolute truth is only conceived but not known. It is possible however to go at least one stage beyond this Kantian *impasse*. The annulment of the objectivity of a given illusory object implies a doubt about the subjective

reality of its perception—the starting experience of getting freed from empirical subjectivity.) The unthinkable no-object is accordingly felt to be only non-empirically given to the pure self, the given-ness is felt to be removed one self from a merely blind imposition and the persisting though enfeebled identification of the self with empiricity already presented as illusory is believed to be progressively retractable. That is how absolute truth, though unknown, is believed to be not unknowable but as demanding to be known. (The faith emerges not only in truth but also in the knowability of truth.)

Here then we have the transition from a particular illusion to the thought of and faith in absolute illusion or *māyā*. The consciousness of the practicability of annulling the given-ness of a particular illusion is what alone yields the conception of truth as not given, as transparent, as self-certified or *svayamprabhā*. Such conception of truth is at once a faith in the knowability of truth. If in one case—*viz.*, the case of a particular illusion, truth is believed to be attainable by the practicable spiritual process of freeing oneself from empiricity, absolute truth—absolute freedom of the self with the reduction of all empiricity to illusion—is conceived to be attainable. For what does the act of freeing in the particular case imply? If a given object turns into illusion, it is by fact and not by any necessity of thought. If the perception of it is suspected to be only a subjective illusion, it means that the self or pure consciousness has so far freed itself, that the conception of and faith in the self as truth has emerged. That implies the consciousness not only that the self is not identified with this perception, this particular empiricity but that being unconsciously identified cannot be predicated of the self at all. The accomplished act of freeing from any empiricity is the consciousness of the act itself as free, *i.e.*, of the self as not affected by the act, as *ever* free, transparent or *svayamprabhā* and not merely *making* itself free or repenting of a previous helpless lapse.

A single act of freeing from an empirical subjectivity implies thus a faith that all such subjectivity and identification with it are illusory. The same faith is reached in another way. When the snake appears as an illusory object, the rope is taken to be real as against it. When the snake appears as a given unthinkable, the rope in contrast with it is believed not only to be real but as justifiable by reason or *pramāṇa*, as in a world of *vyavahārika*, i.e., thinkable and practical reality, as conformable to *Veda* or Objective Reason or—what amounts to the same thing—as in a world of laws or system of relations. That the unthinkable is still given though it should not be given brings up the thought and faith that the *vyavahārika* world—with *Veda* itself as objective reason—is also given and is not necessary, that it is a free revelation, that its ultimate ground is dark or inexplicable, i.e., is *māyā*, that the system of relations is not self-justifying truth. What is given and justified by something else, i.e., logically thought is still only *real*, not *true*. (The Absolute must be the self-evidencing truth, not given to any *pramāṇa* but enjoyingly intuited.)

How this enjoying intuition is to be reached, how the freedom of the self from empiricity is to be progressively achieved, how in other words the given-ness of illusion is to be finally eliminated are questions of metapsychological *sādhana* or discipline which bring out the spiritual aspect of *māyā*. This aspect is not discussed in the present paper.

KRISHNACHANDRA BHATTACHARYA

MĀYĀ OF ŚAṆKARA AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

(An interpretation on the basis of textual study.)

Referring to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Brahmasūtra I. 1. 2. Rāmānuja says that those who believe in Brahman as characterless (nirviśeṣa) cannot do justice to the interpretation of the attributes of Brahman as affirmed in the above sūtra for instead of saying that the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world from Brahman, they ought rather to say that the illusion of creation, maintenance and absorption is from Brahman. This raises an important question as regards the real meaning of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the above sūtra. Did he really mean as he is apparently ascribed by Rāmānuja to be saying that, that from which there is the illusion of creation, etc., of the world is Brahman, or did he really mean Brahman and Brahman by itself alone is the cause of a real creation, etc., of the world? (Śaṅkara as is well-known was a commentator of the Brahmasūtras and the Upanishads and it can hardly be denied that there are many passages in these which would directly yield a theistic sense and the sense of a real creation of a real world by a real God. Śaṅkara had to explain these passages and he did not always use his strictly absolutistic phrases for as he admitted three kinds of existence he could talk in all kinds of phraseology, only, one had to be told about the sort of phraseology that Śaṅkara had in view at the time and this was not always done. (The result has been that there are at least some passages which appear by themselves to be realistically theistic, others which are ambiguous and may be interpreted in both ways and others which are professedly absolutistic. But if the testimony of the great commentators and independent writers of the Śaṅkara school be taken, Śaṅkara's doctrine should be explained in the purely monistic sense and in that alone.) Brahman is indeed the unchangeable,

infinite and absolute ground of the emergence, maintenance and dissolution of all the world-appearance and the ultimate truth underlying it. But there are two elements in the appearance of the world phenomena, the ultimate ground, the Brahman, the only being and truth in them and the element of change and diversity, the Māyā by the evolution or the transformation of which the appearance of the many is possible. But in passages like those found in Śaṅkara's bhāṣhya on Brahmasūtra, I. 1.2, it might appear as if the world-phenomena are no mere appearance but are real, inasmuch as they are not merely grounded in the real but are also the emanations from the real—the Brahman. But strictly speaking Brahman is not alone the *upādāna* or the material cause of the world but Brahman-with-avidyā is the material cause of the world and such a world is grounded in Brahman and is absorbed in Him and Vacaspati in his Bhāmatī on Śaṅkara's bhāṣhya on the same sūtra (B.S. I. 1.2) makes the same remark.¹ Prakāśātman in his Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa says that the creative functions here spoken of do not essentially appertain to Brahman and an enquiry into the nature of Brahman does not mean that Brahman is to be known as being associated with these qualities.² Bhāskara had asserted that Brahman had himself transformed himself into the world-order and that this was a real transformation—*pariṇāma*—a transformation of his energies into the manifold universe. But Prakāśātman in rejecting the view of *pariṇāma* says that even though the world appearance be of the stuff of māyā, since this māyā is associated with Brahman, the world-appearance as such is never found to be contradicted or negated or found to be not existing—it is only found that it is not ultimately real.³

¹ *avidyā-sahitā-brahmopādānam jagat brahmanyevasmi tatniva ca līyate. Bhāmatī, I. 1.2.*

² *na hi nānūvidhakāryyakriyāveśātmakatvam tatprasavaśaktyātmakatvam vā jījñāśya, vituddhabrahmāntargatambhavitum arhati. Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa, p. 205*

³ *Ṣṣṭeīca svopādhan abhāvavyūrttatvāt sarve ca svopādhikādharmāḥ svāśrayopādhan abādhyatayā satyā bhavanti ṣṣṭīrapi svarupena na bādhyate kintu paramārthasatyena. ibid, p. 206*

Māyā is supported in Brahman and the world-appearance being transformation of māyā is real only as such transformations, and it is grounded also in Brahman, for its ultimate reality is only so far as this ground or Brahman is concerned and so far as the world-appearances are concerned they are only relatively real as māyā transformations. (The conception of joint causality of Brahma and māyā may be made in three ways, that māyā and Brahma are like two threads twisted together into one thread, or that Brahman with māyā as its power or śakti is the cause of the world, or that Brahman being the support of māyā is indirectly the cause of the world.¹ In the latter two views māyā being dependent on Brahman the work of māyā—the world—is also dependent on Brahman and these two views by an interpretation like this pure Brahman (śuddhabrahma) is the cause of the world. Sarvajñātmamuni who also thinks that pure Brahman is the material cause conceives the function of māyā not as being joint material cause with Brahman, but as the instrument or the means through which the causality of pure Brahman appears as the manifold and the diversity of the universe, but even in this view the stuff of the diversity is the māyā, only such manifestation of māyā would have been impossible if the ground cause, the Brahman is absent.²)

In discussing the nature of the causality of Brahman Prakāśātmā says that the monistic doctrine of the Vedānta is upheld by the fact that apart from the cause there is nothing in the effect which is speakable or describable.³ So in all these various ways in which Śaṅkara's philosophy has been interpreted it has been universally held by almost all the followers

¹ *traividhyamātra sambhavati rajjvāḥ samyuktasūtradvayavat māyāviśiṣṭam brahma kāraṇam iti va devātmasaktim svāgunai niguḍham iti kṛteḥ na śaktimatkāraṇam iti vā jagadupādānamāyāśrayatayā brahma kāraṇamiti vā*

ibid, p. 212.

² *Samkshhepaśrīraka* I, 332, 334, and the commentary *Anvayārthaprakāśikā* by Ramātrīha.

³ *upādānavyutirekeṇa kāryasya anirūpaṇāt advitīyatā, Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*, p. 221.

of Śaṅkara that though Brahman was at bottom the ground cause yet the stuff of the world was not of real Brahma material but of māyā, and though all the diversity of the world has relative existence it has no reality in the true sense of the term in which Brahman is real.¹

Śaṅkara himself says that the omniscience of Brahman consists in its eternal power of universal illumination or manifestation.² Though there is no action or agency involved in this universal consciousness it is spoken of as being a knowing agent, just as the Sun is spoken of as burning and illuminating though the Sun itself is nothing but an identity of heat and light.³ Before the creation of the world what becomes the object of this universal consciousness is the indefinable name and form which cannot be ascertained as this or that.⁴ The omniscience of Brahman is therefore this universal manifestation by which all the creations of māyā become the knowable contents of thought, but this manifestation is not an act of knowledge, but a permanent steady light of consciousness, by which the unreal appearances of māyā flash into being and are made known. That Brahman is the creator of the world is true in

¹ Prakāśātmi refers to several ways in which the relation of Brahman and māyā had been conceived such as—Brahma and māyā as his power, and the individual souls were all associated with avidyā,—brahma as reflected in māyā and avidyā was the cause of the world (māyāvidyāpratibimbitam brahma jagat kāraṇam) - pure brahman is immortal and individual souls are associated with avidyā—individual souls have their own relations of the world and these through similarity appear to be one permanent world. Brahman undergoes an apparent transformation through its own avidyā—but in none of these views the world is regarded to be a real emanation from Brahman. *Pancapādikāvivarṇa*, p. 232.

Regarding the question as to how the Brahman could be the cause of the beginningless Vedas, Prakāśātmi explains it by supposing that Brahman was the underlying reality by which all the Vedas imposed on it were manifested. *ibid* pp. 230, 231.

² *Yasya hi sarvavaiśayāvabhāsanakṣhamam jñānam nityamasti.*

³ *Pratataushṇaparakāśe'pi savītari dahati prakāśayati itī svātantryavyapadesadarśanāt..... evam asatyapi jñānakarmani brahmanāḥ 'tadaikṣhata' iti kartṛtva vyapadesadārsanāt.*

⁴ *Kim punastat karmma yat prāgutpattirīśvarajñānasya vīśhaya bhavati tattvānya-tvābhyām anirvacaniye nāmarūpe avyākṛte vyaśikīrṣhite iti brumuh, Śaṅkarabhāṣya, 1.1-5.*

the same sense as it may be called the material cause of the world. (Brahman being the support of māyā which has transformed into the world-appearance is called the material cause and it being the support of māyā in all its various transformations as will and activity is at the same time regarded as the creator.) So it is in the same sense of underlying reality that Brahman is called both the producer and the material cause of the world (abhinnanimittopādānakam Brahma).¹ The Buddhists had asserted that all that we see and know were mere phenomenal appearances and that there were nowhere anything which could be called truly real, absolute and unchangeable, ultimate and ever-existent. Śaṅkara tried to rebut this view by affirming that the entity denoted by the term Brahman in the Upanishads was the ultimate reality which was the underlying ground of all our experience and of all phenomena as such. Śaṅkara emphasised the importance of the realisation of this Brahman as the pure contentless consciousness, the ultimate reality or being, which was also identical with pure and contentless happiness. (The concept of change or appearance was irreconcilable with the notion of being or reality and though the latter was the basis of the former, yet no independent meaning could be attributed to the former. So he in a manner agreed with the Buddhists that the world of appearances was false, mere magic show or māyā. He himself however did not do much to elaborate philosophically the full significance of this concept of māyā. He tried to explain it by means of commonplace analogies of perceptual error or illusion, *e.g.*, the illusion of snake in rope, or of silver in conch-shell. Either on account of the defect of the eye or dim light, or mental inattention or preoccupation with other ideas, one may falsely perceive a snake where there is only a rope, at a later moment when he is told

¹ Ekameva caitanyam avidyopahitatvena upādānam avidyāparināmeccākṛtyādyāśrayatvena kṛtṛ ca iti siddhamidam nirviśesham brahma nimittamupādānam ca. General drift of the argument in Advaitasiddhi-Brahmano' bhinnanimittopādānatve pramāṇopapattih.

that it was only a rope, he attends to it more carefully, and correctly perceives it to be a rope. This positive perception has with it however a negative implication as well—this is a rope and not a snake. This leads to a third stage of reconsideration of the matter which convinces us that the snake did not at any time exist in the rope, it does not exist in it now and it will not be in it in future. What is meant by saying that the snake does not exist in the rope is that the snake is not of the same stuff as the rope and is by no means a real transformation of the rope, but is only an appearance which was only hanging on the entity of the rope when we were ignorant of its true nature as rope. This contradiction or negation (bādha) of snake in past, present and future is called its falsehood or illusoriness. It is held that the appearance of the world phenomena is also hanging as it were on the Real the Brahman, but when the true nature of Brahman is realised this world-appearance will also be found negated in the same way as the illusory perception of snake was.

(It may naturally be asked, what is then the nature of these phenomena, are they mere impositions of our corrupt imagination, mere ideas of the mind having no objective existence outside of us as perceivers as the subjectively idealistic school of Buddhists asserts?) Śaṅkara emphatically denies any such suggestion. Things which we perceive, whatever they may really be in themselves, are not my ideas, nor are they produced by my perception, nor will they cease when I cease to perceive them, nor are they mis-perceptions except in the sense that they have no permanent substratum in the sense in which we speak of the principle of pure consciousness to be real; but still they are somehow there, Śaṅkara definitely opposed the Vijñānavādins who held that there was no external world or objects before us, but only the ideas appearing or disappearing in a series. The external world was present as perceived, though it may not have a reality as such. We do not perceive ideas but objects. The Buddhists held that things which are

invariably found together are identical and that since 'blue' and the idea of 'blue' were always and invariably found simultaneously they were identical (sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ). Śaṅkara rebutted this epistemological view and held that 'blue' and the knowledge or the idea of blue were entirely two different things and they could not be identical. I perceive the 'blue,' have an idea of the blue, but neither my idea nor my perception is blue. Corresponding to each external perception there is an external object that we perceive, the pillar, wall, jug, cloth.¹ These objects are perceived by sense contact and one cannot say that they are not perceived or that they do not exist.² These external objects are certainly different from my ideas of them or perceptions, for no one thinks that his perception of a wall is a wall or that his perception of a pillar is a pillar (yataḥ upalabdhivyatireko'pi balādarthasya abhyupagantavya upalabdhireva; na hi kaścīd upalabdhimeva stambhaḥ kuḍyam ca iti upalabhate). If the things did not exist externally, why should they appear that they were existing outside, whereas my ideas were felt to be my own. So the "awareness" and its object are different from each other (tasmadarthajñānayorbhedah). Dr. Moore had asserted in his well-known article in "Mind"—Refutation of Idealism "that the main defect of idealism is that it cannot distinguish between "awareness" and its object, "blue" and the knowledge of "blue," and this is his refutation of idealism that the object and its awareness are different—we are aware of blue but blue and awareness are not identical. Here in Śaṅkara we have a form of idealism where this distinction is realised and where it is definitely maintained that knowledge and its object are different and which agrees with Moore in holding the view that we are aware of "blue" and our awareness is not blue. We cannot indeed say that things "really"

¹ Upalabhyate hi pratipratyayam bāhyo'rthaḥ stambhaḥ, kuḍyam, ghaṭaḥ, paṭaḥ iti.

² Indriyasannikarśheṇa svayamupalabhamāna eva bāhyamartham naḥupalabhee naca so'stīti brūvan katham upādeyavacanāḥ syāt.

are as they are seen, but we may say that things are as they are seen. This is a distinction with which we are familiar in our own times. Thus Holt in defending his position against the idealists says that "as things are perceived so they are," and the Idealists have rashly misunderstood him to mean that "things are perceived as they really are" *i.e.*, not all perceived things are *real* things.'

But a question might then naturally arise that what then is the nature of the falsehood of the world-appearance? If it is urged by any interpreter that the world-appearance is simply felt to be given but when this is corrected it will be found that it was absolute nought (*tuccha*), it did not exist, it does not exist, and it will not exist and so are all illusions, I must at once point out that such an interpretation is entirely false and against the universal tradition of Vedantic interpretation and also against the evident intention of Śaṅkara's view. When an error is corrected then the third stage of reflection does not show that the illusory object did not exist at all, but it only certifies that the illusory object was never partly or wholly any part of the entity which was perceived as the illusory object. The *snake* perceived never was, nor is, nor will be any part of the "this" of the rope which was mistaken as the snake—*pratipannopādhau traikālikanishedhapratityogitvam mithyātvam*. This definition of falsehood means that falsehood of an appearance consists in the fact that its existence may be denied, in all the three possible temporal relations, in the locus or the entity (*upādhi* or *adhikaraṇa*) where it is perceived (*pratipanna*). This latter qualification (*pratipannopādhau*) is purposely given to rule out the suggestion that the falsehood of the world-appearance may be regarded to be of the nature of the absolutely non-existent like the round square or the hare's horn (*śaśavishāṇā-dyasadvyāvṛttyartham pratipannatvam upādhiviśeṣaṇam*).¹

¹ *Pratipannaḥ, mithyātvābhimata—(ava) prakāśakadhīviśeṣyaḥ ya upādhiradhikaraṇam tannishtho yatraikalikanishedho' tyantābhāvapratiyogitvam ityarthah—Gauḍa-brahmānandī and Viṭṭhaleśopādhyāyī.*

This has been said in a slightly different way when falsehood is again defined as that which appears to exist in an entity where it does not exist (svāśrayanishthātyantābhāvapratiyogitvam or svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇe eva pratiyamānatvam) *i.e.*, the illusory object is that which appears in an entity (adhikaraṇa) where it (sva) does not exist (atyantābhava). When it is said that the illusory object is both existent and non-existent, it may again well be argued that according to the principle of excluded middle what is existent cannot be non-existent and what is non-existent cannot be existent (sattvāsattvayoḥ parasparavirahavyāpyatayā); but the answer to such a question is that the word 'non-existent' has been used here in a special sense; it means here a denial of that 'existence' which remains uncontradicted in all time; an illusory object is then that which appears as existent, but is yet not such an existent which remains uncontradicted in past, present and future. So the principle of excluded middle has no application to the co-existence of such existence and non-existence. Brahman is known to us on the strength of the testimony of the Upanishads to be the unchangeable pure existence, but the world-appearance cannot be admitted to be such existence, but yet it appears to be objectively existent, it is therefore a denial of unchangeable pure being and is at the same time to be admitted to be objectively existent; the world-appearance is therefore a different category from both existence and its denial the non-existence; if an animal is a horse it cannot be cow, if it is a cow it cannot be a horse, but if it is an elephant it need not be either a cow or a horse. So between absolute existence and absolute negation one has to admit separate category which is not absolute existence like Brahman because it is not permanent and uncontradicted in all times, and is not also the absolutely nonexistent like the hare's horn (the absolute nought—tuccha) for it appears as objectively existent and excepting the fact that it is not uncontradicted at all times it is existent for all other purposes.¹

¹ Sattvātyantābhāvavatve sati asattvātyantābhāvarupam viśiṣṭam.

(The main point about the world-appearance is that it depends entirely on Brahman or pure consciousness or absolute being for its existence and it is this that constitutes the difference between reality and unreality.) That alone is real which does not depend on anything else for its self-manifestation, whereas unreal is that which cannot manifest itself without the help of the real ; it is therefore that though being is different from appearance all appearance is manifested only as associated with being or as revealed by the underlying being. (One of the most essential characteristics of the Vedānta philosophy is that it distinguishes between being and all manifestations which appear to have being, consciousness and all states which appear to be conscious and these manifestations or states cannot be supposed to have any independent existence but yet nor are they non-existent, only when considered as separate from being they are unspeakable, indefinable and substanceless. (It is this dependence on pure consciousness or pure being that constitutes the perceivability (dṛśyatva) the materiality (jaḍatva) and the limitedness (paricchinna) of world-appearance.)

Disregarding the subtle technical difference between avidyā, ajñāna and māyā, avidyā or māyā is defined as that which is a positive entity from beginningless time but which ceases with the rise of the true knowledge.¹ This positivity means merely the denial of negativity or nought.² But though this positivity does not mean pure or absolute existence, yet it may be the material cause of the transformations through which it passes, for it continues through all its transformations.³ So māyā is regarded as the upādāna or the substance stuff of the world-appearances and Brahma is only the support of this substance for it is such that it has always to hang on Brahman in order that it may remain or that it may produce

¹ Anādivibhavarūpatve sati ajñānanivartya.

² Bhāvatvam cātra abhāvavilakṣaṇatvamāstram vivakṣitam.

³ Ajñānasya bhramasya ca bhāvavilakṣaṇatve 'pyupādānopādeyabhāvopapattih, na hi bhāvatvam upādānatve tantram, kintu anvayikāṇatvam upādānatve tantram.

all its illusory transformations as the world-appearance (viśva-bhramopādānamāyādhishṭhānam Brahma).

Appearances and illusory objects have therefore objectivity, but not reality and one of the special features of the Sāṅkarite Vedānta is to distinguish the two concepts, and the acceptance of a third category of that which is neither being nor non-being. On the right understanding of the nature of avidyā as accepted by the Sāṅkarites, there is an illuminating passage in Nyāyamakaranda of Ānandabodhabhattākāchāryya which I translate, "It cannot be said that "avidyā" is mere false knowledge (mithyājñānam) or absence of knowledge (vidyābhāva) and that in neither of these senses can avidyā be regarded as material cause (samavāyikāraṇa) for in neither of these senses can it be regarded as a substance (adravyatvāt), for avidyā is accepted as beginningless and indefinable. Its nature is to be determined by the nature of the effect that it produces and it is not something fictitious (apramāṇikatā). The occasional happening of an effect necessarily requires the operation of a cause; without a material stuff no effect can be produced merely by the instrumental cause, for all effects (except destruction—dhvamsa) are produced by material cause; an untrue effect cannot be due to a true material cause, and that which does not exist and which is devoid of all capacity cannot be called material cause, so since neither being nor nothingness can be the substance-stuff of the illusory objects, we are forced to admit a cause which is neither being nor nothing.¹ So it is for admitting such a wholly different kind of cause that a beginningless cause of the type of avidyā has to be admitted." "That which is the indefinable substance stuff of the illusory object—silver—is what is termed avidyā."

That this view was almost universally accepted by the Śāṅkara school of thinkers is apparent from the account of the origin of the illusory silver as found in Samkshepasariraka.

¹ Tothūcānopapādyamānāyām sadasādopādānatāyām tadvilakṣhaṇameva kāraṇam pariśeṣataḥ kāryyamanumāpayet—Nyāyamakaranda p. 123.

For in that work Sarvajñātmanamuni thinks that the substance-stuff (upādāna) of the illusory silver is the ignorance (ajñāna) of the determinate qualities of the "this" perceived before, *i.e.*, the "this" underlying the conch-shell, for so long as this specific ignorance of the qualities of the conch-shell remains, there is the illusory perception of silver in the "this" of the conch-shell and as soon as this ignorance is removed the "this" of conch-shell appears in its true state as conch-shell. This view has also been emphasised in *Pramāṇamālā* and *Nyāya-dīpāvalī* and *Vāchaspati* also supports this view in his *Brahma-tatvasamīkshā*.

It is only *Nṛsiṃha Bhatta* who denies the two processes (vṛtti) in illusory perception and takes a somewhat subjective view of it and thinks that illusory perceptions are due to defects in the sense organs due to associations and other causes which become operative when their functions are not opposed by the specific nature of the object baffling all suggestions of similarity and the like which when aroused generally corrupt the proper functions of the sense organs. But even in his view it is the *avidyā* inherent in the object that is affected by its association with the defective sense organ and undergoes a modification towards being turned into an effect and at the succeeding moment transforms itself into the form of the illusory object (*e.g.*, silver).¹

But it may well be asked what is meant by this transformation of ignorance? Ignorance is only absence, or negation of knowledge and there is no meaning in saying that negation can undergo any positive or objective transformation. But the answer of the Sankarites on this point is that ignorance or *avidyā* as used in this connection is not negation, but is a positive entity which can be directly experienced by perception and established by inference. When one says "I do not know

¹ Idamarthāvacchinnacaitanye rajatapariṇāmiṇi avidyā duṣṭendriyasamparkarupād adhyāsa-nimittakārapabhutāt kṣobham kāryābhimukhyam prāpuoti, uttarakṣaṇe ca rajatarupeṇa pariṇamate.

what you mean " (Tvaduktam na jñāmi), it is not the negation of something that is meant, but a perceptual experience of ignorance as a positive entity. For if it was simply a negation that is denoted, such a negation must be a specific negation negating a definite object, but in the above cases it is only indefinite negation that is meant and negation cannot be indefinite ; what is said an indefinite negation is the positive experience of ignorance. The awaking memory of deep sleep that I slept so long and did not know anything (etāvantam kālam na kimcidavedishāmiti parāmarsasiddham saushuptam pratyakshamapi bhāvarupajñānavishayameva) also refers to a similar kind of perception of positive ignorance. For in such cases though there is an experience of ignorance as referring to the particular import that is meant, there is no specific negation that is implied.¹

The only difficulty however is with regard to the conception of the dissolution of avidyā with right knowledge and commentators use all their ingenuity to explain the nature and characteristic of such a dissolution. Ānandabodha Bhattarakāchāryya after discussing all sorts of views, says that such a dissolution cannot be regarded as 'real,' for then the doctrine of monism fails (for then both this dissolution of avidyā and Brahma would be real and that would be duality), it cannot be regarded as unreal in the sense of absolute nought or non-existent, for then how could it be removed by right knowledge (nāpyasati jñānasādhyatvayogāt), cannot be both existent and non-existent in the same sense for that would be self-contradictory (napi sadasadrupa virodhāt) ; it cannot also be considered to be indefinable in its nature (anirvācya) for it may well be contended that there is no reason why it should not then exist

¹ Viśeshajñānābhāvasya tvaduktārthajñānabhāvasya va'nabhyupagame tadviśhaya-jñānasattvena tadvyavahārāpatteśca ; na caivam dr̥syate ; svataḥprāmāṇyapakshe tutatprakāśakatve tadviśeshyakatve tu gr̥hyamāne tadvattvagrahapaśya āśasyakatayā tadamīe tatprakāśakatadviśeshyakatvasya tādr̥sapratīyogijñāne sambhavat spāṣṭa eva vyāghātaḥ bhāvarūpajñānapakshe tu sarvasyāpi sākehivedyatayā na vyāghātaḥ. Advaitasiddhi, p. 556.

even after emancipation (mukti) or why it could after all be removable by true knowledge (tadupādānajñānānuvṛtтыupapatteḥ jñānanivartтыatvāpatteśca). It is therefore to be regarded as being of an altogether different type, different from all these four possible kinds of conception, a fifth and a different kind altogether. This is known as the *pañcamaparakāraavidyānivṛtti*. Sureśvara in his *Brahmasiddhi* says that the dissolution of avidyā is nothing but the pure self (ātmaiva iti). Others think that avidyānivṛtti or dissolution of avidyā is also indefinable (anirvācyā). See *Siddhāntaleśa*.

S. N. DASGUPTA

RĀMĀNUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

It may appear to some that not much light can be thrown on the problem of knowledge by Indian thinkers whose prime interest is in Ethics and Ontology. It is so to some extent in the case of early Indian thought where the reference to the question of knowledge is only implicit; but as philosophic inquiry progresses, the problem receives a more and more explicit treatment, though it still be only incidentally; and we find in the end that almost every system formulates its own more or less distinctive theory of knowledge. Of the several theories found in Indian Philosophy, we shall deal with one here. These theories, however, it must be remembered, are generally found mixed up with matters that are not strictly philosophical and therefore require to be freed from them before they can be properly appreciated. Two such matters, we may mention here—one, the eschatological reference which practically all the Indian systems contain, whatever be the topic they discuss; and the other, the allegiance which they directly or indirectly show to the authority of the *Veda*. The first, as mere speculation and the second, as mere faith have no direct relation to the true meaning of knowledge. We shall accordingly avoid, as far as possible, dwelling upon discussions bearing upon these aspects and endeavour to give a purely philosophic version of the problem and its solution. To the two circumstances interfering with a proper unfolding of a theory of knowledge which are common to nearly all the Systems, we have to add in the case of Ramanuja's *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, a third, *viz.*, the incorporation in its philosophy, mainly based upon the *Upanishads*, of elements drawn from *Vaiṣṇaviṣm* which seems to have sprung from a different source. We shall not refer to this point either, except at the end where, if the conclusion we

reach suggest any ideal of knowledge, we shall in pointing it out, briefly indicate how far the general character of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* doctrine, as taught by Ramanuja, is warranted by his theory of knowledge.

Like many another Indian thinker, Ramanuja holds that knowledge implies on the one hand a subject to which it belongs, and on the other, an object to which it refers. Our consideration of his view, to be complete, must refer to both these factors; but we propose to confine our attention to the objective or logical side of knowledge, adding only a few words, in a preliminary way, on the other, *viz.*, its psychological side. Each Indian school of thought has its own psychology, for this branch of study was never separated in India from general philosophy and cultivated independently as it is in modern times. And since belief in an enduring self is an integral part of the teaching of many of these schools, they do not countenance what is termed a "psychology without a soul." Ramanuja is no exception to this rule and the self or *Jīva* in which he believes is a permanent spiritual entity. There are many such *jīvas*, each with its own individuality, and each is described as a *kartā* and *bhoktā*, by which we must understand that it can both *will* and *feel*. *Jñāna* or knowledge is what eternally belongs to this self. To understand its exact nature, it is necessary to know a certain classification of ultimate entities which is peculiar to Ramanuja's system. To the well-known distinction between "spirit" and "matter," respectively termed *cetana* and *jaḍa* in Sanskrit, it adds another which is neither, but is partly like the one and partly like the other. *Jñāna* is of this intermediate type. It is different from the *jaḍa* in that it can, unaided, manifest itself and external objects as well, neither of which is possible for the *jaḍa*. But what it thus manifests is never for itself but always for another. That is, it can only *show* but cannot *know*. In this latter respect, it is unlike the *cetana*, which knows though it is unable, according to the doctrine, to show anything but itself. To cite an

analogy from the physical sphere, *Jñāna* is like a lamp which can reveal the presence of a jar (say) as well as its own, but cannot *see* either, its revelation of things being always for another. *Jñāna* also similarly functions not for itself but for another—the self of which it is a unique adjunct. The classification of ultimate things here then is not into *jaḍa* and *cetana*, but *jaḍa* and *ajāḍa*, where the second term which may comprehensively be rendered into English as “the immaterial,” stands for the *cetana* (*prāiṇyak*) and what is also partly like it and yet distinct from it *viz.*, *jñāna* (*parāk*).¹

Since *Jñāna* always and necessarily pertains to the *cetana*, it is described as *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*—literally, secondary or subsidiary *jñāna*, the primary or higher *jñāna* implied by such a description being the *jīva* which, as its owner, is comparable to the flame of a lamp as distinguished from its rays which belong to it and radiate from it. When *jñāna* which is similarly associated with the *jīva* “streams out” from it, through one or other of the senses and comes into contact with an object, it is able to manifest it to that particular *jīva*. The exact process in which objects come to be known is not clear from the description given;² but what is important for us here is—our interest being logical rather than psychological—that objects are regarded as prior to knowledge and that what knowledge does, is to bring them into relation with the knowing self. Throughout life, *jñāna* is supposed to function in a more or less restricted manner,—even at its best. That is, knowledge, as known to us, has limitations. But it never ceases to be. Even in *susupti*, it *is*, though it does not function then and therefore does not show itself, the theory being that *jñāna* is known only *along with* some object or not at all. Then the *jīva* remains in its intrinsic state of self-consciousness, along

¹ See *Yatindra-mata-dīpikā* pp. 51 and 67 (Ānandaśrama edition).

² The explanation appears to be modelled upon that given in the *Sāṃkhya*, the chief difference being the substitution of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* for *antaḥ-karṇa*.

with what we may describe as the unrealised presence of its *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*.

Another distinguishing feature of Ramanuja's view is that knowledge invariably refers to a complex object (*savišeṣa-vastu*) and that it is impossible for the mind to apprehend anything in isolation—without some qualitative characteristic or other being known at the same time. What is known is necessarily known as qualified, its *jāti* or generic feature in any case being inseparable from it. The importance of this view, we shall appreciate if we compare it for instance with the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* one of *nirvikalpaka*, according to which isolated reals—substance by itself, quality by itself etc.,—are all that are apprehended at first. According to Ramanuja, such a stage is a psychological myth. The *savikalpaka* of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, according to him, marks the most primitive stage of knowledge. Any simpler form of it is the result of later analysis and has nothing corresponding to it in the mental process as it actually takes place. This does not however mean that Ramanuja rejects the distinction between *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*; only to him, the two alike involve a complex presentation. Perceptual experience is termed *nirvikalpaka* when the object is cognised for the first time. It is primary presentation that does not call up any previous impression of the same. A child sees a cow, let us say, for the first time; even then it sees the object as qualified in some manner or other. When it sees the animal again, the sight of it is accompanied by a revival of the former impression and it is this second and subsequent apprehension—this cognition of the new in the light of the old—that is described as *savikalpaka* by Ramanuja. While "This is a cow" represents the form of perceptual experience at the *nirvikalpaka* level, "This also is a cow" does the same at the *savikalpaka*, so that the development involved in *pratyakṣa* is not from the simple to the complex, as it is according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, but in the complex itself, once less familiar becoming more so. To put the same in another way, while

according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, only the *savikalpaka* involves judgment, the *nirvikalpaka* furnishing the material for it, all perceptual experience, according to Ramanuja alike involves judgment.¹

It is not only in the primal stage of perception that Ramanuja rejects the possibility of knowing an unqualified object (*nirviśeṣa-vastu*). It is never knowable. In fact it does not exist. This constitutes a radical difference from Sankara who, though he like Ramanuja refuses to admit that *pratyakṣa* begins as simple and grows to be complex, lays down that the object in itself (*akhandārtha*) can be apprehended, as for example through '*tat tvam asi*' which points to the *nirguṇa-brahman*. Ramanuja controverts this view at length, pouring scorn upon its exponent in the course of doing so, and asserts that *jñāna* is always and necessarily of a complex object and that all objects, including the ultimate Reality, are complex. "All that the term *nirviśeṣa* can mean is that *some* qualities are denied of the object, while there are still others characterising it; and this does not mean that there are things which are wholly unqualified."² ✓

To turn now to the objective implication of knowledge. We have already drawn attention in noticing Ramanuja's description of the process of knowing that objects are viewed as preceding knowledge—as existing already before they are known. They are therefore to be reckoned as real and since they depend in no way upon the self or the knowledge which brings them into relation with it, their reality is not merely objective or relative but absolute. Ramanuja traces this realistic

¹ The *savikalpaka* does not thereby become the same as recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), This is that Devadatta"—for while in recognition one and the same object is recognised twice, here it is not so. In both alike, no doubt, "a present fact is associated with a present idea of a past fact"; yet the *savikalpaka* is only re-cognition and not recognition. Further though all perceptual experience equally entails judgment, recognition includes a specific reference to the difference in time and space in which the object was cognised on the two occasions—Devadatta *there* and *then* as distinguished from Devadatta *here* and *now*.

² *Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 71 (Nirnaya Sāgara Press).

view to the old teaching of the *Veda*.¹ That is however only his way of putting it and we may regard it for our purpose here as a postulate of his system. His view in particular is described as *Sat-Khyāti* or *yathārtha-khyāti* which means that what exists (*sat*) is alone cognised and that knowledge in the absence of an object corresponding to what is given in it (*yathārtha*) is impossible. It is not enough for securing the correspondence here meant, if something or other exists outside to serve as the source from which a *general* stimulus comes. Consistently with Ramanuja's view that only complex objects exist and are known, the *kind* of the object also should be as it is given in knowledge. In other words, the agreement between knowledge and its object should extend from the *that* (*prakārin*) to the *what* (*prakāra*) also of what is presented. That is, Ramanuja believes in a real world having real qualities. While it is easy to understand this position so far as normal perception is concerned, the question will arise as to how it can be maintained in the case of illusions where we seem to have knowledge without corresponding things. Ramanuja's explanation of them, broadly speaking, is two-fold. It necessarily involves the interpretation of certain physical and physiological facts and the interpretation, because the Indian theories were all formulated before the days of experimental science, is sometimes fanciful. But this need not always affect the soundness of the accompanying logical theory. We shall have to bear this in mind as we proceed and see that we do not judge the logical significance of our theory by the value of the scientific beliefs cited in the course of its exposition.

(i) In some cases the realistic position is maintained on the basis of the *Vedāntic* doctrine of *pañcī-karaṇa*, according to which objects of the physical world, which are all compounds contain all the five *bhūtas* or gross elements, though in varying proportions. Thus in the case of the "mirage," what is being looked at is a heated sandy waste which contains not only

¹ Compare Śālika-nātha's *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, p. 32.

pr̥thivī which is the preponderating part of it, but also *ap*, however slight, and the apprehension of water there, it is said, is therefore only of what is actually presented to the eye. That is, Ramanuja justifies his view of *sat-khyāti* here by pointing to what is a fundamental tenet of his system, the unity of the physical world and the structural affinity that is discoverable among the things that belong to it. But such an explanation may do only in cases where the object of illusion, as in the example given, is one or other of the five *bhūtas*. Illusions however are by no means confined to such rare cases. (We may for instance mistake 'shell' for 'silver' where neither is a *bhūta*. To explain cases like these, Ramanuja resorts to an extension of the principle underlying *pañcī-karaṇa*. The illusion of 'shell-silver' is due, among other causes, to the similarity between the two substances, *vis.*, their peculiar lustre.) This similarity means to Ramanuja the presence in the 'shell,' though only to a very limited extent, of the very material which constitutes 'silver.' (Likeness is to him only another term for partial identity and so even here what is perceived is what is actually presented. Only it is not the *bhūtas* as such that are brought together here, but what are derived from them—*bhautikas*.) The 'shell' is a compound not of *pr̥thivī*, *tejas*, etc., in their primitive form, but of certain differentiations of them—the 'shell' being a particular modification of *pr̥thivī* and the 'silver,' as indicated by the lustre, of *tejas*.

(ii) In other cases such as the white conch seen as yellow by a person with a jaundiced eye, a different explanation becomes necessary. The 'yellowness' in this case is no doubt there outside the knowing self and is therefore real. But the point requiring elucidation here is not whether the 'yellowness' is real but how it comes to be seen in the conch. The explanation of Ramanuja, which is based upon beliefs current at the time, assumes that the 'yellowness' found in the diseased eyeball is actually transmitted from there to the conch along with the 'rays' of the organ of sight (*nayanarāśmi*) as they travel

to it in the process of seeing and that the new colour thus imposed upon the conch obscures the whiteness natural to it. The conch is thus supposed to become actually yellow, though only for the time being ; and so here also knowledge is of what is given not only in respect of the relata but also the relation between them. To the question that if the conch becomes actually yellow, others also should find it so, the answer is given that the 'yellowness' here is of too subtle a kind to be perceived by any one who, unlike the person in question, has not followed it throughout its course of transmission.¹ The explanation is no doubt arbitrary and unconvincing ; but what our present purpose requires us to note in it is not its scientific correctness but the spirit of persistent realism that underlies it. The question will readily occur here as to how dreams are to be accounted for. There at least we seem to have experience without corresponding objects existing at the time. The explanation once again is arbitrary and it is stated, now on the authority of the Upanisads,² that objects like the elephant (say) seen in dreams, are actually there at the time, though as in the case of the yellow conch, they are perceivable only by the individual dreamer. 'God is their creator,' says Ramanuja and adds that the reason for His creating such unique things is the same as in the case of objects of the waking state, *viz.*, the providing of *suitable* means for the individual to experience pain or pleasure according to his past *Karma*.

It is instructive to find out what may be the basis of this twofold explanation. The 'yellow-conch' and the 'dream-elephant' are objects *solely* of individual experience. The illusion of the 'mirage' or the 'shell-silver' also in one sense has reference to particular individuals ; but the 'water' and the 'silver' perceived there by one are *verifiable by all*, for when the illusion disappears they are not sublated being absolutely real

¹ The analogy is here adduced of a small bird soaring in the sky which, he that has followed its course from the moment it began to fly, is able to spot easily but not others.

² *Br. Up.* IV, iii, 10.

by hypothesis, but as we shall see presently, only set aside or superseded (*abhi-bhūta*). In the case of the 'yellow-conch' or the 'dream-elephant' also, the objects perceived, being quite real, can be testified to; but the testimony can, in the nature of the case, be only of the individual that saw them. This shows that Ramanuja distinguishes two classes of objects—one which is common to all or many and may therefore be called 'public'; and the other, special to single persons and may therefore be termed 'private.' It may seem from this distinction that he admits different kinds of orders of being—an admission which would place his doctrine epistemologically on the same footing as Sankara's *Advaita*. Really however no such admission is made. In fact it is in denying that there is such a distinction that he formulates the doctrine of *sat-khyāti*. In point of reality, 'private' and 'public' objects differ in no way according to him. Both alike are equally outside and independent of knowledge and both therefore are equally and absolutely real. A thing's being 'private' does not take away from its reality. Our pains and pleasures are personal to each one of us but they are not the less real on that account. This aspect of *sat-khyāti* is of the utmost moment to Ramanuja's doctrine on its metaphysical side.

However diverse the explanation in the two cases and whatever we may think of its scientific value, it is clear that the aim of *sat-khyāti* is to show that *jñāna*, including the so-called illusion, cannot deviate from reality and that even in the case of objects whose existence can be vouched for only by individual experience, there is no ideal or purely subjective element. If all knowledge be equally valid, it may be asked how the distinction between truth (*pramā*) and error (*bhrama*), which is universally recognised, is to be explained. Before answering this question, it is necessary to draw attention to another important aspect of *sat-khyāti*. While the doctrine postulates that only what is given is known, it does not admit that *all* that is given is apprehended. Knowledge, no doubt,

is always of the given and of nothing but the given ; but it need not be of the *whole* of what is given. This is evident from the examples cited above. Besides the ' water ' and the ' silver ' for instance, there is much in the ' sandy waste ' and the ' shell ' that is left unapprehended. Ramanuja bases his explanation of error on this feature of knowledge. The peculiar view upheld in *sat-khyāti* however makes one thing certain : there can be no errors of commission. But the same cannot be said about those of omission ; for knowledge, though invariably valid, may be incomplete and incomplete knowing (*agraha*)¹ may give rise to errors of this kind. Thus in the case of the ' yellow-conch,' it is the failure to comprehend its whiteness that causes the error. In dream-objects again, their being ' private ' to the particular dreamer is overlooked and they are therefore confounded with the corresponding objects belonging to the normal order of nature. The omission and the consequent error are clearer still in the case of another example given—the ' firebrand-circle ' (*alāta-cakra*) where a point, owing to its rapid movement, is mistaken for its locus, because while the fact that it occupies every point on the circumference is apprehended, the other fact that the occupation takes place successively and not simultaneously is lost sight of.

These illustrations and the statement that error is due to incomplete knowing may lead us to conclude that truth is complete knowledge. But that would not be right, for according to *sat-khyāti*, there may be an element of omission even in the so-called truth. When for instance we perceive ' shell ' as ' shell,' there is present in it ' silver,' but it is ignored quite as much as the 'shell'-aspect is, when the same object is mistaken for 'silver'. Similarly in the case of the 'desert', when we cognise it as such, our mind lets slip the element of 'water' in it. Since completeness like validity fails to differentiate

¹ Here is a point of agreement between Ramanuja's *sat-khyāti* and Prabhākara's *akhyāti*. The two are not identical. Compare Vedānta-Deśika's description of the former as *akhyāti-samvaliṣa-yathārtha-khyāti*.

truth from error, Ramanuja enunciates a new principle *viz.*, that for knowledge to be true, in its commonly accepted sense it should, in addition to agreeing with outside reality be serviceable in life. When the 'mirage' and the 'shell-silver' are described as false, what we have to understand is, not that 'water' and 'silver' are not present there, for in that case, we could not have become conscious of them at all; but that they are not such as can be put to practical use. The distinction between truth and error comes thus to be significant only from the practical standpoint; from the theoretical one, it does not exist. All knowledge without exception is valid and necessarily so, but such validity need not guarantee that what is known is adequate to satisfy a practical need. A geologist may correctly adjudge a piece of ore as golden; but it does not mean that a bracelet (say) can be made out of the metal in it. This is the significance of the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* definition of truth¹ as not only *yathārtha* or 'agreeing with outside reality,' but also *vyavahārānuguna* or 'conforming to *vyavahāra* or the practical interest of life.' If knowledge should conform to *vyavahāra*, it should in the first place refer to objects of common or collective experience. It is deficiency in this respect, due to their 'private' character, that makes the 'yellow-conch' and the 'dream-elephant' false; and it is this very deficiency when supplied that exposes their falsity. In the second place knowledge to conform to *vayvahāra* should comprehend the *preponderating* element in the object presented. The object we call 'shell' may contain 'silver,' but the 'shell' part predominates in it and it is this predominance that explains its being put to use as the one and not as the other 'Silver' though certainly present, does not count *practically* on account of its *alpatva* or smallness and it is this very feature when discovered that changes the erroneous knowledge of 'silver' into the true one of 'shell.' *Pramā* not only apprehends rightly so far as it goes, but also goes far enough to be of

¹ See *Yatindra-mata-dīpikā*, p. 3. (Ānandāsrama Edn.).

service in life. *Bhrama* also is right so far as it goes ; but it does not go far enough and therefore fails to help us in the manner in which it may be expected to do. So when erroneous knowledge disappears, and truth comes to be known, as Ramanuja's commentator says, "the *artha* (object) is not negated but only *pravṛtti* (activity) is arrested." To express the same otherwise, the discovery of error touches the reactive side of consciousness, not its receptive side.

Two important corollaries follow from such a view. The practical activities of life do not require a complete knowledge of our surroundings. It is enough if we know them approximately fully. In other words purposive thought is selective, not exhaustive; and partial or imperfect knowledge is not necessarily a hindrance to the attainment of the common ends of life. It is important to realise that this is not the same as saying that absolute validity is not found in common knowledge for the advocate of *sat-khyāti*, as we know, insists that all knowledge—even *bhrama*—is correct so far as it goes. The doctrine also recognises a social or intersubjective side to knowledge. (So far as theoretic certainty is concerned, there is no need to appeal from the individual to common consciousness for, as we have so often remarked, it is in the very nature of knowledge, without reference to its being peculiar to one or common to many, to point to reality ; but its serviceability depends upon the general, though tacit testimony of society—upon the 'common' sense of mankind. These observations are sure to suggest a likeness between the doctrine of *sat-khyāti* and what is now known as Pragmatism. Both recognise the instrumental character of knowledge and adopt practical utility as the criterion of truth. But there is one essential difference between them. Here knowledge is valid by its own intrinsic nature and not because it 'works' or is serviceable. That is, Ramanuja admits the cognitive value of knowledge apart from the practical, whereas Pragmatism in its familiar form seems to admit no such distinction. Even in error, there is

some revelation of reality, so that in adopting the pragmatic attitude Ramanuja does not relinquish the philosophic one. In fact knowledge according to him has not one but two functions to perform—to reveal reality and to serve the purposes of practical life. Both are equally important; and if either is to be emphasised more than the other, it would undoubtedly be the former. This should not be understood as introducing a double criterion for judging knowledge, for practical value and logical validity, according to Ramanuja, do not exclude each other. Doubtless the two are not the same, but there is no incompatibility between them, especially as one of them, *viz.*, validity is a constant and not a passing feature of knowledge.

The view which we have so far sketched somewhat alters the nature of the epistemological problem. (The question to be decided about knowledge is not whether it is valid or not—for by deficiency in this respect knowledge would lose its very title to that name—but whether it comprehends less or more of its object. In other words, it is not quality that varies in knowledge but range. If we take this along with what was stated above, *viz.*, that even truth may reveal reality only incompletely, we see that the *sat-khyāti* doctrine contains the suggestion of an ideal form of knowledge which is not only valid and has practical value but is also all-comprehensive. This ideal of perfect knowledge¹ which we may deduce from the premises of *sat-khyāti* is actually recognized by Ramanuja as characterizing the *jīva* in its condition of *mukti*. Throughout *samsāra*, as we have already stated, *jñāna* is said to operate under limitations, for *doṣas* of one kind or another interfere with its free activity. Consequently common knowledge, including *pramā* or truth, only half reveals reality. Its full revelation is possible only in *mukti* when all *doṣas* are overcome and all possibility of error is removed. Man's vision then becomes extended to the maximum. 'It blossoms to the

¹ Compare the *Kevala-jñāna* of Jainism with which this ideal may not be historically unconnected.

full,' as it is said ; and the *mukta* knows each and every thing fully and as it is. We do not mean by referring to this support from the side of logic to the *Visiṣṭādvaita* conception of *mutki* that it is necessarily right in all its details. It may well be that several of them have nothing more than speculation or dogma as their basis. All that we wish to point out here is that there is no disharmony between Ramanuja's theory of knowledge and the final goal of *Visiṣṭādvaita* as taught by him.

M. HIRIYANNA.

BĀDARĀYANA'S PHILOSOPHY

The only definitely known work of Bādarāyaṇa is the famous Brahma Sūtras, known also as Brahma-mīmāṃsā Sūtras or Vedānta Sūtras. An approximation of his philosophy has therefore to be made only as a result of critical and comparative study of the import of the Brahma Sūtras. If the equation of identity between Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma Sūtras and Vyāsa, the great author of the Mahābhārata which contains that philosophic classic, the Bhagavad-Gītā, is admitted, then an estimation of Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy becomes the most difficult of all tasks. Personally, therefore, I stick to the historical existence of a separate Sūtra-Kāra, long after the days of the great Scholiast Vyāsa, necessarily because of the fact that the author of the Sūtras pre-supposes and in fact relies on many an occasion on the authority of the Smṛti writer, the author of the Bhagavadgītā. It is the particular desire of Bādarāyaṇa to correlate what the revealed tradition has to say with what is adumbrated in the Gītā, giving due weight to the various stages of development of philosophic thought and speculation. His enquiry into the science of Brahman which he predicates in the first Sūtra *athāto brahmajijñāsā* is carried on really rationalistic lines, first by the elucidation of the fundamental facts of the seemingly permanent relationships between God, Soul and Matter as propounded in his second Sūtra *janmadyasya yataḥ*, the conclusions therein arrived at being based on the conclusive authority of Śāstra, *sāstrayonitvāt*, Śāstra clearly meaning Śruti as well as Smṛti up to a stage—not the absolutely steel-framed mechanism of the Śruti texts which very often apparently contradict one another, sometimes in and around the same context and at other times

by distinctly divergent views expressed on different occasions but Śruti texts which could admit of a harmonious blending by all accepted canons of correct knowledge as amplified and delimited by the authority of the Smṛti literature as correlated to the individual experience *ātmānubhava*, which in its final and absolute realisation resolves itself to be the one and only sure instrument for true Knowledge. This process of arriving at a true comprehension of Absolute Reality is to Bādarāyaṇa a very simple, reliable and correct process, the method being the method of *samanvaya*, correct understanding in and through the process of interrelating all seemingly conflicting passages and apparently contradictory conclusions so as to make them point out their true purport. Thus a critical study of the first four introductory Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa will easily supply us with a definite idea of Bādarāyaṇa's aim, the method he employs to arrive at his conclusions and the conclusion he would like to arrive at.

In academic circles, it is now easily conceded that the three great systems of Vedānta Philosophy represented respectively by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva did not exactly originate with them, that these ideas, though only in the main, existed long before and that these systems came to be called after these great Ācāryas only because of the fact that they were the first to give us a systematised presentation of their conclusions. There is a fourth system also which is represented by Śrīkaṇṭha or Śrīkaṇṭha Sivācārya. A cursory glance into Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya will not be enough to approximate his true philosophic contribution; but his great commentator Appaya Dīkṣitar who flourished during the last decades of the sixteenth century has amplified Śrīkaṇṭha's philosophy in his monumental work *Śivārka-Manidīpikā*.¹ Śrīkaṇṭha's System also must have existed long before him and he was only the

¹ It is not correct to say that Śrīkaṇṭha is but the Saivite counterpart of Rāmānuja. Śrīkaṇṭha is something quite different and I shall in its proper place give a brief summary of his conclusions.

first of a long line of text-book-writers who systematised and perfected that school of thought.

A critical examination of all these four systems yields us the important result that Bādarāyaṇa must have been quite aware of these systems in the germ in composing the Brahma Sūtras. The humour of the situation lies in this—that these four systems were quite orthodox systems based on the Upaniṣads—at any rate on the more ancient and therefore the more authoritative Upaniṣads as well as on Smṛiti literature chiefly represented by the Gītā. The apparently conflicting conclusions and argumentative analyses contained in the philosophical literature of the Upaniṣads and the Gītā gave rise to the systematisation of the teachings contained in them and four different distinct schools of philosophy arose.

The internal dissensions in the camp of the philosophers and the growing importance of the non-orthodox systems of the Baudhdhas and other logicians, must have set Bādarāyaṇa thinking. The only hope of salvation lay through the door of conciliation, reconciling the fundamental truth as something which was not exactly distinct from the conclusions of the four schools but which was being revealed, though only partly and incompletely, by each school. It is this attempt at conciliation that has given us these immortal 550 and odd Sūtras known as the Brahma Sūtras.

Long after, the rise of Buddhism and Jainism into still greater prominence, the growing dislike of Sacerdotal Brahminism and various other causes led to a very grave situation portending the utter demolition of the stupendous structure of the orthodox systems. Then it was that Śaṅkara came to the rescue and wrote his immortal work. His minor treatises paved the way. But a master-stroke was necessary. The antagonists were too many and were quite respectable and could not be ignored. He therefore took up the cudgels seriously and systematised the teaching of the Vedānta Sūtras. It should be noted that Śaṅkara clearly stated that he was only following

the foot-steps of his predecessors, that he was only a follower and not the originator or leader of his school. Śaṅkara had really to be highly logical—even logical to the very extreme. For his opponents, the Bauddhas and others, were, if anything, pure logicians. While Śaṅkara's system was duly enthroned as the victor, it did not exactly satisfy the growing and newly stirred-up cravings of the less cultured masses. He was too much for their comprehension. Rāmānuja arose to take up his mission which was directed more to the rejuvenation of the masses by presenting the Sūtras in more popular and attractive form, dealing with less of metaphysics and more of religion. Philosophy, rigid and stiff as it was with Śaṅkara, bore on it the mellowing influence of religion; and we have Ramanuja's system, which appealed to the public to a yet greater degree more readily. The insurgent masses could not be so easily duped by Rāmānuja. To them Rāmānuja was only seemingly satisfactory as he too demanded very nearly all the requisite highly-strung metaphysical conclusions of Śaṅkara, though only not saying so in as many words. Rāmānuja's system appeared to them only as a sugar-coated quinine pill—sweet at first when taken but soon after its bitterness was there alright. Therefore Madhvācārya arose to present Bādarāyaṇa in a different light. He accepted all the objections to the Śaṅkara and the Rāmānuja Schools and perverted and diverted logic to make Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy something akin to absolute Realism. The face values of the facts of the universe were taken for their accepted and ultimate value. With the hand-maid of religion, he evolved and perfected his system whose chief contribution to metaphysics was that it was perfectly subordinated to Religion through the prostituted pressure of formal logic.

There are reasons to suppose that Śrīkaṇṭha should have preceded Śaṅkara. There is very little of difference from the point of view of metaphysics between Śrīkaṇṭha and Śaṅkara, except this—that while Śaṅkara's Brahman is a negation of all qualities and attributes and with reference to which no positive

aspect can be predicated, Śrīkanṭha's Brahman is something of which positivity and positive aspect can well be predicated. It is *Saccidānanda*, *Sat* only to those who would only view the Brahman that way but none the less *Cit* as well as *Ānanda*, and again *Cit* only to those who may care to view it only that way, but none the less full of *Sat* and *Ānanda* and *Ānanda* only to those who may choose to restrict their ideas of Brahman, though all the time it has been really full of *Sat* and *Cit*. The idea is that *Sat* alone does not exist except in company with *Cit* and *Ānanda*, *Cit* alone does not exist separately nor *Ānanda* alone. You have to imagine a sort of triangular constituency where each appears to be the major item,—but where really there is nothing like separateness or differentiation. It is a single concept which, differently viewed at, presents a different phase. The chief point about Śrīkanṭha's Brahman is its volitional or positive aspect as opposed to the non-volitional or negative aspect of Śaṅkara's Brahman.

I have so far tried to show the relative positions of Madhva, Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara and Śrīkanṭha. In the ladder of philosophical quest, it is only a question of mounting step by step. From the absolute Realism of Madhva, the next step leads on to the Religion-cum-Metaphysics of Rāmānuja, the still higher step being the too stiff and logical non-dualism of Śaṅkara. A still higher step is that of Śrīkanṭha who represents a pure and unadulterated Monism of which a positivity can be predicated, effectively answering most of the critics of Śaṅkara.

It appears to me that within the compass of his Sūtras, Bādarāyaṇa has accepted in the germ, the genesis of all these four schools of thought as possessing each its degree of truth. Bādarāyaṇa's idea seems to have been that all these are equally good, well-planned, well-maintained and traditionally accepted roads to the goal of liberation. The originals of all these schools must have existed during his time. He brought out his hand of systematisation and showed in his Sūtras how these systems though apparently warring and contradictory have yet

a soul of commonness of purpose which if clearly discerned would definitely lead on the enquirer, however strict and rigid a logician and metaphysician he may be, ultimately to liberation through an unquestionable road.

If the *Brahma Sūtras* are subjected to a critical study as outlined in the Abstract I have no doubt that an impartial enquirer would come to the above conclusions.

Professor Deussen has done us a distinct service by his excellent work—*The system des Vedanta*—presenting Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Brahma-sūtras* from the critical and comparative point of view. If similar work is done with reference to the three other systems mentioned above, then we can have all the necessary reliable material which, when subjected to a comprehensive and critical synthesis will yield us a true and full idea of Bādarāyaṇa's Philosophy.

The philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa as thus conceived bears a strong resemblance to the critical idealism of the West especially as developed by the English philosophers, Bradley and Bosanquet. The central feature of this system of philosophy is the comprehension of all other possible views within itself, each as possessing its degree of truth as finally synthesised and transcended in the ultimate view. This attempt at synthesising instead of merely leaving out warring theories is just what is claimed to be the characteristic of Bādarāyaṇa. It will not be possible here to develop the parallel in greater detail. But reference may be made to one interesting and striking coincidence between Bādarāyaṇa's treatment of points of view and that of Bosanquet. It will be remembered that the latter recognises three grades of thinking—common-sense, common-sense theory and philosophical theory. For common-sense, there is an experienced dualism of subject and object; common-sense theory hypostatizes the subject and object as different independent existants, lying each outside the other and requiring an impossible bridge over an imaginary chasm. Philosophical theory transcends this notion of duality and brings to clear

relief the unity that was imbedded in the common-sense theory all the time. It does not merely negate common-sense theory but goes beyond it and includes it within itself. This three-fold distinction closely corresponds to that between *Vyāvahārika*, *Prātibhāsika* and *Pāramārthika* states of comprehension. Vyāvahāra is just cognition of the External World. Pratibhāsa is the hypostatisation of Externality. Paramārtha is the comprehension of absolute experience which is beyond the duality and but for which there would be no duality.

P. P. S. SASTRI

A SYNTHETIC STUDY OF THE VEDĀNTA

The object of the Vedānta is the apprehension of Brahman enshrined in Sāstra and justified by reasoning and sense perception and the attainment of its infinite bliss. Sruti being the very breath of Brahman is its own evidence; it is eternal and impersonal and is the source of all knowledge. The postulate of Vedāntic thought is the knowability of Brahman by means of intuitive insight afforded by the teaching of the Guru, individual reflection, and direct revelation. Divinity can never be realised by mere dialectics. Reason can only determine truth but cannot discover it. The seeker after truth becomes a seer and it is this test of personal verifiability that invests the study of the Vedānta with a unique value of its own. The intuitions of the Upanishads are systematised by the Sūtras and summed up by the Gitā, and the three together form the Vedānta Prasthānas. The Vedānta reveals the nature of Brahman as the supreme truth, beauty and goodness and pragmatically speaking, any scripture which aims at the same ideal may be accepted as a species of Vedāntic revelation. This view enables us to re-state the method of the Vedānta and emphasise its synthetic rather than the Siddhānta aspect. The Sūtra is an analytic study of the Sruti and by employing the logical test of consistency and the Mimāṃsa rules of Vedic interpretation, establishes truth by the refutation of rival theories. But its comprehensiveness has given rise to a variety of Vedāntic systems which baffle us by their contradictions. Every system selects a type of Vedic judgments as its central concept and deduces a system therefrom. The synthetic method claims to analyse the rich and varied content of Vedāntic experiences and see them whole without sacrificing their integrity. The criterion of the Vedānta is the Sūtra, but the Gitā is the crown.

It is the synthesis of the logical ground as well as the religious goal. Metaphysics is not really divorced from true mysticism and the mapmaking mind has also the divine vision of seeing the soul of all things in God. Vedānta is the ideal in which all ideals are realised and addresses itself to the whole being of men. It aims at logical satisfactoriness as well as the spiritual satisfaction. The synthetic study demands an openness of mind which disdains dogma as well as uncertainty, a comprehensiveness of outlook which seeks affinities between truths without impairing their integrity, a passion for the Sutra method of consistency combining with the synoptic vision of the Gitā and an insight into the soul of each system as a tissue of divine unity. The Vedāntic study pre-supposes (1) a faith in the co-ordination of Sruti, reasoning, and experience (2) a lofty view of personality satisfying the higher logical, ethical, and aesthetic needs, (3) the belief in one God as the source and goal of human experience, making for rationality, righteousness, and rapture, (4) a passion for realising Brahman by an inductive elimination of the false values of Prakriti and (5) a living faith in the ultimate knowability of God by all.

The Vedānta is primarily interested in the knowledge of personality, human as well as Divine, and the discovery of their exact religious relations indicated by the Vedic judgment "Thou art that." All existence is for a self which is its own evidence, persisting in its being as a self-determined subject and essentially free from ignorance, evil, and the ills of *samsāra*. The problem of matter and the origin of the cosmos occupy only the outskirts of the Vedānta and it may well be contended that no theory of creation is either final or satisfying. This truth accounts for the selection of the terms Dwaita, Adwaita and Visistādwaita to connote the spiritual relationship between the Jiva and Iswara as the central thought of the Sruti. It is the exact meaning given to the above Vedic judgment that determines the differentia of each school of thought. Adwaita

refers to the absolute identity between Jiva and Iswara. But the Dwaita abhors the absolute. Visishtādwaita claims to mediate between the two. It is of profound interest to examine the details of each school, study the variations, and thus bring out their mutual bearings. Each school will be seen to admit of seven species of experience including the avaidika or alien varieties that are related to them. The Dwaita relations may be classified into seven kinds : (1) Lord and subject, (2) Master and servant, (3) Friend and friend, (4) Father and son, (5) Mother and son, (6) Son and mother, and (7) Bridegroom and bride. The Visishtādwaitic varieties may be grouped into (1) Vadagalaism, (2) Thengalaism, (3) Vallabhaism, (4) Saiva Siddhānta, (5) Christian mysticism, (6) Sufeeism and (7) Jainism. The main Adwaitic varieties are (1) Sankara Adwaita, (2) and (3) the pure Adwaita of Māyāvāda and Buddhism, (4), (5) (6), and (7) the practical Adwaita of Dhyana Vidi Niyoga Bhāskara, Yādhava and Anubhavādwaita.

1. The system of *Dwaita* selects the bheda srutis as its main texts and posits the personality of God as a Perfect self-conscious Will distinct from the plurality of the finite selves and the aggregate of material things. The self cannot be its own object nor can it have common parts with other selves without sacrificing its individuality. It is an eternal self-conscious monadic personality absolutely dependent on the will of God. The Vedic judgment only brings out the self-dependence of God, the dependence of the Jivas on His will and the eternal differences in the experience of mukthi in which all desires are satisfied without the sting of sin or the sorrows of satiety. Dwaita thrives in the atmosphere of anthropomorphism. God enters into personal spiritual relations with man and this relationship implies the externality of the relata and their eternal difference manifesting itself in seven forms of devotion.

(1) *God as Lord or Ruler.* The idea of God as Iswara, Lord or Āllā connotes His omnipotence and the impotence of

Jiva and thus generates in the devotee the attitude of reverence and resignation. The name Islam is said to refer to the surrender of man to the will of an extra cosmic God and Mohammed His Vicegerent on earth. (2) *God as master or the Dāsya mood*. It is the mood of dependence on God and personal service to Him and arises out of the consciousness of divine power and goodness. (3) *God as Father or Pithā*. This mood combines the reverence that results from the worship of His transcendental eminence and the intimacy of His immanence. According to Christianity fellowship with God is the harmony of the human will with the divine will. Christ is the divine copula between the finite and the infinite atoning for the sins of man and revealing the redemptive glory of God. Salvation is at-one-ment with God in his Kingdom of love and attunement with His redemptive purpose. In the Zoroastrian scheme in which the spirit of righteousness is united with the spirit of evil in the one God, the elect soul is to ally itself with the good by absolute piety and purity till in the fulness of time it passes to the other shore and enjoys eternal fellowship with God in the Kingdom of Heaven. (4) *God as Friend*. The Sakhya state is the consciousness of equality between God and the devotee as seen in the case of the cowherd boys of Brindāvan and in the case of Sundara-murthiswamigal. (5) *God as Mother or Thayar or Māthā*. The motherhood of God is a peculiar type of Vedāntic experience associated with Vaishnavism and Saivaism. It is Sri or Lakshmi that changes Iswara as Law-giver into redeemer and thus offers security to the karma-ridden sinner. In Saivaism and tantra worship, the mother idea stands for energising of Divine Sakti which sustains the soul with love and grace. (6) *God as a Child*. The Vāthsalya bhāva brings out the motherly tenderness and care which the devotee exhibits for God and follows directly from the excessive love to His beauteous form exhibited in avathāra and archa as seen in the love of Periālwār and other Ālwārs. (7) *God as*

Bridegroom. In the Nāyaka-nāyaki bhāva or Madhura bhāva as Chaitanya calls it in his scheme of bhāvas, the love of the devotee for the Beloved develops into the restless madness of a mahā bhāva and becomes the fulfilment of all other devotions. Love disdains even mukthi if it is emptied of Krishna-love and rejects the Iswaratva exhibited in the Krishna of Mathurā and Dwārakā. The Lord Himself spurns his transcendentalism and yearns for human love. Nāyaki love in Sri Vaishnavism connotes dependence (pārathantīyam) and exclusive love to the Nāyaka (anannyārha-seshatvam) and is thus regarded as the most adequate symbol of parā-bhakthi. In the restless love of Rādhā, a storm of spiritual feeling sweeps through the soul and swinging between the agony of separation and the thrills of divine touches, the self-feeling at last vanishes and the two are ultimately glued together in one spirit. When the infinite feelings stored up in the instincts are spiritualised and directed to God, they lose their sensuality and develop into an irresistible craving for God. But reason exulting in its self-sufficient serenity sees in all these states nothing but hysterical fits and erotic excesses.

II. *Adwaita.*—To the monistic mind duality is only a delusion and death. Personality, human as well as divine, is a mere perishing phenomenal process limited by time, space and causality and in the absolute state of samādhi, the self expands into the infinity of being and dies a nameless death in the spaceless chithākāsa and is immersed in eternal bliss. Existence is the experience of a self-conscious subject and when the self ceases to be the subject, it returns to its own state of sat, chit and ānanda. The Adwaitic interpretation of Sankara is based on this experience and the four truths deduced therefrom, viz., (1) Nirguna Brahman, (2) Vivartha-vāda, (3) Jahat-ajahat-lakshana and (4) Jivan-mukti. Knowledge is a cognition and not an affirmation and is obtained by the abedha srutis known as Mahāvākyas or Adwaitic judgments. Consciousness is self-posited, eternal and absolute,

and every predication thereof is a determination and contradiction and therefore not true. Identity precedes difference and then denies it. The copula in the Vedic judgment refers to the absolute identity of the Jīva and Iswara by the elimination of all differences. With the dawn of this cosmic consciousness, individuality which is a mass of solidified māyā now disappears like an iceberg in the morning sun and expands into the infinity of light and love, released from all dwandwas and duality.

(2) and (3). The more thoroughgoing Advaitin rejects the religious or practical adwaita of Sankara and deduces his pure adwaita by means of dialectic enquiry. The world process is now explained as the effectuation of māyā and māyā-bound Iswara or more consistently still the actualisation of avidyā or subjective illusion. Māyā is the cause of the cosmic fiction and is an all-enveloping darkness. But since what has a beginning or end cannot be real, māyā is really non-existent like the horn of a hair. The extreme form of logical adwaita is exhibited in the Buddhistic idealism of vijñānavāda and mādhyamika. The absolute is the negation of the phenomenal process riddled with contradictions. By fixing the mind on the phenomenal flux, the flux ceases to flow and then the 'that' alone (vijñāna) remains without the 'what.' This state is known as Nirvāna which is 'sinless, stirless rest which knows no change.' From the logical point of view this is the extreme form of metaphysical monism in its negative aspect.

The practical adwaita of Sankara in its ethical aspect is developed by the theory of (4), dhyāna, vidhi, niyoga, and the two schools of bheda'bheda, (5) and (6). The former disputes the validity of securing moksha by the mere knowledge of the Vedic judgment. It is only by the spiritual process of purification and meditation that the intuition of Brahman dawns on the mind, followed by the disappearance of the cosmic illusion. The bedhā'bheda view is the development of the logical principle of identity in difference and thus

postulates the co-existence of apparently contradictory qualities. The Vedic judgment from this point of view affirms the unity as well as the difference of spiritual experience. To Bhāskara however identity is essential and difference is only an adventitious limitation of empirical experience. Even God is only one of the eaches or adjectives of the absolute though He has maximum being and in the self-identity of Brahman, the finite transcends itself and its content coalesces with that of Brahman like 'a perfume exhaled in the very dissolution of its being.' But Yādhava rejects the doctrine of Upādhis and asserts the equal and eternal reality of both identity and difference. (7) Anubhavādwaita lays stress on the parināma-vāda and krama-mukti or the progressive realisation of Brahman in the expanding experience of the brahmavara, brahmavaryan and brahmavarishtan. The last stage is the fulfilment of the adwaitic process and is known as thuriya theetha.

III. *Visishtādwaita*.—It is a form of Personalism midway between theism and absolutism in which the Jīva is neither a distinct real external to God nor a differentiation transcending itself in the absolute nor a vanishing process. It is a personality organically united with God who is its source as well as sustainer. Rāmānuja insists on the reality of experience and the equal validity of all Vedic texts. Reality is an affirmation and not a mere cognition. From this realistic postulate he deduces the principles of (sāmānādhikaranya) (appradaksidhaviseshana), sarira-sariri sambandha and kramamukthi. The Vedic judgment exhibits Brahman as the 'unity of composition' in co-ordination with the same Brahman as the inner self of individuality. Every determining attribute refers to the subject of which it is the attribute. Likewise, a word connoting the body also connotes the self of which it is the body. The Vedic judgment thus speaks of Swethaketu as the body of Brahman. The Jīva is a living tissue of God functioning through thought (ādheyatwa), will (videyatwa) and feeling (seshatwa). That is, the Jīva is

sustained and controlled by God and becomes a means to His satisfaction. Brahman is the life of its life under the forms of causality; substantiality and totality. He is the inner ruler of individuality and impelled by the redemptive impulse of Sri, He is interested in the making of souls. Though the Jīva is monadic in substance its attributive thought expands into the omniscience of God. Freed from the shackles of karma its ahankāra is transfigured into the aham as the mode of God. He becomes Brahmanised in intelligence and bliss, but without the cosmic will of Brahman. Owing to its atomic finitude, the self is absolutely dependent on the will of God who, as the seshi, is really the means as well as the end. The mystic experience of Nammālwār forms the background of this śiddhānta. The soul is sustained and supported by the Lord and is only a means to His satisfaction. Seized with soul hunger, the Lord of love assaults the Jīva and tries to swallow up its whole being. The self likewise thirsts for God and is thrilled by His touches. The grace of God is answered by the gift of self. The creative deliciousness of this communion is enhanced by the alternation of the joy with the gloom of separation. In the rapport that follows, individuality swoons away and expires in eternal enjoyment and service.

In the synthetic interpretation of this spiritual experience of the Rishis and the Ālwārs, in what is styled as Ubhaya-vedānta there arose two schools of thought called Vadagalaism and Thengalaism. (1) Vedānta Desika, the founder of the former school, explains the Ālwārs in the light of the teachings of the Rishis and though he recognises prapatti as an alternative and direct means of attaining salvation, he emphasises the volitional type of devotion wherein moral freedom and self-gift have their fruition in the gift of the redemptive grace of God. (2) Thengalaism led by Lokācharya lays more stress on the Tamil Veda and self-surrender type of devotion in which the Lord of Love fulfils himself by seeking the sinner and even relishing his sins. Self-donation then follows from the inflow

of His redemptive grace. (3) The Vallabha system styled as Suddhādwaita relates to the monistic experience of Rādhā-Krishna whose beauteous form is made of love itself. Krishna as sat, chit and ānanda delights Himself by assuming their forms. The highest form of devotion called pushti-bhakti is not a mere discipline but a deluge of divine love in which the soul is immersed without self-extinction.

(4) Saiva Siddhānta is the systematisation of the srutis, the Saivāgamas and the experiences of the Saiva Nayanmars and other saints and resembles in its philosophic aspect as brought out by Neelkanta, the commentator of the sutras, the essentials of Rāmānuja system in many respects. It posits the three eternal categories of pathi, pasu and pasam which can be distinguished but not divided. Pathi is the supreme lord Siva who is the essence of life, light and love, the formless absolute who out of mercy assumes eight cosmic forms without the limitation of incarnation.

Like a crystal or mirror, the pasu or Jīva assumes the form of what is presented to it. It may be a mode of matter or a mode of Siva. Salvation is secured by the Jīva becoming one with Siva after giving up its false identity with matter and its 36 modes. In the transition from swānubhava to sivānubhava the self is not absorbed by the Absolute. Its adwaita relation connotes dependence and inseparability (ananyatwa). Absorption is thus not loss of personality but loss in personality. Separateness alone is destroyed but not substantiality. Sākthaism as a Vedāntic variety is a religion of love in which Sakthi as Mother lavishes her love on the devotee and grants him nirvana mukti higher than the state of sāyujya itself.

(5) Christian mysticism is, pragmatically speaking, closely allied to Visishtādwaitic experience and is supported by its own āgamas. The soul with its genius for God in whom it lives, moves and has its being, yearns for the rapture of re-union. In the game of love, there is as usual a swinging between

gloom and joy till the fulness of final rapture is attained. In that state of self-loss, there is the dower of divine vitality in which the grace of God responds to the self-donation in the 'osmosis between the self and the God.'

(6) Sufeeism also asserts the truth of God as love and indicates the means of drinking that love and satisfying the thirst for eternal joy. Man is the meeting point of the absolute and the phenomenal show and he alone can imitate God in His wholeness. When the Lord of Love is reached I and thou get dissolved in the ocean of divine bliss like breaking bubbles.

(7) Jainism. While Buddhism refers to the 'that' in the Vedic judgment, Jainism going to the other extreme, refers to the 'thou' alone and deifies it. In the state of mukti the Jiva is practically Brahmanised.

Conclusion.—This rapid survey of the Vedāntic varieties and the religions allied to them in spirit enables us to study their mutual relations in the light of their own religious insight. Every school claims insight into Truth and bases that claim on logical consistency and spiritual satisfactoriness. While the Rishi seeks the direct intuition of God, the mere Āchārya in his passion for logic misses the spiritual meaning of his central concept. The logic of 'one religion' based on non-contradiction is valid so far as it goes, but how is the truth of given premises to be tested? Institutionism feeds on the impulse of uniformity and glorification, and very often allies itself with secularism and force. The method of immanent criticism adopted in this study is rooted in the assumption of the indwelling of Brahman in all Vedāntic experiences, and in all humility tries to find out the heart of religions without destroying their individuality. It utilises to the fullest extent the value of other methods like history, psychology and evolution.

Historically speaking, each school is a response to the vital needs of the age which gave birth to it and is its highest fulfilment. Psychology studies the mentality of each school

and explains it by reference to temperament, environment and education. It recognises the equal values of the three functions of thought, feeling and will, and attributes the differences in the three schools to their undue emphasis of one function in the Divine life. Likewise, the four means of mukti, *viz.*, karma yoga, bhakti yoga, rāja yoga and jñāna yoga are founded on the functions of will, feeling and thought. The service rendered by the pragmatic method to synthetic study is invaluable. Religion aims at intellectual illumination, moral elevation and emotional exaltation, and any religion which satisfies this sātṛwika test may therefore be accepted as true. The method of mysticism claims the supreme authoritativeness of personal experience. Every form of mysticism speaks with one voice about the knowability of God and the attainment of immortal bliss. The evolutionary method is applied to the growth of religious experience as a progressive realization of Brahman. From this point of view truth is not a progress from falsity ; it is a progress from the lower to the higher. Adwaita, for example, employs this test and claims to reconcile all systems. Religion starts with dualistic externality and differentiation and ends with unity and identity. But the assimilation of experience on this Adwaitic basis or bias is not acceptable to the theistic temper. If Dwaita is a concession to empiricism, a Bedhavādin may retort by saying that Adwaita is an empty abstraction starving the vital needs of personality. It is therefore safer to follow the traditional view that each system has its own individuality sanctified by immemorial custom.

The content of spiritual experience is determined by the nature of the aspirant's devotion or meditation. The riches of spiritual life cannot be exhausted by mere labels and symbols. While discussing the nature of the 32 vidyās mentioned in the sruti, the sutrakāra concludes in favour of individual choice on account of the identity of the results, *viz.*, the knowledge of the Brahman and the consequent release from

samsāric evil and ignorance. The Rig-veda asserts this truth in the well-known saying "that which exists is one, the sages call it variously," and is confirmed by the Gitā "Whatsoever worships me in whatsoever form finally reaches me." The variety of the experiences of Nammālwār and Rāmkrishna points to the manifold ways in which the Lord manifests Himself in moods of the devotee. Practically speaking, the difference between Visishtādwaitic and Adwaitic experience is the distinction between absorption and identity. To the mumukshu, it is almost immaterial to know whether there is self-forgetfulness or self-negation in the Adwaitic experience. Applying the method of Rāmānuja we may say that an attribute connotes its substance, and conclude that every Vedāntic experience refers to a specific character of Brahman, and therefore to Brahman himself. God is the goal of all spiritual endeavour, and employing the analogy of the circle and the radii, we may say that God is the centre in whom each of the 21 experiences sketched above ultimately meet. The gift of self to God who is its seed and source is the birthright of every man and religion ought to provide for a dualist to whom monism is a mass of *māyā* and an adwaitin who sees delusion and death in duality. In Divine Democracy there is certainly a place for Janaka, Prahlāda, Vāmadeva and Jaḍabharata, and for the founders of all noble faiths. Vedānta also recognises and realises the inherent quality of every religious experience to guarantee God and has therefore a justifiable claim to universality. As a Visishtādwaitin having his faith in Krishna as Purnāvathāra, immanent in all sects, as their source and goal, I love to think of the jiva-hood of all living beings and the fraternity of faiths. Sects may multiply but the God of sects is the same, and may Vedānta unify all religions and thus glorify the land of its birth as of yore.

P. N. SRINIVASACHARI

THE NATURE OF THE SELF

(A STUDY IN SĀNKHYA AND VĒDĀNTA.)

The problem of the Self is one of the most persistent as also one of the most difficult problems of philosophy. The permanent interest which attaches to it arises from the fact that there is nothing so dear to a man as the Self. There are, of course, persons in every age and country who willingly die for causes and ideals which they hold dearer than life. An adequate solution of the difficulty presented by the behaviour of these martyrs will appear at the end of our investigation. But the truth of the statement that every person attaches the greatest value to his Self will, for the present, be sufficiently borne out by a psychological analysis of the phenomenon of desire. When a poor man desires to be rich, he does it with the belief that wealth will satisfy his needs and when a rich man thirsts for honour and fame, he also thinks that these will satisfy him. But there have been poor men like Socrates who made no effort to be rich, thinking that their needs were not to be fulfilled by wealth. What is an object of desire to one person may be an object of aversion to another and the same person who when hungry desires food may not even bear to see it when he has had more than enough. (These instances make it clear that every object is desired as a means to the fulfilment of the self.) In other words we may say that the essence of desire is a sense of incompleteness coupled with the expectation, true or false, that a certain object, if obtained, will make us complete. The Self thus is the ultimate object of all desire and if the martyr desires to hold fast to his cause or ideal even at the cost of his body it must be in the belief that his self will be fulfilled in that way alone. It is because his self is dearer

to him than the body that he is prepared to sacrifice the latter. As the Brihadāranyakopaniṣad puts it आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियम् भवति (Everything is loved for the sake of self). The self being thus the standard of all value there is a constant reference to it in all our dealings with other persons and things. In social intercourse especially, is it necessary for us to study the nature of others and this we can do only to the extent to which we understand our own Self. In the science of psychology the explanation of most psychical phenomena depends on an adequate idea of the Self while the development of this idea is in itself a subject of absorbing interest. In ethics, the ultimate solution of moral problems is based upon the end of human life but this cannot be discovered before the true nature of the self is determined. In fact, the knowledge of the self may well claim to be the key to the knowledge of the whole Universe and the precept "Know thyself" is perhaps the wisest saying of the wise men of ancient Greece. As the same Upaniṣad says further आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासीतव्यः (Verily, the Self, Oh Maitreyi, should be realised and for this purpose it should be heard about, thought about and constantly dwelt upon). Thus it is the duty of every man to find out for himself the true nature of the Self with the help of his own experience and of the great thinkers of the past and present.

If we look at the answers given by the various systems of philosophy we find there is a bewildering variety of them. Each answer is founded upon some experiences and hence is not without an element of truth but the neglect to notice other relevant experiences naturally leads to error. For instance, in ordinary thinking the line between the Self and the not-Self is generally drawn at the surface of the body though sometimes we talk and behave as if our property, family, reputation, and other things are parts of ourself. It is through the body that we act upon the external world (including other members of society) and are in turn acted upon. The state of the body accounts for much of the happiness or misery of our lives. This,



combined with the impossibility of perceiving through the senses anything else, makes some thinkers believe that the Self is the body and nothing else. A sufficient refutation of this view is that it is false to those very experiences (those states of consciousness) by which the body is known to exist. Others would correct this view by including the mind as well as the body into the self. It is possible to point out against this that we experience the body as the object of knowledge as distinguished from ourselves who are the subjects. Still others would make the self consist of the mind alone but understand by mind only passing states of consciousness so that there is no such thing as an identical self persisting through the life of the individual. This view goes against many facts of mental life notably the facts of memory and recognition which require a co-ordination of processes taking place at different times often separated by very long intervals. Thus we see the danger we have to avoid in our quest of the self. We must put together the various kinds of experience we go through in life without omitting any and form a conception of the self that will be consistent with them all. For this purpose we shall first examine commonsense notions which though often inconsistent with one another are all one-sided views of the truth and will guide us to the desired goal if we make a proper use of them.

What do we include in the self in ordinary thinking? The most important constituent is obviously the body. The condition of the body in respect of health, strength, beauty, age, etc., is taken to be one's own condition (as is evident from forms of speech like "I am ill," "I am old"), so that the identification of the self with the body may be said to be almost complete in most persons. But that there are other things with which men identify themselves is clear from the fact that many men risk their lives in the service of their country, in the pursuit of truth, for maintaining their reputation and even for such a low aim as that of money-making. Whatever a man lays down his life for

is obviously to him his true self or at least a more important part of his self than his body. Though these men form a small minority while those that would keep body and soul together at any cost are the vast majority, yet there is no doubt that the latter also include in their self material possessions, relatives, country, reputation and ideals generally to a greater or less extent as determined by their mental and moral development.

In general, everything which we are glad to have and sorry to part with or any cause which we should like to see prospering and should not like to see suffering is so far considered by us to be a portion of our self. A man who loses his money or son feels himself, as it were, mutilated and many times says that he is ruined. On the other hand a man whose business is prospering and who is surrounded by a growing and happy family feels that his self is becoming fuller and larger.

Now it is true that along with the sense of unity we are also aware of our distinction from our material possessions, relatives and friends. This awareness is due to their being objects which are known by us or of which we are conscious and it is brought home to us by their frequent absence. Though the body also is as much an object of consciousness as a house, yet as it is always with us and constantly affects us agreeably or disagreeably, its distinction from the self is obscured and is realised only by an effort of reflective analysis. A man certainly speaks as if he is his body when he says "I am ill," but if we ask him how he came to know of his illness he will answer "Why? Am I not conscious of the body and its conditions?" If we further ask him whether the body is conscious of itself he will say "No; I am conscious of the body which is not conscious of itself." This experience shows the falsity of the belief that he is the same as his body.

Having thus established the distinction of the self from the body, we may proceed further along the same line of reasoning. On the principle that every object of consciousness is distinct from the self, we see how the various modifications of the



mind called in modern psychology "Immediate experiences (and including sensations, images, formless states of mind as also ideas, concepts, beliefs, emotions, desires, and volitions), are not parts of the self but only objects of which the self is the conscious subject. Thus consciousness taken apart from all objects is seen to be the essential nature of the self." This experience of the self as the conscious subject or as consciousness is involved in all our conscious life and enables every one to say with Descartes "*Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am, *i.e.*, I exist as the thinker or the conscious subject)." Hume, losing sight of this constant experience of the self looked for it among the objects of consciousness and failing to find it there denied its existence apart from perceptions. Thus the one thing which is beyond the possibility of doubt (as doubt itself presupposes the doubter) is to Hume as good as non-existing.

Before we proceed further we have to answer a serious objection which might be raised here. On hearing that consciousness taken apart from all objects is the self, one may naturally ask. "How can consciousness ever be without an object? It must always have some object or another." The objection may be answered in this way. It is true that for want of a better word we use the name consciousness which like all other words is relative. The word subject implies a similar relation. But we guard against this implication by using the expression consciousness without an object or pure consciousness. The self as related to objects is called "consciousness" but it is not necessary that it should be always so related. The very fact that it is not bound up with any particular object but may have one object or another shows that its existence is independent of all objects. A simple illustration will make this clear. Light, as that which illuminates, requires something or other to be illuminated by it. But as no particular object is required the thing which we call "light" in its relation to visible objects exists apart from them all. Of course the name

"light" does not properly apply to it when thus taken apart from things illuminated but for want of a better word we convey our meaning by the apparently self-contradictory expression "light without things illuminated." After this explanation we can use the name "pure consciousness," without laying ourselves open to the charge of self-contradiction, to denote the essential nature of the self.

Understood thus the self will be readily seen to be constant and to admit of no change. If we take our waking life on any day from the moment of rising to the moment of falling asleep, we find there is no moment at which consciousness is absent. It remains the same though the objects come and go. It will also be agreed that there is uninterrupted consciousness during dreams; but there appears to be no consciousness during deep sleep. The reason why we think we are unconsciousness during sleep is that on awaking we do not remember to have experienced any object while asleep. Yet we remember that we did not experience anything and this implies that during sleep we were conscious of not experiencing anything. "यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन्वै तन्न पश्यति (Though he does not see anything, he sees that he does not see anything)," says the Upanishad. We can also describe the state of deep sleep as a state of intense happiness and as such a phase of our conscious life. As we rise from deep sleep we feel that we are emerging from an intensely happy state under the influence of which we remain for some time before we are reminded of the preceding day's events and of the occupations of the coming day. Similarly if we observe the process of sinking into deep sleep we feel that we are being merged in a state of bliss. When we feel very sleepy but are prevented from going to sleep by some one talking to us we are vexed and are impatient to enter into the state of bliss which should be ours but for the disturbance. Again if a man is awakened while fast asleep he wishes to do away with the disturbance as soon as possible and to return to the blissful state from which he has been torn away. These



experiences are sufficient to prove that deep sleep is not a period of unconsciousness but one of happiness. The intensity of the happiness is so absorbing that the distinction between subject and object is obscured so that a man is not able to say to himself at the time that he is happy. But this is a characteristic of concentration in general and is no peculiarity of sleep, though such absorption is rare in waking life.

Thus consciousness is one and continuous through waking, dreaming and sleeping. What goes to sleep is not consciousness but the mind which must be distinguished from it as its object. It is the mind that undergoes various modifications during the states of waking and dreaming and remains comparatively unmodified during deep sleep. Mental dispositions or impressions left behind by previous experiences persist during sleep and to a large extent determine the subsequent modification of the mind. Thus all the modifications and changes occur in the mind and body while consciousness (spirit, soul) remains changeless and suffers no breaks. The same result can be reached in another way also. If consciousness undergoes changes, these must be perceived by consciousness itself. Now a change involves a difference between the previous and the subsequent states of a thing. If, therefore, a change in anything is to be perceived both the states must be perceived by the same unchanging perceiver. It will not do for the previous state to be perceived by one perceiver and the subsequent one by another. Hence these changes must necessarily be in the objects and not in consciousness itself which is required to be their perceiver.

From the point of view at which we have now arrived we can see clearly the mistake made by Hume. While looking for the self he could only observe some perception or other and when there was no perception as in sleep, there was no consciousness of self either. Hence he concluded that the self was nothing but a bundle of perceptions, distinct from one another but giving rise to the illusion of identity by their inconceivably rapid succession. He failed to see that if rapid succession is

to give rise to the illusion of identity and continuity (*e.g.*, in the case of a flowing river), the various percepts that succeed one another must be perceived by a really identical perceiver. Apparent identity of the object presupposes real identity of the subject. In fact, Hume's fundamental mistake lay in confining his attention to the objects and in ignoring the subject. Experience has two sides: experience of the object as object and experience of the subject as subject. It was the latter experience that enabled Descartes to say "*Cogito, ergo sum.*" Modern psychology which takes the self to consist mainly of a complex system of mental dispositions is also unable to explain the sense of unity and identity. It is true that mental dispositions are more lasting than the fleeting states of consciousness (so called) but they are constantly being modified by the latter. Old impressions tend to be effaced and new ones arise so that if we compare the dispositions of a man at the age of 35 with those at the age of 10 we shall find very little in common; yet he is sure that he is the same man that existed 25 years back. Again, the only explanation of this sense of identity is that the change being gradual gives rise to this illusion. But, as has been already pointed out, all illusion of identity pre-supposes real identity in the perceiver.

For the foregoing reasons the Sāṅkhya philosopher maintains that the true nature of the self is pure, continuous, immutable consciousness. He may of course be called upon to account for the experience of activity and the cases of alterations of personality. His reply would be that it is the false identification of the self with the mind (which is really active and which sometimes undergoes sudden and vast changes) that is responsible for both. This identification cannot be conceived to have a beginning though, as will appear later, in any particular individual it may have an end. This brings us to the question of the origin and end of the self.

If, as Descartes saw, the existence of the self is beyond the possibility of doubt (as doubting itself requires the self to

exist), we cannot escape the conclusion that it has always been existing and will always continue to exist. To say that anything that really exists now did not exist before and will cease to exist in the future is to admit that something comes out of nothing and passes into nothing which is clearly an absurdity. It will not do to point out against this the creation and destruction of things taking place before our eyes every day; for it is only the form of a thing that comes and goes while the stuff of which it is made exists before the form, along with the form and after the form and is therefore, alone real. As the Chhândogyopanishad says, "वाच-
रंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् (The form is only a name and arises from speech. It is the matter of the earthen pot, viz., the earth which alone is real)." The modern physical scientist who believes in the real existence of matter, also, for this reason, believes in its indestructibility. The Bhagavadgītā expresses the principle thus, "नास्ततो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः (That which does not already exist can never come into existence and that which really exists can never pass out of existence)," and in the words of the मांडूक्योपनिषत्कारिका, "आदावन्ते च यद्वास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा (That which did not exist in the past and will not exist in the future does not also exist in the present)." The self, therefore, of whose present existence there can be no doubt, must always have existed and will always exist. Besides, all destruction that we know of is dis-integration or dissolution into parts; but pure consciousness which can have no parts does not admit of being dis-integrated or dissolved. In fact it is the indispensable witness of all birth and death, production and destruction. If anything exists or ceases to exist it can do so only for some consciousness. True that we can very easily imagine the contents of a box existing without being perceived by any one. Still they exist for our consciousness. Existence and, similarly, non-existence have meaning only as objects of consciousness. Bishop Berkeley's attempt to reduce external

objects to sensations was un-successful and he himself distinguished the two in his Dialogues by saying that the former were ideas of God, not of any particular individual. But he was not able to establish the true relation between God and men. He thought that God had created individual beings and might, if He chose, put an end to them. But consciousness which is the essence of every soul can never be an object and is therefore without birth and death even at the hands of God. As Vidyāraṇyaswami says in the opening passage of his Pañchadasi, “मासाब्दयुगकल्पेषु गतागम्येष्वनेकधा । नोदेतिनास्तमेत्येका संविदेषास्त्रयंप्रभा (Through the endless months, years, ages and cycles, past and to come, this self-luminous consciousness is one and neither begins nor ends).”

The Sāṅkhya philosopher has rendered invaluable service to the cause of truth by determining the exact nature of the self but he is afraid to draw all the conclusions that follow from his discovery. He continues to believe in an endless number of individual selves all existing independently of one another. But if each self is pure consciousness distinguished from all objects, it is impossible to say what can distinguish one self from another. We cannot say that one self occupies this portion of space and another, another portion of space, for consciousness does not occupy space which belongs to the object world. Similarly we cannot distinguish them by temporal relations. The only way that might be supposed to remain is by saying that one self is conscious of one set of objects and another of another. But even this way is not open; for though the self has been said to consist of consciousness, its existence has been seen to be independent of all objects. The Vedānta, therefore, teaches that there is only one universal self in the true sense of the word. The so-called individual selves are only false appearances due to identification with different minds and bodies. Within the false individual self are distinguished various partial selves such as body-self, energy-self, the self as mind (desire and doubt), the self as

intellect (determination), and the self as happiness. Beyond all these is the self as pure consciousness or universal subject (प्रत्यगात्मा). The Sāṅkhya objects to this conclusion by saying that if there were only one (universal) self, all men would be equally happy or equally miserable. But we find that some are happy, others are miserable; some are wise, others are ignorant; some souls are liberated, others are bound. The Vedāntin meets this objection effectively by pointing to his distinction between the individual selves and the universal self, the latter alone being ultimately real. Even the Sāṅkhya believes that the real self is the same, un-changing consciousness throughout and that the experiences in the way of pleasure or pain, knowledge or ignorance, which really belong to the mind are falsely ascribed to the self. The self which is always free is never bound and therefore is never liberated. The Sāṅkhya therefore gains nothing by retaining the conception of a plurality of selves. It must be noted here that even in ordinary thought and conduct we are not altogether without experience of the universal self. When a number of persons (relatives or friends) feel that their interests are the same and, as far as possible, ignore the rights which each has against the others, they may be said to be particularly emphasizing the elements which are common to them as distinguished from those which make them separate individuals. All acts of sympathy and sacrifice involve a certain sense of unity based on the belief that it is only the common or universal element that is essential and real, while what distinguishes one man from another is un-essential and un-real. It is true that our sympathies are generally limited to a more or less narrow sphere—our caste, community, country, religious sect and so on—but the principle underlying a narrow and a world-wide sympathy is just the same, viz., the belief that what is common is alone real and essential. The saint succeeds in freeing himself from all exclusive tendencies by means of the conviction that the one eternal principle which runs through all individuals is alone

valuable while the differences are unessential and not worth considering. It thus appears that the same tendency towards universalization which in ordinary persons works occasionally and to a limited extent is always and consistently carried out by the saint.

But how can the differences among individuals be shown to be un-real? We have already seen that pure consciousness is the same everywhere and that it is the objects alone which vary. The differences among individuals are made by the different minds and bodies which in relation to the real self are objects. They are therefore un-real in the sense that they do not really distinguish one self from another. There is also a further sense in which they are un-real to the Vedāntin. Every object exists only for some subject and therefore presupposes it. The subject on the other hand is a subject only in relation to an object and therefore presupposes it in the same way. Both subject and object thus presuppose each other and must therefore be abstract and hence un-real aspects of one distinctionless concrete reality. The Vedāntin, be it noted, does not deny objective reality. On the contrary he adversely criticises those who, like some of the Buddhists, reduce all things to subjective ideas by pointing out that our experience of external objects clearly involves, besides immediate experiences or modifications of the mind, a consciousness of things outside the mind. His only point is that just as the objects of dream consciousness are un-real when compared with the external objects of waking consciousness, similarly, the latter are un-real as compared to the absolute reality which is beyond the subject-object relation and therefore also beyond all speech and thought. It is called by the names, Self, Consciousness, Infinite, but it is made clear that these names are to be understood apart from the relations which they ordinarily imply. As long, of course, as we have not realised the true nature of this concrete reality we must continue to talk and behave as if objects are real and as



if individuals are, to a certain extent, different from one another.

What is meant by realising the true nature of the self and what is the way to that realisation? Those who take the self to be a complex thing which gradually evolves through life understand by self-realisation the perfect development of the different capacities possessed by the self. According to Aristotle the real nature of a thing is the final stage of its development and till this is reached it exists more or less in potentiality. What is only possible at first is afterwards realised. The use of the phrase may also be justified in another way. The different instincts and capacities which constitute our nature give rise to different needs and the complete satisfaction of these needs is an ideal which every person seeks to realise according to his light and means. What exists at first only in idea is afterwards made real. But when the true nature of the self is seen to be constant and to admit of no development we cannot speak of self-realisation in these senses though there is still a legitimate sense in which we may use the expression. Our ordinary thought and action as we saw at the outset, imply false notions of the self due to our identification with things which properly belong to the world of objects (the not-self). Hence the process of realising the self consists in ridding ourselves of this false identification and attaining to a view of it as it really exists. Owing to the force of habit which is particularly strong in this case it is not sufficient for our purpose to sit down and reflect on the true nature of the self once for all. For in the first place, a certain moral and physical discipline is required for loosening the attachment to 'flesh' which is to be found in almost all persons (though in different degrees) before we can even be inclined to take up the line of reasoning which has been indicated in the foregoing pages. Secondly even if we follow and are convinced for the time being by the reasoning, the mental dispositions left behind by the opposite beliefs which are too deep to

be effaced at once will continue to trouble us by raising doubts and difficulties and will many times make us forget the conclusions at which we have already arrived by sound reasoning. To counteract and finally destroy these dispositions what is required is constant thinking and dwelling upon the true nature of the self. When in consequence of this prolonged process the old habit of thinking is destroyed and a new one formed, then we become free from doubts and difficulties and can be said to have 'realised' the self.

The attainment of this self-realisation (आत्मसाक्षात्कार in the Vedāntic language) marks the end of all temptation, sin, and misery. Unhappiness arises from the presence of unfulfilled wants and happiness has its source in the sense of freedom from want. A man who is convinced that he is really the One, Infinite Being which can neither be added to nor taken away from, must feel that he is above all want, for want implies a sense of incompleteness and the expectation of becoming complete by the acquisition of some object. The person who has realised the self is, therefore, in possession of the source of supreme happiness which is the ultimate aim of all human endeavour though most persons are not clearly aware of this fact. Whatever may be the immediate object of a man's desire, it is always sought after as a means to the removal of the sense of incompleteness which, as has already been pointed out, is an essential element in all desire. All objects of desire are thus considered to be means to a completer self. Desire therefore will come to a natural end and permanent happiness will be gained when we know the self to be really infinite. In this way every man is seeking to realise his infinity though without a clear consciousness of it.

In the light of these truths we are able to settle many differences in ethical science, notably, the opposition between egoism and utilitarianism and that between self-surrender and self-development. In his "Methods of Ethics" Sidgwick makes the truth of utilitarianism rest upon intuition which

means that a man intuitively perceives the ultimate value of general happiness for every person. But if any one says that his intuition declares his own happiness to be ultimately valuable this statement cannot be gainsaid and Sidgwick under these circumstances despairs of reconciling the two standards of value unless the reconciliation takes place in the next world. We now see that the deepest need of every one is to realise his own true nature as being universal and infinite and therefore, regard for one's own happiness and that for universal happiness spring from one and the same source. In the case of the conflict between self-surrender and self-development, we now understand how the individual must abandon false and limited notions of the self if he is to realise his true infinity. The martyr, as has been seen, ceases to identify himself with his body and is therefore prepared to sacrifice it in the interest of what he thinks to be his true self. Even the ordinary suicide is not thinking of putting an end to his own existence but only wants to be free from the trouble which he hopes to avoid by giving up this body.

Thus this grand conception of the self which is the richest treasure bequeathed to us by the ancient sages of our land satisfies the most rigid claims of logical intelligence while at the same time it possesses the highest pragmatic value.

V. B. SHRIKHANDE

SOME REALISTIC ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAṆKARA

The Philosophy of Saṅkara was developed by his followers through centuries of subtle speculations into forms which he himself would find it difficult to accept. But a deplorable lack of the historical sense has stood in the way of realising this important fact and the post-Saṅkarite *advaitism*, with its various developments passes unchallenged in the name of Saṅkara's own philosophy. Consequently the philosophy of Saṅkara, as mingled with and coloured by the views of his followers, has always been found to border on solipsism, acosmism, inactivism and the like, which are but the results of undue emphasis on the negative aspects of *advaita* philosophy.

Some scholars deliberately justify this hopeless confusion by saying that as the post-Saṅkarite *advaitism* is but the faithful working out and logical outcome of Saṅkara's own philosophy, it is quite reasonable to ignore the distinction and view the whole of *advaitism en bloc*. It is convenient, they would say, to judge the merit of Saṅkara's philosophy in light of its historical and logical conclusions.

While granting all this one can scarcely belittle the great importance and necessity of isolating the doctrines of a philosopher from their subsequent developments and judge their merits as they stand thus isolated. Indeed, if a philosophy is to be judged by or along with its logical outcome then the dualism of Descartes has to be judged along with the monism of Spinoza, the philosophy of Kant by that of Hegel and Fichte and even pluralistic realism by absolutistic idealism, which has been considered by some contemporary writers as the only logical conclusion of the former.

We shall try in this short paper to isolate the views of Saṅkara from that of his followers and set forth in brief some of the realistic aspects of his philosophy, which have been rather drowned by the subjectivistic emphasis of post-Saṅkarite advaitism, but which cannot fail to strike one who cares to understand Saṅkara through his own writings.

(The most vital issue, that has been confused, concerns the existence of the sensible or external world. On this point, it has become customary to class Saṅkara with the acosmists. Judged in the light of the latter-day advaitism, Saṅkara is supposed to hold that the world is non-existent, an illusion, an empty dream. But a close examination of his writings shows that this popular notion about Saṅkara is not quite justified. The reality of the external world is not, for Saṅkara, on a par with that of the dream-world. He is not a solipsist or subjective idealist. His is not the *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda* of latter-day advaitism, which holds that the world is a creation of the percipient mind. On the contrary, he is positive in his refutation of Vijñānavāda or subjective idealism.) He presses point after point against solipsism, in course of his refutation of the Vijñānavāda of the Buddhists. We quote some of them just to bring the fact home to the mind of those who may think otherwise, how strongly against subjective idealism Saṅkara was.)

(Non-existence of the external world, says he, is *prima facie* impossible. The external world is being apprehended in every act of perception. What is directly perceived cannot be denied existence, any more than one tasting and relishing his food can say—"I do neither taste nor relish any food.") It is absurd to say, therefore, that the external world is non-existent while it is being perceived.

(Neither can it be said, he thinks, that the external objects like a pot or a post are elements of knowledge itself. For the given-ness or the objective character of external objects is universally felt ;—external objects appear not as elements of knowledge itself, but as the objects of knowledge.) (Nor can it

be maintained that elements of knowledge or ideas can *appear like* objects, without really being so. For even this would imply the previous knowledge of external objects, which vitiates the solipsistic hypothesis. Furthermore, it is idle to judge, dialectically, the possibility of the existence of an object when it is already existing as an object of knowledge. Again, according to subjective idealism there being no external object, a pot and the idea of a pot are indistinguishable. So the difference between the presentation of a pot and the memory of it is also inexplicable. Nothing, again, can explain what constitutes the difference between, for example, the knowledge of a pot and that of a cloth.¹

On these and many other grounds, Saṅkara holds that subjective idealism is not tenable. Consequently he endorses the view of Vyāsa, while explaining the sūtra, "Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat" (2. 2. 29), that the existence of the sensible world cannot be likened to a dream. (In fact, epistemologically Saṅkara can be classed rather with the realists and the pragmatists, in so far as he admits the existence of an external world, outside and independent of the subject mind and judges the validity of knowledge by practical results.)

That Saṅkara admits the existence of the sensible world is now sufficiently clear. (But what is the status of this existence? On this, Saṅkara parts company with the ordinary realists. He distinguishes between various kinds of existence. The snake in illusion no doubt somehow and for ever so short a time, exists and so also does the real snake. Though both share the common characteristic of existence, they differ also considerably and cannot be classed together. (The illusory snake is contradicted, negated by subsequent experience, but not so the real snake.) Consequently it is necessary to distinguish between these two cases of existence. (This distinction, it should be noted, is primarily based on pragmatic

¹ Vide *Brahma-sutra-bhāṣya* on 2. 2. 28.

grounds.) It is the practical result of contradiction and non-contradiction that constitutes this distinction. What is never contradicted is of the highest order of reality—is *pāramārthika*, is Sat, *par excellence*. Accordingly Brahman or the absolute which by its very conception can never be negated is the only Sat, that enjoys this highest kind of reality. Objects, perceived in dreams or illusions, being contradicted in daily experience are reals of the lowest order. But intermediate between these two extremes, stand the world of ordinary experience. This is not absolutely real or is not on a par with the Absolute, as it is also contradicted as such when the intuition of the one is vouchsafed. So, according to Saṅkara, all kinds of existence are real, though their realities differ in degree.

Much misapprehension centres, again, around the notion of contradiction or negation. Generally the Bādha or negation of the world of ordinary experience, as advocated by Saṅkara, is understood to mean dissolution into nothing. We often hear of the world vanishing altogether after Sākṣāt-kāra. Nothing is farther from the intention of Saṅkara than such an interpretation. If, what once exists passes into nothing and something previously non-existent springs into existence, then Saṅkara has to embrace, *asat-kāryavāda*, which he openly contradicts. In fact, however, Saṅkara again and again speaks of the world as being *brahmabhūta* or transformed into Brahman after Sākṣāt-kāra.

To understand this point more clearly, we have to understand the exact nature of the illusion, which has to be removed. The illusory snake does not spring out of nothing and neither does it pass into nothing, when the illusion is over. 'Thisness' of the rope is always present there as the objective datum, through illusion and correct apprehension. The root of the illusion is, therefore, rather logical and psychological than ontological. It is an error of judgment that is responsible for this illusion. (So the objective data being the same, diversion of attention and difference of judgment lead to change of

opinion or conception. It is thus that the rope becomes a snake and the snake turns back into a rope. Similarly does the Jagat, or the differentiated world of ordinary experience stand transfigured, as the manifestation of Brahman when attention is diverted from multiplicity to the unity of the whole universe and the ordinary judgment is revised in the light of the new experience of intuition of the one. So the negation of the world, as conceived by Saṅkara, is more a transformation, re-organisation and revaluation than wholesale annihilation.

But though the genesis and disappearance of the world of ordinary experience are logically and psychologically explained, the metaphysical question as to the relation between this contradicted world and the Absolute or the Sat, presents a dilemma. If this world is in any way related with the Absolute it cannot disappear, and if it is not so related, the very possibility of its momentary emergence is ruled out. So Saṅkara calls the world, that is negated, a *māyā*, that which is indefinable—*Tattvānyattvābhyām anirvacaniyā* and *Sadasadbhyām anirvacaniyā*. It can be placed neither under the category of Sat, nor under Asat; Sat meaning, of course, the Absolute or Brahman.

Though the exact relation between the contradicted world and the Absolute is difficult to ascertain, Saṅkara firmly maintains that this world is not a groundless phantom, but that it is grounded in the Brahman, in the Sat. He confirms the views expressed in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*—"All these are rooted in the Sat, held in the Sat and they retire also into the Sat [*Sanmulah Somya imāh sarvāh prajāh, Sadāyatanā, Satpratiṣṭhā*]."¹ "As everything in this world," says Saṅkara in another connection, "originates from Brahman, being otherwise understood through the differentiating intellect, we do not deny existence to anything, whatsoever."²

When it is once admitted that everything is rooted in the Absolute, the inevitable conclusion forces itself that, essentially

¹ *Chhāndogya*, 6. 8. 4.

² *Chhāndogya*, 6. 2. 3.

or in substance the world is as permanent and real as the Absolute itself. Contrary to the popular notion, Saṅkara does not shirk even this conclusion. (Startling as it may appear to some, he says in unequivocal terms,—“Just as the substratum Brahman does not lose its existence or reality at any time, past, present or future, exactly so does the Jagat not lose its existence at any of the three divisions of time.”¹)

(The falsity of the world consists, however, in considering it as an independent reality. Just as an earthen pot exists in *substance* even before it takes its peculiar shape and even after that shape is destroyed, but independently of the substance earth, it cannot exist for a single moment, exactly so does the world exist in *substance* for all times, but independently of the substance or abstracted from its ground, the Brahman, it has no existence, it is a meaningless falsity.)

To understand more clearly this position of Saṅkara we must understand his idea of change. (The ordinary notion is that Saṅkara's Universe is a static one that allows no change. But, in fact, Saṅkara does not ignore change. What he means only is, that in changing its states the subject cannot change in substance, though it changes in form. Without an abiding substance at the back-ground, change is altogether unintelligible. As the lump of clay changes its form into a pot and then into broken pieces, the varying forms are posited in and cannot be abstracted from the same abiding substance, earth, which in itself suffers no addition or alteration. “A mere addition of form is no argument for change in substance,”² says Saṅkara.) The different forms of the substance are indistinguishable from the substance itself.

(So change there is, but not in substance.) The illustration that Saṅkara gives to explain this peculiar position is very apt. (“Indeed,” says he, “Devadatta, with folded hands

¹ “यदाच कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति एवं कार्यमपि जगत् त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति,” *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 2. 1. 16.

² *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 2. 1. 18.

and feet or with the same extended, does not become another entity only because an alteration of form is evidenced. He is recognised as the self-same man.¹⁾

The creation of the manifold world from the one Absolute is also to be understood in this light. "Thus," says Saṅkara, "in one Brahman, the creation of the multiform world is possible, without violating its own essence" ["tathā ekasmin-napi brahmani Svarupānupamardanena eva anekākārā sṛṣṭir-bhaviṣyati," Br. Sutra, 2. 1. 28.].

(Saṅkara's Universe then is neither a static frame of steel nor a Bergsonian flux.) He recognises the changes that are throbbing in the universe and postulates also a bond of unity running through and through without which change itself remains unexplained.

This necessitates a change in the popular notion of Pure Being attributed to Saṅkara. (The Absolute or Brahman of Saṅkara, it should be noted, is not a mere abstract principle. It is the very seat of many-sided energy which is manifested in the Universe. The creative energy is designated Māyā. "The manifold creation is possible for the one Brahman," says Saṅkara, "possessed as he is of manysided energy" ["ekas-yāpi brahmano vichitra-śakti-yogāt upapadyate vicitro vikāra-prapancāh," Br. Sutra. Bh. 2. 1. 30].

(In manipulating his energy, however, Brahman does not suffer any mutation; so his activity is likened by Saṅkara to that of a magnet that moves a piece of iron, without itself being moved.)

The foregoing remarks will be further ratified if we consider the fact that (the Brahman of Saṅkara is both transcendent and immanent. He defines Sat as both murta or manifest and amurta as unmanifest, as both patent and latent, [mūrta-mūrta-lakṣaṇam Sat].

This double aspect of Brahman has been fully discussed and made clear by Saṅkara in connection with sutras 2. 1.

26, 2. 1. 27, where Brahman has been viewed as both transcendent and immanent.

From this we can safely conclude that according to Saṅkara change and (progress do not fall outside the realm of the Real or the Brahman, though he does not admit the absurdity that the Absolute itself changes. The Absolute maintains its unity and integrity through all changes that are perceived, just as Devadatta retains his individuality intact through all his changing activities. To speak in the words of Bradley, "There is of course progress in this world, there is also retrogression, but we cannot think that the whole either moves on or backwards. The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number." Again, "The Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit and blossoms. Like our globe it always and it never has Summer and Winter."

This paradoxical nature of reality led Saṅkara to refer frequently to the two possible standpoints :—the pāramārthika and the vyāvahārika ;—the standpoints of the Absolute and of the relative or the practical.)

To sum up our short discussion, Saṅkara is not a sollip-sist or subjective idealist, as often he is thought to be. For he admits the existence of the external world. He is not, therefore, an acosmist, as well. He is rather a realist and a pragmatist, though in a limited sense. For he considers the universe to be real in so far as it is grounded in Reality itself. He characterises reality pragmatically on the basis of practical contradiction and non-contradiction. In a sense his universe is more real than that of the so-called realists. For being grounded in a permanent substratum, it is placed beyond the precarious fate of change and decay that befall the isolated entities of pluralistic realism. "All this world of name and form," says Saṅkara, "is real, the Real being their essence, but considered independently or by themselves they are false." The universe of Saṅkara is not wholly static, though not also

in a constant flux. Change here is made possible and intelligible on the postulation of an abiding substratum running through the different states. The Absolute is not a featureless unity. The many are there as its states or manifestation, but are also inseparable from it. Neither is the absolute a mere abstraction—it is the fountain-head of all energy. Saṅkara is not also a pantheist; - for his Brahman is as much transcendent as immanent.) Finally, according to Saṅkara, Sākṣāt-kāra or the intuition of the Absolute does not reduce the universe into an empty nothing. It directs attention to new aspects and changes the angle of vision, which leads to a rearrangement and revaluation of the old data and transformation of old forms. And when this rare vision dawns, the universe stands transfigured as a manifestation of the One, the Absolute, the Brahman.

DHIRENDRA MOHAN DUTT.

THE JAINA INSTRUMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Jainism does not lend itself to any summary definition. It can, in the broadest sense, be described as an attitude and method. It is essentially a critique of categories (Syādvāda) and a philosophy of standpoints (ānekāntavāda). It arose as a protest against the too intellectualistic, abstractionistic philosophy of the later Upanishads, on the one hand, and the ritualism and inhumanism of the followers of the earlier portions of the Vedas on the other. Its attitude is humanistic as it tends to regard man as the measure of the universe and pragmatistic as it regards the concept of life as the fundamental concept of philosophy. Reality is, according to it, plastic and protean like life and cannot be characterised by rigid distinctions or comprehended by closed systems. Life is an eternal endeavour and an adventure and is indeterminate. Jainism accepts the attitude of life as adequate to comprehend reality. Its method is experimental; the search for truth is a trying of ways (nayas) and standpoints. The common quarrels and contradictions of philosophers are traced by Jainism, to the tendency on the part of philosophers to consider what is only a search as constituting a finished system, what is only an approach to reality as an all-comprehensive view. Its logic is therefore the logic of eclecticism which cares more for the practical and peaceful adjustment of our claims of life with reality rather than for intellectual consistency.

It sets forth the problem of knowledge in its characteristically pragmatistic fashion. The Jaina takes up the attitude of the man in the street who is interested in knowledge in so far as it is a *power* in life. A fruitful way of approaching the problem of knowledge would be to inquire into the different psychological

antecedents of cognition and the practical purposes which it fulfils. Knowledge is an instrument and the problem of knowledge is to study what knotty situations in life call it forth and how it meets those situations and enables us to secure what is good and to avoid what is evil. The theory of knowledge of the Jainas is therefore essentially instrumental and pragmatistic.

Experience is their starting point and guide and the reality that we are concerned with is not the reality that lies behind or beyond our experience and which conditions it from without ; it is, on the other hand, the reality that is immanent and operative within our experience that we are concerned with. If experience is our guide we cannot reject the two verities of experience the subject that knows and the object that is known. The object we meet with in experience is the real object itself but it is independent of our perception and of ourselves. Though the object is only in and through the self it is yet external to and independent of the self. In knowing we do not make the object but only find it. Objects exist in their own right and are known as such. "Experiencing," as the neo-realists say, "makes no difference to the facts."

Though the Jaina is frankly realistic on the empirical and psychological plane, he soars to the height of idealism when he comes to speak of knowledge at the self-conscious level. The object at this stage ceases to be external and becomes internal to the subject. In knowing that I am, I am in my knowing. In self-consciousness, my knowing is inseparable from my being. "Knowledge" as Dr. Das Gupta very well puts, "which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself."

Equally idealistic and no less contradictory is their view that knowledge is not something produced in us by external reality, but is something drawn forth from within. "This is so even when we perceive a new object for the first time." All

the impressions and states of consciousness lie latent in the soul and need the removal of causes which prevent their coming into manifestation.

When we turn to the question of the validity of knowledge, this idealistic view of knowledge is given up and there is a return to the realistic standpoint. Though knowledge is considered to be an innate quality of the self, the validity of knowledge does not lie in the very conditions that give rise to it. The Jaina denies Svatahprāmānya ; it is not in the nature of knowledge to certify its own validity. "Both of them—validity and invalidity, originate from the non-self, but their consciousness is due to the self and non-self." The non-self is the abode of gunas and doṣas. These determine whether our knowledge regarding the non-self is valid or invalid, the guṇas help the origination of valid knowledge and doṣas that of invalid knowledge. Hence it is that the non-self is the *ultimate cause* of valid and invalid knowledge." But he admits self-validity (Svatahprāmānya) only in the case of knowledge which is based on previous knowledge of validity.

Since the validity of knowledge is paratah, it depends for its validity on correspondence (samvāda) of idea with object. But this correspondence does not consist, as some realists hold in any comparison between the idea in the mind and the object outside the mind, for such a comparison is *ex hypothesi*, impossible. The test of correspondence between idea and object is the pragmatistic test that the idea serves the purpose which one expects it to serve. Our knowledge is said to correspond to reality if, acting on its basis, we get the expected result. Truth is what works. That is true knowledge which leads to a successful adjustment of acts to ends and that is false knowledge which brings us to a clash and conflict with our environment.

Knowledge is thus wedged tightly between the interest which stimulates it and the purpose which it subserves. It arises in the context of a concrete situation of life, and takes us

in the end to concrete results. The circuit of thought which is set going by an interest is completed in the end which it fulfils. The need for knowledge arises when life presents a puzzle or a perplexity. This raises doubt (*saṁśaya*). Doubt is essentially unpleasant and it stimulates an effort at inquiry (*jijñāsa*). *Jijñāsa* in turn leads to question (*prasna*) and knowledge is always an answer to a question, and is reflective and mediate.

There are as many questions as there are points of view from which we can look at a thing. Reality is many-faced (*anantadharmātmakam vastu*) and intelligence is selective. There are therefore as many ways of knowing (*nayas*) as there are faces to reality.

The doctrine of standpoints is an analytical view of reality. But the theory of knowledge of the Jaina is not merely analytical like that of the realistic *vaiśeṣika*. He recognises, unlike the latter, the essentially abstract and one-sided character of the analysed factors and feels the need of restoring them to their concrete and synthetic setting. To supplement their analytic *nayavāda* he has recourse to the dialectical *syādvāda* which synthesises the partial views.

The dialectic is called *Saptabhangi* as it represents the movement of thought through seven stages. It is a criticism of categories and "arises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute." (Absolute affirmation or bare denial are incapable of describing reality. To say that reality is, is to make a tautologous and meaningless statement. To say that reality is not, is contradiction in terms.) Our affirmations or negations have meaning only in relation to the points of view we take. Philosophers forgetting this principle of relativity hold doctrines of bare affirmation or bare negation; of affirmation and negation, or of inexplicability, or of existence and inexplicability, or of non-existence and inexplicability, or, of existence and non-existence and inexplicability. Each of them is right in what he affirms and wrong in what he denies. It is their unconditioned affirmation and negation that render their doctrines

erroneous. Hence the Jaina would prefix expressions like "may be," "in a sense" to affirmative and negative statements to indicate that their statements are not absolute and unconditioned, but relative and limited.

Jainism is no doubt true to modern psychology when it says that the intellect is essentially selective and the truth it seeks is the concrete and dynamic truth which lives within the context of human experience, not the abstract and static truth which has an archetypal existence far removed from human experience. Accordingly to suit the varied and changing nature of life as well as of reality, it has to employ many relative and indeterminate truths, not a single determinate truth. The truth of human experience is "an indetermination or alteration of truths." Jainism no doubt shows a sound instinct when it rejects the formal laws of identity and contradiction as inadequate to define the nature of thought and maintains that thought follows the law of affirmation through negation and is disjunctive and dialectical. It is also an improvement on one-sided realism which is mainly empirical and analytic and one-sided idealism which is mystic and negligent of the positive facts of life. Its great defect lies in the fact that it yields to the temptation of an easy compromise without overcoming the contradictions inherent in the opposed standpoints in a higher synthesis. It asks us to approach reality with an open mind, so that our mind may not settle down into one-sided and partial truths. But it leaves us in the end with partial truths and gives us not the truth. It fails to sustain the interest which it stimulates. It takes care to show that the truths of science and of our every day experience are relative and one-sided; but it leaves us in the end with the view that truth is a sum of relative truths. A mere putting together of many half-truths—definite-indefinites—cannot give us the whole truth. This is the central defect of Jaina *anekāntavāda* and *saptabhangi*. Its *anekāntavāda* is relativism taken through seven steps or, as an audacious Jaina logician says, seven hundred, but it is still

relativism. Its saptabhaṅgi is merely the assertion of the limitation and therefore the negation of every point of view and comes in the end very near to the negative dialectic of Nāgārjuna. But even Nāgārjuna could not stop at a negative conclusion, but had to admit that there was an Absolute, though it could not be described in terms of finite categories. Truth cannot consist in a mere disjunction of alternative hypothesis, though it is through disjunction that we reach the truth. Disjunction has meaning only within a system; merely to leave the alternate truths without the system underlying them is to miss the meaning of disjunction altogether. (Jainism seems to recognise this when it admits that over and above the many relative truths is the one absolute truth (paṁamārthasatya).) But this absolute truth does not rise on the scaffolding of the relative truths, but lies alongside of them. The synthesis of the Jaina dialectic is a mere summing up of the parts, not a synthesising of them into a systematic unity. The movement of thought is *linear*, not dialectical; it involves a *regressus ad infinitum* (anavasthā). The logic underlying it is not one of implication but one of *linear* inference. At times, it rises to the level of a logic of implication, but it droops. It is swayed by its native prejudice towards the Absolute of the Upaniṣads rather than urged by the pressure of its own logic. It was the fashion of philosophy in the time of Mahāvīra to revile against Absolutism and Mahāvīra and his followers have yielded to it in spite of the implications of their logic. Though Jainism manifests a fine scientific temper and philosophic fastidiousness in its hatred of abstraction and one-sidedness, it ultimately falls a prey to anti-absolutistic prejudices. The same defect is to be found also in its views regarding the relation of the subject to the object. Its inner logic points to internality of the subject to the object. Still the tendency to regard the relation of the object to the subject as external is prominent. At the finite and empirical level the object is external to and independent of the subject; but at the philosophic and self-conscious level

the two become internal to one another. Knowledge, which to start with, is a knowledge of the objects external to the knowing subject becomes finally a revelation of the self. Jainism is thus realistic as well as idealistic and uses its realism or idealism as occasion suits it, but, like modern pragmatism, perplexes both realist and idealist, finding fault with both.

The same see-saw is to be found in its treatment of the question of *prāmānya*. The epistemological dualism with which it starts makes *paratahprāmānya* inevitable. The object being external to the knowing subject, the knowledge of the object can only be validated by referring to the conditions outside that knowledge. But when Jainism speaks of our knowledge of the objective as a revelation of our self and is inseparable from it, *paratahprāmānya* becomes impossible. According to this view error becomes *paratah* as it is due to the stain of *pudgala* and truth becomes *svatah* as it becomes the revelation of the self. Knowledge which at the start finds its measure outside itself becomes finally its own measure. What Jainism teaches in one place and context it contradicts in another place and context. It does not harmonise these contradictions but simply leaves them together, at one time emphasising the realistic and forgetting the idealistic side and *vice versa*. On the whole, one finds that Jainism is more partial to the empirical and the finite, the relative and changing, and prejudicial towards the metaphysical, the ideal and the Absolute. The empirical and the relative are the objects of its first love; the Absolute and the ideal are the conclusions of its final logic. Its first love has the better of its final logic. This is so not only on the side of its epistemology, but also on the side of its Metaphysics and Ethics. There again, we see the tendency to please everybody and to compromise and in trying to compromise it involves itself in self-contradictions; the Saviour of all systems is committing suicide.

ADAITAVĀDA IN THE RĠG-VEDA

In describing the relation which subsists between the cause and its successive effects, Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra introduced the idea of two stand-points from which this relation can be viewed, viz., the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika. He says that from the former stand-point the effects are to be looked upon as Ananya (अनन्य) from their cause, although from the vyāvahārika view, we take them to be Anya (अन्य) from the cause. About the exact significance of these two terms—'Anyā' and 'Ananya'—much misunderstanding exists in various quarters and we would try in this paper to bring out the bearing of these two terms upon his entire theory in the light of what Śaṅkara has himself said about them.

We would here explain the idea with the help of an illustration which Śaṅkara himself has used in several parts of his commentaries. मृच्चूर्ण, पिंड, घट are the effects or transformations or manifestations of the cause मृत्तिका. Now, what is the nature of the relation that exists between these successive changes issuing out of the मृत्तिका,—effects produced from the मृत्तिका? This relation can be explained in two different ways. The ordinary common people of the world regard the successive changes thus produced as self-subsisting entities—existing *separated* or divided from their cause. The clay, to their view, has transformed itself as मृच्चूर्ण, and the मृच्चूर्ण totally transforms itself into मृत्-पिंड, and the मृत्-पिंड into the घट or the pot. One form is changed into another and that again into another and so on. One dies and another is produced. The preceding forms are looked upon as the causes, successively, of the latter forms. This is the empirical stand-point and our practical life is bound up with this view.

But it is otherwise when these are considered from the

Pāramārthika stand-point. This view never regards the effects as separated from or outside of the causal reality. They can never exist separated from their cause, *out of relation to their cause*. मृच्चूर्णं, मृत्पिंड, घट etc., are not, to this view, so many self-subsisting entities, but only successive manifestations of the one causal reality—मृत्तिका—lying behind them. Here, the clay or rather the nature of the clay finds its expression in the successive forms produced out of it. The real essence of the clay is not *lost* in these forms; it is present behind each of these successive changes,—the identity of the cause is not lost but present—in each successive change or difference. It does not itself change with those changing forms; it does not in assuming these forms become something else or अन्य. It is clear then that these successively changing forms do not altogether vanish, do not entirely lose their value in the eyes of those who are possessed of the पारमार्थिक दृष्टि। Śaṅkara has told us that there is really no conflict or opposition (विरोध) between these two views.¹ As there is no opposition, there arises no need for abolishing the things of the world, declaring them to be false or unreal. The परिणाम-वाद may be retained, even when we emphasise the विवर्त-वाद।²

But there are unfortunately many interpreters of the Śaṅkara system who think otherwise. They regard all nāma-rūpas—the whole universe—as mere illusion—as unreal and false. But Śaṅkara has, as we have seen above, found no necessity for denying the existence of the world. “No body,” Śaṅkara distinctly declares, “has the power to dissolve both the external and internal existences which are presented to our senses and to our consciousness.” Here is how he expresses this idea—

“कोऽयं प्रपञ्च-विलयो नाम ?...तत्र यदि तावत् विद्यमानोऽयं प्रपञ्चो देहादिलक्षण अध्यात्मिकः, बाह्यश्च पृथिव्यादिलक्षणः प्रविलापयितव्यः इत्युच्येत,

¹ तेनायं हेतुना अभात्यची न निरुध्यते तैः हेतैः—इत्यादि (Vide Mān-‘karikā,’ Bhāṣ. 3. 17-18, 4-57.)

² “अप्रत्याख्याय कार्यप्रपञ्चं परिणामप्रक्रियाच्च आश्रयति सूचकारः” (वेदा० भा०, 2.1.14)

स पुरुषमात्रेण अशक्यः प्रविलापयितुमिति, तत्प्रविलयोपदेशोऽशक्यविषय एव स्यात् ।” (वे० भा०, 3, 2, 21.)

In a famous passage in the Brihadāranyaka-bhāṣya he raises a question—“If you hold all the nāma-rūpas to be real and not false, what would be the fate of your Advaita-vāda? Brahman has been declared in the Śruti as one and without a second. If you hold to this declaration made by the Śruti, you cannot at the same time admit the reality of the difference of the nāma-rūpa—the changes going on in the world.”—

“नामरूपोपाध्यस्तित्वे—‘एकमेवाद्वीयं’ ‘नेह नानास्ति किंचन’ इति श्रुतयो विरुध्येरन् इति चेत्—न ; सलिलफेनदृष्टान्तेन परिहृतत्वात् ।”

(वे० भा०, 3, 2, 21)

The reply suggested by Śaṅkara is very important. He says—“No ; you need not deny the existence of the changes—the nāma-rūpas. The existence of these does not at all harm in any way the theory of Advaitism. Take the case of the relation between water and its productions ;—the changes of waves, bubbles, foams and froth ; the relation between clay and its successive transformations in the shape of मृच्चूर्णं, मृत्पिण्ड etc.” No necessity arises to *deny* these successive changes, if we declare them to be अनन्य from their cause. That these are non-separate (अनन्य) from their cause does not make them different (अन्य) or independent entities ; neither does it *abolish their respective forms*. This is what Śaṅkara says in this respect in his Vedānta-bhāṣya—

नच समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि...फेन-तरंगादीनां इतरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति ।

न च तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्तावपि समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्व’ भवति । (वे० भा०, 2, 1, 13).

The sum and substance of Śaṅkara’s arguments may be thus stated—

(a) Whenever the effects are produced, they are produced

from their cause ; they can never appear divided—separated—from their cause.¹ Can you separate the pot from its cause, the clay ? Can you separate the waves from their cause—the water ? Can you, placing the waves outside the water, regard them as something self-existent—as something अन्य ?

(b) The effects are, in reality, the modifications of their cause,—the stages through which the causal reality expresses its nature. It is the cause which differentiates itself in these forms. It is the cause which holds these forms, sustains them. It is like the identity of the thread which holds the manifold flowers together and forms a piece of garland. Then, how is it possible to *abolish* these successive changes or to *separate* them from their cause which holds them ?

(c) The cause does not, in assuming these forms, lose itself in them. The movements of my hand, the walking, the uttering of words—all these are my states ; they are mine, they belong to me. If you separate these from me, they lose their substance, they die ; for, it is the cause alone which binds its effects. One can, without difficulty, recognise the *identity* of the cause in its different manifestations. A cow, when lying in repose and ruminating, is called a cow ; but when it gets up and walks, will it be now called a horse, and not the same identical cows ?² The cause is thus the same throughout all its changing differentiations and does not lose its identity and *become* something *different* from its own self.

Brahman or the underlying Reality is not thus in any way affected by the changing nāma-rūpas, so that you need not deny the reality or the existence of the universe. It is the universe in which the Reality is expressing its nature. There is therefore no opposition between the world and its causal source. It is in this way that in Śaṅkara-Vedānta, the परिणाम

¹ यस्य च यस्मादात्मलभो भवति, स तेन अपविभक्तो दृष्टः, यथा घटादीनां सृष्टा । (इ० भा०)
(वे० भा०)।

² “न हि लोके गौस्तृणान् गच्छन् वा गौर्भवति, शयानस्तु अश्वदिजात्यन्तरं इत्यादि ।” (इ० भा०,)

has been retained, while emphasising the *विवर्त*. It is most erroneous to suppose, as has been done by many, that in order to retain the unity of Brahman, Śaṅkara has abolished the world as false.

Śaṅkara's Adwaita Philosophy is founded upon this relation of the cause and its effect. From the discussion given above we arrive at the conclusion that one cause is present behind its different manifestations in the world; that the cause itself is gradually realising itself in the different forms of *nāma-rūpa*. It will be a mistake to think the effects produced from the cause as something different from it. One Reality manifests to itself in the multiplicity of *nāma-rūpas* and the true nature of this Reality has not been *reduced* to these successive effects. It is the connecting link of all these differences, and its own nature realises itself in and through these differentiations. There is no need in Śaṅkara system to declare the unreality of these differences, or to separate these from the underlying causal reality, taking them as self-sufficient entities.

It is our deliberate opinion—and this opinion has been formed by a deep and scrutinising study of the *R̥g-veda* itself—that the relation between the cause and its effect as expounded by Śaṅkara, the true import of which we have given above,—owes its origin to the *R̥g-veda*. The popular conception that the hymns of the *R̥g-veda* are addressed to the grand and remarkable natural forces which captured the imagination of the primitive Aryan settlers of India, in the shape of the Sun, the Moon, the Dawn, the Sky, etc., is altogether erroneous. We have, on the contrary, found ample material in the *R̥g-veda* which unmistakably proves that the theory of non-dualism as interpreted by Śaṅkara in his Vedānta system of philosophy runs throughout the work from the beginning to the end. This may sound strange to many ears, but would it not rather be regarded as remarkably strange that an intelligent race of people like the Hindus should exhibit such a lamentable want of even common sense in allowing the hymns and mantras to

inert (जड़) non-intelligent *natural* phenomena to form an essential part of their religion! Even at the present day, their daily devotions and prayers to God are performed by a hymn of the Ṛg-veda. If the Ṛg-veda contains nothing but certain measured lines meant to be addressed to the fascinating objects of nature calculated to inspire awe and admiration, then its value and importance are considerably diminished. To our view, the importance of the Ṛg-veda lies in the fact that it is the original store-house of the Indian Idealism which supplied materials of Adwaitavāda which subsequently gave rise to the admirable system of Vedānta.

We have found above that it is an important feature of the Vedāntic causal theory that the effects produced by the cause can never remain separated from the cause and be considered on their own account, to be independent and self-sufficient entities; and that the causal reality, in assuming these forms, does not become something else (अन्य), losing its own nature. It is only the nature of the causal reality which finds gradual expression in and through these visible forms. Now, *this is also the position of the Ṛg-Veda itself*. The Vedic Ṛṣis worshipped this causal reality which operates behind these visible forms, knowing full well that these visible स्थूल forms *by themselves* have no value at all. For, they can never be separated from the underlying causal reality and considered on their own account as if they are the only realities. The Vedic Ṛṣis did not remain satisfied with these visible forms, but behind the shifting scenes of nature they always tried to seek for and discovered a constant causal reality which they worshipped.

There are quite a number of arguments by which this position has been established in the Ṛg-Veda. We would in this paper content ourselves with presenting *only one set* of arguments collected from different places of the Ṛg-Veda. If, to the Vedic Ṛṣis the gods were no more than so many visible objects as they appeared to the senses, we would not have

found mention of the *dual nature* of each of the Vedic gods so clearly and distinctly, as has been done in the R̥g-Veda. The Agni, the Surya, the Aswins, the Soma,—in fact every Vedic god we find described as possessing a dual form, a dual nature of his own. As Brahman has been described in the Upanishads as प्राणस्य प्राणः, मनसो मनः, सूर्यस्य सूर्यः etc., so in the R̥g-Veda, under the visible forms of the gods there is, in each case, an invisible form which constitutes the true nature of these gods. There were of course people belonging to the lowest stratum of the society who could never rise to a higher conception and remained completely satisfied with the actual forms which they perceived of these gods; but in that state of society people were not wanting whose cultured minds were busy discovering the presence of all invisible causal power working behind nature, which they worshipped and contemplated, taking the shifting phenomena of nature as mere external expressions of that causal power. The very mention of the dual nature of the Vedic gods unmistakably bears witness to the fact that the actual, visible forms of the gods were never regarded in the R̥g-Veda as the *only realities*.

We would now quote here the hymns from which the readers will find how the dual nature of the gods has been brought about in the R̥g-Veda.

(1) Take the case of the *Agni*.—

It is stated about Agni—the fire-god—that the visible, material form of Agni has *within him* another invisible, internal form, and this internal form—सूक्ष्मरूप—is the real nature of the material fire. श्मशानाग्नि, i.e., the fire kindled on the cremation ground for burning the dead body is thus addressed—

क्रव्यादमग्निं प्रहिणोमि दूरं, यमराज्यं गच्छतु रिप्रवाहः ।

इहैवायमितरो जातवेदा, देवेभ्यो हव्यं वहतु प्रजानन् ॥

“The material form of the fire, the form which is devouring, consuming the body of the dead, we do not want; let this form be removed from us. But here, *within* this visible fire,

there is *another fire*, and this fire it is which knows everything born in the world. It is this fire which always conveys oblations to the gods."

Take again the following mantra—

“विधेमते परमे जन्मन्त्रग्ने, विधेम स्तोमै रवरे सधस्ते ।
यन्माद् योनि रुदारिया, यजे तम् ।”

“The fire has two-fold birth-places—the place of its manifestation. The one is the superior place, and the other inferior or the gross place. We desire to worship, O Fire ! that place—*that source*—*that योनि*—from which thou hast sprung.” That the invisible form of the fire is nothing but its causal nature has been very well brought out by the term *योनि*. This invisible causal substance of the visible fire is also referred to in another hymn in this manner—

विद्या ते नाम परमं गुहा यत् । विद्या तमुक्त्वं यत आजगम्भ ।

“The fire has got a most *hidden* name and we have been able to learn this hidden name of the fire. We know, too, *the source*—*उक्त्वं*—from which thou hast sprung up, Oh, Fire !”

In another hymn, we find this address—

“Over and above this material body, the fire has a most *auspicious body*; carry by that body this dead man to the higher region of heaven (10. 16. 4).” Exactly similar prayer we find addressed to the sun in the Isha-Upanishad: “Withdraw O Sun ! these thy visible rays. I desire to see that auspicious form of thine *which lies concealed within* those rays.”

(2) *Surya*—

The Ṛg-Veda in similarly unmistakable terms refers to the underlying hidden causal substance existing behind the visible form of the sun.

हे ते चक्रे सूर्ये ब्रह्माण क्रतुया विदुः ।

अथैकं चक्रं यद् गुहा, तदध्यातय इत् विदुः ॥

“To the sun belong two wheels (चक्र). One is gross, visible to all; but the other is hidden, invisible—गुहा ।”

“Who knows this *invisible hidden* चक्र of the sun? Only to those who are of contemplative turn of mind, who meditates inwardly within, this गूढ चक्र reveals its essence; others can not know this.” This description leaves no doubt in our mind as to the real nature of this invisible wheel of the sun. It is the causal substance which underlies the visible gross form of the sun. The presence of this causal substance within the visible sun has been brought out in another form in a hymn which the 50th Sukta contains in the first Mandala. The sun is thus described there—

“There are three states or forms of the sun. The one state is termed as उत्; the other is उत्+तर and the last is उत्+तम. That sun is called उत्, whose beams fall upon this earth. The sun which spreads its beams upwards in heaven is termed as “उत्तर”. Besides these two, there exists the उत्तम sun who never sets, never rises.” This beautiful description gives us an idea of the visible gross form of the sun, as well as its invisible causal form, and also the form which lies even beyond the Causal State (which in the Upanishad-nomenclature may be called as तुरीय state). Śaṅkara in his Commentary on the Vedānta has explained that the light (ज्योतिः) of the Sun which is sent up to heaven is no other than the being of Brahman—“अथ यदतः परो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते etc., etc.” (Ved. bhā. 1. 1. 24). By the ‘light’ mentioned here in the Śruti, we are to understand the Being of Brahman which is to be found underlying all the visible existences as their causal substance.¹

The R̥g-veda, too, in describing the invisible subtle state of the Sun clearly refers to that underlying causal substance. In the Chāndogya Upanisad, the Solar Disc has been described as a beehive and it is there stated that the real sun does not

¹ विकारे अनुगतं जगत्-कारणं ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टं (वे० भा०, 1.1.24-25)

rise and does not set—"न निस्त्रोच, नोर्दिषाय ।" This line is exactly similar in its idea to the sun described in the Ṛg-veda as the उत्तम sun 'which never rises, never sets.'

These descriptions clearly bring out the fact that the Ṛg-vedic Sun and the Fire are not merely the visible gross natural objects.

(3) We shall now consider how the सोम has been described in the Ṛg-veda. This is stated about the Soma (सोम) :—

सोमं मन्यते पपिव अन्यत्, संपिपन्ति ओषधिं ।
सोमं यं ब्रह्मणो विदुः, न तस्याश्रति कथन ॥

"When the people press the सोम and squeezing from it its juice drink it off, they think indeed that they have quaffed the सोम; but to those whose minds are inwardly turned, the fact stands clearly comprehended that nobody can ever drink of the true, real सोम." न ते अश्रति पार्थिवः—"No mortal man of the earth can drink thee, Soma!" The readers will see that as in the case of the Sun and the Fire, here also we find the two-fold forms of the सोम;—the one is its gross form which the people ordinarily press and drink; but "who is to drink the subtle invisible form of साम, its hidden causal substance which the material form of सोम contains within it?" It is for this reason that *elsewhere* it has been stated of the सोम that the "eternally existent Soma has got two kinds of beams extending both ways."—

उभयतः पवमानस्य (सोमस्य) रश्मयः, ध्रुवस्य सतः परियन्ति केतवः ।

And also—

द्विता वूर्णन् अमृतस्य धाम, स्रविदे भुवनानि प्रथन्त ।

i.e., "सोम which is the source of अमृत has its two parts covered by its rays."

It is also stated that the "Soma has a place within it which lies hidden and invisible to the ordinary gaze of the

people and it is in this hidden place where exist the thirty-three gods" and that "to this *real* place become centred all the prayers of the devotees."—

“तव त्वे सोम पवमान निन्धे, विश्वे देवास्त्रय एकादशासः ।”

“तन्न सत्यं पवमानस्य अस्तु, यत्र विश्वे कारवः सन्नसन्तु ।”

If the सोम were merely the सोम-plant, how could it be addressed as the “inexhaustible navel (नाभिः) of the earth,” as “the seed (रितः) from which all the objects have been produced.”

As we have seen above in the case of the Sun, the सोम also has been stated to have a “तुरीय”-place — “तुरीयं धाम महिषो विवक्ति ।”

(4) We now come to *Indra*.

Indra has got two forms: one of these forms constitutes its gross, visible form and the other is the causal form behind the former into which it is interwoven, and that is his invisible, subtle form. These dual forms of Indra find expression in several ways—

दूरे तन्नाम (शरीरं) गुह्यं पराचैः ।...महत् तन्नाम गुह्यं पुरुष्यक्, येन भुतं जनयो येन भव्यं । प्रत्नं जातं ज्योति र्यदस्य प्रियम् ।

“Indra possesses dual bodies. One of these bodies is *most hidden*; and this hidden body is very large and it extends over—touches—large spaces. By this body, Indra has brought into being the past and the future (objects) and created those bright objects he desired to create.” This body, the readers will mark, has been called ‘प्रत्नं ज्योतिः’ and ‘पुरुष्यक्’ i.e., ‘it is the most ancient light’ and ‘it exists in touch of all the objects of the world.’ Can it be anything else than the causal substance which interweaves itself into the visible form? The poet of the mandal V has clearly indicated this causal form when he declares that “he has come to learn the most *hidden place* (पदं) of Indra—

अवाचचक्षं पदमस्य सस्त्र रुग्रं निधातु रन्वाय मिच्छन्
अपृच्छमन्यान्तत ते मे आहुः, इन्द्रं नरो बुबुधाना अशेम ।

“Among the performers of the sacrifices, only those are able to know this hidden पद of Indra who are बुबुधानाः *i.e.*, those who could see into the depth of things.”

Unless we take the invisible causal form of Indra into our consideration, the description that “Indra has created the heaven and the sky (द्यावा-पृथिव्यौ) that “Indra has inserted light into the sun,” that “Indra has planted milk into the bosom of the cow”—becomes inconsistent and insignificant. Such descriptions lose their value and become useless when only the gross, visible phenomenal form of Indra is taken.

As we have seen while considering the forms of the Sun, the Fire and the Soma that each of these vedic gods possesses a तुरीय form ; in the case of Indra also, a तुरीय पद, besides the two पदs already stated, is mentioned—

“उभे नि वासि जन्मनी । तुरीयादित्य हवनं त इन्द्रिय मातस्यावसृतं दिवि ।”

And this तुरीय पद has been described as अमृत पद ।

(5) In the description of Viṣṇu, we find a statement about a परम पद । Viṣṇu has been described to “contain three पदs—*vis.*, the one extending over the earth, the other over the sky and the third the heaven. But no body, it has been stated, can ever see the *hidden पद of viṣṇu*—which is अमृत—undying, and which is—filled up with honey मधुपूर्ण ।”—

तौनि पदा विचक्रमे विष्णु गोपा अदाभ्यः ।...तद्विद्वांसो विपश्यन्तो जागृवांसः समिन्धते, विष्णो र्यत् परमं पदम् ।

“Only those who are *wakeful*—ever alive to the real nature of things—who are thoughtful—only such people can see the परम पद of Viṣṇu.”

(6) Of the वायु—the wind-god—also, we find a similar description of its twofold forms. The one is its स्थूल—gross visible form and the other its deep-laid subtle invisible form which the former contains behind it.

हा विमो वातो ;—वात आ सिन्धो रा परावतः ।

दत्तं ते अस्य आवातु, परान्यो वातु यद्रपः ।

"The wind is two-fold: one form blows from the sea; but the other comes from a place very far off (परावतः) i.e., a place *lying beyond (the visible world)*. The first form gives us strength; but the other has the *power* to drive out sin." What has been described as the killer of sin can never be the gross वायु; it must be the *causal reality existing behind* all the visible objects. This *subtle form* of the वायु, is known as मातरिश्वा in the Rg-veda. Now the मातरिश्वा is the source of all sorts of activities. It is from this source that the visible वायु—vibratory motion—has sprung. In the 168 Sukta in Mandala I, we also find twofold strength of maruts—"द्विता शवः"। "From which region the marut is coming?"—it has been asked. The reply given is—"Is it coming from the inferior (अवर i.e. स्थूल) regions? Or is it blowing from a region lying *beyond* the visible spaces?" This enquiry shows us clearly the visible and the invisible forms of the Marut. It is with reference to this invisible underlying वायु that such statements become consistent as these:—"It is *within the lap* of the वायु, that all the gods perform their respective functions." It is clearly the casual reality which is present behind the visible motions or activities which has been referred to by these descriptions. It is of this वायु we find it stated that it is the Maruts who have extended the objects of the earth and the shining objects of the sky.—

आ ये विश्वा पार्थिवानि पप्रथन् रोचना दिवः ।

The term त्रिषधस्य in connection with the Marut indicates its three states—the visible, the casual and the तुरीय states. For this reason it has been stated that "no one knows the birth place of the Maruts, it is only they themselves who are acquainted with their own *productive source*." That all of them have only *one source* from which they have all sprung has been beautifully described by a metaphor. "As the spokes are all centred and fixed in the navel of the wheel, so they

are all come from one *identical source*."— "अथानां ये अराः सनाभयः ।"

‘यदतो वात ते गृहे अमृतस्य निधि र्हितः ।’—

This *treasure-house* of अमृत must be the casual substance which sustains the gross visible form and which is its source.

(7) Two kinds of sky (आकाश) we find described in the R̥g-veda. As in the Upanishads, the भूताकाश and the परम व्योम—both of these are mentioned, of which the latter is undifferentiated condition of the Prāṇa-Śakti. The भूताकाश is the visible differentiated vibrations which fill the आकाश । This परम व्योम *lying behind* the भूताकाश, is also known as पुराणं खं in the Upanishads, while the भूताकाश is also known as वायुरं खं । In the R̥g-veda also, similarly two terms have been employed. The one is द्यौः ; it is nothing but the भूताकाश । The other is परम व्योम । In this परम व्योम the first manifestation of मातरिखा or Prāṇa-Śakti appears.

We need not quote further passages. These would amply show that each and every god mentioned in the R̥g-veda has, in addition to its visible form, *an invisible causal form* which underlies the form. To exhibit this twofold form, *all the gods* have been *collectively also* described or defined as द्विजन्मा—

द्विजन्मानो ये ऋतथापः सत्याः ।

(8) Even of the अश्वि-twins, it is thus stated—

“वीनि पदानि अश्विनोः, आविः सन्ति गुहा परः ।”

“The Aswins have three पदs, some are visible—perceptible to the senses; the others are invisible, deep, *hidden*.”

(9) The same fact irresistably comes to our mind, when we follow the description of Varuna (वरुण). It is said of him :—

“यासां (अपां) राजा वरुणो याति मध्ये सत्यान्तते अवपश्यन् जनानां ।”

“There travels *within* the flowing water Varuna who watches the truth and untruth—the merit and demerit—of all the beings in the world.”

This seer of truth and untruth which is present within the water cannot but be the casual सत्ता existing within all. Take again such description as this—

“Varuna knows *two kinds* of पद,—one visible (“दर्शनैय”) and the other invisible (प्राचीन) *pada* (8, 41, 4)”. This प्राचीन पद must be the casual substance lying behind its visible form. And this hidden पद is otherwise referred to when the Vedic R̥ṣi declared that “Varuna has revealed the secret of a *hidden pada* to a worthy intelligent devotee.”—

“विद्वान् पदस्य गुह्यान् अवोचत्, युगाय (योग्याय) विप्र उपराय शिचन् ।”

The following stanza about Varuna becomes consistent only when we take the *Casual Form* of Varuna, otherwise it will be meaningless. It is the casual substance alone which works differently in different objects.

“वनेषु व्यन्तरीक्षं ततान, वाजमर्ब्वत्सु, पय उस्त्रियासु ।

ह्रत्सु क्रतुं वरुणो, अप्सु अग्निं, दिवि सूर्यमदधात्, सोममद्रौ ।”

“It is Varuna who has placed strength in the horse, milk in the cow, fire in the water, sun in the sky, soma in the mountain and Varuna has spread the firmanent overhead.”

Can a visible, limited object do all these various functions?

In addition to the line of argument here developed to indicate the subtle causal form which is *present behind each* of the visible forms of the Vedic gods, there are several other forms of reasoning, which bring out the same fact. We are not able to set them forth here for considerations of space

Śaṅkara has shown by logical arguments that the effects can never be separated from, and taken outside of, their causal substance, and that they must always be considered *in relation with*¹ their underlying cause which is finding its own realisation through them. In giving an idea of the invisible but ever

¹ तदयुक्तमखिलं वस्तु, व्यवहारः चिदान्वितः ।...ब्रह्म और सापेक्षिवापेक्षितं (१० व्याख्यानरूपण) ।

accompanying causal reality *behind* each of the visible gods the Ṛg-veda wants to show that the visible forms of the gods will always put the people in mind of the *Causal Reality* which is *ever present behind* them and *severed from which* the gods will at once become unessential and कदलोस्तम्भवदसारः, to use the expression employed by Śaṅkara. They are always to be considered *in connection with* their causal substance—which is none other but Brahman itself—of which these gods are so many manifestations. The idea of the Ṛg-veda is that Brahman is finding its expression through the visible objects—the Vedic gods—mentioned therein. The description of the सूक्ष्मरूप behind the visible स्थूल forms of these gods serves this great purpose. It would be totally unphilosophical to take the Vedic gods as *separated* from their causal source and to read them as so many self-sufficient, independent beings, which some interpreters of the Ṛg-veda have done. Śaṅkara has shown such a procedure to be erroneous. The effects can not, even for a moment, stand *unrelated* to their cause. Neither do they serve any other purpose than the realisation, through them, of the nature of the causal reality. It is in this way that the Ṛg-vedic gods must be considered. Śaṅkara has repeatedly stated that one finite object does indeed negate or exclude another finite object, but none of these objects can negate or exclude the idea of their cause which is the infinite existing behind them.

नहि कार्यं नाम वस्तुतो अस्ति, यतः कारण-बुद्धिर्विनिवर्त्तत ।

For, the कार्य is nothing but the transformation of the causal reality. How then can a कार्य exclude the idea of its cause? The visible forms or the effects have no real value of *their own*. As these are परार्थ, they serve the purpose of the realisation of the nature of the causal reality which exists and operates within them. The causal realities are therefore the ends; but as Brahman is the absolute end, it includes all other

lower ends within it.* १ Śaṅkara has explained this relation between the causal reality and the effects produced out of it. This exactly is the relation which exists between the dual forms of the gods described in the R̥g-veda. Forgetting the *intimate relation* in which the hidden underlying causal reality always stands with the visibly gross forms of natural objects, it is wrong to look upon these as the *only objects* with which we have any concern in the world. This would be the व्यवहारिक view as stated by Śaṅkara. But this is not at all the real view; it is the most unphilosophical view which obtains among the ordinary people. We must try to cultivate the real पारमार्थिक view and look upon the gods, *i.e.*, the phenomenal objects as *manifestations* of the Causal Reality—as Brahma itself which sustains them and which *works within* them, and without which and cut off from which they would altogether lose their importance, would become unreal, unessential. This grand truth the R̥g-veda has inculcated upon us, when it describes the subtle invisible form along with the visible gross forms of its gods. Otherwise, such description becomes a meaningless jumble. Yet the modern interpreters of the R̥g-veda have not a word to say about the invisible causal form which accompanies those gods, so clearly described in the pages of the R̥g-veda in connection with each of its gods.

• KOKILESWAR SASTRI

*अनेके हि ब्रह्मरूपाः सामान्य-विवेकाः ।...तेषां एकस्मिन् महासामान्ये पारम्यर्थस्य च लभावः ॥१॥

THE JAINA CONCEPTION OF TRUTH AND REALITY

The central problem of Jaina thought is Man in all his relations to the universe which is attempted to be accounted for and explained only in so far as it bears on human life and existence. The Jaina ethics is an elaborate consideration of the conditions of bondage and emancipation of man. The God of the Jaina Religion is no Absolute and Transcendental Being who looked down upon the mortals below from his sidereal seat, but is the *Jina* or Man-God, that is, one who had been one amongst us, but exalted to the status of a god by his own efforts, by the attainment of consummation in the cognitive, emotive and conative aspects of his life. In Psychology the Jaina has come upon his concept of soul not by way of searching after the self as self-existent and unchangeable principle in the ever-changing world of phenomena like the Upanishads, but rather by way of *perception of life* which is of more immediate interest for man than everything else in the universe.¹ And the same dominating interest in Man has also been distinctly manifest in his conception of Truth and Reality. Thus the entire Jaina system may be said to have developed a distinctly biocentric or anthropocentric standpoint. And the present essay deals with the problem of Truth and Reality from the anthropocentric standpoint of the Jaina.

Now if, as already stated, the central problem of the Jaina system is man, then the knowledge and existence of the extra-mental world will have significance and value only in so far as such knowledge and existence affect the practical life of man. In other words, the test or standard of truth must be *pragmatic, i.e.,*

¹ Cf. Dr. Jacobi's note in S. E. S. XXII, p. 3, and Deussen's "Philosophy of the Upanishads," Ch. XI.

all genuine knowledge must aim at the fulfilment of some useful purpose, must lead the human agent to some useful activity. Knowledge, in order to be valid, must inform the subject of an object that would subserve some useful purpose for him; and if our knowledge of a particular object be such that thereby we are not at all helped to discern whether that thing is to be eschewed (*heya*) or accepted (*upādeya*), whether that thing will be of any service to us or not, then such knowledge is of little or no value in our practical life, and amounts to error and is termed *viparyaya*. The validity of knowledge is thus constituted by its practical consequence, by its verification. The truth of an idea or a judgment is not thus a property inherent in it; truth happens to an idea or a judgment. It becomes true, is made true by useful consequences.¹ Hence the Jaina urges that if, as the Mimāṃsakas hold,² truth were constituted by the very same conditions under which cognition as such arises, and not by anything extraneous to these conditions, as would follow from their *Swatahprāmānyavāda*, then it would hardly be possible to distinguish between right and false cognition, between truth and error.³

The Buddhist account of the test of truth is also pragmatic. The Buddhist also states that the validity of knowledge consists in its verifiability, in its leading the agent to fruitful activity.⁴ But though both Jainism and Buddhism agree in their affirmation that valid cognition always points to something leading to the fulfilment of a purpose, yet they differ from each other in their ultimate reference (*pramāṇaphalam*). That conative fulfilment is the essential element in the validity of an idea is common ground for the Bauddha and the Jaina

¹ Cf. *Parikṣāmukhasūtra*, Ch. I. 1. and *Prameyakamalamārtan* in thereon.

² Cf. James's *Pragmatism*, p. 201; "Tasmāt aprāmānyabat prāmānyamapi paratah eba utpadyate."—*Nyayadīpikā*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid*, p. 5.

⁴ *Abisambhāḍakam jñānam Samyagjñānam*.—*Nyayabindutika*, p. 3; *Yatascha artha-śiddhistat Samyagjñānam*.—*Ibid*, p. 6. *Arthakriyāsamarthabastu Pradarsakam Samyagjñānam*.—*Ibid*, p. 8.

alike, and this is patent from their common use of the term *arthakriyākāritwa*.¹ The concept of *arthakriyākāritwa* has, however borne not the same connotation with both.

A historical study of the concept of *arthakriyākāritwa* reveals that it was perhaps used for the first time in Buddhist literature by Dharmakīrti in his "Nyāyabindu" (650 A.D.), and that the earliest mention of it in Jaina literature appears to have been made by Akalankadeva (750 A.D.) in his commentary entitled *Ashtasati* on the *Āptamimāṃsā* of Samantabhadra.² The *artha* of *arthakriyākāritwa*, however, has not throughout its history referred explicitly to human purpose (*purushārtha*) uniformly, so far as Buddhist literature is concerned, but it may be stated without fear of contradiction that there is in all cases at least an implicit reference to a purpose of some human agent.³ In any case the Buddhist doctrine of *Sattwa* or existence does not refer to any abiding (*nitya*) reality apart from the series of ever-flowing phenomena each of which is new and different from the other (*Swalakṣaṇam*). Each moment ushers into existence a new effect and each new effect as produced in each case means the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of another phenomenon. *Sattwa* thus means nothing other than an impression produced on us; so that the idea of power as producing impressions and as making up the essence of a permanent entity has no meaning apart from the impressions themselves which succeed one another in time; and hence *arthakriyākāritwa* as constituting the essence of *Sattwa* means nothing more than mere empirical causality. The Buddhist

¹ The Buddhist doctrine of Existence or reality: "*Sattwam arthakriyākāritwa-lakṣaṇam*."—*Saṃbhāṣaṇa Saṃgraha*, p. 15.

The Jaina doctrine of existence or reality: "*Bastunastābhadarthakriyākāritwam lakṣaṇam*."—*Syādvāda-manjari* (Benares Edition), p. 19.

² Cf. Dr. Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 154-55 and p. 163, and *vide Ashtasati* on *Āptamimāṃsā*, Ch. II. 33.

For implicit and explicit reference to human purpose as far as traceable in Buddhist literature *vide* Dr. Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy* and for Jaina reference, *vide* *Syādvāda-manjari*, *Tarkarāhasya-dīpikā*, etc.

account of the criterion of truth is thus pragmatic and is greatly akin to the pragmatism of William James in so far as it ends in a mere epistemological method, developed out of an empirical and psychological analysis of our actual facts of knowing, and as such shuts out all reference to ontological reality.

Here the Jaina joins issue with the Buddhist and points out that if *arthakriyākāritwa*, i.e., leading to useful activity, be the criterion of truth then our inquiry must at once outstep the limits of epistemology and merge into the realm of metaphysics from which epistemology can hardly be separated except by abstraction. The *purushārtha* or subjective human purpose may be served by a world of objects which are by their very nature adequate for such purpose. Now experience and common sense tell us that our world is composed of a plurality of concrete objects which are neither absolutely immutable nor absolutely mutable but which combine in themselves both characteristics.) The concrete reality is thus constituted by some element which is permanent or immutable (*dhruba*) and by some element which is transitory or mutable, or subject to change or motion resulting in appearance of new qualities (*utpāda*) and in loss or dissolution (*byaya*) of old ones.¹ In so far as the immutable element is concerned it is known as *dravya* and in so far as mutation or modification is concerned it is known as *Paryāya*. Both *Dravya* and *Paryāya* elements enter into the nature of a concrete reality.² Hence the Jaina points out that the Bauddha has really missed the significance of *arthakriyākāritwa* to have applied it to the world of objects which he conceives to be composed of momentary phenomena (*paryāyas*) only.

By using subtlest dialectical polemic the Jaina establishes that a momentary existence cannot exert *arthakriyākāritwa* or causal efficiency, as the Bauddha conceives it, either by way

¹ Cf. "Utpādabyayadhraubyayuktam Sat."—Ch. V. 29.

² "Dravyam paryāyabiyutam paryāyā dravyabharjitah. Kva kadā kena kimrupā dṛiṣṭā mānna kenachit."

of succession or by way of simultaneity.¹ In the first instance, a momentary existence cannot exert causal efficiency by operating successively, for successive operation involves pervasion in point of space (*deśakritā byāpti*) as well as in point of time (*kālakritā byāpti*); but pervasion is an impossibility in the case of what is momentary. Nor can a momentary existence exert causal efficiency by way of simultaneity. If it could, then we would have to conceive that a momentary existence, say a seed, would simultaneously produce the manifold effect of absorbing heat and moisture, differentiating into sprout, etc., which are contrary to experience.

Now the Jaina contention is that just as the concept of *arthakriyākāritwa* does not consist with the Buddhist view of momentary existence as shown above, even so it does not apply to the world of objects viewed as wholly permanent (*ekānta nitya*). Suppose, if possible, that *arthakriyākāritwa* holds good of an immutable reality, then it holds good either by way of succession or by way of simultaneity. But *arthakriyākāritwa* does not really hold good of a permanent reality by way of *succession* (*kramena*). Now succession involves lapse of time and lapse of time implies inadequacy in the cause to produce the effect. For had it been adequately efficient then it would have produced the whole series of effects by its initial activity. And even waiving the lapse of time as the sign of inefficiency we are bound to affirm that if the cause, instead of producing the whole effect all at once, has to pass through successive moments of time then it indicates that the cause has to depend upon the collocation of circumstances (*sahakāribhavan*) which does not come to maturity by the first moment of its operation, and thus the cause is inadequate in itself to produce the effect. In other words, the Jaina thinks that the purely static conception of reality (*ekānta nitya*) is incompatible with the idea of causality. To be is not to do,

¹ "Sattvam arthakriyākāritwam taccha kramākramābhyām byāptam."—*Syādvāda-manjari* (Benares Edition), pp. 19-21.

bare unchangeable existence is no determinant of causality which is dynamic and which involves change and activity. And the Jaina disposes of the other alternative that *arthakriyākāritwa* holds good of a static reality by way of simultaneity, simply by pointing out that we never come across in our actual experience a case of a static reality producing the whole series of effects simultaneously, in its first moment of operation. Thus while the Buddhist doctrine of *Arthakriyākāritwa* stops short at pointing out merely that causal efficiency obtains amongst unconnected moments of phenomena without any reference to any noumenal background, and that human cognition is to be judged valid in so far as some purpose of the subject is fulfilled by the cognition of such phenomena, with the Jaina it acquired a more comprehensive and humanistic meaning in that it establishes the concrete character of reality which is not pure being (*ekānta nitya*) of the Vedantist nor, pure becoming (*ekānta anitya*) of the Buddhist but which is both in one, (*dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu*). Hence while Buddhist pragmatism is anti-metaphysical, the pragmatism of the Jaina distinctly points to a pluralistic realism. But the Jaina has gone much further than this and has shown that the reality is indeterminate (*anekāntadharmātmak*), admitting of infinite number of ways of characterisations because of infinite number of qualities possessed by it. Hence any one judgment or affirmation represents only one out of innumerable points of view from which an object may be characterised and is partially or relatively true, always leaving room for alternative predication. And this partial or relative determination of reality in the face of its infinite potentiality is technically called *Naya*¹ by the Jainas, according to whom therefore, the truth of a judgment becomes relative to the standpoint from which it is affirmed. The truth of any one affirmation is therefore only conditional and relative and becomes contradicted

¹ "Tatra anirūkritapratipakso bastvamāgrāhi jñaturabhiprāyo nayah."—Prameya-kamalamārtanda, Ch. 6.

when conceived to form the absolute point of view, and thus becomes a *nayābhāsa* or semblance of *naya* which amounts to a fallacy. (Hence it follows that all judgments or affirmations are true in some sense and false in another, there being no judgment which is absolutely true and none which is absolutely false.)

Now the Jaina contends, very much in the same spirit, as the modern pragmatist, that in spite of the privative or relative character of specific concepts or judgments, the Vedāntist, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika thinker, and the Buddhist have each in his own way taken specific concepts or judgments to represent the whole or absolute truth, and have been led to the supposition that because a thing has one definable character, it cannot have any other, that the formal principles of identity and contradiction have invulnerable rigidity alike in the realms of thought and things. An unbiassed examination of facts, however, reveals the contrary: each object of our experience is a home of contradictions, a harbour of opposites. Hence the Jaina directs his dialectic skill against what James calls "Vicious Intellectualism or Abstractionism"¹ as exhibited by each of the Vedāntist, the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosopher and the Buddhist in so far as each of them uses concepts *privatively* or confines them to one or other specific aspect of the concrete reality which is infinitely rich in characters (*Dharmas*). To express the Jaina standpoint in the language of Prof. Perry, "The world may be truly conceived as permanent and unified, since it is such *in a certain respect*. But this should not lead us, as it has led certain intellectualists, to suppose that the world is therefore not changing and plural. We must not identify our world with one conception of it. In its concrete richness it lends itself to many conceptions. And the same is true of the least thing in the world. It has many aspects, none of which is exhaustive of it. It may be

¹ James: "Meaning of Truth," p. 249 and also "Pluralistic Universe," p. 218.

taken in many relations, and orders, and be given different names accordingly."¹

Then the Jaina proceeds further and says that this sort of abstractionism or Nayābhāsa is manifest not only in our representation of the world of objects as exclusively immutable (nitya) or exclusively mutable (anitya) but also in our application of the concepts of *universality* and *particularity*, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* to them. The problem of the nature, and relation between the universal and the particular has occupied the Jaina mind no less engrossingly than the world of Western thought and the solution it has preferred has tended to strengthen the *Anekāntavāda* or the doctrine of indeterminate reality. The non-dualistic Vedāntists maintain that the universal is real and that the distinctions and particularities, the world of our experience teems with, are but unreal modes (bikāras) which melt into nothingness before the universal *satta* which is real. The Buddhist on the other hand insists that what we really perceive is not the universal but particulars which are unique in themselves (svalakṣaṇa), our perception of a cow does not imply anything like the cow-essence (gotwa) beyond the particular colour and the particular bodily configuration which make up the individuality of the cow.² Further the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers are supposed by the Jainas to admit the reality of the universal and the particular but not in their proper relation to each other.³ According to them the universal can exist apart from particular and particulars are also conceivable independently of the universal. They are as independent and exclusive of each other

¹ Prof. Perry's *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 228.

² Cf. "Etāsu panchasvabhāsanīṣhu
Pratyaksabodhe Sphutamangulīṣhu
Sādhāranam rūpamabeksate yah
Sringam Sirasyātmana īksate sah."

—Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by
M. M. Haraprasad Shastri.

³ Cf. *Syādvāda-manjarī*, pp. 19-21.

as fire and water. As to the question how the universal (gotwa) and the particular (Śabaladhabalādi) are found to co-exist (Sāmānādhikaranyam) if they are mutually exclusive, the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeshika rejoined that such co-existence is more apparent than real: the universal is not immanent in the particulars, so that the reality is not universal-particular, but universal or particular according as the perceiver emphasises the one or the other. Now the Jaina urges that neither exclusively in terms of the universal (Sāmānya), nor exclusively in terms of the particular (Viśeṣa) are we justified in conceiving the objects of experience, the conception of reality in terms of the abstract universal out of all relation to particulars is as incompatible with experience as the conception of reality constituted by abstract particularity. The object of our experience is a concrete reality where the universal embodies itself in the particular; the cow of our experience presents before our mind's eye not only the particularity which differentiates the cow from the buffalo and other animals but also the universal essence of 'cow'-ness (gotwa) which permeates through all the animals denoted by the term cow. Then the universals are neither *ante res* nor *post res* but are *in rebus*, not transcendent but immanent in the particulars.

The indeterminate character of reality is further brought out by the Jaina in another way. He thinks that the object of our experience is both existent (sat) as well as non-existent (asat). Our supposition of an object as a pure being is an abstraction and our taking it as pure non-existence also amounts to downright negation. What the Jaina wants to point out is that everything has its existence (satta) without which no characterisation whatsoever is possible, but at the same time it is non-existent in the sense that it is characterised by the absence of the qualities of all other things but itself.¹ If a particular thing, say a pot, were purely non-existent, then

¹ "Sarvamasti Svarūpeṇa Pararūpeṇa nāsticha.
Anyathā Sarvasattwam syāt svarupsyāpyasambhavaḥ."

the very that-ness, or *quālit*y would have been an impossible conception. Hence the pot *per se* is necessarily existent in order to the very conception of it. On the other hand the qualities of any other object, say of cloth, are not existent in the pot, so that the pot is non-existent in relation to the cloth. In other words every object *per se* is *sat*, but relation to every other object is *asat*.

Thus the Jaina concludes that the world of objects, if they are objects at all for any human subject to whom they bear any significance and value, if they are not to belie their true characters as revealed by experience and common sense, must be conceived as indeterminate having infinite number of aspects; it is neither purely *dravya*, nor purely *paryāya*, neither purely *nitya* nor purely *anitya*, neither purely universal, nor purely particular, neither purely *sat*, nor purely *asat*, and so on, so that any one judgment or affirmation from any one standpoint, where there are really infinite number of standpoints corresponding to an infinite number of aspects of the concrete reality, can represent but a relative truth. Every judgment or affirmation is thus relative to the aspect of the reality it represents, and in order to avoid misconstruction that it represents the whole or absolute truth it must be conveyed by the reservation indicated by the expression *Syāt*. And here we have what is known as the doctrine of *Syādvāda* or *Relativism*.

Now this doctrine of *Syādvāda* or Relativism corresponding to the indeterminate character of reality has been developed into the famous *Saptabhanginaya* or the *doctrine of sevenfold judgment or predication* which is unique in the history of world-thought. From the doctrine of Relativism of knowledge it has been plain to us that what can be affirmed from one standpoint may also be denied from another; and since position (*bidhi*) and negation (*nishedha*) can be conceived both in succession and simultaneity (*kramayaugapadyābhyām*) we can evolve the sevenfold way of predication. A careful student of Jaina dialectic will notice that from any one standpoint

or *naya* we can evolve with the help of *affirmation* and negation made both successively and simultaneously, the similar sevenfold predication in any case. Just as by fixing our attention on the particular *naya* or standpoint of existence (*astitva*) we can go on evolving the seven stages: *Syādasti*, *Syānnāsti*, *Syādasti Syānnāsticha*, *Syādavaktavyam*; *Syadasticha avaktavyamcha*, *Syānnāsticha avaktavyamcha* and *Syādasticha Syānnāsticha avaktavyamcha*. Similarly we may, from the standpoint of *nityatva* or immutability make out the sevenfold predication: *Syādnityam*, *Syādanityam*, *Syādubhayam*, etc. Thus the Jaina contention is that the nature of reality is indeterminate and is conceivable in an infinite number of ways in accordance with the infinite number of aspects of a thing and that nothing short of the sevenfold judgment will represent even any one of the many standpoints from which an object can be looked at.¹

Now bearing in mind that the Jaina doctrine of *Naya* and that of the *Saptabhanginaya* which grows out of the doctrine of *Naya* have significance and value only with reference to the nature of reality conceived in relation to man, we now proceed to consider the further implications of the Jaina view of truth and Reality. (We have already noticed that from the Jaina account of *arthakriyākāritva* the truth or validity of an idea or judgment is made or engendered by its leading to some fruitful activity. Now the question may legitimately arise as to *how reality is related to the making of truth*. If truth is truth for us, in so far as it answers to our purpose, is reality in the same sense reality for us? The Jaina holds that in the cognitive elaboration of experience both truth and reality grow up *pari passu*. It is in our attainment of valid knowledge that we make reality so far as it is cognisable. Epistemologically therefore, *i.e.*, so

¹ Bikaladesāsabhāvā hi nayasaptabhangī bastwamśā mātra prarupakatwāt, sakalā-deśasabhāvāhi pramāṇa saptabhangī yathābat bastuprarupakatwāt.—

far as our knowledge can go, there is a sense in saying that the making of truth and making of reality are identical. But metaphysically speaking we must make a distinction between reality that is made and reality that is. The *Anekantavāda* of the Jaina conceives reality as indeterminate and infinite potentiality, which serves as a sort of inexhaustible reserve of objective reality but which yet perpetually grows up into the reality of our own knowing and therefore of our own making. Jainism is thus no scepticism or agnosticism, landing us into the absolute doubt as to reality, or into the unknowable things-in-themselves of Kant or into the Spencerian transfigured Realism, according to which we are debarred from knowing the Absolute Reality "in the strict sense of knowing." Jaina indeterminism is a form of realism, but it differs from modern realism in that it, instead of conceiving, like the latter, a plurality of determinate truths, goes beyond it to show that each truth admits of an infinite number of alternative judgments. Further the Jaina theory is almost an incontrovertible rejoinder against the conception of independent reality which the metaphysics of absolutism and realism agree in misinterpreting as one of total absence of dependence upon human experience. The absolutistic and realistic metaphysics errs in so far as it supposes that in the cognitive transaction it is the subject only and not the object as well, that undergoes transformation. Now it is highly interesting to note that in the Jaina system it is maintained that both the subject or the knower, and the object in so far as it is known, are *altered* by the cognitive process. A reality may be regarded as independent¹ of our knowing or as affected or *altered* by it according as it is shown whether or not *it is aware of being known*.

Now a reality can be said to be transformed in the *sense of being-aware of being known* only on the condition that it is endowed with some form of psychical life. The Jaina holds that the whole of the universe is endowed with psychical life of

¹ Cf. Schiller : Studies in Humanism, Ch. XIX, pp. 439-44.

different degrees of intensity.¹ "Everything from the solar system to the dew drop has a soul, and not merely men and animals. The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas ; they are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme pains so that there are souls even in so-called inanimate objects called metals and stones." Now this *hylo-zoistic* or more properly speaking, *panpsychist* view of the universe as held by the Jaina lends an additional support to our interpretation of his view that in our act of knowing an object, in our cognitive manipulation of it, it may be said to be aware of being known in some sense and therefore said to be *altered* or made by us. In one word, there is, *in some sense, the actual making of reality by us, as there is the making of truth.* And so far Jainism answers to a great extent to the present day humanism of Schiller.

We conclude here that the Jaina system as an independent venture of the Indian mind, is of great philosophical importance for the comparative study of the present day problems of western thought. It has, as we have seen, developed a Pragmatic Epistemology but has at the same time given us a pluralistic realism which goes beyond modern realism in so far as it, instead of confining itself to the doctrine of a plurality of determinate truths, indicates that reality is indeterminate admitting of an infinity of alternative predications, and that quite on an independent line of thought, scarcely inferior in scientific manipulation profundity of conceptions to the present day Humanism of the western world. And it would be the height of sacrilege to the system of Jaina speculation to attempt an unnecessary twisting of facts, to impose an absolutist and monist interpretation on their conception of truth and reality, as has been done in some quarters, on the plea of pseudo-simplicity, or perhaps owing to speculative bias.²

HARIMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA

¹ Cf. Lokaprakāśa, VI, pp. 31 ff.

² Vide Prof. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, ch. on the Jaina System.

VEDĀNTIC INTUITION

Tattwajñāna or right knowledge of the ultimate Reality is, according to the Vedānta, the only means of attaining salvation. Ignorance or want of knowledge is the cause of all bondage and sufferings, and when this ignorance is removed, there is everlasting freedom and infinite bliss for human beings. The Upanishads abound with such sayings as 'tarati sokamātmā mabī'—only he who has known the self can transcend all miseries; 'tameba bidityātimritymuch nānya panthā vidyate ayanāya'—knowledge of Him alone can bestow immortality, there is no other road to salvation, *etc.* It is difficult to understand, however, what exactly the Upanishads meant by the root (विद्) vid here. It is clear enough that we are not to mean by it anything of the nature of what we ordinarily mean by knowledge. If we take the ordinary sense of the root, we cannot explain such passages as, (i) 'anyadeba tadbidityādathābidityād,' that is neither known nor unknown, or that is different from all that is known or all that is unknown; (ii)

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।

अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम् ॥

(He who thinks that Brahman is not known *i.e.*, not the object of the process of knowing, knows it properly; he who thinks that Brahman is known to him, knows it not; so Brahman is not revealed to those who think they knew it, but is revealed to those who think they knew it not, (iii) यतो वाचोनिर्गम्य अप्राप्य मनसा सह—from which words come back with the failing to attain it, *etc.* Again, we find in the Upanishads such statement as मनसेवेदमवान्तथ्य—it is to be attained through the mind and mind alone.)

These seemingly contradictory passages clearly indicate that the Upanishads have in view a different kind of apprehension of the ultimate Reality from what we are familiar with in ordinary knowledge. While denying straightforwardly that there can be knowledge of the Absolute in the ordinary sense, they proclaim loudly that experience or realisation of the Absolute is not only possible, but that this experience alone is competent to bestow salvation on us. A distinction has always been drawn in Vedāntic literature between 'parokshajñāna' and 'aparokshānubhūti.' Sometimes the word 'vijñāna' is used to indicate the latter, as distinguished from the word 'jñāna.' 'Jñānam' according to the commentators means only sāstriya Jñānam or knowledge that is acquired through the reading of the sastras, while 'vijñānam' means 'anubhavam' or realisation. (Madhusudan Saraswati holds that vijñānam is direct realisation in one's *anubhava* of what has been previously ascertained by arguments, तदप्रामाण्यशङ्कानिराकरणफलेन विचारेण तस्यैव तेषां स्वानुभवेनापरोक्षोक्तिकरणं (Bhagbadgita vi. 8). Parokshajñāna is mere intellectual apprehension or understanding of fact or truths, while aparokshajñāna is intuitive or direct acquaintance with them.) This distinction between indirect and intuitive knowledge is also noted by Western philosophers. B. Russell distinguishes between 'knowledge by description' and 'knowledge by acquaintance.' According to him, the things that impress themselves on us directly are known by acquaintance *e.g.*, sense-data *i.e.*, the materials for sensations, but our percepts are known by description, in as much as they involve representation or indirect elements. Josiah Royce again distinguishes between 'the world of description,' and 'the world of appreciation.' There are some experiences which come to us in such a fashion that while they bring with them the best criterion of reality and affect the deepest core of our hearts, still we cannot apply to them the categories of space, time, causality, *etc.*, which are the only available modes of describing reality. There is something indiscribable in these experiences, and this element of

indescribability constitutes much of their life. We can only *appreciate* such experiences, but cannot describe them. Appreciation is realising for oneself exactly as it is a part of his own experience. I may be said to have an appreciation of a piece of painting when exactly the same ideas which preceded the actual outlining of the scene in the mind of the artist are reproduced in me *i.e.*, when I for the moment coincide with the mind of the artist so far as this particular occupation is concerned. (When my will actually coincides with the will of the artist, the manifestation of which is the piece of painting, then only I really have an appreciation of the same.) There is a great deal of difference between this appreciation and imagination. (Imagination is the process where we get only a mental copy of a description, which is the outward manifestation or symbolisation of an inner will. In appreciation, on the other hand, the will directly has cognisance of another will. It is a direct acquaintance of the self with another self, so far as this is possible.) To understand the meaning of a poem through the exercise of one's imaginative powers is very different from appreciating it by placing oneself in the position of the poet and experiencing first the inner workings in the mind of the poet while he is engaged in mentally composing the poem. The poem itself is a thing in the world of description, while the mental preparations for the poem are events in the world of appreciation. If at some happy moment through continued meditation over it we can experience a glimpse of the mood of the poet mentally composing the poem, then only we can have a real appreciation of the piece of poetry. (This is *Svarupa-Jñāna i.e.*, to know a thing by being it, by identifying the inner life of one with the inner life of another. This is appreciation *i.e.*, soul's knowledge of other souls.) Material bodies can only be *described* by us, they cannot be appreciated. We can acquire intellectual knowledge of them, but we can have no appreciation of them. Knowledge through appreciation is something like thought-reading, where the intermediaries or outward

expressions of thoughts have been dispensed with. (When the finite will can identify itself with the world-will, it can have an appreciative knowledge of the universe, where the categories of space and time and causality, *etc.*, are hopelessly inadequate and useless.) The self can directly know or appreciate only selves, and this appreciation is knowledge not through the intervention of any expression or outward manifestation or description of an idea. This is the only consistent knowledge by acquaintance. It is not possible to have knowledge by acquaintance of sense-data, as Bertrand Russel supposes, simply because matter is farthest removed from consciousness, and appreciation or acquaintance in its proper sense, can exist only between objects which are very intimately related. \

(There is of course a difference between Royce's 'appreciation' and Sankara's *aparokshānubhuti*. There may be appreciation by the self of other selves, but there can be *aparokshānubhuti* of only one's own self. Sankara tells us of a state of experience where there is unqualified unity, where there is not a society of selves, but where there is only *the self* pervading the whole of consciousness and so also the whole universe resting in its own glory (*sve mahimni protisthitam*). We may here recall the famous passage in the Chandagya Upanishads describing the *Bhumā*: यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा, यो वे भूमातदमृतमथ यदल्पं तन्मर्त्त्यं, स भावः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति, स्वे महिम्नि, यदि वा न महिम्नोति, स एवाधस्तात्, स उपरिष्ठात्, स पश्चात् स पुरस्तात् स दक्षिणतः स उत्तरतः य एवेदं सर्वमिति- /where or when nothing else can be seen or heard or known, but this alone; this is experience of the Absolute and the Infinite. That which is limitless is also endless or destructionless, so everything which has a limit is bound to destruction. This *Bhumā* rests on its own glory or it does not rest on anything at all. This *Bhumā* is below us and is also above us, is behind us as well as in the front of us, is to the south of us, and to the north of us, this *Bhumā* is everything *i.e.*, there is nothing over and above it. In *aparokshānubhuti* or when the

self finds the self directly and unveiled completely, *Jagat* or the World or materiality which is the source of multiplicity disappears altogether. All not-self is gone, the not-self even in the form of ideas disappears. Even ideas are detached existences in a sense from the self. The ideas seem to come out of the self, and therefore, to some extent, are distant from the self. The stage of willing before there has been some ideation seems to be more intimate to the self. That which is the prius of all ideation, the stage where there has not been any expression even in the form of ideas, seems to be peculiarly intimate, to be nearest to the self. (At this stage, there is no externality, no outwardness, not the least trace of any not-self.) (At the stage of ideation, there seems to be an apparent self-division of the self into itself and its ideas, as the not-self, although the so-called not-self is still nothing beyond the bigger circle of self. This is perhaps the stage of self-consciousness as held by Hegel. Although this is an advance on Russell's Realism which speaks of acquaintance of sense-data, still it cannot be regarded as a specimen of perfect Idealism, in as much as it does not clearly tell us of the stage of *primaeval* unity where there is not even the distinction of the self and the ideas forming the not-self.) (It is because of this that the Vedānta speaks of knowledge through ideation, through reasoning and argumentation as *paroksha* and indirect. It wants us to go further still and discover a stage which is prior to the stage of ideation, where the self alone shines, and which it designates by the name of *aparokshānubhuti*.) Knowledge through ideas gives us merely descriptive knowledge, and therefore there can be *aparoksha* only of the unmanifested or the *abyakta chetana*. So we see that there can be by the very nature of the case, *aparoksha* or most intimate, direct, nearest or identical knowledge of only one thing, and this is one's *own self*. So, the self cannot have *aparoksha* of material bodies or their copies or sense-data, or even of ideas and memories and images, but it can have *aparokshajñāna* only of itself.

Bergson's 'intuition' is much simpler and easier than Sankara's aparokshānubhuti. (Intuition, with Bergson, is intellectual sympathy) and is the sort of thing with which persons acquainted with and producing literary composition, are familiar. (It is the concrete and living experience, not yet symbolised in abstract concepts,) which one gathers flowing with the stream so to speak. (But this intuition can hardly give us svarupajñāna or absolute acquaintance, which Bergson claims for it, because here also an element of relativity remains, viz., the memories, the living experiences of the individual, in short, the concrete life of the individual.) The poet or the philosopher, who penetrates deeply into his own heart may find out treasures but there are richer treasures behind, i.e., deeper still, and in the inmost recess, where there is no disturbing factor or upādhi (i.e., when it is completely upādhibinirmukta), is found something which is really valuable, which is absolute, which is svarupa tattwa, which is entirely free from all contradictions, where all oppositions are solved. This (aparokshānubhuti or ātmabodha or self-realisation or tatwajñāna is really something mysterious to the ordinary man, and it is very difficult to attain the same. Certainly the moments of deep concentration when we seem to enter into ourselves, which Bergson refers to as moments of intuition, are preparatory stages towards the intuition which Sankara refers to. In order that such an anubhuti may be had, there should not only be the development of the intellect, but there should be other forms of discipline training the mind.) The moment of intuition should be a moment when the mind is freed from all prepossessed ideas or notions, when the mind becomes as clear and transparent as is possible, and consciously or sub-consciously remains occupied with nothing else, in order that it may receive a full and thorough and exact view of reality, as it is. For svarupajñāna, the absence of all possible disturbing influence, is absolutely essential, and such a condition is very very difficult to attain. Bergson was charmed with what he saw in the depths of the ocean of

self-consciousness, and the treasures discovered there declared forcibly and loudly for their inestimable worth and value as contrasted with that of the pebbles hitherto collected in the sea-beach of intellectualism. But Sankara tells us that he has dived deeper still and discovered a place where everything is quiet, where there is perfect and all-pervading luminosity, where there is perfect ease and harmony and freedom, where all multiplicity and diversity and roaring of the waves of the surface are for ever stopped.)

Patañjali also speaks of such svarupajñāna or knowledge of the self as it really is. When the *chittabrittis* or operations of the mind are fully controlled, then the Drastā or the seer or the self is free from all disturbing influences and can be experienced just in its svarupa—योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः—तदाद्रष्टुः स्वरूपावस्थानम् । In the Samādhi state, preparations for which are made through Dhāranā and Dhyāna—fixation and meditation, the object is revealed in its svarupa. (Patañjali speaks of prajñā or intuition which is ritambharā or unerring, and this is acquired in the Samādhi state. ऋतम्भरा तत्र प्रज्ञा सा पुनः श्रुतानुमानप्रज्ञाम्यामन्यविषया । विशेषार्थत्वात् । This intuition which reveals the truth, where there is not the least possibility of error is different from knowledge acquired through testimony or inference. Inferences and testimonies can give us only *sāmānyajñāna* or descriptive knowledge. They can give us no *viśeṣajñāna* or acquaintance or rather appreciation of the thing. But this intuition takes us to the very heart of things, reveals their speciality or individuality, gives us viśeṣa or appreciation, which is something unspeakable) The Bhāṣyakāra says नहि विशेषण कृतसङ्केतः—शब्दः— words can never express what is peculiar to the individual. Things distant and of very fine magnitude cannot be grasped by ordinary perceptions. But we should not suppose that a thing does not exist, merely because perception, inference and testimony cannot give us knowledge of it. The existence of an object is not disproved merely because certain sources of knowledge fail to supply us

with its knowledge; rather we have to find out some other *pramāna* or source of knowledge and Patañjali gives us a new source of knowledge and this is (*samādhi prajñā*)—which is also unerring at a certain stage.

In the nirvikalpa samādhi state, the self is realised directly in its real nature by the self. This is very near to Sankara's aparokshānubhūti. But there seems to be a point of distinction. While there are indications of व्युत्थान *Byuthyāna* or falling away from the nirvikalpa samādhi, Sankara speaks of no such state. To put clearly, a Yogin even when he has attained nirvikalpa samādhi may, after a certain period of time when the samādhi state is no longer, return to moments of ordinary consciousness. His experience in the samādhi state differs from his experiences of his ordinary moments. But (Sankara's aparokshānubhūti or ātmabodha, once attained, is never lost, there is no *Byuthyāna* or falling away from it. Patañjali's nirvikalpa samādhi seems to be dependent on a process, while Sankara's aparokshānubhūti seems to be altogether independent of all processes whatsoever.)

NALINIKANTA BRAHMA

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VASISHTHA

This paper is a brief sketch of the philosophical doctrines embodied in the huge and important work, Yoga Vāsishtha, which curiously enough, has not been given the attention it really deserves. It is a work of real philosophical merit and has a right to be recognised as one of the best works on the Vedānta metaphysics.

The author of the work presents to us the doctrines Ramachandra is supposed to have been taught by Vasishtha. Rama, while still a boy begins to reflect on the nature of things and finds them unsatisfactory, illogical, transitory and illusory. As a consequence he is overpowered by pessimism. Rama's father coming to know of his condition calls him in the presence of Vasishtha before whom Ramachandra gives expression to his views. 'What use,' he says, 'is there of our living here when we are all born to die? Life is momentary and is fastly passing away. It is a doll in the hands of death. Our mind is so restless that it never finds lasting repose in any thing. Our desires are insatiate and always flow from one object to another. The body is an abode of disease and suffering. Childhood is beset with want of strength and wisdom. Youth, in itself evanescent, makes our minds polluted. In youth we become slaves to the person of the women, which appears charming only for a short time, but turns destructive of health and happiness soon after. There is none whom old-age does not overcome. Our existence is a mere mockery. Our enjoyments are the source of our own pain and our desires and ambitions allure us to ruin. Our own senses are our enemy. The splendour of all objects is flickering. Thus there is nothing in life in which a sensible man can find peace. I therefore, want to know if there is any state of existence attainable which is above the sufferings and sorrows of this life.'

Vasishtha begins by saying that true happiness which is unconsciously desired by all does not reside in objects. Objects of our enjoyment appear to be pleasant only when we have a hankering or desire for them. There is a real pleasure, joy, or happiness which is felt in the absence of desires; and it is the abiding pleasure belonging to the very nature of our self for which we have to go nowhere outside. It is on account of the ignorance of the self and consequently of the false knowledge of the world that we suffer all sorts of pain. But there is a way out of this wrong vision, and it consists in the right investigation into the nature of the self and the world.

Before one starts to acquire anything he must be convinced of the fact that the sole determining factor in any achievement is one's own self-exertion. Those, who vainly depend upon fate for getting their desired objects and so neglect self-effort, are their own enemy. They depend upon a thing which neither exists nor does aught. For fate is a non-entity. Our fate is nothing but the inevitable result of our own accomplished deeds. The actions performed in a former life become destiny in the next. So, the so-called fate can easily be overcome by our present efforts. For of the two powers that of the present is superior to the other because the past has become what it is and the present is still undetermined.

There are four other requirements also which a man desirous of truth, in particular, should cultivate in order that he may easily succeed in his efforts; namely, balance of mind, contentment, association with the wise, and rational thinking. Of these the last is the most important. For, by no other way does one directly come to the knowledge of truth than one's own rational thought. In fact there is no other means (प्रमाण) of knowing the self than self-intuition, without which we can have no conception of it.

The nature of our knowledge pre-supposes that behind the plurality and variety perceived in the world there is an

all-embracing unity. All relations presuppose some identity behind the related things. And knowledge, specially, can have only for its object that which is homogeneous with it in nature. Consequently all objects along with the perceiving subject are modifications of mind.

The world is a manifestation of mind, *i.e.*, a system of ideas (कल्पनाः) in the mind. Everything (वस्तु) is the coinage of mind as the dream-experiences are. It is also evident from the fact that yogis do not experience anything at all when they bring their mind to rest. Time is a relation of succession of one idea after another. It is also mind's imagination and is relative to the flow of ideas. Space is also a relation of co-existence of ideas and is relative to the mind's activity. The law of nature (नियोग) is nothing but the idea of sameness in the order of ideas. The stability and persistence of the world are also, like those in a dream, the imagination of mind.

On this view there is little or no difference between the dream world and the waking world. Both are alike in their nature and as long as each lasts, it gives us the same sense of reality and stability as the other.

Every individual perceives only what is within his own mind. No mind perceives aught but its own ideas. So the world appearance has arisen individually to every mind, and every mind has the power to manufacture its own universe. But Vasishtha is not only a subjective Idealist. He admits a plurality of minds and a common world-experience also, which in its original form is a system of ideas in the cosmic mind which he names Brahmā. Both these views are reconciled thus. The ideas manufactured in the mind of Brahmā are the common objects of experience of us all, although in our own mind they enter as our own. And every mind being the manifestation of the same Divine Mind is capable of representing within itself other individual minds as its own ideas. The common ideas of us all give us the appearance of a common universe.

There is another very interesting outcome of this kind of Idealism, namely, that there are worlds within worlds. Whatever is thought by the mind, be it cosmic or individual, becomes, in its own turn, a mind, the creator of its own world. In every universe, thus, there are contained millions of other universes and this process goes *ad infinitum*. There is, however, no fixed uniformity governing all the worlds. Some of them are indeed similar in their whole nature, others similar only in some respects, others still quite different from one another. Every world-evolution, however, is followed by an involution. The evolution of the world proceeds on the principle of desire-fulfilment, *i.e.*, the materialisation of our desires in the shape of objects of enjoyment on the one hand, and the body and sense-organs on the other.

This standpoint of idealism saves us from many false conceptions of our life. Death is one of them. In death there is nothing really to fear. Even if death means the total dissolution of the person, it is a desirable consummation, for in that case, it is a cessation of all our sorrows and sufferings. But such total extinction does not occur in the case of all. Souls bound to their desire are led from one body to another in endless succession and death is only a change of experience. The body being dead the vital airs (प्राणाः) with the potential mental energy in them mix with the atmospheric air, where having recovered from their state of forgetfulness after some time, the dead experience various kinds of other worlds, *e.g.*, heaven and hell according to their respective beliefs and merits. Having enjoyed the bliss of heaven or the pain of hell, the minds begin to experience to wander again on this earth in bodies worthy of their spiritual status. It is only the persons who have realised their divinity (जीवनमुक्ताः) that having given up their bodies do not undergo any other world experience, for they have no desires to fructify. They attain the state of Nirvāna—the total extinction of separate existence. Thus there is no death for the self. It is a change in our experience

due to our desires. It is also possible for us to have control over death. Death is powerless in the case of those who are above sorrows, cares and anxieties ; who are not slaves to their changing moods and lusty passions. People, pure at heart, can live as long as they like.

Thus what a tremendous power mind has got ! Whatever it thinks intensely and believes, comes to exist. It is the seed of the world, nave of the universe. Creation and Dissolution are the rising and setting of its activities. Every individual mind is the master of its destiny, maker of its body and circumstances. There is no other agency but our mental efforts that give us our desired objects. Mind creates the body from its own imagination, can change the form of the body by the force of its imagination. It can cure all the physical diseases of the body by its own harmonious and healthy thoughts, for all physical diseases have their root in mental inharmony. Our health and youth are in our own hands to make or mar. It is in our own power to stay well and young as long as we like. For whatever the mind determines to see in the body, no agency can obstruct. Bondage and Freedom are also the states of mind. Bondage consists in our dependence on some thing other than ourselves for our happiness and joy. Freedom from such a wrong belief is liberation. He is liberated indeed, who is centred within and does not look for his happiness to other things. The peace of our own mind fills the whole universe with nectar for us, just as for him that wears the shoes the whole earth becomes covered with skin.

Mind is named differently according to its various activities or aspects. Mind, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Chitta, Karma, Kalpanā, Smṛiti, Vāsanā, Avidyā, Mala, Indriya, Prakṛiti, Māyā, Kriyā Jiva, Puryashtak, Ativāhik, Dravya, Brahmā, etc., are the names of mind.

All the innumerable individual minds have their origin from the cosmic mind (ब्रह्मा) who has his origin from the

absolute consciousness. The Absolute (ब्रह्म) in its creative aspect or power, by its own Free Will, in mere sportful overflow of joy, comes to self-consciousness at one point, as, it were,—which in other words is the self-forgetfulness of the whole—and on account of intensity there, begins to vibrate in the form of thinking activity and assumes a separate and distinct existence for itself as apart from the whole whose one aspect it is in reality. The rise of the mind, be it cosmic or individual, is a spontaneous activity and is not governed by the law of karma. The law, however, begins to prevail when a mind begins a life of separation and distinctness and operates so long as the union with the Absolute is not realised. Mind in reality is not a separate and distinct reality from the Absolute but one with it as its own power.

The Absolute and its power are not two realities. It is one and the same Absolute which is itself and its Power also. The power when it is active may falsely assume reality for itself but when it recoils back to its possessor, it merges in it and becomes undifferentiated.

It is very difficult to say anything about the Absolute, for, it is above all our concepts and categories which are coined from our limited experience. We cannot for example, say whether it is one or many; Being or non-being; self or not-self; changing or at rest. It is only the mystic experience of those who have raised themselves above the relative standpoint that some how comprehends the nature of the Absolute. What we can say is that it is the All-powerful Reality manifesting itself in all things. It is the subtlest of the subtle and grossest of the gross. It is the unchanging soul of the perpetual change. It illumines the self as well as all other things. It is not far from us but exists always in our own selves as the pure consciousness, the source of all our thoughts.

All our conceptions and experience of life and world are relatively true because they are mere appearance to us. From the point of view of the absolute Reality, however, there is

neither the subject nor the object ; neither life nor death neither bondage nor freedom. There is no world-experience for the Absolute, for from the standpoint of the Absolute it is a non-entity like the son of a barren woman. All such assertion that the universe evolves from the Absolute, that it creates the universe or even that it is the seed of the universe (ब्रह्मसूत्र, रन्याय) are made for practical purposes. The universe is अजात (unproduced).

Now the problem is : how can this absolute reality be made a really conscious experience of our life. There is only one method, namely, rational investigation of Truth and living it. It cannot be realised by any other means. It is not even a matter of grace of any god or spiritual teacher ; for no god can confer freedom on one who is not disciplined through his own right thinking. No renunciation of any kind of actions or performance of others is required. What is required is rising to a higher standpoint and cutting the very root of actions, namely, desires for limited things.

Knowledge is, thus, the only requirement for liberation. But whatever we come to know should not remain a mere belief but should become the experience of life. And we should try to raise ourselves to the absolute standpoint by constant practice, which is to be made along either of the two lines : ब्रह्मभावना—constantly imagining oneself to be identical with the Absolute,—and मनोविलय—stopping the activity of the mind. There are two ways of doing the latter ; renunciation of desires and control of the vital airs (प्राणाः).

Thus self-realisation is not like a magic feat but a long process of our own conscious effort. It is a psychological process of transforming a tiny, weak, and miserable creature into the Almighty, Blissful Absolute. There are seven main psychological stages on the path of this realisation. विवेक (dawn of reflective consciousness), विचारणा (rational investigation), तनुमानसा (purification of mind), स्वप्नभावना (realisation of Idealism), पदार्थाभावभावना (realising the objects to be pure

consciousness in their essence), तुरीया (realisation of the unity), and विदेहमुक्तता (the ultimate peace where all experience of distinctness drops down).

The traveller on the sixth stage is called the जौवनमुक्त । Such a man sees all things in the same light. He is neither delighted in prosperity nor dejected in distress. Though outwardly in discharging the duties of life, yet he is free within. He is in fact free from all the bonds of caste, creed and shastras. He is always cheerful and happy. He is polite and friendly to all. He does neither shun what comes to him nor desires to get what is away from him. He is a child with children, youthful in the society of the young, and grave in the company of the aged and the wise. Such a man rises above all laws of morality. There is no good to be realised by him through action, for there is nothing in this world which is desirable to the free. Yet he performs action that circumstances demand of him for he knows that as long as life continues as a result of his previous desires it has to vibrate into activity. Yet his action is not an action because there is no desire for it. Such a man is protected throughout his life by the very power of nature. All things necessary for life are obtained with little labour.

These are some of the doctrines dealt with very thoroughly and beautifully in the *Yoga Vāsishtā* which consists of more than thirty-two thousand stanzas of the sanskrit language. I have discussed the philosophy of Vasishtha in a separate book which will soon be before the public.

B. L. ATREYA

PERCEPT AND IDEA

A Percept and an Idea refer to one and the same object. That is why the process of Memory has been variously called *Recollection*, *Re-cognition*, *Re-production*, etc. Indian psychologists, described *Smaraṇa* as '*Tadākārollekhi Vijñānam, i.e.,* 'knowledge which identifies its object with that of the previous cognition.' It is worth noting that although some of the Indian thinkers of the orthodox school admitted no less than eight or nine modes of the *Pramāṇa* or sources of knowledge,—accepting, as they did, in some cases the admissibility of *Āitihya* or hearsay evidence—none of them acknowledged the *Pramāṇa*-hood of *Smṛiti* or Recollection. The *Buddhist* epistemologists agree with the thinkers of the orthodox Indian school in rejecting the *Pramāṇa*-hood of *Smṛiti*. The reason of thus eliminating Recollection is not of course far to seek. The definition of the *Pramāṇa*, as stated by the old *Mīmāṃsā* school and unhesitatingly accepted in principle by all the orthodox as well as the *Buddhist* epistemologists was, '*Anadhigatārthādhigāntṛi Pramāṇam.*' 'The *Pramāṇa* is that which makes known what was previously unknown.' If so,—*Smṛiti* is certainly no *Pramāṇa*, for its object, being identical with the object of Perception must have been previously known.

While, it may be readily admitted that Perception and Recollection refer to one and the same object, the question is quite a debatable one, whether the contents of Recollection are identical with those of Perception. It has appeared to many psychologists that an idea is nothing but a fainter form of a Percept. Hobbes defines Imagination (by which he means Ideation) as "—nothing but decaying sense." He is followed by Hume, according to whom an Idea whether of Memory or of Imagination differs from a Percept only in respect of *vivacity*;

they are not essentially different. Wundt also applies the term *Vorstellung* both to Perception and to Idea.

Here we want to pause and consider the position well. The difference between a Percept and an Idea is said (*e.g.*, by Titchener) to correspond with the difference between the existence and the non-existence of an outside object. The latter difference is certainly not a difference of *degree* in intensity or vivacity ; a non-existent thing cannot be said to exist faintly before us. Hence the difference between a Percept and an Idea seems to be one of *kind*. This essential difference between a Percept and an Idea is accounted for by the fact that the latter is more or less a product of the activity of the mind. Reid means the same fact when he says, "An ability to revive our ideas or perceptions after they have ceased to be, can signify no more than an ability to create new ideas or perceptions, similar to those, we have had before." And then, is it absolutely true that matters of Perception and Recollection are the same ? Hume has referred to the difference in intensity between them. Locke who uses the term *Idea* for both a Percept and an Idea, admitted that the contents of Recollection are not exactly identical with those of Perception, in as much as the former have "the additional perception, annexed to them that it (the mind) has had them before." Observation would moreover show that while the matter of Perception is conspicuous by the richness of its details that of Recollection has more and more a 'schematic character.'

In India, when the *Mimāṃsā* school rejected the *Pramāṇa*-hood of *Smṛiti* and was followed by all other schools of thought, including the *Buddhist*, a necessity was felt for pointing out that the matters of Perception and Recollection were not exactly identical. The credit is due to the *Jaina* philosophers for including *Smṛiti* in the category of the *Pramāṇas*. Recognition, according to them, is a mode of the *Parōksha Pramāṇa*, the source of indirect knowledge. The difference between the *Pratyaksha* and the *Paroksha* is this that the matters of the

former appear to be clearer and richer in details than those of the latter. In a way thus, the *Jaina* psychologists subscribed to the contention of Hume that a Percept has greater *vivacity* than an Idea. But they went further than that and admitted that the matter of Recollection is different in kind from that of Perception. "Recollection," says Ratnaprabhāchāryya, "is dependent on Perception only in so far as its genesis is concerned,—it being possible because of the traces left in the mind by Perception ; as regards the determination of its objects, it has independence....." He goes on arguing,....."as Perception gives us the knowledge of objects with many details and as Recollection gives us that of objects with but a small number of those details, Recollection is an independent process. It may be said, 'well not in all cases does Recollection revive only *some* of the details ; there are cases in which it is found to revive *all* the details. (Is not Recollection identical with Perception in such cases ?)".....(Our answer is) : ' No ; in such cases, the fact that *it is being perceived* is a detail which is never present in Recollection.....In Recollection, what we have is the fact that its object *was perceived*.'

It is thus that the Percept and its corresponding Memory-Idea refer to one and the same object but that their contents are essentially different. There is no denial that the Idea originates from the Percept. It is difficult, however, if not impossible, to demonstrate how a Percept becomes transformed into an Idea. So far, the modern psychologists have been able to point out some facts of consciousness which are intermediate between the Percept and the Idea. These have been called 'After-Sensation,' 'Recurrent Sensation' and 'Primary Memory Image' (Ward). It is doubtful, however, if attempts to take them away from the province of Perception and identify them with Memory Images are psychologically justifiable. While it is never denied that the After-Sensation, the Recurrent Sensation and the Primary Memory Image are similar to the Memory Idea in not having the object actually affecting the sense-organs,

they are all due to the persistence of the original peripheral or cerebral excitations after the stimulus is withdrawn. They are thus within the domain of Perception still.

In India, the *Buddhist* psychologists characterised *Pratyaksha* as *Nirvikalpa* or absolutely undetermined. According to the *Buddhists*, *Pratyaksha* or Perception proper is confined to sensing the Object, pure and simple; it is *Nirvikalpa* or undetermined by the processes of conception and naming. As distinguished from the *Nirvikalpa*, what follows it, is called the *Savikalpa*. The *Buddhist* philosophers contend that the *Savikalpa* is not *Pratyaksha* in the strict sense of the term, as there are in it (to quote the words of *Aniruddha Bhatta*) "—elements of naming and conception which are introduced by Recollection, due to the apprehension of similarity and the consequent re-awakening of *Samskāra* or parts of association."

The *Savikalpa* is thus the product of Ideation. The followers of *Jñāna-garbha* are of opinion that the *Savikalpa*, which is characterised by its ideational elements takes its origin from the *Manō-vijñāna* or *Mānasa-Pratyaksha*. This has been defined by the author of *Nyāya-vindu* as, "—what is similar to and unseparated from Sensuous Perception and is generated by Sensuous Perception, attended with a matter which is unseparated from its own." Objects of the *Manō-vijñāna* are essentially similar to After-Image, etc., of the modern European psychology. In illustrating the *Mānasa-Pratyaksha*, the *Buddhist* commentator expressly says that we have Sensuous Perception when the Eyes, for instance, are operating; Mental Perception, on the contrary, arises when these cease to be active.

The object of the *Manō-vijñāna* is not exactly the object, as it is perceived in the *Indriya-vijñāna*; and herein lies the similarity between the object of the *Manō-vijñāna* and the *Savikalpa* according to *Jñāna-garbha* who consequently concludes that the latter originates from the former. His theory is rejected by *Dharmōttara*. However much an After-Sensation

may appear to be similar to a Memory-Idea, it is impossible not to notice the fundamental difference between the two; one is, after all, an Image, closely connected with Sense-Perception; the latter is an idea produced independently of any sense-stimulation.

The nature of the *Manō-vijñāna* and of its contents is clearly expressed in the *Buddhist* answer to *Kumarila's* criticism of the doctrine. The *Buddhists* point out that the object of the *Manō-vijñāna* is different from that of the *Indriya-vijñāna*, although both of them belong to the same unitary continuum or *Santāna*. In modern psychology too, an After-Image is by no means identified with actual Perception. At the same time, the After-Image is not the Memory-Idea; these two also are essentially different. The After-Image, after all, is a product or by-product of the perceptual process. The *Buddhists* recognise this by saying that the *Manō-vijñāna* is, "what is similar to and unseparated from Sensuous Perception and is generated by Sensuous Perception"

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA

IS ADVAITISM AN ADEQUATE ANSWER TO BUDDHISM ?

Has Sankara answered Buddha ?¹—eliminating personalities, has it been considered by the orthodox and carefully transmitted tradition of the Vedānta, that Advaitism is an adequate answer to Buddhism ? At the very outset the issue can be honestly and straightforwardly formulated thus. The Dvaita Vedānta of Sri Ānandatīrtha definitely holds that Sri Sankara has to be considered a Pracchanna-Bauddha—a veiled Buddhist—or a Buddhist Incognito—whose metaphysical theories and doctrines have the most striking and astonishing family resemblance to those of the Buddhists. In the course of the present discussion, I desire to examine the question : Is the charge of Sankara being a Pracchanna Bauddha sustainable in the light of any affinity existing between the doctrines of Advaitism and Buddhism ? If the answer be in the affirmative, may it not be possible in the interests of fair historical judgment and criticism to exonerate Mādhva from the charge or accusation—almost classic among the orthodox pandit circles—of having libelled their opponents by characterising them as Pracchanna Bauddhas and thereby endeavouring to thwart the successful proselytising progress of the Advaitins and otherwise discrediting generally their system of philosophy ? The discussion can proceed on *two* clearly defined lines. (1) Sankara's criticism of Buddhism occurring in the Second Adhyāya of the Brahmasutras may be shown to be untenable. In that case the net result of the discussion will be that Advaitism is no adequate answer to Buddhism—on the showing that the Buddhist conceptions of

¹ The title of this discussion was suggested to me on a perusal of a controversy carried on some years ago in the pages of a Western philosophical periodical over the question—
"Has Kant answered Hume ?"

(1) Ultimate Reality, (2) Finite world, (3) their relationship, etc.,—have been left where they are and they have not been improved upon by their critics. The second method of procedure is this: (2) If it is possible to point out some striking affinity between the Buddhist and Advaitic conceptions of the Ultimate Reality, Finite Universe, etc.—then it should be held that Advaitism is no answer to Buddhism. Let me briefly touch upon the former mode of procedure and devote greater attention to the latter.

I desire to confine the discussion to *two* works which alone in my view contain the necessary internal evidence.¹ (1) They are Sri Sankara's Bhāshya on Fifteen Sutras of the Second Adhyāya, second Pāda, of the Brahmasutrās, and (2) Sri Ānandatīrtha's work entitled *Tattvodyota*.

By the author or the compiler of the Brahmasutras² Fifteen Sutras have been devoted to a refutation of Buddhism. The following are the salient points of Sankara's Critique of Buddhism. (1) The atomic collocation of the Buddhists cannot be sustained on account of the absence of an intelligent Prime Mover who would bring the atoms together. (2) Everything cannot be transitory or momentary. Nothing in fact can be. On the view of momentariness the concept of causality will have to be surrendered. (3) On the Buddhist view neither creation nor destruction of the Universe can be rendered intelligible. (4) The conception of soul—jīva as Kshanikajñānasantāna—succession of moments of awareness, is untenable in view of the fact of *Memory*. (5) The illusory character of the Universe is unsustainable on account of the marked contrast between the waking and the dreaming states.

What is Sankara's substitute? Like Anaxagoras he has recourse to a *Nous*—and calls it Ātman. A choice has to be

¹ The references throughout this discussion are to the Bombay Edition of the Sankara Bhāshya with the commentaries of Ratnasprabhā, Bhāmati and Ānanda Gīriya (pp. 449-479), to the Kumbakonam Edition of the *Tattvodyota* (Madhvavilas Book Depot) and to the Belgaum Edition of the latter with a number of commentaries.

² Adhyāya 2, Pāda 2, Sutras : 18-32 (both inclusive).

made between a purely mechanistic explanation of the Universe and the teleological one. Supposing the latter is urged by Sankara as against the former view of the Buddhists, is it consistently held and is it in conformity with the other leading metaphysical concepts of the system such as the Nirgunatva—nirākāratva—nirdharmakatva—etc. of the Brahman? A monistic Philosophy or uncompromising absolutism has to face an inevitable nemesis. Why should the Absolute ever manifest itself as the finite world and get itself entangled in the “Phantasmagoria of metempsychosis?” (Gough) is a pertinent question. It is not a valid reply that the why of things can never be explained by limited finite human intelligence. That all can be explained by Māyā or Avidyā can only land us in a Cul-de-sac. An intelligent First Cause is sought to be established by Sankara. What has been the result? It cannot be held to be personal. It cannot be assigned definite form, features and qualities. It has to remain a mysterious something. Instead, the Buddhistic notion of atomic conglomeration may be accepted. Yet Sankara would not.

Sutra 29 deserves special consideration. Sankara has the following significant sentence: “*Naivam jāgaritopalabdham vasthu sthambhādikam kasyāmchidapyavasthāyām bādhyate.*” He who runs may read Sankara’s anxiety to establish a contrast between the Dreaming and the Waking states. What are the criteria? *Bādha* and *Abādha*. The dream experiences are found to be at variance with and in contradiction to the waking state. The former are negated and denied in the light of the latter. This contrast between the waking and the dreaming states is a standing and persistent fact. The waking state is never denied or sublated under any circumstances. The term used by Sankara is *kasyāmchidapyavasthāyām*. Does the term include the *pāramārthikāvasthā*—the state of identity between the Finite and the Absolute—the Jiva and the Brahman? Why should an exception be made? For the nonce Sankara appears to have forgotten the state.

His own theory is that the waking state shares the same fate as the dream one. If the dream is unreal now in the light of the waking state, the turn of the latter itself will come next. Both are *Unreal*. If so, what is the criticism which Sankara may be said to have successfully urged against the Buddhists? It is a perfectly relevant question whether Sankara has effectively improved upon or answered the Buddhistic doctrine of the illusory character of the Universe, by vehement assertions merely to the contrary. If the waking state is not denied or negated or sublated, *by any higher one* possessing more reality, as it really appears to be according to the implication contained in the significant sentence *Kasyāmchidapyavasthāyām na Bādhyate*—then the foremost plank of Advaitism has to be abandoned or kept in the back ground. The Buddhist may well retort that no differentia has been found for the Vyavahāra stage. Let us apply the criteria of Sankara himself. *Bādha* and *Abādha*. The dream world is sublated and negated by the waking. The waking in its turn is sublated and negated by a knowledge of Brahman.

Did Sankara really mean to accord a greater degree of reality to the waking state? If so, is it not strange that a lower degree is deliberately assigned to it just to make it capable of negation or sublation when the knowledge of the Pāramārthika is once attained? On the criterion of negation then, the dreaming and the waking states satisfy the required conditions and both are unreal and illusory.

It is difficult to say what exactly prevents Sankara from arriving at the unreality of the Universe exactly on the same logic as the Buddhists. Both should be annihilated.

It does not matter at all if the annihilation or sublation of the waking state comes later in point of time. Further Sankara stands committed to a definite position which he cannot go back upon. The world is *Jñāna Nivarthya—Jñānanyadhvam-sapratyogi*. It is negated or denied by knowledge of Brahman. The dream is also *Jñānanivarthya*.

The position amounts to this. Either the waking state is sublated by the Pāramārthikāvasthānubhava—the experience intuitive of the ultimate reality—or not. If it is, it should be on a par with the dream state as far as sublation is concerned, and hence is illusory even as the dream state. If not, one would be left with the suicidal admission of the reality of the finite universe. It is better the issue is narrowed down to an interpretation of the 29th Sutra—*vaidharṃyāccha na svapnā-
nivat*.

It is possible to adduce yet another reason. The Buddhists hold the theory of *aprāmānya* being *svataḥ*. To them all existence is *prima facie* illusory. Consistently with their notion of Prāmānya, they have developed the unreality of the universe. But to the Advaitins, Prāmānya is *svataḥ*. The admission of the unreality of the universe is really inconsistent with the Svataḥprāmānya. The point of the contention is this. The unreality of the Universe can be consistently held by the Buddhists in view of *aprāmānya* being *svataḥ*. The Advaitins on the other hand who cling to the view of *prāmānya* being *svataḥ*—cannot consistently maintain the said theory.¹ Some such considerations as the above appear to have made Ānandatīrtha discern some striking affinity between the Buddhist and Advaitic doctrines.

After a general criticism of Māyā-Vāda Ānandatīrtha makes a reference to Sutras 26-28, and pointedly to 29, and remarks that Māyā-Vāda has not commanded the approval of the Sutrakāra. The question is asked: is it not usual to understand the Sutras in view as containing a repudiation of *sunyavāda*? True. But there is hardly any difference between Sunyavāda and Māyāvāda. Ānandatīrtha writes: *nacha sunyavādinassakāsāt vailakshanyam māyāvādinah*. There is no difference or divergence between Māyāvāda and Sunyavāda. So the Sutrakāra's refutation of Sunyavāda can very well be

¹ See Nyāyāmṛta and Advaitasiddhi—The chapter on *Drīṣyatvaḥetu*.

interpreted to mean and imply the repudiation of Māyāvāda as well, in view of their fundamental resemblances.

Let us first consider the reality of the Universe. *Vyāvahārikasatvasya tenāpyangikriyamānatvāt*. The Buddhist too admits a qualified and conditional reality of the Universe. *Satyam tu dvividham proktam—samvritam pāramārthikam. Samvritam vyāvahāryam syāt—nivrittāu pāramārthikam*. Two kinds or types of reality—including the Sunya are admitted by the Buddhists. One is the Samvriti Satya, the reality of the finite universe—the phenomenal existence. The other is the pāramārthika—the noumenal. So do the Advaitins. *Vichāryamāne no satvam-satvamchūpipratityate. Yasya tat-samvritam jneyam vyāvahārapadam cha yat.* Logical analysis reduces the finite into illusory existences. It does not exist in the beginning. It does not in the end. How can it in the middle? Yet the finite world is existent for all practical purposes. Such is the characteristic of the tantalising Samvritisatya. This description exactly fits in with that of the Advaitins of the world as *sadasadvilakshana*.

The familiar Buddhist Kārika is quoted. *Dvesatye samu-pasritya buddhānām dharmadesanā. Loke samvriti satyam cha satyam cha paramārthatah.*

Ānandatīrtha next turns his attention to emphasise the resemblance between the Buddhistic Sunya and the Advaitic Brahman. The stanza from Murārisataka "Anritajada virodhirupamantatrayamalabandhana jadyata viruddham." etc—is quoted as typical embodiment of the Advaitic conception of Brahman. The Buddhist karikā "Nāsyasatvamastvam vā na dosho guna eva vā. Heyopadeyarāhitam—tat sunyam padamakshāyam, etc.

The following resemblances are pointed out. (1) The Brahman is Nirdharmaka—and Nirguna—Nirākara—etc. So is the Sunya. (2) The Brahman is Nishkriya—devoid of all activity—the Parmenidian Being. So is Sunya. (3) The Brahman is indescribable—cannot be squeezed into conceptual

categories. So is the Sunya. (4) The Brahman manifests itself as the phenomenal universe. So does the Sunya. (5) The Brahman is the goal of the Advaitins' spiritual and metaphysical endeavour. So is the Sunya the goal of the moral and metaphysical endeavour of the Buddhists.

Ānandatīrtha contends that in view of the aforesaid points of striking resemblance between the Māyāvāda and the Sunyavāda, it must be held that the Sutrakāra while refuting the latter should have also had in mind the former. Another minor justification is given. By common consent the Sūtras are held to be *visvatomukhaḥ*—capable of more than one interpretation. So for the sake of brevity the Sutrakāra did not take the trouble of refuting the tenets of Māyāvāda separately which he thought refuted by implication merely with the refutation of Sunyavāda. A faint echo of this view is heard in the opinion of the Western Savants like Thibaut who believed that the philosophy of Sri Rāmānuja is more in accordance with the spirit of the Brahmasūtras while that of Sankara more true to the spirit of the Upanishads. Whether the Abstract Monism of Sankara rings true to the Upanishadic teaching is still an open question. In matters of Religion and Philosophy we do not come across instances of *res judicata*.

From the Kārikās quoted by Ānandatīrtha in the *Tattvodyota* it is clear that there is some strong affinity between the Buddhistic and Advaitic concepts of the (1) Unreality of the Universe, (2) and the concept of Sunya and Brahman.

2. The contrast that is between the waking and the dream states on which Sankara relies for a refutation of the Buddhist doctrines fails of its purpose, as the waking state itself, according to Sankara, is only *Vyāvahārika* and merely waits to be sublated by the dawn of illumination or knowledge of Brahman.

3. The theory of *Pratityasamutpāda* or unconscious cyclic causation has a close family resemblance to the Advaitic theory of the *Upādānakāranatva* of the Brahman.

4. The saguna Brahman can be consistently assigned no part. It is also vyāvahārika. The Nirguna Brahman is as good or as bad as the Buddhistic Sunya.

5. The resemblance or even the identity in the matter of leading doctrinal import between the Sunyavāda and Māyāvāda must render it hard to give an adequate explanation of Sankara's vehement denunciations of Buddhism in his commentary on the Vedāntasutras.

The following explanation can be provisionally ventured: There is a school of critical opinion which holds that the Critique of Pure Reason alone represents the personal reflections of Kant and his convictions and that the Practical Reason is intended as a concession or accommodation to some strong prevalent contemporary opinion. Such may well have been the case with Sankara. His own keen sense of logic and marvellous powers of metaphysical analysis could have convinced him that his own Absolute was not after all really far removed from the Buddhistic Sunya and that the phenomenal reality which he ascribed to the world was the same as the Samvritisatya of the Buddhists. Yet he readily entered into a severe polemic against the Buddhistic doctrines. We have no means of judging at this time with any amount of certainty why Sankara found it necessary to range himself along with the critics of Buddhism, while as a matter of fact—as pointed out by Ānandatīrtha—his own view regarding the nature of the reality of the Universe, and the Nirguna Brahman resembles so closely that of the Buddhists.

Only one more aspect of the question remains to be touched upon. What satisfactory explanation can be offered for Sankara's vehement Critique of Buddhism in his Bhāṣhya on the Brahmasutras?—if indeed, as is urged by Ānandatīrtha, there is little or no difference between the doctrines of Advaitism and Buddhism. Two reasons can be given. At the time of Sankara the conflict between the Vaidika and Avaidika Darsanas—systems of philosophy recognising and

repudiating the authority of the Vedaṣ, should have reached a definitely acute stage and adherence to the latter was perhaps condemned as heterodox. Sankara should have thought it necessary that his own system be regarded as duly based on the authority of the scriptures. Secondly, it may be an adroit move on the part of Sri Sankara to hide for some reason or other his own intellectual sympathy with a 'system of speculation which he nonetheless felt bound to criticise.

Even granting for the sake of argument that the two reasons aforesaid are not valid, the fate of Sankara's Critique of Buddhism must rest on its compatibility or otherwise with the leading doctrines of his own system of philosophy. Is the criticism compatible with two of his leading doctrines: the unreality of the Universe and the Nirguna Braṁman? As Ānandatīrtha has conclusively pointed out, Sankara's Critique of Buddhism is *in-compatible* with his own two leading doctrines. This incompatibility is sought to be based on the affinity existing between the Māyāvāda and the Sunyavāda.

If indeed after an examination of the leading doctrines of the Sunyavāda and Māyāvāda, it should transpire that the two have striking points of resemblance, Ānandatīrtha and his commentators should be exonerated from the charge of having written a libellous attack against their opponents by calling them Pracchanna Bauddhas. It cannot be doubted that such an affinity does exist. Prof. S. Radhakrishnan writes: "It is a strange irony that the great exponents of the two doctrines look upon themselves as supporting antagonistic positions." (p. 669. Indian Philosophy.)

I conclude then with a definite answer to the question appearing as the heading of this discussion—Is Advaitism an adequate answer to Buddhism? The answer is in the negative. Advaitism is no adequate answer. The problems of ultimate reality and the reality of the finite Universe are exactly where the Buddhists left them. The Buddhistic and

the Advaitic doctrines—the Sunyavāda and the Māyāvāda as pointed out by Ānandatīrtha—closely resemble one another. There is then some justification for the humorous characterisation of the Advaitins as Pracchanna Bauddhas.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

ONE OF INDIA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

The final test of Truth and its criterion.

Of what value is any philosophy if it teach us not what is true? Every school, therefore, contends that its own position is based on truth, as it is known, and that others' conclusions are either not true or only approaching the truth attained by it. And there appears to be hardly a work on philosophy which in seeking to establish its own views and in demolishing those of others, does not make use of such language as 'That is untenable,' 'This is unsound,' 'That is inconceivable,' 'That is irrational,' 'That has no proof,' 'This gives us no satisfaction,' 'That is absurd,' 'This conveys no meaning,' 'This serves no purpose,' 'That has no value' and so forth. It therefore happens that what appears erroneous to one is perfectly sound to another; and what is unthinkable to one is most easily conceived by another. But when critics thus attack one another they seem to appeal to some common or recognised tribunal. And every human being behaves as though there were in him an inherent capacity to discern truth from error. Does truth then mean the same for all men? If not, is there at least a common criterion of truth? If there be no such common ground of truth, a philosophical congress would only be a vain show.

This babel of philosophies, though it has multiplied grave doubts and irreconcilable differences, has been productive of a great good. It has brought once again into proper relief the central problem of philosophy (and may I add of Religion also?)—the old old question: What is truth and what is its criterion? Philosophy, therefore, is not merely the love of what the ancient Greeks somewhat vaguely termed wisdom (Sophia)

but the love of what the ancient Hindus specifically indicated by truth (Satyam).

Nothing, therefore, would be more easy, but nothing more useless, in philosophy than to assert, in respect of any fundamental doctrine, that a Hume or a Kant is unsound or that a Rāmānuja or a Sankara is absurd without the critic's stating his own idea of truth and without his examining that of the philosopher criticised.

Now, is truth only a will-o'-the-wisp enticing us to a quagmire, or a horizon that every one sees but no one reaches? That is what the vast and formidable literature that has grown around it makes one fear. Even beasts and birds seem to be instinctively capable of distinguishing the true from the false. And every man, from the philosopher down to the fool, acts as though he could instinctively know truth though he may not be able to give the meaning of it. Let us, therefore, make a start by noting how man instinctively sets about when he seeks to ascertain the truth of any belief or judgment. The question of truth does not appear to arise till a doubt arises and a doubt manifests itself only when a contradiction is felt either in thought only or in practical life (in working). As contradictions increase the need is felt for testing every piece of knowledge. And the usual method adopted for testing is to see whether one's knowledge of any fact of experience is contradicted by that of others or by one's own, at different times and under varying conditions. The absence of contradiction gives him all the assurance that is possible, which is also the underlying principle of the Scientist's method of ascertaining truth. But what is not contradicted at one time may be contradicted at another time or by another person. Unless, therefore, one could consult all men and all times, one can never get at what is absolutely uncontradicted knowledge. This instinctive method evidently demands that truth should be characterised by universal and eternal non-contradiction. And truth of this description is presumably unattainable. From this

point of view what we in the work-a-day world would call truth is not truth, but only the *way* to truth.

This negative principle of non-contradiction, though instinctive, does not give us anything certain, which practical life demands; nor does it do justice to the instinct which prompts the continued pursuit of truth. The positive principle of *agreement* is felt by many as something more tangible as well as more reliable. But even in this case if truth demands perfect agreement such perfection is as unattainable as absolute non-contradiction, though as before, degrees of agreement are within reach. For two objects or two ideas may agree in every respect, and yet differ in one. Two objects must occupy two different places and two ideas two different moments. Absolute agreement or non-difference is therefore impossible. This principle of agreement has been weighed in other respects also and found wanting. Based on it a number of theories have been suggested. The 'copy,' 'correspondence,' 'compresence,' 'coherence' or 'consistency' and the 'harmony' theories as well as those of 'workability' and mutual 'adaptation' and 'determination,' with a view to the attainment of particular ends, all hold good, each in respect of a body of facts applicable to it. But that, as a universally satisfactory interpretation, every one of them has failed is too well-known to need further comment here.

As the correspondence theory has a hold on a very large number of men, we may glance at it before leaving this part of the subject. Originally it was supposed that there was a correspondence between ideas and objects. But the impossibility of establishing the truth of such a connection led to a modification which says that the correspondence exists only between relations. The relation between two ideas A and B in a judgment, is said to correspond to the relation between two objects A and B. But this does not in the least improve matters. For, we have no means of knowing the relation between the objects A and B nor between the idea A and the object A, and the idea B and the object B.

Having started with a reference to relations in judgments or beliefs we are naturally led to make further enquiries into the psychological implications, leaving for a moment the logical.

Psychology reveals some other aspects of truth such as 'effort' and 'satisfaction.' Satisfaction implies a cessation of effort when the end is reached. Men almost universally rely upon satisfaction as the safest guide in their quest. But what satisfies a fool does not satisfy a philosopher. And it is because satisfaction is considered a criterion, that we have so many conflicting philosophies and religions: for, when satisfaction is felt it is often believed that the end has been reached, as in the case of the mystic and the man of religion. Satisfaction by itself is therefore the most unreliable of guides. The question, then; is whether and, if so, under what conditions satisfaction could be considered a test or a criterion of truth? Efforts or mental motion is sometimes taken as a basic principle and theories of 'workability,' 'mental determination' and so forth are formulated. But they fail, as is well-known to students of philosophy, when we find that truths exist, whose workability, etc., cannot be tested as contemplated by the theories.

Here in passing we may refer also to the two psychometaphysical tests. 'Conceivability' is found to land us in a world of uncertainties and inconsistencies. The 'inconceivability of the opposite' is limited in its application to the existence of the self only.

Since effort and satisfaction are further resolvable, we may probe a little deeper and ask what constitutes truth, *i.e.*, what the contents of truth-concept are. An epistemological analysis of true knowledge gives us, at least four elements: (1) consciousness, or better, awareness; (2) content or object of awareness; (3) effort to comprehend it so as to get a meaning and (4) feeling of satisfaction. Awareness cannot be further resolved. And to the characteristics we shall refer in the sequel.

Content or object may be what is called purely mental, characterised by internality or it may be material, considered as external.

The effort to comprehend aims at a 'meaning.' We get a 'meaning' when what is believed to be foreign to, or different from consciousness, or what was hidden from consciousness, is presented to it in terms of consciousness itself, or, in other words, is somehow converted to or assimilated (as some Indian philosophers would have it) to the same essence or stuff or nature or order to which consciousness itself belongs. Further, till we know the 'meaning' we feel that we are not on firm ground. With the realization of the meaning comes a feeling of assurance or certainty. When the full meaning is attained, *i.e.*, when the assimilation is complete, the effort ceases and what is known as satisfaction ensues.

But in seeking to understand 'meaning' we take it for granted that an object different from or foreign to consciousness is translated into terms of thought or consciousness. If this be actually done, how are we to account for doubt or error? For, whatever is in consciousness and is of the same nature cannot but be known beyond doubt. Further, if knowledge consists in comprehending the contents of one's own mind what need is there for an 'effort' to know? Or, is the process of translation defective? For an answer to these questions we have to go to Metaphysics also.

The business of truth is to help thought to comprehend reality. If thought does not present Reality *as Reality*, to whatever extent it be, thought ceases to be true. Is such presentation by thought possible?

When we say that 2^3 is the same as 8, or that carbon is the same as diamond, we prove the truth of our statement by converting 2^3 into 8 or 8 into 2^3 , or by converting carbon into diamond or diamond into carbon. Or, both may be reduced to some common denomination or basic substance. The truth of their non-difference can be proved beyond all doubt only at

a stage when their duality ceases. If truth is to reveal reality it can do so only when either of the two existents is converted to the other, when duality must cease or when both are converted to a third which must also evidently be common to the two and therefore non-dual. With non-duality alone comes absolute certainty. So long as there are dual existences such as thought and reality (as content of thought), no proof of *truth* is possible.

But truth is dependent on Reality as it is obliged to follow and reveal it. Reality determines thought, and is the prius of thought. It is independent and stands in its own right while thought is dependent on it. What gives validity to Truth is Reality. If the two factors have, therefore, to forego their dual existence to make proof of truth possible, it is 'thought' that has either to cease to exist or transform itself into Reality. But truth implies thought and if thought ceases to exist or commits suicide there can be no question of truth at all. If, on the other hand, thought is made dominant and Reality subservient, which often happens when imagination or fancy is specially active, we do not get at truth.

We have here, then, to face a dilemma. So long as thought and reality are there as dual existences no truth is possible. When thought alone or Reality alone exists, no truth is possible. This situation arises because of the static view that is taken of truth. Truth, however, is an effort, a process. It is a passing over of thought to Reality.

In truth-seeking, therefore, thought has but one course open to it and that is to so identify itself ultimately with reality as to make itself indistinguishable from Reality. Ultimately, then, Truth or true thought is Reality. And several thousands of years ago the Indian philosophers appear to have seen that the end of truth or the highest truth as it is sometimes called is not different from Reality and therefore used the same word 'Satyam' to denote truth as well as reality.

Let us, further, see what the Scientist does in discovering his truth or reality. He does not start by laying down that

what he proposes to discover *is* so and so. His reality or truth is *independent* and his knowledge has to conform itself to the result which may be what he did not expect at all. And the precaution he takes is the elimination of the errors due to what is called personal equation, *i.e.*, the thoughts and feelings of individuals. A perfectly open mind without prejudices of any kind is what he wants as an absolute condition for knowing truth. In other words, he eliminates the play of individual emotion, will and desire, as far as possible. This also exactly is the method of *sādhana* laid down for the pursuit of truth by Indian philosophers, like Sankara, who put it in the language of Religion. For, in their days, Religion was mixed up with Philosophy. This is identically the course prescribed at the beginning of Sankara's *Bhāshya*, under *Sādhanachatushtaya*. Of the four items referred to here, only the last has a religious character, the other three being purely philosophical or scientific. Truth thus ascertained shows that Reality is best known by so concentrating and directing thought as to make it follow implicitly Reality and disclose the fact that thought and Reality are not ultimately *two* different existences — for, then alone, 'meaning' or 'interpretation' or 'revelation' of object or content, is possible.

Why should we use a *negative* term non-dual? Why not say that Unity, as it is understood in the West, is truth, as has been done by some European Philosophers who speak of 'monism,' 'wholeness', or 'individuality' or 'Absolute' as truth or reality? A little thought would show that unity is in fact duality. For when we think of Unity, there are two: thinker and the idea of Unity thought about. Further in truth-seeking we proceed from the known to the unknown (*not the unknowable*) in terms of the known. It is the march of thought towards the not-known. Truth always implies, therefore, a negative. Further, the whole and the part, the individual and the many, or the relative and the absolute, is duality, though described differently. And as has been shown, truth is impossible in

any kind of duality, however qualified. But without duality there can be no thought of an approach to Reality and no question of truth whatever. Whenever any intellectual process makes for a negation of difference and duality there is an approach to truth and wherever there is an implication of duality, in whatever form, there is room for doubt and error. Truth is only an effort or a process at negating duality, non-duality being the ultimate test and characteristic of truth.

Further Metaphysical enquiry reveals the *applicability* of this same test of truth to what is known as mediate knowledge which implies the existence of external objects. It also shows how the sense of *certainty* arises in us in respect of our perceptual knowledge (Pratyaksham) and inferential knowledge (Anumānam).

Pratyaksham:—There can be no knowledge where there is no awareness or consciousness. And consciousness implies a content or object, mental or material. What distinguishes this awareness from its content or object is that the latter is changing while the former notes the changes and co-ordinates them. This co-ordinating awareness, which implies invariability, functions as subject with reference both to the content and the external object. This awareness is what is known to me most intimately and therefore most certainly. And I call it Reality. I know of nothing else so intimate and so certain, and which functions as subject so that I could call it also real. The content or object which is bound by time, space and causality and therefore of a different order, is not the same as reality.

‘Reality’ is used in other senses also. Whatever is perceived is real: whatever exists is real: what is perfect is real: whatever changes is real and so on. All these, however, when analysed, seem to agree in this that, that on which thought ultimately rests is real. But that, we say, is awareness, for all thought presupposes it.

Truth is one's thought of reality. And validity of truth is determined by reality. But in Pratyaksham we consider that thought to be truth that reveals not merely the reality called subject but the content or object which is other than reality. And the question is : how does this sense of truth in respect of what is other than real arise ? What is it that gives one the feeling of certainty in respect of this truth of Pratyaksham ? Can what is not-real determine any validity of truth ?

Now we know but one truth, that is, truth in respect of the reality which is awareness or subject. This feeling of truth is ever-present in thought. Wherever there is thought, there is this awareness, this reality, and this sense of truth. Even when one thinks of the content or object, there is this awareness and this sense of truth, from which *no* thought can free itself. Hence this sense of truth is underlying the thought of the object or content also.

This awareness is called Ātman and it is Ātman's truth that is manifesting itself as the truth of Pratyaksham and gives it validity. And Truth, we have seen already, lies in the negation of duality. Reality or Ātman is known only by negating the duality of existence, from which follows the truth which implies the negation of the duality of thought and matter.

Turning to Anumānam, one sees smoke at a distance and infers fire. The object here is to establish the truth of the existence of an unseen and unknown object 'fire.' But truth is what reveals Reality, the ever-existing and the most certain of entities. Can there be, then, truth of an unseen and unknown object ? Though this is an impossibility, yet we have the sense of truth in regard to Anumānam and it is also considered to be valid. Whence does this arise ? It is again the ever-present Awareness or Ātman that gives the sense of truth and validity to thought in Anumānam.

But in Pratyaksham, there is, at least, an object. Here there is not even that. What makes us believe in the existence

of fire, which we do not see or which may be found not to exist at all? We say that there must be fire, for wherever there is smoke there is fire. But how shall we hold this when we have not seen all the smoke and all the fire in the world, in the past, present and future? This notion of universality and invariability of relation must have its source somewhere in our knowledge. It is not to be found in the content or object which is bound by time and space. It must evidently have come from the subject, awareness. It is the sense of the invariability which characterises awareness or Ātman, which is present as subject in every act of thought, including the thought in Anumānam, that gives one the feeling of existence in regard to unseen objects associated with existing objects. And the truth of the existence of Ātman lies in the negation of duality.

The nature of error and doubt has not been considered here. It may, however, be sufficient for the purposes of this paper to note, as has been already indicated, that where there is duality, *i.e.*, where thought and reality are considered as dual existences there is room for doubt and error. And where the test of truth is not applied to existences other than real or other than real and unreal, there is error. These, however, relate to the subject of reality. But the self-contradiction in which thought entangles itself, for the reason that thought implies reality which is non-dual and yet seeks to view it as different, is a prolific source of error.

Next in the application of this non-dualistic test to the knowledge of particular groups of facts or subjects, varying and appropriate adjustments will be necessary, as for instance in the case of the physicist, the chemist, the historian, the logician or the lawyer and so forth. The adjustment is governed by special laws determined by the nature of each province. Such laws, which are sometimes called truths, of one subject may contradict those of another. But they do not vitiate the truth within their respective provinces. The contradictions

may, however; be explained by a more comprehensive law or may prove false from a higher point of view. Similarly there are many contradictions in the entire practical world which is called Vyavahārika and in which we do not consider ultimate truth and reality. The co-existence of contradictions like 'Rest and Motion,' 'Sat and Asat,' 'Truth and Error,' 'Particular and Universal,' 'One and Many,' 'Divisibility and Indivisibility' and so on, is well known. A reconciliation of these contradictions of Vyavahāra is not possible from the standpoint of Vyavahāra. But when we go to the place of non-duality, *i.e.*, take the view-point of Paramārtha, we find a solution.

If the ascertainment of truth be so difficult and truth itself so complicated as to place it beyond the reach of even the most learned and acute of men, how does it happen that every human being possesses the capacity to know truth? And if truth were altogether unknown, how are we to account for the existence in man of the idea of the pursuit of truth. In the absence of suitable adjustments appropriate to the nature of subjects, the instinctive test may fail in respect of particular facts. All the same, the universal existence of the truth-instinct cannot be doubted. Philosophers may study, scan, analyse, apply successfully or do what they can with the concept of truth. They may also see what obstacles prevent the application of the test, and even remove them. But they cannot create the sense or faculty to know truth. All these attempts presuppose the existence of the sense of truth in all men. Before the oldest known philosophers of the world, like the Vedic Rishis for instance, there must have lived hundreds of generations of men who went in quest of truth. And the inherited wisdom of the Vedic ages says that truth is such that often the learned miss it, while the unlearned find it, and that he who thinks that he knows it, knows it not, while he who thinks that he knows it not, knows it. Does this not mean that the capacity to know truth has no bearing on the

vastness of learning or on the consciousness of the test or theory of truth, but that all mankind alike possess the capacity?

The intellectually great may know the applications of truth to a thousand subjects. But the truth instinct cannot but be natural to one and all. If so, its criterion must also be universal.

Now, is this test of non-duality merely theoretical with no reference to reality or life? The answer is that it has the firmest basis in experience. Its entire validity is derived from reality. In regard to such questions the divorce between theory and practice, between intellectuality and life, between logic and experience, is very common. The reason, according to Indian philosophers, is not far to seek. To draw correct inferences it is necessary to have *all* the data. Fractional data yield only partly correct inferences. To get a complete and correct view of truth, the totality of experience should be considered. Part of experience gives only partial truth. Man's experience covers not only what is called the walking state, but also the dream and the deep sleep.

European Philosophy which confines itself to the data of the waking state finds that logical truth and practical truth are at variance. But the Vedānta that co-ordinates the three states, reconciles all differences. Non-duality is universally experienced in one of the states, *i.e.*, deep sleep. And it is a fact of facts.

Does truth, then, point to a blank of the nature of deep sleep? Can anything be more absurd? Taken by itself it would certainly be a blank. But co-ordinated with the other two states, it is something (not nothing) from which differentiated thought proceeds as in the waking or the dream states. Life does not cease in deep sleep. The experience of all the three states gives us the totality of one's knowledge.

When we ask for a criterion we only ask for a fact of universal experience for that is the highest court of appeal. And the criterion for non-dualist's truth is not the fractional

waking experience, but the totality of experience called *Anubhava* in its threefold aspect.

No theory of truth can be complete and convincing without discussion of the subject of reality. But the limitations of time prevent further enquiry here. All that is aimed at is only to point to the existence of an *original* Indian test of truth and its criterion, living their examination to others.

To sum up;—As has been shown above the Advaitic school fully recognises the validity of every other theory of truth in so far as each of them is applicable to practical life. But it is found on examination that in every case the criterion is vitiated by contradictions. Nevertheless they are valid for practical life called *Vyavahāra*. These *Vyavahārika* truths derive their validity or certitude from the ultimate or *Pāramārthika* truth of *non-duality*. The *Vyavahārika* truths are but approaches or processes suggesting the highest or *Pāramārthika* truth.

While it is the *Pāramārthika* truth that gives the character of certitude to *Vyavahārika* truths, it gives them their validity only as *Vyavahārika* or practical truths. Practical truths do not impart any validity to the ultimate or *Pāramārthika* truth. It has its own validity because it is non-dual.

Non-duality is the ultimate test and characteristic of truth. Its criterion is 'totality' of experience, *i.e.*, *Anubhava* based on *avasthā-traya*. This answers to the description of truth given by the oldest known philosophers of the world, the Vedic Rishis.

Where there are *not* two existents (things or thoughts),

1. There is no possibility of contradiction.
2. There does not arise the impossibility of perfect agreement.
3. There can be no thought of the possibility of any doubt arising.
4. There can be no room for anything to be desired for or any want of satisfaction.

5. There are in it the characteristics of Universality and eternality.
6. In as much as it is based on fact or experience, *i.e.*, a thought is inseparable from fact called reality, there is found in it the characteristic of necessity.
7. There is the fulfilment of the instinctive negative test of truth.
8. And above all, there we find a reconciliation of whatever is true in all the philosophies, *i.e.*, whatever is true for the Vyavahārika or practical world. For, it negates duality without negating reality and its validity is not antithetical to that of any other truth.

This test of non-duality is said to be the final or the supreme test, or as Sankara calls it, the *Antya Pramānam*, which is the subject of this paper.

I leave it to you to say whether there is any such idea of a 'final' or 'supreme' test of truth in any other system. Here, in brief outline, has been given the Advaitin's theory of truth on which is based his much maligned Māyāvāda.

V. SUBRAHAMANYA IYER

THE CONCEPTION OF THE SELF IN THE UPANISHADS

The authors of the Upanishads, whoever they were, were metaphysicians of no mean order. Their contribution to the central problem of philosophy, *viz.*, the problem of the self is wonderfully original, and, in my opinion, much in advance of anything that modern philosophy or psychology has been able to tell us. Their method, too, was of the right kind.

It is true, they did not embody their thoughts in methodical or systematic language, but, nevertheless, their treatment of the philosophical problems lacked neither method nor system. Bādarāyana has shown, and following him, Śankara and Rāmānuja, to mention only two principal among the commentators on Bādarāyana's Sūtras, how the thoughts of the Upanishads can be woven into a consistent and methodical system, such as can challenge comparison with any "Weltanschauung" that has ever been conceived by the mind of man.

I

As regards methods, the ancient sages have very little to learn from their modern confrères. The psychological method of introspective analysis was well-known to them. They employed it with great skill, enlarging its scope, so as to include in their analysis of consciousness, dream and sleep, as well as waking experiences. The method of phenomenological reduction was well understood and was adopted with equal success. But the most conspicuous feature of the Upanishadic method of investigation is what the ancient teachers called "*Tapas*." "*Tapas*" was conceived as constituting the *sine-quā-non*, the indispensable preparatory condition

for the proper investigation of philosophical truths. No one who had not undergone *tapas* was considered fit for philosophical enquiry, much less for philosophical instruction.

Bhrigu, son of Varuna, went to his father, so we are told in the Taittiriya Upanishad, and asked for instruction in the doctrine of Brahman. Varuna said, "Perform *tapas*, my son; know Brahman by *tapas*; for, *tapas* is the way to Brahman." The son performed *tapas*, came back with an answer about which he was not sure in his own mind, and requested his father to enlighten him. "Go and perform *tapas* again," was the peremptory reply. In this way the son was made to scale higher and higher heights until all his doubts were dissipated, and the truth flashed forth filling his mind with happiness and conviction.

Indra, the king of the gods, and Virochana, the king of the demons, went to Prajāpati for instruction in the nature of the self. Both received elementary instruction from the master. Virochana, who did not care for the truth, went away, satisfied with what little he had learnt or mislearnt. But Indra was troubled with doubts and felt that his knowledge was insufficient. He, therefore, stayed with the master and underwent a course of discipline extending over a period of 105 years. At the end of this long period of discipline, when his mind was completely purified by *tapas*, he received the highest illumination.¹

Upakoshalas, another aspirant after truth, lived in the house of his master, we are told in the Chhāndogya Upanishad, for 12 years as a Brahmacharin. For twelve years he served his master and tended his fires. The master allowed the other pupils to depart, but Upakoshala was not allowed to go. Then the master's wife took pity on him, went up to the master and said, "This student has regularly performed his *tapas* and carefully tended your fires. Let him now receive instruction, or the fires will blame you." But the master did not pay

¹ See Chāndogya-Up. VIII, 7-12.

any heed to his wife's expostulations, and went away on a journey. On his return from the journey he found his pupil pure and fit, and gave him the instruction. There are many other anecdotes like the above in the Upanishads, inculcating the importance of mental purification, discipline, or *tapas*, as an indispensable preliminary to the investigation of a philosophical problem.

The Kathopanishad (Verse 2, 24) says :—

“He, who has not turned away from wickedness, who is not tranquil, who is not subdued, whose mind is not concentrated, he cannot obtain the self by knowledge alone.” In other words for a knowledge of the self, one must perform *tapas* which consists in (1) abstaining from wicked modes of life, (2) the controlling of the senses and the mind and (3) concentration. In the Brihadāranyakopanishad (Verse 4.4.24) we read:

“He who has subdued his outer senses (Sānta), he who has subdued his inner senses (Dānta), he who is free from attachment (Uparata), he who is patient (Titikshu), he who has learnt concentration (Samāhita), he sees the self in the great self, and sees all in the self.”

This process of mental and moral purification so as to enable the mind to concentrate on one definite object was a speciality of the method employed by the teachers of the Upanishads.

II

The central problem of the Upanishads is the problem of the self. The self, the Upanishads declare, is to be searched for and known; for, it alone is blissful, and everything else is “*ārtam*,” i.e., afflicted with suffering. What then is the self, the Ātman, the subject of all experience? The answer is arrived at by stripping the self of all that is not self but is in association with it. This method of phenomenological reduction, as it is now called by its modern adherents in

Germany, which has been adopted in recent times with such remarkable success by Professor Husserl in his works, was followed by the Rishis of old in this country to investigate and discover the true nature of the self. (The self, they said, is the knower, the ātman, by whose light all things are lighted up. It is the subject of all experience and is in association with an object which it knows.) Yet the two, the subject and the object, are antithetical and sharply opposed. The essence of the subject consists in knowing, *i.e.*, consciousness, and the essence of the object in being known, *i.e.*, absence of consciousness. A subject cannot be anything but a subject or knower, and an object cannot be anything but an object,—it can never be a knower. Our body, our thoughts, feelings and desires are all objects of knowledge and, though closely related to the self, they are not the self. To transfer their quality to the subject would be entirely wrong. The quality of being known, *i.e.*, unconsciousness can never be ascribed to the subject, nor can the quality of knowing, *i.e.*, consciousness be attributed to the object, whether the object be external like the table I am writing on, or internal like the thoughts and feelings that are passing in my mind. Hence the self, the subject of conscious experience, must be different from the physical body and its states, as well as from the internal organs like the mind, and its states such as thoughts, feelings and desires, all of which are objects of knowledge. (The subject is above all objects which it knows or illuminates. It cannot itself be objectively known. How can the knower, asks Yājñavalkya, become the object of knowledge, for who can know the knower? "Verily, beloved one," Yājñavalkya thus instructs his wife, "the self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature. For, when there is duality (as in waking and dream experience), then one sees the other, one hears the other, one perceives the other, one knows the other. But when the self is all in all (as in dreamless sleep or in moments of highest illumination) how should he see another, how should he know another? How

should he know him by whom he knows all?...How, O beloved one, should the knower know the knower?"

Yet the existence of the self or the knower cannot be denied or doubted; for to doubt it, as Sankara and Descartes have shown, would be to doubt the doubter, which is an absurdity. (We can know the self only by being the self; we can know the knower by being the knower. In self-knowledge, knowing and being are identical. This characteristic of self-knowledge follows from the nature of the self as knower or consciousness. The nearest analogue to the self in this respect is light which is self-luminous and does not depend upon anything else for illumination.) We truly become or know the self (here knowing is identical with being) in dreamless sleep,—so we are told by Yājñavalkya in the Brihadāranya-Upanishad, by Prajāpati in the Chhāndogya-Upanishad, and by Ajātasatru in the Kaushitaki Upanishad, for in dreamless sleep, the self alone exists, transcending all objective limitations. "If the Hindu philosopher," says Prof. Max Müller, "is clear on any point, it is this, that the subjective soul, the witness, or knower, or the self can never be known as objective, but can only be itself, and thus be conscious of itself."¹

III

Having seen in a general way that the subject is different from the object, the soul from its organic states, let us now turn to the organs or vehicles which the soul employs for its objective knowledge and see how they condition consciousness in its various stages.

The vehicles of man are beautifully described in the Katha-Upanishad in the following manner:—

"Know thyself to be the person sitting in the chariot, thy body to be that chariot, thy *buddhi* to be the driver thereof,

¹ See Max Müller's Three Lectures on the Vedānta, p. 67.

thy manas to be the reins, thy senses to be the horses and the objects of thy senses to be the roads for the horses. When the soul is in union with the body, the senses, and the manas the wise call it the enjoyer, *i.e.*, the individual soul." The Maitrāyana-Upanishad adopts the same simile with a slight variation. It says: the perceptive organs are his reins, the active organs are his horses, the mind is his charioteer, the whip being his temperament. Driven by the whip, the chariot of the body goes round and round like the wheel of the potter. The Svetāsvatara-Upanishad mentions the organs of Sankalpa (manas), Ahankāra (egoism), and buddhi (intuition) as belonging to the self. But the best and the most systematic account of the vehicles of the self is perhaps to be found in the Taittiriya-Upanishad, where five sheaths or koshas are briefly but systematically described, and are said to constitute the five consecutive coverings of the self. These coverings or Koshas are known as Annamaya, Prānamaya, Manomaya, Vijñānamaya and Ānandamaya.¹

The Annamaya Kosha.

(The Annamaya Kosha is the outermost shell in the constitution of man; it is his coarse physical body.) It is built up, according to Tait.-Upanishad, from the gross physical matter and is akin in nature to the gross physical world which sustains it. It is with this body that man carries on his work on this physical plane. Two systems of organs are recognized in it,—one under the control of the mind (manas) and the other under the control of life (prāna), corresponding to the modern physiological divisions of the body into the central nervous system and the sympathetic system.²

¹ The account of the five Koshas in the Tait.-Up. seems to have been derived from the Brih.-Up. 1. 5. 3. and 2.1. 10-20

² Prāna-Up. 4. 3-4.

The Prānamaya Kosha.

(Behind the coarse physical body the seers of the Upanishads saw a subtler kosha compound of tanmātras as the bearer and vehicle of vegetative life.) They also saw that this finer sheath acts on the gross inorganic matter and converts it into a mass of protoplasm, and that as soon as its activity is withdrawn the protoplasmic matter disintegrates and is reduced to its old inorganic state. The Prasna-Upanishad ascribes the work of *Vidhāraṇa*, i.e., preserving the organic character of the body, to this Kosha. This vital sheath, however, performs five different functions, in consequence of which five varieties of prānamaya, known as prāna, apāna, vyāna, samāna, and udāna, are distinguished. Prāna performs the functions of respiration, apāna of evacuation, vyāna of circulation, samāna of digestion and udāna of separation of the soul from the body at death. These five varieties of the Prānamaya occupy different parts of the body, and with the help of the sympathetic system of the body, which they control, they carry on all the vital processes.

The Manomaya Kosha.

(Behind the Kosha of vital matter, the sages saw a still subtler kosha enveloping the soul, a kosha through which the soul performs its conscious activities. This subtler internal vehicle of consciousness is called the Manomaya kosha. The manomaya or the manas is in close touch with and controls the central nervous system of the body, and has organic arrangements corresponding to it.) The manas has, according to the Upanishads, five organs of sensation (corresponding to the sensory organs of ear, eye, nose, skin and tongue), five organs of action (corresponding to the motor organs of hands, feet, mouth, anus, and the organ of generation) and a central organ of direction and control,

sometimes called the lower manas, and sometimes called Sankalpa (corresponding to the physical brain).¹ These eleven organs act in waking life through their physical counterparts, controlling and guiding them for purposes of conscious life ; but in dream the mental organs are withdrawn from the physical body and work independently of the physical organs. What we call wakeful consciousness is not possible, if the mental organs are not in touch with the central nervous system of the body. But the conscious functions of the mind are not on that account dependant on the body. They can go on independently of its help. When, in dream, the mind is released from its physical fetters, it can see and hear and perform all conscious operations. Brihadāranyaka 1.5.3. says : " My mind was elsewhere, I could not see, my mind was elsewhere I could not hear ; it is therefore clear that we see with the mind, hear with the mind, and know with the mind."

When, as in the waking state, the mind works through the physical organs of the body it can deal with and know only the physical world, but in dream when it works by itself, independently of the physical organs, it knows and deals with a higher world which is akin to it in nature and substance. In dream, as Yājñavalkya has clearly pointed out, we have two kinds of experience: either we enjoy the mental images of waking life, or we gather experiences of the mental world in which we then temporarily live.² The new experiences thus obtained in dream can be brought, as they are sometimes brought, to waking consciousness, if the physical brain on which the waking consciousness depends is fit to receive them.

The Vijnānamaya Kosha.

"Behind the manomaya but different from it there is a still subtler kosha," says the Taittiriya Upanishad, "called

¹ See Prasna-Up. 4-8., Chand-Up. VII. 6-7., Maitr.-Up. 6. 34. 6.

² See Brih.-Up. 4. 3. 9-14, Prasna.-Up. 4-5.

Vijnānamaya. It permeates the manomaya as its very soul. It has the shape of man, like the human shape of the manomaya is the human shape of the Vijnānamaya. Faith (Sraddhā) is its head, goodness or rectitude (Ritam) is its right arm, truth (Satyam) is its left arm, concentration (Yoga) is its trunk, and Mahat is its support." (The Vijnānamaya is the faculty of intuition, of ecstatic vision. It is composed of pure sattva, and as sattva does not cloud or obscure, its revelations are pure and unadulterated. It is an organ of direct apperception of the true, the good, and the beautiful.)

Just as the mind works normally through the physical body, so does the vijnāna or buddhi work normally through the mind. Hence the vijnānamaya is described as the soul of the manomaya. But unlike the manomaya which easily isolates itself from the body in dream, the vijnāna can hardly free itself from the shackles of the mind, except by hard and persistent labour. Tapas, rigorous discipline alone can release the vijnānamaya from the shackles of the manas. Hence the importance of Tapas as a preparation for the right understanding of truth. So long as the vijnāna is wedded to the manas, it only apperceives whatever is presented to it by the manas ; but when it separates itself from the manas it expatiates in a world higher than that of manas, a world of mahat, of pure sattva and spirituality, a world of real goodness, beauty and truth.

The Ānandamaya Kosha.

Behind the Vijnānamaya the sages have seen the Ānandamaya. (The Taittiriya Upanishad thus describes the ānandamaya : "It permeates the Vijnānamaya as its very soul.) It has the shape of a man, like the human shape of the Vijnānamaya is the human shape of the ānandamaya. Joy is its head, Bliss is its trunk and Brahman is its seat and support." This ānandamaya kosha is also a mere husk of the self and not its kernel, as some have wrongly supposed. But it is a much finer

husk which performs no active functions. It is a vehicle of mere potentiality. It is described by Gauḍapāda as "Vijani-drāyutah Prajñāh"; as a state of consciousness in which the individuality of the Jiva lies in a latent seed-condition. Into this kosha the soul enters in dreamless sleep and *pralaya*, leaving the other koshas behind. (Being thus bereft of the active koshas the self loses its adventitious characters which it acquires through its association with the active koshas and realises its essential nature as bliss. Hence this kosha is called Ānandamaya. It thus serves to lead man to self-realization and union with Brahman.)

IV

We have considered the vehicles through which the soul carries on its work. We have also seen how they influence consciousness and give rise to the three conditions of wakefulness, dream and sleep. Let us now briefly discuss the nature of these three states so as to bring out clearly the truth that the objective limitations which are imposed upon consciousness in dream and waking hours and which are absent in dreamless sleep are due entirely to the association of the soul with the active koshas, and are not essential to its real nature.

(In dreamless sleep, as we have shown above, the soul leaves all the active koshas behind and enters into Brahman with a thin veil of potential individuality, which is void of function. The soul then loses its objective relativity which characterises its two other states and realizes its true nature as pure consciousness and bliss. But the latent individuality asserts itself after a while and the soul is again encircled by a variety of active organs. In dream, the awakened soul is enveloped by the Vijnāna in close association with the manas, while in the waking state, it is encased in a highly complex apparatus consisting of the Vijnāna, the manas, the vital sheath and the physical body, all in close association with one another.)

In dream the manas forms the outermost shell in the wrappings of the soul. Hence, in dream, the soul cannot go beyond the range of manas ; it enjoys the objects which the manas presents to it (provivikta-bhuk)¹ and suffers from the limitations which the manas imposes on it. In the waking state, the soul is wedded to the full complement of its koshas and depends upon the physical body which then forms its outermost covering. It then enjoys physical objects (Sthoola-bhuk)² and is confined within the range of its physical senses. It becomes subject to the laws and limitations of the physical body and falls an easy prey to the ills (such as death, diseases, etc.) to which the physical body is an heir. Thus the soul which remains pure and blissful in dreamless sleep becomes impure and afflicted with evil, suffering, and objectivity through its association with the active koshas.

But even the husk of potentiality (*i.e.*, the ānandamaya kosha) which clings to the self in dreamless sleep is not an inseparable adjunct of the soul. Like that of the other koshas, its relation with the self is only accidental. The soul leaves it along with the active koshas in beatific vision or "Samādhi." By "tapas" or "Yoga," the soul can free itself completely from the influence of the koshas and attain what the Katha-Up.³ describes as the highest goal (paramān gatim), *i.e.*, union with Brahman. In the highest form of "Yoga" called "Nirvikalpa Samādhi," the soul is said to be divested of all the koshas including the ānandamaya. It then realises its complete unity with Brahman. The soul, therefore, is a Sojourner stranded in an alien land where it lives for a time, until it finds its way back to "God who is its home."

If in the moments of highest experience such as dreamless sleep and beatific vision, the self becomes one with Brahman, and knows itself as infinite, it follows that that must be its real

¹ See Mandukya-Up. 4.

² See Mandukya-Up. 3.

³ In Katha-Up. II. 3. 10.

nature and that its finitude such as prevails in dream and waking life through its association with the finite vehicles must be adventitious. The finite vehicles from ānanda-maya down to the physical body are all objective and can have nothing in common with the subjective self. ("Subjectivity" in the Upanishads is not merely a logical idea, but is also a metaphysical concept.) It involves the idea of being a knower, a witness, as well as the notion of being a permanent and eternal substance, of being that which stands firm behind the fleeting phenomena. The object is "Satyam," *i.e.*, empirically real, but the subject is "Satyasya Satyam," *i.e.*, the eternal element behind the fleeting empirical reality.¹ The association between such opposed principles, *vis.*, the subjective self and the objective koshas cannot, therefore, be anything but adventitious. Moreover, the pure blissful consciousness which we enjoy in dreamless sleep and more fully and adequately in beatific vision (Samādhi) can find no interpretation in terms of the koshas which are well-nigh non-existent in those states. Such consciousness must, therefore, be regarded as the very essence of the self which then subsists alone; and the finitude, duality and other aberrations of consciousness which we experience in the waking and dream states must be conceived as the results of the influence which the koshas then exert on the imprisoned self. (Thus, in its essential nature the self is pure consciousness and free from all limitations,—it is in fact one with Brahman.)

V

But one further question has still to be answered and it is this: if the soul of man is really infinite and one with Brahman, how is this identity to be conceived in the face of his undeniable limitations, even though the limitations be accidental? Is the soul of man to be regarded as a part or as a modification of

¹ In Brih-Up. II. 3. 6.

Brahman? No, there cannot be any distinction of part and whole in pure consciousness, for it is beyond time and space, and beyond distinction and duality. Any one who sees plurality in this, declare the Upanishads, wanders from death to death. There can be no distinction of part, no "Svagata bheda," as Śankara would say, for if parts existed, Brahman would cease to be infinite and assume a finite character as towards its own parts. Nor can the human soul be a modification of Brahman, for Brahman, according to the Upanishads, is pure consciousness. He is advam, avyayam, aksharam, one undual, eternal and unchangeable being. To admit a change or modification in Brahman would be tantamount to an admission of plurality and objectivity in the nature of pure consciousness.

But on the plane of manifestation the divine consciousness appears in two different ways.¹ It appears synthetically through the entire creation and analytically through special parts; the former gives rise to Hiranyagarbha or the cosmic soul who sustains the world, and the latter to a plurality of Jivas. In pralaya, the cosmic consciousness is withdrawn into its source and the world is dissolved. In Samādhi and dreamless sleep, the Jiva-consciousness is withdrawn and is united with Brahman. But consciousness, whether in the part or in the whole of creation, or beyond it, is one and the same. In reply to a question from Uddālaka Aruni Yājñavalkya says in the Brihat-Upanishad: "There is no other seer but He (the highest self, Brahman), there is no other hearer but He, there is no other perceiver but He, there is no other knower but He, He is thyself, the ruler within, the immortal." Again in another place Yājñavalkya says: "Thou can'st see the seer of all sights, thou can'st hear the hearer of all hearing, thou can'st know the knower of all knowing, He is thyself, He is Brahman, He is within all."

¹ The problem of manifestation is not discussed in this paper. The manifested world is taken as a fact of experience,—only its incompatibility with pure consciousness is insisted upon.

Now, to sum up : there is only one consciousness, one knower, one witness, one self. He is Sachchidānanda, such as we experience ourselves to be when bereft of the koshas. He is Brahman. When He works through the microcosmic koshas He is Jiva, the soul of man : when He works through cosmic koshas he is Hiranyagarbha, the cosmic soul. But these koshas, whether microcosmic or macrocosmic, are mere adventitious accretions, and do not touch the essence of the soul. He who is the soul of man, He who is the soul of the cosmos, and He who is beyond,—all are one. Just as pure water, whether taken from the jug or tank, or the sea is always H_2O , everything else in it being foreign matter, so the pure self, whether of man or of gods, whether of Hiranyagarbha or of the absolute Brahman, is always Sachchidānanda (being-knowing bliss), everything else with which it may happen to be united for a time being entirely foreign to its true nature.

S. C. SEN

ONE OR MANY ?

The problem of One and Many is a time-worn one. Philosophical speculations regarding the nature of ultimate reality may be said, in a sense, to have moved between these two extremes with various intermediate forms. We can hardly say that the problem has been settled finally. It may be questioned, on the other hand, whether the problem will ever be solved, so long as the underlying motives on either side remain at work in the construction of philosophical systems. Among the motives, it may also be questioned whether there is not ultimately a biological necessity on the side of One and an intellectual necessity on the side of Many. My own purpose here is not to thrust out any constructive theory, but to suggest only a line of procedure, which might, on an impartial review of the actual movements of thought on the subject, throw some light on the problem.

It would be well to begin by explaining certain terms, which I have freely used in the course of the present paper, regarding the various conceptions of One and Many that are actually formed in the different systems of thought brought under review here. There is, first, the conception of what may be called a *Numerical Unity* as the ultimate reality underlying the universe. Next comes the term *Systematic Unity*—a One in Many—a unity of diverse elements. The Many, again, for those who stand for it, may be an unrelated or a related one. The one may be called *Absolute Pluralism*, ranging from two to an indefinite number of ultimate realities but holding no inner ties or relations among themselves; the other is called here, for want of a better name, *Relative Pluralism*, in which the ultimate reals are many (it may be only two)

but they are held together by the definite relations, not necessarily forming *one* whole.

The question now is : whether the universe can ultimately be reduced, or traced back, to a unitary principle, either of the *numerical* or of the *systematic* kind, or whether it should be so traced ultimately to certain pluralistic entities of the *absolute* or of the *relative* kind. The problem is a fundamental one, and its importance is great in the present state of philosophical speculations in the West. The main contention of *Idealism versus Realism* may be represented as moving between the two extremes of One and Many—the One giving a monistic view of the universe, the other a pluralistic view; the One standing for what William James calls a “block universe,” in which there can be nothing absolutely new, the other for a freely-increasing universe in which there are infinite possibilities of new creations. Each side has no doubt its own grounds to stand upon. But each has also its own pitfalls. Will the final and satisfactory solution of the points of contention between them lie in a reconciliation of the two positions in a higher unity? Hardly there can be any such reconciliation so long as they stick to their own grounds supposed by each party to be solid.

The world as we actually experience it is a Many. Even the absolute monists would not deny that. There are so many different orders of beings, so much contrast and difference and struggle amongst them, that to view them as one would be sheer non-sense. The doubt naturally arises—how can this variety be reduced to a unity—the Many traced to One? The boldest attempt made in this direction was by Sankara in this country and by Parmenides in ancient Greece. But both, at the same time, virtually recognised the difficulty of explaining the origin of the many by their *one*. The perfecting of their position required, therefore, the unavoidable admission of illusoriness of the Many. But each had, at the same time, to admit a second principle to account for the many supposed

to the illusory. The *Non-being* of the one and the *Avidyā* of the other are but words to cover a real difficulty. The ontological necessity of a *many* is virtually admitted by both. It is no wonder, therefore, that a philosophical reaction followed immediately in both countries. I will now be treating of the reaction as it took place in the West, relegating to subsequent pages its treatment as it took place in this country. The Eleatic monism was but a refined Ionian Hylozoism, which had its inevitable reaction, culminating in the absolute pluralism of Democritus. The two greatest figures in ancient Greece—Plato and Aristotle—were but a repetition in principle of the same reaction, notwithstanding their high philosophical achievements in other respects. What was but a *systematic unity* of Hierarchy of Ideas in Plato became a *relative pluralism* in Aristotle. Even Plato himself was not a monist in the strict sense, as he had to admit an unrelated second by the side of his system of Ideas—an independent principle of matter. Aristotle, on the other hand, was a downright pluralist. He admits, by the side of his *Primum Materia*—the first formless matter, the existence of a *Primum mobile*—the first unmoved mover—his God, standing outside of and in no intimate relationship to his matter, to account for change in the latter. His admission of innumerable pure individual souls brings in a further complication, rendering it difficult to say whether he advocated absolute pluralism or a relative one. The Neo-Platonic movement offering Monism of a mystical kind can hardly be said to have faced the problem boldly in a strictly philosophical manner. On the contrary, it may be doubted even whether, as a matter of speculation, they advocated any form of Monism strictly. The renowned founder of the school—Plotinus—appears to recognise something like the Platonic Matter by the side of his supreme Being—the Good—lying at the core of his triad of *Hypostases* which is but a systematic unity. The Mediæval Period, dominated by theological ideas, is considered generally to be of little philosophical interest.

For the problem before us, the period has, however, its own significance. It is one of what may be called *Theological Monism*, to coin a new term, which traces the whole choir of heaven and earth, including human souls, to one supreme Being of unlimited powers. The same kind of monism is formed also in other scriptures, not Judaic in origin. The aspect of unity here displayed as being at the root of the universe can still be viewed under our category of *systematic unity*. It is not an absolute unity of the numerical kind, the creator here being conceived as a spiritual Entity of many powers held together in the unity of His essence. Coming down to the Modern Period, we find that the father of modern metaphysics—Descartes, was a pluralist of the absolute kind to start with. His greatest contribution to philosophy is his dualism of matter and mind, conceived as two distinct entities having nothing in common between them, not even any relation to find them together. This dualism was the result of a true insight into the fundamental factors involved in our experience. His third reality—God, he could have easily placed by the side of the dual as an additional entity, disconnected with the other two and holding but an external relation to them. But the scholastic influence, which he no doubt wanted to avoid by all means, was too much for him and he still clung to the theological monism of the Judaic type defended speculatively by the schoolmen. The so-called monism of Spinoza is no doubt a bold attempt to get rid of the Cartesian Dualism. But did he really succeed in his endeavour? His Divine substance is split up into an infinite number of Attributes, disconnected in themselves but welded together into a nominal unity holding the two incompatibles of *Thought* and *Extension*, not to speak of the others. Leibnitz was a natural and inevitable reaction to this Spinozistic flight of speculation. His dominant tone is pluralistic of an extreme form, in so far as his doctrine of monads goes. But his mind too was not free from the glamour of unity. His God with the Pre-established Harmony is still a concession to

the scholastic idea. It can, indeed, be questioned how far this concession was at all necessary to the completion of his thought on ground of "sufficient reason." On the English soil, again, the philosophical thought that can be said to be native to it, I mean Empiricism, is pluralistic both in tone and results. Locke and Berkeley were both pluralists, though in different ways, except for their theological monism which was but a persistent inheritance of the scholastic thought. Hume was a true pluralist of the consistent type, free entirely from any theological bias, although it would not be right to say strictly that he treated of the ontological problem in question here. Much of what is called Neo-realism, whether of the American or of the English type, is but an advanced repetition of the Humian pluralism. A bare mention, I suppose, would do to say that Materialists, whether of the past or of the present, are all pluralists in their own way, although they are mistakably called monists because of their denial of a separate spiritual existence. We fail to find in their thought any attempt to trace the plural aspects of the universe to one entity.

The review, undertaken above in the briefest outlines, of the development of philosophic thought in the West on the problem before us gives two outstanding facts, namely: (1) that Pluralism, in some form or other, has been admitted by all the thinkers and (2) that those of them (and their number is large) who show a tendency towards monism have either surreptitiously admitted a *plural* or failed to account for the manifoldness of the Universe with their unitary principle. At least those who have made any serious use of the monistic idea have done so with the relative, rather than the absolute form of it. Their unity at best is of the *systematic* and not the *numerical* kind. The advocates of true and absolute monism may be said to date from Fichte. His own predecessor and philosophical preceptor Immanuel Kant was, however, a pluralist of the extreme form, in so far at least as he leaves an impossible gap between his world of Noumena and that of Phenomena. Kant's God, again

a third reality conceived as a *Moral Postulate* can hardly be called a creator after the Judaic fashion. The disciple who wanted to correct his Master's dualism of mind and matter by reducing them into two evolutes of One Absolute is the father of what is called the Modern Idealistic Monism. But can Fichte or his successors in the same line of thought be said to have succeeded in showing satisfactorily how and why the Absolute should evolve out of itself the Ego and the Non-ego, or how the bare absolute Being or Thought, as is maintained by Hegel, should pass on to its opposite to negate itself and then rise up to a higher synthesis in which both *Is* and *Is not* are held together into a mysterious unity? What may appear to be a dubious necessity of human ways of knowing or thinking is raised here into an Ontological principle, with what logic Hegel and his admirers know best. The modern followers of this Hegelianism have rightly found the procedure to be unsatisfactory, detecting perhaps an incurable flaw in the whole position, which they do not, however, out of high respect for their Master, dare to avow in plain terms. They have almost given up what is "dead" in Hegel and cling only to the general form of his line of thought. But what is *not* dead in Hegel is, I think, his surreptitious admission of a *dual*—Fichte's Ego and Non-ego and Hegel's Being and Non-being, without which, intellectually at least, the universe would remain unexplained. It is perhaps to avoid this inevitable dualism and, at the same time to keep on the one Absolute in its place as an object of faith and devotion, that the modern Idealists of the Bradleian type view the Absolute as a systematic unity of all that was, is and will be—of a many united into a whole without which, they think, they would have no *raison-d'être*. These thinkers cannot give up the many in all its infinite forms and cannot give up, again, the One for which they have forsooth profound reverence. And so they have somehow coupled them together into what they call a *Time-less Absolute*—a conception which has justly found its opponents in their Italian brothers—a Croce

or a Gentile, though these illustrious Neo-Idealists have not proved themselves fully equal to the task, by dispelling once for all, from their minds, the glamour of the Absolute One. But what conception of the Absolute can we have with them, except in terms of its parts—the many which they would discard for reasons mysterious? Is it not a concession to pluralism in a covert way? No, they say: the parts have no existence of their own except in relations to each other, and these relations to other relations, and so on, each being “implicated” in others, which is possible only when there is a whole. But the sort of reasoning they adopt to justify their position is so abstruse, intricate and puzzling that a suspicion naturally arises that there must be somewhere a rift in their lute. Otherwise why cannot they speak in plain words what they would have us accept? Perhaps they would say that the things they treat of are too high for ordinary intelligence and too subtle to be expressed in the ordinary ways of speech. May be. But then they should have kept their thoughts to themselves and not sought popularity by their writings.

Now I proceed to take a brief review of the attitude adopted by the principal systems of Indian thought towards the problem under consideration here. I say systems of Indian thought and not the history of them, as a history of Indian philosophy is still in the making. So I begin at once with the greatest devotee of Unity—our Āchārya Sankara. I have already tried to show how far he can be called a monist *philosophically*. True, he declares emphatically that when knowledge of the One is attained in a transcendental vision of the *aparoksha* kind, all pluralism will vanish away. But all the same he repeats, times and over, that the dualism of self and not-self cannot be got rid of so long as this vision is not attained. We have to do here with philosophical speculations and not with that which he would put above and beyond them. Does he not place such speculations involving the use of intellectual faculties at the door of Avidyā which he holds to be responsible for all

pluralistic knowledge? Yes, there is the ineradicable *Avidyā* in the philosopher's mind and he must think in terms of many. By the side of the transcendental reality of Brahman the philosopher has to reckon with another reality of a different order the *avidyā* when he speaks from the speculative standpoint. Is this not virtually a concession to many by the philosopher himself? Āchārya Rāmānuja appears to adopt rather the naive view of one order of reality under which he brings his three ultimates—his Cosmic Soul—*Brahman*, the individual ones—*Jīvas* and the subtle matter—called *Jagat*, all equally real, but distinct in this nature from each other. He thus begins as a pluralist. But the glamour of unity is still upon him and so he creates a sort of systematic unity with the three reals with the Divine Soul at the centre of them dominating the other two. I do not mention the position of the other schools of the Vedāntic thought—which are either pluralistic, as in the school of Madhyāchārya, or Monistic after the theological fashion. The Sāmkhya takes up a bold and independent step on the problem by placing itself squarely on an irreducible dualism of *Prakriti* and *Purusha*, each being recognised as a reality of its own kind and distinct in its nature from the other. Their relation to each other, if there be any, is conceived rather to be an adventitious one, each being regarded as complete in itself without the other. No doubt Sāmkhya bases its system ultimately on an epistemological analysis of experience into *Subject* and *Object* (*Viśaya* and *Viśayi*), but that relation is regarded as one of *yogyatā* or "fitness." *Purusha* is by its nature fit to be the *knower*, and *Prakriti*, fit to be the *known*. There is no inner tie between them, so as to make a unity of subject-object in the language of the monistic Idealists of the West. But Kapila, the accredited founder of the system, could not still avoid the glamour of Unity. His attempt to trace the origin of the multiple universe in a unitary principle—the *Pradhāna* shows clearly an influence of the monistic tendency. But is the *Pradhāna* of Kapila really a unitary principle? Is it not

constituted of the three different entities—*Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, distinct and opposed in their very nature, though held to work in unison. Their *Sāmyāvasthā*—the condition of equilibrium is no doubt called by the name *Pradhāna*. But in this very conception of *Sāmyāvasthā*, we find the influence of the persistent idea of a unity, which he could have easily done without. The net result stands that he is a downright pluralist, even in his view of the ultimate principles underlying Nature. The Yoga system of Patanjali stands ontologically, as in other respects, on the same ground as the system of Kapila. The admission of an additional principle—the *Isvara*—by Patanjali only introduces a further complication into their pluralism. We come next to the two allied systems of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*, which with their six or seven *Padārthas* (categories) and nine *Dravyas* (substances) would appear to stand rather for Absolute Pluralism. But in the actual account they offer of the origin of Nature out of these pluralistic elements, they evince still a leaning towards a sort of unity. The *Adrista* of the *Vaiśeṣika* and *Isvara* with *adrīṣṭa* of the *Naiyāyika* supplies a bond to their many. But this bond forms what may be called a Relative Pluralism, rather than a Systematic Unity. There is nothing like the theological monism in their systems. The Judaic conception of absolute creation is foreign to their thought. Among the *Mīmāṃsakas*, again, we do not find any serious consideration of the ultimate source of the Universe. The very idea of creation is expunged by them. Their purpose was not fundamentally metaphysical, but quite different, having to settle disputes regarding right interpretation of Vedic injunctions. The philosophical speculations, mostly of the epistemological character, that we find in their writings were of later growth. On ontological matters, where they are found to treat of any, they appear to have freely drawn upon the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. We pass on next to the two schools which claim to have created systems independently of any philosophical traditions. I mean Buddhism and Jainism.

Ontological discussions, in the strict sense, are missed in Buddhism, at least in its earliest form as presented in the *Tripitakas*. Buddha himself appears there to waive such problems rather than hazard any definite opinion on them. His purpose was quite different. Yet the universe, viewed, as it is, by him phenomenally as a disconnected series of events which succeed each other without any bond of continuity in them would place them under pluralists of the human type. But the influence of Unity is still there. The course of Nature is viewed by them as coming under the one universal law of *Pratityasamutpāda*. And the ever-recurring twelve-linked chain of causation in which the law finds its application to life is another instance of the influence. Under what category shall we place them? Whether under that of systematic unity or of relative pluralism is difficult to settle. A true advocacy of what may be called absolute pluralism is found only in Jainism among the systems of Indian thought. The Jaina Universe is interpenetrated with six different entities, each keeping to its own unique nature and each doing its own special work in the scheme of the universe. We fail to find there the mention of any unity holding the substances together by any bond, whether of the divine or of the mundane kind. True, Jainism recognises the existence of causal relation in the events of the world, but that causality works in different strands peculiar to the nature of the different reals. Unity of any kind is foreign to their very position, called appropriately *anekāntavāda*.

The reviews, undertaken above, were intended to show that there is a wide-spread tendency towards monism of some form or other among philosophers both of the East and the West. Even those who began boldly with a pluralistic view could not keep their mind entirely free from the influence of Unity. But why One and not Many at the back ground of the plural Universe, a *One*, again, which the boldest of the bold monists cannot keep to consistently? There must be some deep-lying reason for the tendency. Is the reason grounded in



any feature of the experienced universe, or is it ultimately based on any feature of the mind that experiences it?) The case of theological monists is quite different. Their's being a matter of faith cannot be subjected to any strict philosophical scrutiny, as I have tried to show. (Does the world as experienced by us present really a unity in its diversity?) Is it a unified system really? Some would say it is and so would proceed to prove that there must be a unitary principle at its source. But is not this very conception of unity of the universe an assumption requiring justification? You begin by assuming a unity as underlying the world of experience and then hasten to show that there must, therefore, be at the root a unitary principle. Good logic, indeed, which would not perceive the *petitio principii* involved in the procedure! A better wisdom is shewn by those who would not proceed with such an assumption, but fall upon the epistemological ground for their monistic position, as we find in their Idealistic brothers. But epistemology has, as a matter of fact, played differently with different schools of thought. There are both monistic and pluralistic epistemology, each offering sound considerations in their favour. The reason for the monistic tendency must, therefore, lie somewhere deeper than in the mere dubious needs of our Intelligence. And what is deeper than intellect? Life is certainly deeper than intellect. May we not hope to find the root of the monistic tendency in some one of your vital needs which may at the same time account for the epistemological demand in those who would stand for it.

Life demands economy of labour, whether physical or mental, for its peace and preservation. It cannot be safe in a situation which it fails to understand and control. To understand and control, again, it must give up much that is irrelevant and select only that which is relevant to its needs. It must, therefore, seek an order where there is Chaos—a unity where there is plurality. (With a disconnected and disorderly many, man cannot go on safely as

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an intelligent being. For the energy at his disposal is a limited quantity. He is found, on pain of extinction, to economise as much as possible for the purposes of life. There is certainly more economy of labour when we have to deal with a few, best if with one, than with a many. Hence we generalise where there are particulars and coin general names to ticket up things which are similar or are expected to react on us similarly.) Do we not extend the same tendency when we try to view the universe as being rooted in a unitary principle, and finding that, our *one*, though it may satisfy life, does not satisfy the understanding, covertly bring in a plural to complete our system. The wavering that we find between One and Many in a large number of thinkers may be due to the struggle between the demand of life and the demand of intellect. For the instrumental use is not the only one we make of the intellect. It is capable also of purely theoretical use, and the freedom of our intelligence lies here. We hear a good deal of the scientific method of Philosophy in these days, by which is meant mainly and essentially, of course, this impartial and objective attitude to be maintained in handling philosophical problems.

It may be objected here, perhaps, that the motives mentioned above are not the only ones at work in philosophical speculations. No, they are not. I admit, on the side of Monism specially, that there are, among others, aesthetic as also religious motives. There is, it may be said, a neatness—a beauty—in monism and a special sanctity on account of its spiritual value. The question of values as determining philosophical views of the universe is a large one, and the subject has received yet only a scanty justice from the hands of the so-called philosophers of value. Into that problem, it is no business of mine to enter here. But one thing I cannot help suggesting: Whether our aesthetic appreciations, if not creations, are not ultimately rooted in the biological law of economy of which I have spoken above. As for the spiritual motive, I fail to see

why it should demand monism. Religious life, even of the mystic of mystics, can be consistent, as it actually, has been in the history of Religion, with Monism and Pluralism both. On the other hand, if by a spiritual life, we mean a self-determined life of free initiations to be achieved by struggle with and victory over the physical side of our nature, then pluralism, and not monism, can be the only reasonable position to stand upon.)

P. B. ADHIKARI.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH.

The problem of truth arises in the possibility of knowing reality. The relation of knowledge to reality is however one of the most debatable points. We are inclined to distinguish the two, and associate a different kind of reality with each. Reality is that which simply *is*, and it makes no difference to it whether it is known or not. Knowledge on the other hand is a state of a certain existent which is peculiarly situated with regard to the rest of reality; it is also comparatively evanescent.

This view of the relation of knowledge to reality has given rise to a theory of truth which is called the correspondence theory. The main difficulties of this position are quite clear. If by correspondence we *mean* knowledge of reality as it is, the theory evidently explains nothing; it is only a descriptive name for true knowledge; and the analysis of this knowledge remains an open question. If however it signifies a certain analysis, it is hopeless even as a *criterion* of truth. For reality to which our knowledge is to correspond cannot be disengaged from this knowledge. Or what is the same thing, knowledge can only correspond to reality as known, in which case the independence of reality is sacrificed. Lastly, there is the consideration that the correspondence theory does not give a satisfactory account of error. Any piece of knowledge whatsoever presumes to be knowledge of fact, *i.e.*, according to this theory it presumes to correspond to fact. All knowledge then will be equally true knowledge; and there will be no room for error anywhere. If it is contended that the time-element is essential to the determination of truth, and that any piece of knowledge to be true must be verified as true, the problem

of truth becomes meaningless. For truth in that case can never be reached. Either there is knowledge the truth of which is immediately evident, or the process of finding truth is endless and its object unattainable.

It has been suggested by some writers that knowledge and reality are not two distinct spheres. The fundamental fact is not reality taken by itself, nor individual knowledge *qua* individual. The fundamental fact is the knowledge of reality, or concrete experience in its several degrees of self-integration. This view has the merit of making experience self-contained, and not something related to a reality external to it. The attainment of truth in any degree whatsoever becomes possible only on the ground that experience is itself the true whole.

The problem however still remains open, what characteristic is it which distinguishes one concrete piece of experience as being true from another as being false. Some thinkers have put forth the view that it is greater coherence. They have further maintained that this coherence is not to be understood in the sense in which a consistent dream is coherent. A dream is not sufficiently articulate. Truth is attained only to the extent to which experience constitutes an articulate system of ideas with a single meaning.

This account however misses the character of human knowledge altogether. Human knowledge necessarily proceeds on the postulate of the teachability of facts. Our environment is not indifferent to our attempts to understand it. And while the systematisation which we have been able to introduce in our experience is a necessary negative part of that experience being true, it is the brute external fact that detects even to our omnipotent reason the flaws in that systematisation and thereby renders progress in the attainment of truth possible. No one will maintain that human knowledge is perfect, or that it constitutes a completely coherent system. And if we are obliged to admit this limitation, we are no less obliged to

account for it by the dualism of knowledge and reality,—and so to accept the part of independent and extra-mental facts in the making of truth.

This coherence theory also fails in its analysis of error. The reference to an external reality which is contained in naive human thinking and corrects that thinking is here abolished. There is consequently nothing which can render human judgment about reality false. All judgments are more or less true, and absolutely true at the level of the apperceptive subject. Beyond each level, for undoubtedly there are levels, the partial truths are gradually gathered together and made into more and more significant wholes. In the Absolute Experience, everything is retained and everything is changed. Nothing is like itself,—its former self,—and yet nothing is lost. But since these thinkers have not given us to understand how the Absolute Experience will feel like or be like, except that it will solve every possible contradiction, commonsense insists upon a more commonsense point of view, according to which error is complete falsification of facts, a judging of facts in entire contradiction to their real form and meaning.

Perhaps the charm of the theory consists in the great ideal which it sets before human knowledge. Its emphasis upon "wholeness", "all-inclusiveness", "perfect understanding", "life and movement", satisfies an inchoate need of the human intelligence. But will the theory satisfy if the imaginative fringe which surrounds these high concepts is removed? We think not. To show this, we shall examine the ideal not in what it has failed to achieve, but in its self-fulfilment and final consummation.

Joachim in his book on "The Nature of Truth" describes the ideal in the following words; "The truth, we seem to see, emerges in its perfect completeness as an individual meaning with an internal logical connectedness or articulation. Its articulate connexion demands discursive expression as a system



of judgments. Its individuality requires self-containedness or complete self-coherence of the system."

The ideal we are told has an internal articulation; it is a system of judgments logically connected together. Now if the whole has an individual meaning, there must evidently be something in the nature of the logical connexion to render the many judgments convey one single meaning. We are warned not to interpret logical connectedness as abstract formal consistency. Are we then to interpret it as that other sort of connectedness which we find between different pieces of human knowledge, which are true only so long as they are not contradicted. For coherence on the level of human thought is nothing else.* It is not the positive seeing of a certain mysterious connexion between one so-called fact and another, but the non-appearance of contradiction. Any fact can well cohere with any other fact so long as they do not conflict. But such logical connectedness or coherence will not give us 'individual' meaning. We get so many facts, all signifying different things, living side by side together in an attitude so to say of benevolent neutrality towards each other.

Logical connectedness may be understood in yet another sense, and that is the sense of the term which it appears to us is accepted by Joachim. It may mean a single governing idea which expresses itself in diverse facts, and gives meaning to each of them and to the whole constituted by their mutual relations. But here the difficulty is that the idea is not a logical entity at all. It is more a matter of vision, or of the level of apperception. True, this heightened perception is not ruled out from that hierarchy of more and more organised experiences which these rationalists emphasise. But to call it a coherent or organised experience is wholly to misunderstand its internal structure. Coherence, however interpreted can never be equal to the idea. The singleness of meaning which the idea involves is only obtained *at the cost of* diversity. It is only to the extent that we detract from this singleness,

that the facts might yet be read off as many or as constituting a system. It is only to the extent that their diversities are not *fully* assimilated in the one meaning, that they yet retain their separate selves, and are the facts that they are. Once however we admit their complete metamorphosis in the Absolute, we shall be forced to the conclusion that the meaning has devoured the facts,—the soul has killed its body.

This may not be so plain at the level of thought where we are concerned with very limited unities; for at that level we are treating facts more or less abstractly, and we do not pretend that our meanings of facts are themselves facts, and that there is no difference whatsoever between our explanation and that which we seek to explain. Reality and meaning are yet divided, and our thinking has only a hypothetical character. The situation however completely changes when we want to know the Whole or the Absolute. The meaning here must itself be the fact; and if the former is single and individual, how can we retain diversity for the latter? Mere repetition of the slogan 'no unity without diversity' will not solve the problem. It will only put off a sincere effort at understanding truth.—

It appears to us undeniable that experience involves reality, and that there can be no reality which does not involve experience. It has been maintained that reality is independent of experience. But if that were so, we should be obliged to go a step further and affirm that reality is unknown and unknowable. For an independent reality, in being known, can remain independent no longer; and the characteristics which it might have in independence will not be guaranteed to it when it is known. The problem of truth will thus cease to become significant.

We may allow that reality involves experience. But we cannot stop ~~half-ways and~~ concede a certain amount of independence to it. If reality involves experience, it is nothing more nor less than any concrete piece of experience. And the

whole of reality must be supposed to be equal to the whole of experience. But then the *problem* of truth once more disappears. Each concrete piece of experience has reality and also truth. We cannot draw a line of demarcation between the two; for what the experience *is*, that it *declares*.

The theory of truth implied under this view would be that of self-evidence. We experience neither more nor less than what we do experience. We can never be deceived by what we do know. Propositions which are an exact analysis of what we do know are true; those which contradict our experience are erroneous; and there are no criteria, external to our experience, by which the truth or falsehood of propositions may be judged.

The matter however is not quite so simple. We recognise our knowledge to be progressive; and this progress is achieved by new points of view. We regard certain experiences to be rudimentary, and as not fully comprehending reality. While others seem to give more light, and make facts more significant. There appear to be levels of experience where experience is truer to reality. Thus the old distinction is forced upon us, and reality becomes greater than the truth apprehended in finite experience; reality becomes in fact the ideal of truth than truth itself.

But is the ideal capable of being realized? Nay, is it a significant ideal? Can we *ever* be said to have progressed so far in truth-making that we should have got beyond finite experience and reached the ideal? If not, it is a mere chimera, and the degrees of truth which are to be judged by the ideal might as well be called degrees of error. Reality may appear to us to be more and more intelligible at the so-called intermediate stages to Truth. But reality cannot have many meanings; and the meaning which it has in the one Absolute Experience alone can be the true meaning. If we cannot see the whole of reality through and through and as it is, all else that we do see does not carry us to Truth. But the ground of such

an experience is what is in question. And we think that on the above analysis of truth, this ground is impossible.

We have two distinct alternatives before us, and we must choose between them. We must either accept as real an impersonal and hypothetical absolute experience, which by its very nature can be nobody's experience. Or we must recognize that all experience is individual experience, and that there is no whole of experience to which the individual can be subordinated, much less assimilated. All 'wholes' are *for* and *to* a subject. This subject might be brushed unceremoniously aside with the word 'individual' or 'finite.' But there is not a more solid point in all reality which can replace it, none that can lend significance in it, even if we supposed that that something had any significance of its own at all.

The ideal of truth cannot subsist leaving the subject. We may have great and illuminating ideas, but greater than the ideas is the subject having them. The ideas are mere conceptual structures that have truth only so long as we choose to believe in them and no farther. And on that conceptual level, the pragmatic criterion of truth, namely, 'workability of ideas,' has as good a warrant as any other. In reality, there can be no greater non-sense than the talk about a criterion of truth. Can truth be recognized by a man-made rule? Can it be so far hidden from intelligence, that the latter should be obliged to go out of its way and construct non-intelligible concepts to give meaning to truth? Truth is nothing if it is not the intelligence-stuff that informs everything, including what we call erroneous knowledge. We cannot *oppose* error to truth. We can do so only if we think out this problem in terms of correspondence or non-correspondence to objective being. But that view of truth is too crude to be taken seriously.)

Still we cannot dismiss the problem of error so simply. We have ideas and we believe ourselves to know in them a reality external to us. And we cannot dismiss this reality by merely calling it appearance, without at least putting in a word

about the place of appearance in Absolute Truth. It has been maintained by some writers that appearance is not absolute untruth, for then it would not appear; it is something, and something that must somehow be conserved in Absolute Truth. They do not however tell us how, and in what form, it is to be conserved. It is to be conserved as appearance or as Truth itself? If as the latter, it has no being in Truth; it is simply the Truth itself. If as the former, it is not somehow conserved, but merely transplanted; it is allowed to continue its history beyond its apparent being. All high-sounding phrases then about Truth being a significant whole, an individual meaning etc., become useless. We cannot treat appearance as truth and error at the same time; and this is the mistake which the writers in question appear to me to be making.

Appearance must *be* something; *but not as appearance*. If it *were* something as appearance, it would not to that extent be appearance but reality. There is no middle category between being and not-being,—something that in part is and in part is not. Appearance as appearance cannot have any reality at all. In fact we imply as much when we call it appearance, and distinguish it from the real. And if it appears to *be something*, its reality must clearly be the reality of that which does not itself appear.

This then is our account of error. Error is not opposed to Truth. But so far as it is a fact at all, Truth is its very being and essence.

The ideal of truth which we want to advocate is to be sharply distinguished from the ideal of truth as a system. A system can only be obtained by stitching together pieces of reality. It involves an external view of things. Starting with this view, we can never get at a real whole; for the extension of reality, if reality has extension, is without limit. To get an individual meaning, the method by which we know reality piece by piece must be changed. To know the 'All,' the 'All' must not be taken to signify 'so many different things related each

to the other. The 'All' must be so interpreted that not only is it capable of being taken in, in a single view, but that it becomes the vision itself. This interpretation is only fulfilled in a view of reality in which there is no dualism and the Self epitomises the essence of being. Self-knowledge then is the ideal of truth. It is what we vaguely seek to realize not knowing in our ignorance that it is eternally realized in us.

G. R. MALKANI.

THE PROBLEM OF MIND IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT: A CRITICAL REVIEW.

The problem of mind and self is, in the opinion of the writer, the central problem in metaphysics. "Know thy self" was the maxim of Socrates. "Wonder," Aristotle said, "is the parent of philosophy." That is, no doubt, true about some philosophers. But there are others who take to philosophy not out of the purely theoretical interest 'to know for the sake of knowing,' but because they are more deeply interested in the concerns of their own selves. With them "the proper study of mankind is man." But this attitude is not to be regarded as identical with what is recently called "Humanism."

I am deeply convinced that the life we live depends to a very large extent upon the view we explicitly or implicitly hold about what we are. If, for instance, "dust thou art to dust returneth" were spoken of the soul as well, then surely it is but natural that one would mind more the bodily comforts and earthly pleasures. But if, on the other hand, the soul is regarded as something which persists in spite of the bodily death, then we would naturally hesitate thrice before we can give ourselves up to the mad pursuits of pleasures and merely physical comforts. I therefore propose to discuss briefly some of the characteristic theories of mind in contemporary thought, as their bearing upon our life and conduct appears to be very great.

There is also another reason for selecting this subject for the first session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. The characteristic feature of the teachings of the Hindus is the doctrine of *Ātman* or soul. They discerned the unity of the *Ātman* in everything. The Aryan civilisation was essentially

spiritualistic. But what a different picture do we find to-day ! Owing to the great influence upon us of the present-day materialistic civilisation of the West and also because of our own very hard struggle for existence, we, the present generation in India, are losing fast our hold upon our ancient spiritual heritage. It is for this reason also that I have selected this topic for discussion in this learned assembly, in the hope that the scholars assembled here would give their best thought to it and consider if there is any basis of truth in that ancient spiritual ideal of our life and civilisation.

The Hindus regarded the soul as a permanent eternal and unchangeable ultimate spiritual substance. It was conceived also almost in the same way at first in the West. The historical development of the doctrine in modern times is described by Prof. Hoernle thus :—Hume and Kant found in the field a metaphysical theory of the soul as an immaterial, spiritual substance, indivisible, self-identical, immortal. For this sort of soul they denied all empirical evidence or warrant. In its place Kant put the empirical ego, Hume 'the bundle of ideas,' rebaptised by James and other empirical idealists as the "stream of consciousness." Thus they inaugurated the era of psychology *without a soul*, "for which there is no soul or self which has experiences, which thinks, feels and wills. The experiences themselves, the feelings, thoughts and volitions, as they come and go, are all the soul there is." But contemporary thought in America tends to go still further. "What is the subject-matter of Psychology ?" asks Yerkes and replies : 'It is consciousness or the world of objects and events viewed as consciousness.' Here at least, the ordinary man may think, is something substantial to lay hold of. But just as he stretches out his hand, the prize is snatched away from his grasp by the *behaviourists*. Whilst most psychologists assure him that there is such a thing as consciousness and that by introspection he can perceive that it is there and what it is like, the strict behaviourist denies both consciousness and

introspection. He does not think it possible to find out what goes on inside a creature's mind. Hence he proposes to study the creature's behaviour in response to definite features of his environment. You say the creature has a mind? Well, there it is patently exhibited in its behaviour. What is the creature conscious of? What does it perceive or think? Look at what it does and to what objects of the environment it responds. Its consciousness is the cross-section of the environment composed of things to which the creature's central nervous system specifically reacts. Do you ask for a self or knower? There is the body. It is the knower and its specific response is knowing. Thus with the passing of the spiritual substance, we first got a "psychology without a soul," and now we are getting a psychology even without consciousness. *From spiritual substance to stream of consciousness, from stream of consciousness to cross-section of the universe defined by behaviour*—such are the vicissitudes which the mind has suffered at the hands of the students." Hoernle—(Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics.)

We thus come across some very astounding theories of mind and self in contemporary thought. Of these the cross-section theory of Holt is logically derived from Behaviourism, which again, is a biological theory. Let us therefore start our discussion with *the biological view of consciousness*. The biologists try to account for the origin and function of consciousness in this way: The organism, according to them, is a mechanism for reception of stimulus from environment and reaction thereto. This reaction or response at the lower levels of life is rather a simple one and is reflex and automatic. But with increasing complexity in the conditions of the environment, the simple mechanism of reflex and automatic response fails. It is at this stage that consciousness appears and through its various processes of perception, memory, imagination, emotion, volition, etc., helps the organism to make suitable response. "Memory and imagination are but half-way house

between stimulus and reaction ;" so writes Angell. The function of consciousness is thus " to delay the response " in order to make it more effective. If the organism fails to make such suitable adaptations it cannot live. Consciousness, therefore, is nothing ultimate but is a biological necessity.

Now it is, no doubt, true that in our struggle for existence we do require to adapt ourselves to circumstances and for that very purpose consciousness is very helpful to us. But that is not the only use of consciousness, at least in man. At the lower levels of animal life it may be true that consciousness has got the sole function of ' delaying the response. ' But when we come to man, in him at least we find certain types of activity, *e.g.*, logical judgment, reflective and aesthetic processes, which it is rather difficult to account for merely in the biological way. Man is an animal, no doubt. But he is always more than an animal. He is often found animated with aspirations and ideals which are worth cherishing for their own sake and not merely for their biological use.

Let us next pass on to Behaviourism.—According to this theory, mind or consciousness is to all intents and purpose identified with behaviour or response of the organism. Behaviourism originates in animal psychology and is gradually extended to the study of human mind. Introspection, according to this theory, is of doubtful validity and is all the more difficult to be used, the more the mind that we are studying is removed from our own. Moreover, it has got certain inherent difficulties of its own, for as soon as you assume the introspective attitude, the very mental state to which it is directed, becomes thereby transformed and transmuted. What passes on in the mind of the creature it is therefore impossible to grasp and to study. You want to study its mind? Well, it is patently exhibited in its behaviour. For scientific purposes, therefore, outward observation is the only means open to you and the mind is practically identified with behaviour. Psychology therefore, instead of engaging itself

in the fruitless task of investigation of consciousness, should study human and animal behaviour. And the behaviourist tries to account for it either by means of its physiological antecedents or at best by reference to instincts and habits. And from the nature of instincts the extreme behaviourists have purged off all traces of any mental element. Instincts are as purely physiological as habits, as much mechanical as the latter, or perhaps more. The point is that in the interpretation of behaviour there is felt no necessity for any mental factor. Even thinking is interpreted as a sort of behaviour in which habits of language play a very important part. "All that is observed and discovered is a certain set of habits in the use of words." The thoughts (if any) in the mind of the examinee are of no interest to the examiner, nor has the examiner any reason to suppose even the most successful examinee capable of even the smallest amount of thought." But all behaviourists do not hold such extreme view. Dr. McDougall, for instance, attempts to show that no adequate account of behaviour can be given without a reference to the mental factor, that intelligence and emotion, imagination and will have indeed much to do in determining the character of behaviour. But Prof. Watson holds fast to his position as tenaciously as ever.

Now behaviourism is simply the spectator-view of mind. It does not take you into the heart of the mental world. On the contrary, it shuts the door against it from outside. Introspection may not be so dark a horse as the behaviourists paint. It may be a difficult process, but that does not mean it is an impossible one or cannot be improved by practice. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to adequately account for the creative insight involved in the discoveries and inventions made by the great scientists and other geniuses in terms of extreme behaviourism. Again the part played by intelligence and imagination, farsight and foresight, in the making of plans for future action by the great generals of the world cannot also be denied, and these processes cannot indeed be identified with

mere behaviour. It is difficult therefore to follow the extreme behaviourists like Prof. Watson.

¶ *Next as to Holt's theory of consciousness:*— With the progress of the biological sciences, a new outlook is open to behaviourism. It is now more systematically conceived in the light of stimulus-response. The simple form of this response is reflex-action. But behaviour is not a simple reflex or aggregate of reflexes. It is something more. 'In the course of evolution from simple to more complex grades of being, there is exhibited always a novelty, a new feature, by things at the moment of their synthesis into an organised whole.' And in the course of biological evolution when the simple mechanisms of reflex actions are integrated into a *nervous system* we get a typical instance of such a novelty. Biologists have called it behaviour. Now if we think of behaviour as somehow consisting of reflex activities, we adopt what Holt calls the "bead theory" of physical causation. But if, instead of that, we note in studying behaviour, what the animal is doing—to what objects of the environment his actions are directed, we pass from the "bead theory" to the "functional theory." Now according to this functional theory of causation it will not do merely to enumerate the preceding states or antecedent conditions of animal behaviour, if we want to study it scientifically, but we must discover exactly to what objects of the environment his behaviour is directed. Behaviour is thus conceived to be the 'function' of some object, process or aspect of the objective environment. This, Holt says, is the crucial point. "Not quite adequately realised by the behaviourists, it is a 'terra totaliter incognita' to the subjectivists. And the proposition negates their whole gospel including specially the notion of consciousness." In behaviour there is thus involved a 'genuine objective reference' to the environment, which is not found in the inorganic or even in the organic world prior to the integrated nervous system. This is the novelty which characterises behaviour.

Now it is out of this novel feature in behaviour that Holt develops his characteristic theory of consciousness. Consciousness, according to him, is not behaviour but the "cross-section" of the universe defined by the objective reference involved in behaviour. And by 'cross-section' he means "any part collection that is defined by a law which is unrelated (or but remotely related) to the laws that define the whole in question." Thus a navigator while exploring his course at night by means of a search-light illuminates a considerable portion of the environment. Now the sum-total of objects so illuminated, say in the course of an entire night, constitutes a cross-section of the region in question. Similarly an organism equipped with a nervous system is found to specifically respond to certain features of the environment. And the group of things and features to which the organism specifically responds constitutes a "cross-section manifold" which is of vital importance to the organism itself. Now, if we are to look for consciousness, we must look for it here in this cross-section and nowhere else. Consciousness is thus not to be found within the brain, nor even in behaviour, but in the collection of objects selected and referred to by behaviour. It is the "cross-section of the universe defined by the specific response of the organism equipped with a central nervous system." Consciousness, according to this theory, is thus neither a substance nor even a quality but simply a relation, though a specific relation. It is not an entity beside other entities of the universe. One and the same entity may enter into different relations. In one relation it is an object in the space-time system; in another relation it becomes the content of consciousness, *i.e.*, becomes a part of the cross-section, when it is specifically responded to by the organism.)

Now New Realism as a philosophic movement arises as a reaction against traditional idealism, the central thesis of which is the subjectivity of mind and its constitutive function in the making of the universe. "Esse est percipi." "Understanding

maketh nature." Such are the maxims of Idealism. But the dictum of Realism is "experiencing does not make any difference to the object experienced." Realism charges Idealism with what it calls "ego-centric predicament," which, it is said, is the characteristic fallacy of all idealistic theory. It is no wonder, therefore, that the new Realists in America cannot bear the slightest taint of subjectivism and are out to destroy all shades of it. This is why they offer a theory of consciousness in terms of the collection of objects defined by behaviour. The only trace of the subjective element, if there be any at all, is to be found in the behaviour or specific response of the organism. (But it is obvious that neither the specific response nor the collection of objects defined thereby can be said to constitute consciousness in the true sense of the term. Response is a physiological process while consciousness is not so. Again, no one would agree to identify consciousness with the objects responded to, unless one would like to abolish the distinction between consciousness and its object. And it is clear, as Prof. Laird points out, that all the objects of which we have consciousness have at least one peculiar circumstance in common, *viz.*, they all *appear*. It is this fact of 'appearance' or 'givenness' which the new Realists have totally failed to grasp. Now the fact that a thing *appears* implies that it appears to something and this can be only when that something is an *apprehending subject*. Now this apprehending subject is as indispensable for consciousness as its objects. Again, Holt's theory has often been described as the "Search-light" theory. But the most important aspect of the "Search-light," *viz.*, the fact of *illumination* is indeed ignored by him while one of its secondary effects, *viz.*, the fact of selection, has been emphasised. Further, it is very difficult to explain in a satisfactory manner the characteristic unity of the mental life and also such peculiar modes of consciousness as attention, volition and especially feelings and emotion, according to this theory.) Holt's laborious attempt to account for them in terms of certain bodily processes practically

tends to *explain them away*, for obviously he fails to grasp what is peculiar and characteristic in these particular modes of consciousness.

British Realism: Prof. Alexander's theory of mind.—But all modern realists do not hold such extreme view with regard to consciousness. When we come to the camp of the British Realists we invariably find that they all admit the importance of the subjective element. They may not and indeed do not regard mind to be an ultimate entity; but they all admit the existence of it as an empirical subjective process which occurs in vital correlation with the operations of the nervous system. Thus Prof. Alexander offers a theory of mind as a new quality which is found to emerge at a certain stage of evolution when the primal stuff of "Space-Time" motion has attained a certain degree of complexity. At a lower stage of such complexity 'life' appears and at a higher stage 'mentality' comes upon the scene. Both are new qualities and may indeed be called only '*secondary*.' For all bits of 'Space-Time' do not possess them, as they possess, for instance, materiality or impenetrability which is a primary quality. Even the organism, that complexity of S. T. which possesses the new qualities both of life and mind—does not possess 'mentality' in all its parts; it is only one portion of it, *viz.*, the nervous system, that is found to possess mind. Mind, therefore, according to Alexander, is simply a quality of the nervous system. At each level of evolution a new quality appears and there is a "hierarchy of qualities." Prof. Alexander's theory of mind is thus vitally connected with this doctrine of 'hierarchy of qualities.' Now this mind, empirically considered, is found to consist of the totality of the mental acts of awareness, which it is said to 'enjoy' or immediately experience; while it can 'contemplate' and thereby *know* other objects of lower degree of complexity than its own. Mind thus can 'enjoy' its own states and processes but cannot 'contemplate' them. Now there is nothing particular about the cognitive relation; it is only a special mode of the universal

relation of 'compresence,' which subsists amongst all finite objects of the universe; and its special character, if any, simply lies in the fact that one of the compresent terms here is mind.

This, in short, is Prof. Alexander's view of mind. There is nothing, as Prof. Broad remarks, sacrosanct about it. It is not the first in the order of evolution but the last, though it may be the highest stage, so far as the present universe goes. (But if this mind can only 'enjoy' its own processes and cannot 'contemplate' them, the question arises, how can we *know* them? Is not introspection the only mode of ascertaining their nature and relations? But Prof. Alexander maintains that in the introspective attitude there follows a change in the being of the process; it 'exists in a blurred and subtly dissected form.' And this is only a mode of being and not of knowing. That being so, it is extremely difficult to see how Prof. Alexander himself could discover 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' to be the functions of the mind and *distinguish* between them.) If not through introspection, through what process Alexander does not say. It will not do to say that 'enjoyment' is a mode of knowing distinct from 'contemplation.' For it is indeed difficult just to ascertain, as Broad points out, what is Alexander's meaning here—whether enjoyment is to be interpreted as a mere mode of being or also as a mode of knowing. But Alexander says that in 'enjoyment' there is not involved the duality of subject and object which is the essential feature of the knowing situation. In view of this it is difficult to interpret 'enjoyment' as a mode of knowing. Moreover, even if it be supposed to be a sort of *implicit* knowing, in which the subject-object distinction has not as yet become explicit, that will not obviate the difficulty in question; for to say that 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' are two distinct functions of the mind, is to *know* them as objects of our experience, which are *distinguishable* from each other; and surely such knowing is not *implicit* knowing. Again, if 'compresence' be the essence of contemplation and therefore

of knowing, to say that one of the compresent terms here must be mind, is to go beyond the doctrine of compresence and to admit the *special function* of mind in knowing. Further, how to account for the knowing of other minds according to this 'compresence' theory? Here Alexander seems to emphasise the factor of social intercourse and to hold that such knowledge of other minds is based upon "an assurance eked out by sympathetic imagination." And this obviously is again going beyond the 'compresence' theory. Again, if mind can contemplate and thereby know only the objects and qualities of the 'space-time' complex of a *lower* order than its own, how is it possible for Alexander to know the next *higher* qualities "in the hierarchy that are yet to be, e.g., deity?"

But over and above these difficulties regarding the functions of the mind, there appears to be another of a more fundamental character. Mr. Lloyd Morgan in his recently published book "Emergent Evolution" has worked out a theory of evolution purely on a scientific basis in which he acknowledges the emergence of a new quality at each 'critical turning points.' Mind is such a new quality. And this we see is what Prof. Alexander maintains. His standpoint is also purely empirical and scientific. Hence these new qualities have been described as 'empirically discoverable but not open to metaphysical explanation.' It is not the business of the 'scientific' philosopher to try to explain them, but simply to accept them as they are found "with a natural piety." Hence the old trouble to try to account for mind as being evolved out of matter does not reappear here. Whatever our ultimate view may be with regard to the position of mind in the universe, it does not surely come before us in the animal world before a certain definite level is reached in the course of evolution. So far we can follow Alexander and to his credit it must be said that unlike some other modern realists he does not try to reduce mind to something which obviously it is not. He has had to acknowledge it as a novel feature which stands on a different footing

from his 'Space-Time' complexes. But my difficulty arises when, it appears to me, in flagrant contradiction to this account of emergent evolution, at the time of discussing the status of the quality, sometimes he says that qualities are "at once new and expressible without residue in terms of the processes proper to the level from which they emerge." The difficulty appears to be all the greater when he discusses the relation of the new quality of mentality with the nervous system. In certain passages it is indeed very difficult to follow Prof. Alexander here.

"That which as experienced from the inside or enjoyed is a conscious process, is as experienced from the outside or contemplated a neural one" (Space, Time and Destiny II, page 5). "A neural process of a certain level of development possesses the quality of consciousness and is thereby a mental process, and alternately a mental process is also a vital one of a certain order" (pp. 5 & 6). "There are not two processes, one neural and the other mental, but one" (p. 9). Does it not seem that Prof. Alexander sometimes feels inclined to identify the two? This appears to be his meaning particularly when we remember that by such means he wants to avoid both parallelism and interactionism. Is there not working in Alexander's mind an unconscious tendency to fit in his theory of mind with his original 'Space-Time' scheme? Indeed it is extremely difficult to follow Alexander here.

But can we not in any way "save the soul" (not of course in the theological sense)? Is there no basis for regarding the soul as a substantial reality which exists by its own right and not merely dependent on other things of the world? Even in the West we find a number of philosophers, though otherwise belonging to different philosophic schools, join hands together to "save the soul" in the midst of the very loud and vociferous cry from a whole host of contemporary thinkers to banish it up from the fields of philosophy and existence. Thus Prof. Hoernle in his interesting book already referred to, attempts

THE QUEST OF TRUTH

Much has been said and written on the noble function of truth ; yet there is a considerable amount of looseness in our conception. This is due to a certain ambiguity in the meaning of truth. There is no knowing whether truth means an entity existing independently by itself or whether it refers to a quality attaching to some modes of our cognition.

On simple inspection the problem resolves itself into 3 well-marked stages : •

- (1) Truth as it is in itself ; a simple timeless, independent Real, sometimes called a fact, a real or a logical proposition.
- (2) Truth as it stands related to mind, *viz.*, the fact as mirrored in mind and
- (3) The judgment that mind makes regarding this content of consciousness, *viz.*, that it is identical with the same fact as exists independently of mind.

Do these different stages all mean one and the same thing ? If so, there is no real difference between truth as it is in itself and truth as it is known. The known truth and the unknown truth become thoroughly interchangeable. How the known and the unknown should appear comparable we do not understand.

Again if it is held that there is real difference in these 3 stages, we have a new problem before us. For we have to ask more definitely which one of these 3 stages constitutes the real truth. Does the essential feature of truth come out in the first stage alone when it enjoys its sacred isolation, and does it suffer in point of integrity and wholesomeness as it enters in combination with mind ? Or is truth realised more

concretely when it stands related to mind and forms the content of an act of judgment?

These are important questions, and whichever way we try to answer them insuperable difficulties arise. In one sense, it appears that the question of 'true' or 'false' arises only in connection with human interests. A fact in itself, which is as good as a pure colourless logical proposition, stands outside the domain of "true" or "false", so long as nobody judges upon it. To be true or false it must be judged psychologically, *i.e.*, there must be some one putting forward a definite claim that it is true and its truth gets firmly established along with the verification of this claim. This makes it plain that the problem of truth arises only in connection with an act of judgment; yet we cannot say that the truth of the judgment depends on the judgment itself. A judgment may be free from logical contradiction and it may be inspired by the most intense emotional fervour, yet it may not turn out to be true. Its truth finally rests upon its verification and the surest test of its verification lies in its conformity to the objective fact. The judgment is true not because of itself but because of the restraining influence to which it is subjected by the extramental fact. And so whenever we talk of truth our eyes are invariably cast upon 'this extra territorial region.' But this 'extra territorial' or rather the extramental character of truth leads to other difficulties. If truth were really to signify an entity that has no connection with mind, we should never get to know of it at all. It would ever remain hidden from us. That being so, we fail to understand how we should characterise it as a fact or an event. Nor could anybody say whether it has any existence at all.

We are really swayed by twofold impulses. On the one hand we recognise the necessity of admitting the knowableness of truth. For us, truth is made real simply when we judge and accept it as truth. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that truth as truth must enjoy a supremacy that is quite

unique and not derived out of anything else. It must be independent of what we know or feel and in its independence should constitute the inflexible authority by which all our knowing and doing must be regulated. In one and the same moment we are forced to declare that truth must be related to mind and yet be independent of it.

It may be said that a way out of the difficulties is suggested by the correspondence theory of truth. The quality of trueness, *viz.*, that which makes a thing true is neither a part of our thought or experience, nor a part of the other reality to which our thought refers, but is rather a relation between our thought and its chosen object, between our idea of judgment and the thing which it means. And this relation is simply one of correspondence.

The copying theory of truth, it seems, has an air of simplicity that makes it so very attractive, yet a moment's inspection reveals fatal defects that can be hardly remedied. Truth according to this theory, essentially consists in the capacity of our ideas to copy or resemble the objective facts. The commonest objection as to how an idea should resemble something that is not itself an idea may be put off for a while. Even a greater difficulty assails us when an explanation is demanded as to how or why the copy should have the claim to constitute truth when the original had none. If our ideas by their resembling objective facts make up truth, this becomes intelligible only on the assumption that these original facts in themselves constituted truth. It is only when we acknowledge the trueness of the original that its copy can have any claim to be true. The copying theory thus virtually throws us back into the pure objective notice of truth that has been already found wanting.

But the copying theory, it will be said, is but a poor specimen of the correspondence theory.

The main significance of the correspondence notion lies in the promise it holds out of obviating the difficulties of an onesided subjective or an equally onesided objective notion of

truth. Truth is the correspondence of the two facts,—the subjective and the objective or rather the mental and the real, so the theory tells us. When put in this abstract fashion it inevitably suggests a number of subsidiary issues that should be stated at the outset.

There are two distinct ways of explaining the fact of correspondence. In one case the correspondence is supposed to be real by itself without any co-operation of mind. In the other case it becomes real only when mind has knowledge of both the factors and through that knowledge becomes aware of the existence of such correspondence. Let us examine the second case first. A judgment is said to be true when the order of thoughts that make up the judgment correspond to the order of facts that make up the real situation. The judgment in this case is supposed to fulfil a twofold function. It thinks of the real and knows at the same time that the real is just as it is being thought of. The mental factor, *vis.*, the judgment is supposed to over-reach the other factor, *i.e.*, this other factor as well as the thought are supposed to be introduced before mind by this judging function in such a way that the mind at once recognises the fact of their correspondence. It is precisely in the moment of our recognising this correspondence that truth comes into being.

Such an account of truth, the critic will suggest, is not the vindication of truth but just the opposite of it. For, if truth were to depend on our recognition of correspondence between thought on one side and reality on the other, such recognition can never take place and so truth can never be a reality for us. To recognise that thought corresponds to reality, we must have both of them side by side. But this speedily leads us to a hopeless *impasse*. Thought and reality cannot be got apart and consequently the doctrine of their correspondence has in the end no meaning.

And so this leads us to the former view. Thought and reality may not be got apart and we may not know, in any

particular case, whether they correspond but that does not prevent them from corresponding. Truth is their correspondence. We do not make the correspondence and we may not know it, yet it exists there independently by itself.

The fact that we know truth or may know it at all is quite a matter of fact affair. It has no necessary connection with the making of the real essence of truth. A truth neither gains nor loses by being known.

On the basis of this supposition that 'experiencing makes no difference to truths,' some of the modern intuitionist Realists have devoted their attention to a discussion as to the nature of truth. In every form of knowledge, perceptual or conceptual, there is a real element given to us. No doubt this real, as we experience it, is always given in relation to our apprehension and always in conjunction or combination with much that is the work of mind. Nevertheless it is possible by an analysis of our sentient experience to separate out the indubitably real from that which is superimposed upon it. This indubitably real forms along with others, peculiar types of complexes, each being a simple whole by itself. Truth is an inherent quality of these complexes, constituting their distinctive flavour, as it were. And we become intuitively aware of this flavour just as we immediately appreciate the flavour of a pine-apple.

In this position we have two things to consider. Truth is said to be an independent entity. But this truth, though existing by itself may also form the content of an apprehending mind. In that moment we have apprehension of truth. Here the independent truth comes in contact with mind and forms another complex which has all the character of simplicity like other complexes. But in coming in contact with mind neither factor in any way interferes with the other. The truth complex always maintains its integrity and independence even while entering into another complex which is its apprehension. There is no necessary influencing of the one by the other.

It is a bold undertaking no doubt, to offer such a simple matter of fact explanation of the two irreconcilable aspects of the truth problem. It acknowledges quite frankly the knowableness of truth. Yet at the same time it urges that experiencing a truth does in no way affect the intrinsically independent character of truth. How the purely independent entity called truth should enter into connection with an experiencing mind and yet retain its independence, we do not understand.

It can enter into union with mind and mind can take cognisance of it only when we assume that there is an inward affinity between it and mind. But such an essential relatedness between mind and truth does violence to the independent character of truth. A remedy is suggested by introducing the notion of pure external relations.

The chief difficulty that troubles us here is to understand how two or more simples when drawn together should retain their independence and yet be a whole. If the simples retain their independence there is no real whole. And in that event we have mind on one side competent to generate experience and an independent entity called truth on the other; but we can never say that we have an experience which is the experience of a truth. If on the other hand it be said that the relation really unites and constitutes one whole in place of two simples, the *relata* thus united are so much not absolutely independent simples, but independent features of a whole.

Thus the attempt of these modern intuitional Realist, though inspired by laudable motives, does not appear to have borne any satisfactory result. To hold that truth is knowable it is necessary to recognise its essential relatedness to mind. To demur to the latter and yet to adhere to the former involves a miraculous operation for which we are not yet prepared.

The thing is that so long as we are carried away by an exclusively static notion of truth, so long as we regard it as an entity completely independent and severed from mind there is

no way of exit out of the maze. Both intuitionism and correspondence theory go to wreck simply because of this.

Nor does pragmatism open up any better prospects in this respect. It has undoubtedly done a great service by emphasising the concrete human aspect of truth and repudiating the notion of 'discarnate truth.' Nevertheless by its enunciation of the principle of "workableness" as the test of truth it has either made its position ambiguous or committed the same mistake which it sought to avoid. It is not definitely clear whether the pragmatists use the notion of workableness as a mere test of truth or also as constituting the essence of truth. To apply the test of "workableness" involves the question of an end. But how are we to conceive of the end? Does it not stand foreign to the means and decide what can be workable and what cannot be? In that event truth is determined by something which in reality is not in the same line with truth. We are not sure from the pragmatists' point of view whether truth has got the capacity to serve because it is truth or whether it becomes true through its capacity for service.

But to avoid the difficulties of an external standard the pragmatists might seek to put a more liberal interpretation upon the term 'workableness.' Workableness does not imply the fitness of an idea to serve a foreign end, but it only signifies the fitness of an idea to serve itself in the way of its own self clarification. An idea is said to 'work' when the links of experience sequent upon the idea form a completely harmonious whole, each implying and being implied by the other. If this is the real sense of pragmatism it seems to be but a mere echo of what the idealists are preaching.

It is clear from the above that anything that starts with a purely objective notion of truth or seeks to measure truth by a standard that stands entirely foreign to it, is fore-doomed to failure. Whatever may be said of truth, truth cannot be anything other than itself nor can it be tested by something that

is not of a piece with truth. It is an all-inclusive whole and, in this sense, remains identical with the fulness and being. It was simply the neglect of this point that wrecked most of the theories we noticed above.

'We must accept,' to quote Bradley, the claim of truth not to be judged from the outside. We must unhesitatingly assert that truth, if it were satisfied itself and if for itself it were perfect, would be itself in the fullest sense the entire and absolute universe.' Two things are implied in this :

1. It means that truth must realise itself completely through every nook and corner of reality. Not a single fact, item, or event that happens, can stand outside Reality or mean an addition to it by a mere external juxtaposition. In other words, truth is a real whole, a whole that has parts, but the parts do not cling to the whole by an adventitious accretion. They are already in the whole and necessitated by the whole. The whole is an all-embracing whole and truth is the realisation of this inner harmony of elements in the relationship of whole and part.

2. Closely connected with this there comes the other important feature that truth must be a completely *significant whole*. Nothing short of this can be truth. A significant whole expresses a whole that is intelligible through the parts and the parts through the whole.

Truth is not simply identical with reality considered in abstraction but it is the fulness of knowledge in which alone reality consists.

Such an identification of knowledge and reality is necessitated by the very nature of reality. To say that reality is an all-containing whole of elements that reciprocally involve one another implies that it is of a piece with consciousness. For, nothing but consciousness can illustrate the type of unity spoken of. The different orders of unity with which we are familiar in the physical universe are regarded unities only by

courtesy. There is nowhere that internal determination of the whole by the parts or the parts by the whole. Even when the elements come together and undergo some amount of transformation to form into a whole as is illustrated in the case of an organism, they do not get incorporated completely in the life of the whole. They retain their independence and externality to a considerable extent. But consciousness illustrates a type of unity in which all the elements cohere in such a close and intimate way that there is no externality in them. Every part is in the other. It is only through the reciprocity of the parts that we get a whole and again it is only in reference to the whole that the parts can even appear as part.

But it is not enough to say that consciousness expresses the nature of the real. To fulfil itself completely the real must advance beyond the stage of simple consciousness. Consciousness in so far as it appears as a mere immediacy of the feeling does not adequately bring out the life of the real; because through feeling the real does not realise itself as a completely significant whole. An entire system of knowledge alone suffices to illustrate how the real is constituted, for it is only in connection with such a system that it becomes possible to understand how anyone single unit carries with it the implication of every other unit, thereby of the whole wherein they cohere. Truth means the organisation of such a system of knowledge in which lies embedded the life of the real.

But immediately we shall be pestered with questions. Was our sketch intended as an exposition of truth as it is for human knowledge? Or were we describing an ideal exposition which no finite mind can ever actually enjoy?

But this involves a real misunderstanding of the entire problem of knowledge. The process of knowledge starts with formation of judgments. And we are too prone to regard a judgment as a datum of knowledge, clearly conceivable and thoroughly unshakable, floating, with its clear cut boundaries

like an island in the midst of an ocean. Out of a vague sensational back-ground, that is bereft of all cognitive value, intellect weaves out 'a perfectly ordered and consummated piece of experience.' In a second moment we may make another judgment but the second judgment is only an addition by the side of the first. Neither of them is in any way affected by the other. Each judgment constitutes a block with boundaries sharply fixed. There is no inner determination of the one by the other. Not only each judgment stands by itself having no necessary connection with another but our judgments, as a class, being products of rational mediation, are supposed to be radically distinct from the 'immediacy' of the 'given.' "The given" as given, lack all cognitive formation. The judgment, on the contrary, is shot through with the fulness of intellectual comprehension. They stand sharply opposed, neither of them having any inner affinity with the other. A theory of knowledge that starts with such a sharp antithesis between the 'manifold of sense' and 'understanding' cannot but adhere to the fragmentary and piecemeal character of knowledge. Knowledge begins, according to it, quite abruptly and ends in a quite abrupt manner.

To explain knowledge in this way is fraught with huge difficulties and these become manifest as soon as we begin to examine the situation more closely. If the 'manifold of sense' were to constitute an utterly discontinuous heap and on that score absolutely blind and unmeaning, it is difficult to understand how the intellect should summon them to order, so as to endow them with fulness of meaning. The elements of sensibility being purely discontinuous, the principle of continuity under which they are subsumed, would serve only as their external apparel and fail to touch or transform their inner core. And without such inner transformation it is futile to hope that these originally blind and discontinuous elements could suddenly be found shining with significance. If the principle of the continuity should render them intelligible at all, it can do it only by

affecting their inner being and this could never be possible unless the elements themselves were naturally disposed to this. The very fact that the principle of continuity succeeds in regularising them, at once disposes of the supposition that they were in themselves naturally discontinuous.

The truth is, there is never a stage in our mental life that can be characterised as consisting of a series of discrete shocks of sensibility. "The given," from the very moment it enters consciousness is already a related whole. "Every individual element belongs to consciousness only through its union with other elements." But the continuity that prevails does not establish itself after the elements are given. Rather on the contrary, it is only because of the relational continuity that the elements can even appear in consciousness. A study of the nature of sensations at once reveals the utter hopelessness of experiencing any simple and independent sensation by itself. It shows that the principle of continuity must have been at work even before we come across any discontinuities. And to the extent there is continuity in the moment of so-called sensibility, to that extent it is definitely cognised.

Yet it can never be said that the knowing process has fulfilled itself completely at this stage. In the same moment that we know it as an ordered whole, new elements of discontinuities crop up and with renewed vigour the struggle for overcoming them ensues. In this way every judgment necessitates another and the full comprehension of any judgment involves comprehension of all the rest. At no moment we have a clear cut single isolated judgment before our consciousness. Knowledge is an endless process. It has no abrupt beginning nor any abrupt terminus. It moves on for ever from the full to the full. It is therefore preposterous to distinguish absolute knowledge from relative knowledge. There is no question of absoluteness or relativity in the sphere of knowledge.

If knowledge were to have a clear cut beginning and to rise abruptly through the functioning of intellect upon the

discontinuous heap of sensibility, the process becomes quite an arbitrary and contingent one. We see no reason why the intellect should descend down at all from its divine place of peace and repose and transmute the dull unintelligible materials of sense with which it had no previous connection. To suppose that knowledge is really such an arbitrary concern of intellect is not to explain knowledge but to cut the very ground on which the validity of knowledge rests.

Knowledge is a process that in one aspect appears to be co-extensive with life and its real value rests on the fact that it springs necessarily from life and offers satisfaction to it. If we agree with the philosopher that wonder is the beginning of knowledge we must nevertheless add that without presupposing knowledge, there can be no feeling of wonder. If life itself were full of discontinuities there could be no occasion for wonder nor again could wonder ever arise if life were a finished rationalised whole. From the very beginning it is a continuous whole, and yet presenting discontinuities that alone can stimulate the flow of knowledge. Knowledge is real and has a necessary valid claim to express life because it has neither beginning nor end. It is this absolutely necessary character of knowledge that makes it co-eternal with life and it is only in this sense that knowledge enjoys the pre-eminent claim to embody truth.

The desire to see life as a rounded whole finds an outlet in the activity of the knowing function. But will knowledge ever succeed in comprehending life altogether? or will truth ever realise itself completely in knowledge?

The answer is not plain. The problem suggests and assumes as if knowledge could ever become a perfectly realised system so as to give us an exhaustive expression of life. From the very nature of knowledge this seems impossible. Knowledge that has exhausted itself and has no further contradiction to overcome is the very stagnation and death of knowledge. It is valid only as a process and as a process it



continually meets conflicts and obstacles, and seeks to overcome them.

Knowledge therefore cannot picture life as a completely harmonious whole, because it is itself perpetually suffering from conflicts and contradictions. This creates suspicion, if our initial assumption that life is a completely ordered whole be not a mistake.

Perhaps in the very heart of Being there dwells an element of discord that ever and anon pushes itself forward and baffles all our attempts to comprehend it. The fact that knowledge is for ever unfinished may be connected with the fact that Being itself is not ready made but still incomplete. Perhaps Being also conceals simultaneous discords in itself which make it impossible to construct an harmonious whole.

But does this not amount to giving way to scepticism? To admit that life contains an essentially irrational element in its inner core is to declare the utter bankruptcy of knowledge. It seems, the sceptic by his scoffing attitude has an advantage over the idealist because he can always taunt the latter with the limitation and unfinished character of knowledge.

But even with this advantage the negative attitude finds no abiding place in life. It is held in check in twofold ways. Though knowledge cannot reach the stage of finality, the very fact that it progresses continually forward and overcomes every discord that meets on the way is enough to spell out the gloom of scepticism. In addition to this there is also the other factor that operates from within life itself. If life harbours discords, it is only because it wants to triumph over them and not to give way to them. This inward struggle of life finds expression, in one way as we have seen, in the growth of knowledge.

But a mere idle faith in the possibilities of knowledge is not adequate to satisfy life. It has evolved other, and probably more effective, ways of realising its inward longing for harmony and continuity. Every piece of discord that torments life

must be overcome and that not by knowledge alone but by will as well. The process of knowledge is often of a protracted nature, it follows a zig-zag course, but life demands immediate action. By our action we shall dash aside every element of discord. The apparent limitation of knowledge need not keep us down. We postulate then that in our will we have a more powerful engine for overcoming discontinuities and thereby realising a deeper value of life than is possible through knowledge.

But morality also has its own limitation. A genuine good will is sometimes balked off its mission of organising a higher order of beauty and symmetry. Moral catastrophies are of a more disquieting nature than temporary intellectual defeats. Nevertheless life continues singing its own tune. It remains steady and unhinged in its fulcrum of motion.

It is neither knowledge nor morality that can really secure this steadiness for life. On the contrary the amount of steadiness they enjoy proceed wholly from life.

One may say that life realises its inward strength and steadiness through spiritual endeavour; for spiritual struggle postulates a *Finality* that has no element of uncertainty in it. Consciousness of this *Finality* constitutes the surest sheet anchor for life.

In the intellectual and the moral plane we have to carry on a struggle which we only hope to do successfully. But we have no sense of absolute security as to how far this cherished hope of ours shall be fulfilled.

The case is far otherwise in the case of spiritual endeavour. Here the struggle commences with the surest conviction that it shall terminate successfully. There is only the semblance of a struggle, its inner life having fled away through the abiding consciousness of sure victory. It is only at this stage that we become free from every element of suspense and anxiety that in one way or other afflicts the moral and intellectual life.



We may therefore characterise the spiritual life as a life of real freedom and it is only through this sense of freedom that life returns to its inmost depth. Neither the moral struggle nor the intellectual striving can ever lead us to this. They can represent it, if at all, only in a symbolic way. But in the moment of our spiritual exercise we are awakened into the full glory and richness of Life. Here we have a direct vision of truth such as can never find expression in knowledge or morality.

Yet we must not undervalue our moral or intellectual life. The faith that stands behind these struggles is a symbol of that real faith that is born in the moment of spiritual consciousness. Further that transcendental or "over-individual" will that drives us to a life of spiritual endeavour presupposes a long period of discipline and training that is covered by the moral and the intellectual effort. The spiritual consciousness is but the sublimated expression of life wherein all moral and intellectual struggles find their fullest consummation.

JITENDRA KUMAR CHAKRAVARTY

INTEREST AND INTERPRETATION.

In the first state of life-manifestation "knowing" appears to us as a form of activity, which consists simply in the life's struggle to adapt itself to its surroundings. The life process as a whole is one of uninterrupted adjustment and readjustment to its environment. Life is grasped, here, "in the mutuality or reciprocity of its environment". There is an inward push or "appetition" in the life process which manifests itself uniquely as a reaction in a process of adjustment. This reaction is possible only on account of the irritability or sentiency in the life in contact with its surroundings. This sentiency is the very "lever of action and reaction". It is immediately correlated, in the beings of the lower order, with the direct present needs of the organism. The various kinds of reactions of the organisms in accordance with the various kinds and degrees of sentiency, of pleasure and pain, or rather of comfortable and uncomfortable positions of the organisms in their immediate surroundings, serve as a clue to the nature of things around us. Life as a whole is a world of aims and desires, of needs and interests, although it is not always conscious of them; the reactions, therefore, are also not made deliberately, at least in the beginning of the life-manifestation. The interest at this stage of life, which underlies all the actions of the organism, consists only in the maintenance and continuance of life. In the drooping of the leaves of the sensitive plant, the curling of the tentacles of the sundew, the orientation of the plants and animals towards light, and similar other movements towards or away from the source of stimulation, which are generally known as tropisms, such as chemotaxis, geotaxis, thigmotaxis, etc., or when, "after a short period of starvation, an amoeba moves about more actively than usual, whereas

when it is gorged with food it becomes sluggish" or again when it "*avoids* things which are injurious and *seeks* things which are beneficial and adapts its behaviour to new conditions", we become acquainted with nothing but the principle of life-maintenance and continuance based chiefly on a kind of selective process.

Again, when we rise a little higher in the scale of the animal kingdom, we meet with a more complicated sort of reactions, commonly known as instinct. According to Bergson, the instinct is nothing but the "prolongation" of the vital impulse. "When the little chick" says he, "is breaking its shell with a peck of its beak, it is acting by instinct, and yet it does but carry on the movement which has borne it through embryonic life". Instinct as well as the other simpler reactions proceed "organically". "They find the appropriate instrument at hand", as Bergson says, but this "instrument forms a part of the body that uses *it*"; and corresponding to this instrument, there is an instinct that "*knows* how to use it." In all the various kinds of instinctive actions there goes on all the time a process of selection and this very selection is dependent on the needs and interests of the organism. This selective activity is well manifested when a chick searches for the worm as its food which it selects from many different varieties of worms or when birds select a little bit of straw, thread or clay for building their particular kinds of nest. This selective process is guided by a kind of sentiency in accordance with the specific needs of life. As these organisms are not possessed of conscious deliberation which generally delays reactions, instinct and other simpler responses act immediately; *i.e.*, "directly", to quote Bergson, "by creating an organised instrument to work with". Intellect, on the other hand, "acts indirectly through an organism, which, instead of possessing the required instrument naturally, will itself construct it by fashioning inorganic matter" and therefore proceed, according to Bergson, "mechanically". Instinct and intelligence, says

he, "represent two *divergent* solutions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem". Thus he thinks that they both are different forms of knowledge—"in the case of instinct this knowledge is rather *acted* and unconscious, while in the case of intelligence, it is *thought* and conscious." It follows from this that the act of adjustment in the lower animal kingdom at any rate is direct and not mediated by any intellectual process. In other words, knowing and acting form one unified whole as there is no necessity for an intervening medium to stand between them. Their knowledge does neither consist of clear perception nor of conception, but of what Bergson calls a "confused sense of the striking quality or of resemblance". It means that the animals have only a sense for the qualities in the things that satisfy their needs. "To this discernment of the useful", says Bergson, "the perception of the animals is, in most cases, confined." "It is grass in general which attracts the herbivorous animal: the colour and the smell of grass, felt and experienced as forces, are the sole immediate data of its external perception." The organisms, specially of the lowest kind, such as amoeba, are sensible to the resemblance, says Bergson, but not to the difference, in the various organic substances which it can assimilate; and the need goes straight to the resemblance or quality. This need of the organism and the "quality" in the environment that removes the need are not consciously perceived or thought, but felt and lived. This sense for the "useful" is immediately followed by the act of adjustment in a needed way. All the movements of the organism are co-ordinated in such a way as to grasp only what is useful. But these movements are not effected by a conscious volition, although they are directed towards realising certain ends. Hence all the actions of the animals are unconsciously purposive but not consciously volitional. Knowledge, therefore, at this stage of life-manifestation consists simply in sensing the "useful" and in taking possession of it for the maintenance of life. Life is, here, more a *doer and an*

enjoyer than a knower. Or we might better say that the knowing aspect of life coincides entirely with that of its doing and enjoying.

Here we might meet with some objection regarding the existence of consciousness in the lower organisms. The ability to learn, or associative memory, is most widely adopted at the present time as the criterion of consciousness. Loeb, Bethe, Bohn and others have adopted this standpoint. Romanes and Lloyd Morgan, while recognising it as indicative of the presence of consciousness, "hesitate to draw the conclusion that consciousness is absent in those animals which are devoid of associative memory." "If I am pricked by a needle", says Holmes, "I am acutely conscious. The feeling of pain is aroused very directly, and it is difficult to see how it can be dependent in any way on associative memory." It is thus a disputed question as to whether consciousness is to be ascribed to the lower organisms. But, even if we hesitate to ascribe consciousness to the lower organisms we can at least say with Hering and Samuel Buler and Richard Semon, that the organism as a store house of the knowledge of the species rather than the mind of the animal is making the response. We may thus regard these various kind of responses as an adjusting knowledge, the roots of which are, of course, to be found in the organic structure. It follows from this, then, that long before individual experience has begun to furnish the material for conscious will, the body was acting as the agent of a life-activity in a truly adaptive fashion and thus betraying a nearness to the highest type of adjustment known, *viz.*, volitional. Thus we might say that the first form of knowing through which a glimpse of reality can be obtained consists simply in "living", for it manifests itself only in being "lived". "In other words, knowledge, here, is equal to life-activity itself."

The knowledge of the organisms at this state of life is very limited. They know only their own world in which their specific interests are centered. Thus an amoeba's world is

different from a dog's world and a dog's from a bird's, and so on. Thus knowledge of the particular kind of world depends upon the specific interest of the organism. But the interest become more and more diversified as we advance higher and higher in the scale of life-manifestation. In the beginning, life simply tries to adapt itself to environment, as we find in the lower organisms, such as the amoeba; but in the comparatively higher stages of life, such as birds, bees, etc., we become acquainted with the fact that besides adapting themselves simply to their environments, they also adapt their environments to themselves to some extent, to satisfy their own needs of life, as we find, for example, in the building of nests and in the construction of hives. The more numerous and diversified the needs and interests of life, the more the organisms try to possess, as it were, the different surroundings to satisfy the necessities of life. In this way, it is not only the organism which grows and develops but also its environment. The appearance of mind is attended with an enlarging of the environment and certain new types of adjustment.

It is generally held that sensations are the first results produced in the mind by the external forces and are, therefore, looked upon as materials of knowledge received passively from outside and formed into an object later on. In the hands of the present-day philosophers and psychologists, however, sensations have lost their passive character and are regarded more as "emotional and practical rather than as cognitive and intellectual." Thus when we see a chair, "we instantly react to it as a single object. The reaction itself is a unifying act." It has four legs and a seat, yet we do not see each of the legs as a separate thing. "On the contrary," says Angell, "our immediate response is the consciousness of a single object." Thus we see that the unity is imposed somehow by us on the total presentation which is subsequently broken up into various sense-impressions. But how is this unification effected? Or, in other words, what is it that makes a thing an object of



knowledge? Is it the unity of apperception or is it the unity of interest?

Since the time of Kant it has been customary with the philosophers to think that in order to make an organised world out of a chaos of sensations and impressions, we need two things:—a mind with its “all-constituting relations,” and a “thing-in-itself,” which by impressing the percipient mind, furnishes the “matter” for which the categories provide the form. The post-Kantians, however, busied themselves in bridging the gulf between form and matter, and thus set up an Absolute Ego or Idea as the common root of these separate worlds, as, for example, we find in Fichte and Hegel. But no attempt has been made to trace the origin of these very categories. They either have been regarded as inherent and fixed in the mind of man or have been deduced artificially from the Absolute. But as the forms of intuition and categories are applicable only to phenomena and as “reason can only suggest inspiring ‘Ideas’” which are eminently useful and necessary, but which reason “cannot possibly help us to prove,” Kant takes the help of Practical Reason to prove the necessity of God, Freedom and Immortality in order to stabilise ethical values. These are regarded by Kant as postulates of practical reason. They are not constitutive principles like the categories of understanding, but simply regulative. In order to avoid an agnostic conclusion Kant directed his attention towards rehabilitation of ethical truths rather than towards analysing the function of will in thought and life. The fact is that in Kant “will” is so closely identified with practical reason or ethical consciousness that its applicability in non-ethical fields was consciously or unconsciously overlooked. The volitional aspect of mental life having points of contact not only with morality, but also with different types of satisfaction, was more or less neglected.

Charles Renouvier, who belongs to that Kantian movement in France which is derived in part from his moral philosophy, attempted to develop Kantian system by making some additions

to the Kantian categories. These additions are, "Devenir" or Becoming, Finality, and Personality, of which the last is regarded by him as "the fullest and most particular of all." This "Personality" is, to him, not only intelligence but also will and emotion. He does not think, like Kant, that it is necessary to suppose a noumenal agent, "of whose transcendental actions the categories may be conceived as expressions;" for he thinks that "they exist in right of experience as members of actual phenomena." He therefore calls his system "Criticism" which is nothing but a form of Neo-Kantianism in France. He has certainly modified Kant's theory of knowledge to some extent by ascribing to "Personality" the highest place in the categories and by introducing liberty and contingency even in the world of phenomena. But, unfortunately, his doctrine of contingency could not affect the rigidity of the categories of understanding and that of the laws of thought. He has constructed the whole of his philosophy in accordance with the rigorous application of the supreme logical law of our thought, called the principle of contradiction. The laws of understanding remain to him as fixed and given forever as with the absolutists. He does not realise the fact that when "Personality" is the highest of all categories, their origin must be found in the very needs and aspirations of our life and therefore their nature is as much unstable as the changeful yearnings of our self. It lies, then, in the efforts of the voluntarists to reach the very root of these so-called categories, to discover their origin in the very depth of human self.

Kant, "the Schematiser of Categories" and "Contemplator of the pure forms of Intuition," has shown us explicitly that their value lies only in *our* life and in *this* world and that they are unable to approach the realm of things-in-themselves. If *we* are the only user of the categories to lead our life in *this* world, and if our life is nothing but the scene of a series of fulfilments and disappointments, developments and destructions of the innermost desires of life, where can we find the origin of

the categories except in our own affective-volitional^{*} self? But Kant ascribes an apriori character to his categories and thinks that they are fixed and immutable and therefore capable of giving form to the unformed sense-impressions, which are called the posteriori elements of knowledge. But in actual knowledge we are not conscious of any apriority or a posteriority of these two supposed elements of knowledge. They are, in reality, fused together in our actual knowing. But it is the need of the philosophers to give a satisfactory explanation of the origin of knowledge that has made them set up a table of categories. These so-called categories are, thus, carved out of the actual knowing-process by logical analysis. They are, therefore, not prior to any thinking, but rather results of logical thought. For this very reason the conceptions of time, space, substance, causality, etc., have passed through various interpretations, and yet philosophers are still in doubt about their real nature. Thus, at last, the so-called categories themselves have become the objects of knowledge and subjects of much discussion! Where lies, then, their "fixity" and "apriority," except only in name? How can they themselves, being objects of knowledge, be regarded as making knowledge possible? Even if it is taken for granted that the categories are the constitutive principles of knowledge, we might ask, "why is it that we need to impose them on the chaos of impressions? Why is it that we require a world of unity and not a world of chaos?" Thus, we have to go further behind the veil of categories to search for the cause of unification of the various sense-impressions.

Some philosophers in France, such as Meyerson and Spir, are of opinion that even in animals there goes on a struggle between sameness, identity, uniformity, constancy, etc., on the one hand, and the crowding in of diversity on the other; in other words, there is in them also a tendency towards unification. This is well manifested in the behaviour of animals. For example, a dog cannot run after its master and a cat after a mouse if they do not respectively perceive their particular object

as one whole amidst an infinite number of various sense-impressions. Again, their actions cannot be different towards different things if they do not perceive separate distinct objects; for instance, a dog barks at the sight of a stranger, but wags its tail whenever it sees its master. But we doubt as to whether Kant would be willing to endow the animals with a table of categories. Yet, there is, no doubt, that all the animals perceive their objects as so many unities. Whence does this unity come? We have seen that the perception of the animals is confined to the "discernment of the useful." When an amoeba sends out its pseudopodia to engulf its food, it becomes sensible only of what is useful for its own organism. Its range of perception is centred only upon this good as a whole. In the same way it is the unity of interest in the master that makes a dog perceive his master as a single whole.

Does human perception have its origin entirely differently from that of the animals? Do we not also perceive only that which interests us and overlook all that does not attract us for the present moment? "That which interests us," says Bergson, "in a given situation, that which we are likely to grasp in it first, is the side by which it can respond to a tendency or a need." "What I perceive," says Haldane, "is what interests me as an organism; and my voluntary reactions upon the surrounding world are reactions in the interest of my organism." This is clearly seen in our everyday life. For example, when we are very thirsty we come into a room to get a drink, our need leads us straight to the water and sometimes we do not even perceive anything else but water. The rest of the things in the room stand in the margin of our consciousness in a confused mass of sense-impressions. Again, when we are deeply occupied in reading a book a very loud noise may escape our notice. Archimedes was unconscious of the sacking of Syracuse because his interest was centred only upon his studies. Thus, Bergson thinks that animals, human beings and even plants and minerals, "seize from out their



surroundings that which interests them practically, without needing any effort of abstraction, simply because the rest of their surroundings takes no hold upon them." Again, he says, that if only the perceptions are "continued by the same reactions, if the organism can extract from them the same useful effects, if they impress upon the body the same attitude, something common will issue from them and the general idea will have been felt and passively experienced, before being represented." From this "felt and lived" similarity or generality are built up in the course of progress, the perception of individuals and the conception of genera. Thus we see that whether in animals or in human beings, there must be "a certain unity of interest in the thing which binds its members into a single whole."

The difference between the perception of animals and that of human beings lies not in their origin, but in their later development. Perception of animals is confined only to the sense for the useful which is "felt and lived" nature of animal perception and, therefore, can attain distinct conscious perception. It is, no doubt, true that the commonest things in our daily life are more "felt and lived" than consciously perceived. For example, when we want to sit, we go straight to the chair, hardly perceiving it clearly. The nature of our perception, here, is more of a discernment of the useful than of a distinct perception of the chair. Again, the range of human perception is much larger than that of the animals. For the interest of animals is chiefly centred upon the maintenance and continuance of life. Man, on the other hand, does not simply want to live, but to live beautifully and comfortably. He not only cares for his own life, but also for the life of others; and is sometimes even ready to sacrifice it for their sake. The mental adjustment is, thus, more important to the life of man than that of the physical. Moreover, life-adjustment is made mainly through the adjustment of mind. Thus, man tries not so much to adopt himself to his surroundings as to adapt the

environment to himself ; in other words, to take possession of it rather than to submit himself to it. For this very reason man has to perceive more than the animal, for the needs and interests of man are greater in number than those of the animal and he alone can rear up a world of conceptual constructs.

Perception of objects, therefore, signifies choice. It is also a kind of habit, for it originates in our similar attitudes towards a particular thing in which our unity of interest is centred. Our present perception of any object is, therefore, what Royce calls "a brief abstract and epitome of our previous experience in connection with such objects." "A sword is," therefore, "an object that you would propose to use or to regard in one way, while a pen is to be used in another." (Royce.) Thus we might say, with Bergson, that "our needs are so many search lights which, directed upon the continuity of sensible qualities, single out in it distinct bodies."

But as perception of objects originates in action, so does it also end in action. For when we see a thing we do not perceive it passively, but take up a particular attitude towards it. Our attitude does not necessarily take the form of a visible movement, but might end in a mental attitude of keeping ourselves towards it or away from it. "Dwell long," says Royce, "on your perceptions of a dog or of a horse, and you will find yourself tending to fondle or perhaps to avoid him." Thus perception always leads to a certain kind of action. Because of this, Bergson thinks, that perception has no speculative interest at all. It is entirely directed towards action and not towards pure knowledge. For he says that "no more in the higher centre of the cortex than in the spinal cord do the nervous elements work with a view to knowledge."

Thus we see that the perceptual consciousness both begins and ends in action. It rises out of the affective-volitional aspect of the psycho-physical organism and ends in a kind of attitude of acceptance or avoidance. We have thus reached behind the veil of categories to find that the unity

of interest is the true principle which introduces unity into the chaos of sense-impressions and that the categories are nothing but the extractions made out of the "bodies" already formed by the encroachment of our needs and interests upon the sensible continuum of objectivity. We, therefore, conclude by saying that "knowing" in mere biological situation coincides with "living": whereas in the higher forms of consciousness it consists in singling out more or less distinct "bodies" of interest out of the confused mass of sense-impressions. It is here not actuated by any conscious purpose. Our needs and interests point naturally and instinctively straight to the objects that satisfy them. The psycho-physical organism, here, is more an actor and an enjoyer than a knower. At this stage of life-manifestation the conscious volitional aspect of mental life has not yet appeared, but it is undoubtedly true that it is this stage that furnishes materials for the mind to think and to will, and therefore it precedes the life of conscious volition and thought.

ASHALATIKA HALDAR

DEGREES OF REALITY

The title of this paper is apt to suggest too ambitious a programme for the short time at my disposal. But it is not my aim so much to present a consistent, systematic exposition of the subject which is well-nigh impossible to do in the course of a short paper that should not take up more than 20 minutes to be read, according to the rules of the conference, as to make a few statements with a view to provoke discussion on some very important problems in metaphysics. In short, I have attempted to fix the precise meaning of the doctrine of degrees of reality which looms large in the writings of some leading thinkers of the present as well as of the past, and to pass in brief review one or two historical presentations of the same.

It will be a useful preliminary to note one fact relevant to the point at issue, on which advocates of opposing systems of thought are agreed. As Baille observes we cannot speak of a complete scheme of reality as more or less. "It is because man's life lies between complete attainment and proximate realisation that the conception possesses its significance. At either extremes, taken by itself, the principle ceases to apply. The absolute *per se* has no degrees, and cannot be constituted by them. Its life must be of equal value to it in the part as in the whole; its activity is 'full and perfect in a hair as in a heart.' The absolute subject, as Hegel puts it, is 'truly real.' While again, at the lowest level of the world's life, that of mere sentiency, there can again be no degrees for such life has no meaning for itself at all." (Baille's Logic of Hegel, p. 302-3.) The same view is voiced forth by Bradley and Taylor when they say that the doctrine of degrees is inapplicable to the absolute which is perfect. Apart from these metaphysical conclusions the fact remains that existence has no contradiction, it is 'truly real.' Schiller rightly holds it as an axiom that "*nothing which*



exists, in however despicable a sense can really be self-contradictory. The very fact of its existence shows that the 'contradictions' which our thought discovers in it, are in some way illusory, that the reality 'somehow' (to use Mr. Bradley's favourite word in this connexion) overpowers, swallows, reconciles, transcends and harmonises them." (Humanism, p. 187.) This axiom will hold good of a dynamic reality as well. If there is a movement, there is a process, Croce would say not that the stages are contradictory and so transcended, but that it is the inner spirit of the whole process that passes from one stage to another, nevertheless each stage is as real and necessary as the whole itself. (Croce, Phil. of Hegel, Chap. IV.) Only we should make this reservation, which any sane man, not to speak of a thinker, should accept that the lower or any one stage is not the whole process. Each stage is wholly real though not the whole reality. The Indian philosophers too have admitted this axiom about the real. "So far as the absolute is concerned, there are no degrees at all. The conception of degrees has meaning only for the finite intelligence which distinguishes things." (Radhakrishnan, Ind. Ph., p. 199.)

as
higher
symmetrical
In the light of the foregoing paragraph let us see what phrase 'degrees of reality' means. Does it mean degrees of the amount of the 'that' possessed by different 'that-what's' or reals? No, surely not, for what is real, simply *is* neither more nor less. Different reals if they are ultimate are wholly real. But if they are not ultimate they are mere abstractions and so their imperfection or disharmony pertains to their abstractedness. To express the same in another way, if reality is static and monistic then it is one and so it is wrong to speak of degrees of realness with reference to it. If pluralism is true then the units are co-ordinates and they are all equally real, each with its own independent status. If we uphold that reality is a process, growth or development, *i.e.*, is viewed as a process, it is true we can distinguish stages and speak of degrees of truth or lower with reference to a standard of ^{realisation} instead of

of the potential idea within and running through the whole process. But in these cases degrees refer to some standard of approximation to a particular stage and not to the amount of realness they contain. The real which is one, divided in-itself, grows on itself, to use the words of Aristotle. If we distinguish parts in reality which is one whole the doctrine of degrees will not apply to parts either. For, if they are parts of *reality* then they are wholly real, parts of the real, but not partially real. If there are no parts *in* reality then we cannot speak of parts of reality at all. Thus we see that 'degrees' cannot refer to the 'that's' possessed by 'that-what's' or reals.

Can the phrase be taken to mean degrees in the real, *i.e.*, superior and inferior grades of the 'what' or nature of different 'that-what's' or reals? Degrees of value, judgments of worth met with in philosophy as well as morality, mathematics and even in the notions of work-a-day man are all relative to a standard and degrees mean varying grades of some particular kind of excellence or quality. Existence is not a quality as Kant pointed out in his criticism of the ontological argument and so we should not speak of degrees of reality, for that would mean more real and less real, judgments of evaluation can give us degrees of goodness, beauty, blackness or warmth as the case may be, but not degrees in point of existence.

Having examined some alternative meanings and found them to be unwarranted we are forced to the conclusion that the phrase, if it means anything at all, must refer to degrees in the extent to which our various ways of construing the real, if they are carried out with perfect correctness, would approximate to the true nature of reality. So it applies to judgments about reality; these judgments or thought systems are evaluated as more true or less true, according to their degrees of approach to the true character of reality. So the doctrine which ^{must} be taken as one of evaluation of particular views of the fact ^{reality} with reference to their claims to give a true account of real. So ^{the real} It deals with our *thoughts of the real* and in which

they are abstractions 'what's' detached from 'that's' they may not be harmonious and so be amenable to descriptions of more true and less true.

(The doctrine therefore in the sense of different grades of harmony and comprehensiveness in our thought systems may be tenable.) If we adhere to the monistic account of reality, to attain a complete view of reality our thought-systems have to be measured by the double-edged standard of inclusiveness and consistency and so we can speak of different thought-systems as more true or less true when compared to one another. Granted the pre-suppositions of the doctrine of internal relations and the monistic nature of reality, we have no alternative but to recognise any view of reality as mere appearance and to escape total scepticism we have to cling to the rope of degrees of truth. If the doctrine is to be overthrown the pre-suppositions have to be disproved and this task if attempted will take us too far afield.

But in one point we have to disagree with the Absolutists even if we grant their pre-suppositions. The doctrine, we saw, could be taken as meaning only degrees of truth and so when we get an intellectual system that is complete and harmonious then we have perfect truth, for it would be a perfectly coherent view of reality. To say that this too is not absolutely true because it is not reality itself is to confuse between knowledge and existence. "Knowledge is Knowledge, its function is to reveal, it is not creative but contemplative." (N. Kemp Smith, *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 236.) The function of logical truth is ended when it is able to give a coherent view of reality and to charge it that it is not existence itself is like prosecuting John because he is not James whom he never professed to be.

(The doctrine therefore concerns only our views of reality and not reality itself. The phrase, 'degrees of reality' is a misnomer and the doctrine ought to be described as 'degrees of truth.' But this wrong use of the word 'reality' instead of

'truth' is not accidental, it is a natural sequel of a confusion between truth which is an epistemological category and existence or reality which is an ontological category. This confusion has been the parent of also many other trivialities which pass for the most fashionable metaphysical conceptions of reality and it itself is the child of false epistemology that dates from the time of Descartes and still romps about in full virility in the metaphysical arena. This epistemological nightmare dubbed by heterodox thinkers as mentalism, subjectivism, ego-centric predicament, etc., is being vigorously attacked by the Realists with the help of weapons furnished by common-sense and polished by modern Psychology. The absurd claim that 'knowing' must end in 'being' is still put forward and Philosophy to hold its own must free itself completely from this notion.

The view set forth in the preceding paragraphs is expressed by Dr. J. S. Mackenzie in the following words: "It seems better to confine ourselves to the statement that there are degrees of completeness in our apprehension of objects and degrees of correctness in our beliefs about them. Certainly, at least, it is very misleading to say that what is important or valuable is more real than what is less important or less valuable. Everything is real when it is seen in its proper place within the whole; but the place of some things is larger or more important than that of others; and their places may be more or less clearly apprehended." (The Elements of Constructive Philosophy, p. 127.)

Having indicated the meaning of the doctrine according to us, let us take one or two noteworthy historical presentations of the same. Hegel, says Croce, dissatisfied with the old system of classification of concepts as co-ordinates and distinct from one another which made an end of the unity of the world, took recourse to this doctrine to prove the unitary structure of our thought-work. We know how his logic of ideas developed from the *notion* of being passes into

metaphysics of external reality and as a sequel the doctrine of degrees also comes to be applied to the different spheres of reality as well. Croce rightly finds the source of confusion and error in Hegel's system in the author's mixing up of the dialectic of opposites and the dialectic of concepts. This confusion led him to regard the various grades of the real as unreal—Art is unreal, Philosophy is real when compared to Art, but unreal when brought before a higher tribunal. If he had seen the distinction between the thought of the real and the existence of the real, his logic would not have masqueraded as metaphysics and he would have recognised that Art, Philosophy, etc., are real as far as they go and it is the inner spirit that transcends these. This confusion is due to the overlooking of the fact that appearances are *our views* of reality and not reality itself.

Coming to Bradley we find that the doctrine of internal relations and his idea of 'substance' or 'individuality' as a self-sufficient whole stand him in good stead to brand all our knowledge as imperfect and mere appearance and he escapes total scepticism by invoking the aid of the doctrine of degrees. Only that which is all-inclusive and self-consistent can be ultimately real and in this sense, according to Bradley, only the absolute in the form of an experience embracing all appearances, but then arranged in a modified form, is the real. He applies the doctrine of degrees of reality to appearances "but, since for Bradley, Reality strictly taken, *i.e.*, as the Absolute, is one and has no degrees, degrees of reality are predicable only of appearances and thus come back to degrees of validity." (Mind, Vol. 33, p. 35, J. Ward.) So his charge of inconsistency and appearance does not refer to reality but to our views of reality and so the doctrine is only that of degrees of truth and not degrees of reality. But Bradley sometimes speaks as though our own experience is the only reality and on the other hand holds the fact of causation, change, time, space, etc., are themselves contradictory. But it is our views of them that

are discrepant and this discrepancy is due to the error of intellect or to its own intrinsic impotence. If Bradley means that our theories of causation are contradictory, that we cannot represent its reality by means of intellect to ourselves then we are in perfect agreement with him. But if he goes further and says that causation for example as a fact operating in the system of reality itself is appearance, then we can only reply to him that fact is fact, *i.e.*, existence is real though intellect cannot understand it. It may be that some other faculty—what Bergson calls 'Intuition'—will be the right method to understand such phases of reality. Bradley without taking stock of all the alternative methods brands all as appearance because our thought-systems are not harmonious. This again is due to the same confusion pointed out in the preceding section between logic and ontology and Bradley conceals this confusion under the vague term experience by which he characterises the Absolute. It is this confusion which makes him liable to the charge of Schiller and others that Bradley's Absolute is sheer nothing, since its parts are appearances and so the whole made of appearances is not more real or that it is an empty ballet of bloodless categories situated in a void without any connection with the actual reality that we come across in our experience.)

Our examination of the historical presentations of the doctrine discloses the fact that it has been used beyond its legitimate province ; instead of confining its application to our thought-systems of reality both Hegel and Bradley have used it as a measure or standard of existence itself.

With regard to its legitimate use with reference to knowledge we have to urge a note of warning. The doctrine taken to mean simply degrees of *truth* is based upon what is called the coherence view of truth or the criterion of consistency. This basis or criterion itself can be called into question. Truth, in our practical life, even though does not *mean* practical utility or satisfaction as the pragmatists insist still its



purpose is practical and this criterion does not help us much. To talk of $2 + 2 = 4$ as partially true would baffle common-sense and without going into details about this aspect of the subject I would simply draw the attention of the learned audience to a valuable article in the last January issue of *the mind* on Bradley's Conception of Truth and Falsity by Dr. Stout.

Common experience and practical life regard judgments as completely true or completely false and they base this verdict on some notion of correspondence to fact. So in as much as practical behaviour based on theoretical understanding is but a part of experience the method of taking judgments as absolutely true or absolutely false is warranted by utility.' The criterion of judgments as resting on correspondence to fact which is understood from practical efficiency may be described as due to the consistency between the ideas taken as the instruments of action and the other parts of our experience taken as constituting the world of practice. But apart from these practical considerations, the criterion of consistency and all-inclusiveness may itself be questioned and the theory of internal relations, especially in its application to the relation between knowing and its object may be liable to objections. But to take up the problem of the criterion of truth will take us far from the immediate purpose and so we are content simply to suggest that the doctrine under discussion, even interpreted as meaning only degrees of truth is not safe from attack and that the criterion of truth on which it is based must take stock of the truth contained in the other standards of truth and must re-examine its own doctrine of internal relations which is the prop on which it rests.

P. S. RAMANATHAN


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
THE NATURE OF SENSUA

The object of sense-knowledge as distinguished from the act of sensing, is what we understand by the term "sensusum." We want to discuss what a sensum really is. We refer different sensa to one physical object, and the problem arises how one and the same object can be made to support different sensa which are not only different from it in many respects but are, also, sometimes contradictory to one another. There are several alternatives possible here. Sensa may not be existences at all but only logical entities; and if existences, they may either be mental or physical, and if physical, they may either be identical with physical objects or constitute a class by themselves different from the class of physical objects.)

We generally believe with common-sense that what is given in our sense knowledge is the physical object. But this belief is not justifiable.) When we look at a flat round physical object, *e.g.*, a pice, in a particular way, it presents an elliptical appearance of varying eccentricity, according to the position of our eyes with regard to it. When a man is affected with jaundice, a white conch shell appears yellow to him. We cannot suppose without contradiction that the round or the white object is identical with the elliptical or the yellow sensum. When a straight stick, thrust into water, looks bent, we cannot suppose that the sensum in this case is identical with the physical object.

(It may be supposed that the difference in these cases, between the sensa and the physical objects, is due to some defects in the conditions of perception which we can easily find out.) If we look straight down upon a pice, we shall find it to be round; if one is cured of jaundice, he will find the conch shell white, and if the stick is taken out of water, it will look quite straight. So the disturbing factor which is responsible





different in any way from that presented to me when I see it, but only to seem so,"—etc.

(What is described here is, I think, belied by everybody's experience. The white colour seen with naked eyes *is* different from the blue colour seen through black spectacles. The sight sensum *is* obviously different from the touch sensum; and the gulf between them is too wide to be bridged by 'seeming.' When we further realise that the being of a sensum consists in its seeming, that it is what it seems, we shall understand how illegitimate it is to make a distinction of being and seeming in the case of sensa. Prof. Moore himself appears to be conscious of a suspicion that what he is talking here may be "sheer nonsense.")

(Mr. Russell speaks of things as 'logical constructions' as classes or series of actual and possible sense-data. Now, to begin with, what is meant by "logical construction"? Since the materials out of which construction is to be made and that which is to be constructed, are not logical entities, we can call only the process of construction logical. This process is not one of inference, as we are told by Mr. Russell himself. The process may be supposed to be one of making an hypothesis. But what is constructed by this process can only be an hypothesis. Our conception of a thing, however, is never that of an hypothesis. We can make an hypothesis about a thing, but the thing itself will not be an hypothesis. An hypothesis is always of the nature of a '*may be*'; and it cannot express the character of a thing which either is or is not.)

Things are also spoken of as classes. But this way of speaking, as Mr. Hoernle points out, ignores the individual character of things. And when further we are reminded that Mr. Russell looks upon classes as logical fictions, we do not understand what to make of the whole affair. Our notion of a chair, be round, is not that of a class or of a fiction. shell white, and our sensa are as different from one another quite straight. So the disturbed a sensum it does not appear joined to



posterior entity for which no metaphysical ingenuity seems anything to find a suitable status. We can make a logical affected with what is sensed and our sensing of it, but seen by a normal act of sensation cannot be separated from sensum which appears. There is no pure sensation in which on? Sometimes it is said to be no sensum for which there is or by the laws of perspectives. I hardly, we may distinguish, of either sort concretely stated, so that it might examine whether it is applicable in any particular that cannot far as we are able to see now, we do not think that any law will hold good in the matter of sensa taken by themselves.

(Sensa are further supposed to belong to our private spaces whereas a physical thing exists in the physical or public space) The physical space is not presumably identical with any of our private spaces, and as we are acquainted only with our private spaces, it has to be constructed out of the elements taken from the latter. But this presupposes that private spaces must be open to inspection by somebody who will construct the public space. For us it is impossible, because we are confined to our private spaces. Testimony will not help us here, for testimony in the last analysis consists only of audible sensa, belonging, if spatial, to the private space of the individual who hears them, and if he is to interpret them in the light of his spatial experience, he will only duplicate his own private space, without really having an insight into the private space of his neighbour. (So it appears impossible to construct out of the sensa of a private space, a physical thing which transcends all private spaces. Once the veil of privacy is drawn upon the objects of sense, it can never again be raised by any amount of logical manipulation.)

(If things are only logical constructions, then they cannot be supposed to be there when there is no such construction. We so, metaphysically speaking, there is no question of to between sensa and physical objects.) There are sensa alone. But if so, why should we logical constructions? When we cannot

different in any way from that presented to me when I see, is it but only to seem so,"—etc.

(What is described here is, I think, belied by the fact that things do exist in their experience. The white colour seen with naked eyes is of an hypothesis from the blue colour seen through black logician?

sensum is obviously different from the character to sensa, Mr. Russell is gulf between them is too Occam's razor or 'lāghava' as we call it. When we further realise the place of one thing of common-sense, he is its seeming, that stands of sensa and in the place of one space, he has offered us millions of spaces.

Although I have not touched upon all the important issues, I think I have said enough to show the extremely difficult character of the question as well as the very unsatisfactory nature of the solutions that have been offered. The root of the difficulty, however, lies in my opinion in the very nature of the question asked and in the point of view from which it has been tackled. I am led to think that contemporary philosophy by its theory of sensa, has created for itself the same difficulties, and is running the same risks, as fell to the lot of modern philosophy when it advocated the theory of representative ideas. Just as representationism made a distinction, on the subjective side, between knowing and there being ideas (inasmuch as it said that we know through ideas or that only ideas are known at first hand), so does the theory of sensa make a distinction, on the objective side, between the physical object we seek to know and the sensum through which we are supposed to know it. Just as the other theory forgot that to have ideas is to know, so does this theory forget that to have a sensum is to know some physical object. If we believe otherwise, we shall not be able to escape from subjectivism which, if courageous Russell is consistent, will lead us to the depth of solipsism; or else, stand what physics will have to be laid to rest on the uncomfortable round of agnosticism and doubt. shell white, and our being divorced from sensation on the one quite straight. So physical object on the other, is rendered a



mysterious entity for which no metaphysical ingenuity seems sufficient to find a suitable status. We can make a logical distinction between what is sensed and our sensing of it, but psychologically an act of sensation cannot be separated from the sensum given in it. There is no pure sensation in which nothing is sensed, and there is no sensum for which there is no corresponding sensation. Similarly, we may distinguish, from the point of view of logic, between that which is known and what is known of it; but metaphysically the 'that' cannot be separated from its 'what.'

✧ We may suppose, therefore, with common-sense and sturdy realism that a sensum is nothing but a physical thing as seen or known by us. In the case of valid knowledge, a physical thing is what it is seen to be, and a sound epistemology may be trusted to determine the conditions of valid perception. In the case of error or illusion, the sensum may be explained by any of the theories of error that we may choose to accept. Logically, we may say that the thing appears otherwise than what it is (*anyathākhyāti*); and from the metaphysical point of view, we may say that the presented object does not exist at all at the place where it is seen (*asatkhyāti*). Sense being present in the case of error as well as in that of right knowledge, the attempt of some philosophers to find a common status for them, appears to be foredoomed to failure.

If the above suggestions appear too plain for the acceptance of a philosopher, we may then seek to get out of the difficulties of the situation by reforming our epistemology and metaphysics. We must then give up the realistic epistemology and the metaphysics of science which seek to define things in themselves, without any relation to the percipient mind. We must realise the truth of the great saying *o* that to exist is to stand in relation. Every thing is what it is by virtue of its relations to other things. A thing *i.e.*, it is determined by the way in which

affected by other things. A thing in itself out of relation with other things of the world, is an empty abstraction.

In our present way of knowing things, we do not know a thing as it is for itself. We do not know, *e.g.*, what a chair or a drama of Shakespeare is *for itself*, but we always know them in terms of what they are or mean *for another*. This being so, a sensum is what a physical thing is for an observer. Now, one observer being different from another,—the constitution of the body and the history of the mind of one observer being different from those of his friends,—their *sensa* are also bound to be different. We may look upon *sensa* as appearances. The nature of a thing is expressed in its appearance, and that which cannot and does not appear, cannot be known at all. Now, an appearance is not an independent entity and it cannot be defined by itself. An appearance means the appearance of something to some one and all these terms are necessary to define an appearance. As our interests are often objective, we take an appearance only in its objective reference, and do not take account of ourselves who are also necessary for it. The many and divergent appearances of a thing are not subversive of its concrete identity and individuality, not only because there is no contradiction in the idea that one and the same thing should have different appearances when the observers and the points of view are different, but also because a thing is, as Mr. Hoernle says, an identity in difference.

We are now in a position to appreciate the elements of truth in the theories we have criticised above. When we remember that *sensa* are appearances, we can say with Mr. Russell that we are acquainted only with *sensa* and a thing has to be defined in terms of *sensa*. We have only to remember that in being acquainted with an appearance, we become acquainted with what appears in it, and that what we define is a concrete thing. Dr. Stout also is right when he says that *sensa* are mind-dependent, because unless a mind is there, there would be no appearance. We may admit with

Prof. Moore that a sensum is part of the thing, in the sense in which an aspect of a thing is its part. We have only to remark that an appearance does not simply *seem* to be different but *is* really different; this difference, however, is not negated but transcended in the concrete identity of the thing. Even the critical realists may be said to be right, when they say that the datum is the essence, because, as we have seen, a thing is characterised by the sensum or its appearance. So the sensum may be said to be its essence or character. It has only to be noted that the character here is given, not in its abstract universality, but in its concrete individuality, bound up with the thing of which it is a character.

RASVIHARY DAS

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SIR OLIVER LODGE

Sir Oliver Lodge, an eminent physicist of the age, has attempted to study philosophical problems. The first philosophy science constructed was a dualistic one, as in Descartes. But in John Toland, through Leibnitz who sought to replace the static conception by a dynamic one, it changed into materialistic monism. Meanwhile conservation of matter and of energy having been established in the domain of science, Buchner was led to give equal values to matter and energy, though he stuck to materialism.¹ Darwin's 'Origin of Species' and 'The Descent of Man' led to the strengthening of materialism, chance and evolution making up the then deficiency in the mechanical explanation. This we find in Haeckel.² Sir Oliver Lodge however takes up a different position. He is not for levelling philosophy down but for raising science up. Generally a scientist adopts one or other of the three positions relating to the philosophical problems; (1) He may be non-committal, or (2) he may separate science from philosophy, as reason from faith, or (3) he may regard them as complementary undertakings. Lodge belongs to the last category. For him, "The region of true religion and the region of completer science are one" (Man and the Universe, p. 51).

We may discuss Lodge's philosophy under the following six heads:—

(1) *Relation of matter to life.*—He rejects the view that life arises from inorganic matter without antecedent life. The doctrine of spontaneous generation forms, in a sense, the first step to materialism; the next step will be to suppose matter to generate consciousness. By rejecting abiogenesis, therefore, Lodge may be said to have kicked the first ladder to materialism.

¹ Cf. His 'Kraft Und Stoff.'

² Cf. His 'Riddle of the Universe.'

What then is his conception of life? "It is neither matter nor energy, nor even function of matter or of energy, but is something belonging to a different category." (Life and Matter, p. 136.) That it appears "to belong to a separate order of existence, which interacts with this material frame of things, and while there, exerts guidance and control on the energy which already here exists." (*Ibid.* p. 133.) Life therefore is not a form of terrestrial energy, but at the same time it is able to direct such energy along new and special path. And it achieves "results which without such living agency could not have occurred, *e.g.*, forests, ant-hills, birds' nests, etc." (p. 133). Now it may be asked, if life and matter belong to two separate orders of being, how is one able to influence the other? And supposing that one does influence the other, how is it that the other yields to it exactly as it would have it to do? If matter offers any obstruction, life could not possibly achieve results spoken of above; and if matter offers no obstruction, certainly it will be right to treat them as of one order of being; and in that case, the dualism between life and matter will vanish. Again how does life influence matter and energy? It is not an energy, yet it influences energy. In influencing it, it does not alter the quantity of energy, yet its presence is sufficient to direct available energy along right lines, just as the presence of steam engine enables the heat to be transformed into work, which otherwise is liable to be dissipated into lower forms. Some *Kavirājs* would have us believe that in the preparation of Makaradhwaja, gold influences mercury in a similar way. Life therefore is not a creative, but a formative principle. Here we can trace the influence of Neo-Realism on Lodge. For him, life is a universal, whose "essential existence is continuous and permanent, though its interactions with matter are discontinuous and temporary." (P. 137.) Particular lives disappear but life persists, just as triangular bodies may disappear, but triangular form subsists.

(2) *Relation of matter to mind*.—The criticisms we made on life apply also to his conception of mind. Mind manifests itself through bodies; and when a body disintegrates, mind does not cease to exist but utilises other bodies for itself. "Matter is the vehicle of mind, but it is dominated and transcended by it." (*Ibid.*, p. 123.) Thus it rejects the view that mind is matter or product of organised matter, or an aspect of material energy. While we recognise these to be the merits of his contention, we must admit that he stops half-way. For him, life and mind are not energies. And why? Probably because this would make them material, the implication being that all energies are material. And it may be that he thinks that if life and mind were energies, they would be capable of being transformed into one another and into 'heat,' 'light,' etc., or else there would be alteration in the quantity of energy. Yet he grants "that it may hereafter be possible to discover new forms (of energy); and when new forms are discovered then either the definition (of conservation of energy) may have to be modified, or else the detailed statement at present found sufficient will have to be overhauled." (*Ibid.*, p. 23). And again if he refuses to regard 'matter,' 'life' and 'mind' as *sui generis*, because that will make the latter material, he is guilty of ignoring the other side; for this may as well make matter mental. Indeed, when we take two things into consideration, *viz.*, the electric theory of matter of which Lodge is an uncompromising advocate, and his persistent refusal to reduce mind to matter, we cannot but expect that he will tend towards reducing matter to mind. For, the electric theory of matter has, among other things, achieved two notable results: (i) it has disproved the notion that atoms are ultimate and indivisible; (ii) that electrons which are so many centres of force, may be regarded as the ultimate basis of matter. In fact the ponderable matter is gone, and ether has taken its place, so much so that Lodge himself is for replacing the current categories of

matter and energy by ether and motion. And is not ether very near to mind? So long as matter is taken to be something spatial, the gulf between matter and mind remains unbridged. But if matter be made up of centres of force, and if it is a manifestation of radio-activity, and if radio-activity, as he supposed, is capable of denotative expansion, there would be much less difficulty in reducing matter to mind. Only mind must be viewed as energy. Again the new theory of matter shows that under certain conditions, energy latent in the so-called atom is capable of being converted into active energy. If so, why not the same be said about mind? May not its potentiality in being transformed into actuality, give rise to matter? In that case, mind could be supposed to be creative and to generate matter, as active end generates the means needed for its realisation. Lodge believes that "the destruction and the creation of matter are well within the range of scientific conception, and may be within the realm of experimental possibility." If so, what is it, if not mind, that can destroy and create matter? But Lodge would not have mind as energy, and this has prevented him from reaching that idealistic monism to which his conceptions of matter and energy and of mind as director, should consistently lead him. Life and mind, he held, guide energies, but are not themselves energies. He writes, "I mean by 'guidance,' the influencing of activity without 'work,' the directing of energy without generating, the utilisation of pre-existent activity for pre-conceived and purposed ends" (*Man and the Universe*, p. 66). Again "Life and mind have determined where the rails shall be laid down.....but they exert no iota of force upon them" (*Ibid.*, p. 67). His mind therefore, like the *nous* of Anaxagoras is world-forming, not world-creating.

(3) *Relation of God to the world.*—This applies not only to finite minds, but to the infinite mind as well. "Conceive a scientific God," he writes. "How would He work?" "It must be by agents." "What in the scheme of things would

be His agents?" "Surely among such agents we must recognise ourselves" (*Ibid.*, pp. 41, and 42). Again, "in accordance with law we had to act.....and through us acts the Deity" (*Ibid.*, p. 44). Again, "the material Universe is dominated and controlled by these agencies (life and mind); which utilised the energy they find available and direct it into desired channels" (*Ibid.*, p. 69). It seems, God is not creator of matter and energy, nor even an agent. Matter has been present eternally with God, and the presence of God enables matter to be arranged into certain orders, just as space enables material bodies to have definite positions, east or west, right or left and so on. God therefore is a form, like space and time. Is it not Russelism carried to the extreme?

(4) *His Metaphysics*.—His Metaphysics appears to be concrete pantheism in which reality is all-inclusive. Thus he writes, "we must realise that the Whole consists not of matter and motion alone, nor yet of spirit and will alone, but of both and all" (*Ibid.*, p. 63). So in this plan matter, energy, mind and indeed everything have been existing from the beginning, *i.e.*, in his system, reality is assigned to many beings and to beings of different orders. Reality for materialistic and idealistic monism is unicoloured; for Spinoza, it is bi-coloured: for Lodge it seems multicoloured. This will make him a pluralist yet he refuses to be called even a dualist. (*Ibid.*, p. 70.) Again when everything possesses an original home to which it returns and from which it comes, there will hardly be any destruction or fresh creation: yet he seriously doubts conservation of matter and energy, as will appear from the passages cited above.

(5) *His views on Evolution*.—In a system of philosophy where everything has been accorded a place at the beginning, either evolution will have little significance or be strictly confined to quantitative increase of what has been always existing. But, for Lodge, evolution leads to the emergence of qualitative differences. "People sometimes think that increase of size is mere magnification and introduces no new property.

They are mistaken " (*Ibid.*, p. 36). A materialist trying to explain the emergence of mind out of matter or an idealist trying to do the converse process, may need creative evolution: but certainly not Lodge who has given to what we regard as qualitatively different phenomena a place, and probably an equal place, at the beginning. Does he think in the absence of some theory of evolution of new properties, the science of Chemistry would go? Is not the supposition that physical and chemical phenomena are intrinsically different, a gratuitous assumption after all? Or, more probably, he thought that that would make time-process essentially real. But even in the Absolutist philosophy, time has a positive significance (see Professor Radha-krishnan's article in the International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XXIV).

Lodge, however, makes a distinct improvement on the position of the scientist in the matter of evolution. He refuses to take evolution as a mere change. Change means that things are not what they ought to be. Imperfect beings therefore must change. And change means groaning for a better order. With commendable courage, he rejects the chance-theory. Not only does he regard the evolutionary process as being guided by intellect, conscious or sub-conscious, but for him it is being guided from the beginning and all through. He writes: "Does any one think that the skill of beaver, the instinct of the bee, the genius of a man, arose by chance?" "What pitiful necessity for earning a living will educe for us a Shakespeare?" (*Ibid.*, p. 39). Such an evolutionary process therefore can produce adaptations and purposive things. Thus far he is right. But when he claims that evolution as he conceives it, under the guidance of intelligence gradually and consistently leads to the better ordering, and ultimately to the best ordering, of things, we feel bound to challenge him on his own grounds. He writes, "Some of the higher attributes of existence..... may actually increase." "On the whole the realm of the good must tend to increase, the realm of the bad to diminish" (*Ibid.*,

p. 180). Again "Good shall on the whole increase in the Universe with the process of the suns" (*Ibid.*, p. 181). This position is worked out more fully in his book "The Substance of Faith," where he writes, "No existing Universe can tend on the whole towards contraction and decay"..... "it will tend towards infinity rather than towards zero." Now it may be asked, if matter be not mind's creature, if matter belongs to a separate order of things, surely it will offer some sort of resistance, feeble or great, to the control of mind. Here then two situations at once emerge: (i) it may be that matter is fully controlled by mind, in which case mind can have the best, as it likes to have; but in that case, matter will be a creature of mind; for we can reasonably maintain that any thing fully controlled by another is capable of being produced by that one, *i.e.*, we will have idealistic monism in which matter becomes a means to mind, and at the same time, its own creation. Or, (ii) if matter and mind are made distinct categories, there will be struggle, perpetual struggle, more or less violent, and in that case, the triumph of spirit over matter will not have sufficient reason behind it, or at most be accidental. Lodge would have neither the one nor the other, but would reconcile sharply opposed positions.

(6) *His Philosophy of Value.*—Lastly, in a scheme of things, in which all conceivable realities have been given a place, and equal place, at the beginning, either all those things possess equal value, which in a sense may mean no value, or the value of things may be made to rest on quantitative increase. Lodge however would have neither the one nor the other. He would say, "the material is subordinate to the spiritual" (Man and the Universe, p. 180); yet would not grant spirit a higher plane of existence: for evidently two things existing from eternity cannot legitimately be regarded as higher and lower. Nor would he make value rest on quantity. For him value "may be something more than merely constant in quantity" (*Ibid.*, p. 179). The evolutionary process means converting what was potential

into an available form, and it means something more. It may in its process give rise to new values. Thus while the old values remain conserved, the new ones are being added to the stock periodically; but the market-value of one and all remains unaltered all the time. True, this enabled him to give maximum value to maximum number of things. True, by this, he was able to give value to 'Freedom,' 'Personality,' 'Love,' etc., *i.e.*, the attributes which did not exist at the beginning, but which emerged at the human stage of existence. But this was secured only at the cost of consistency. He did not deliberate if *murhi* (fried rice) and *misri* (sugar) could be classed in the same category. He did not pause to consider if the parts harmonised with one another and with the system as a whole. Indeed as the new values emerge out of the process, straightway they are pigeonholed with the old ones, but no serious effort is made to dovetail the pieces and to evaluate them properly.

The difficulties and inconsistencies which Lodge's way of thinking gave rise to, are of his own creation. He wanted to keep everything, to lose nothing. His unbounded fidelity to science overcarried him, and prevented him from seeing things in their true perspective. By all means give reality and value to matter and energy, but have some difference in your scale such as higher and lower. Else, if you are out to give equal value to all, you must end with a multiverse, not a universe. His errors, it must be admitted, are largely on the right side. He errs by including too much, by overvaluing things. And if absence of discriminating charity is a sign of weakness, he shares it. Still Sir Oliver's excursions into Philosophy are to be welcomed on two broad grounds. Not only does he bring to bear upon these wider problems a sympathetic mind which is indeed rare among scientists, but he takes up an attitude which is probably the best under the circumstances. His efforts have brought Science and Philosophy nearer to each other. We may have a Philosophy which is indifferent to, and may sneer at, the conclusions of Science.



We may have a Science which puts up rigidly the standards of exact proof and exact measurement. The result is a sterile Philosophy or a sceptical Science. A Philosophy which has to watch consistently the ever-growing conclusions of Science will have periodically to revise its position, and to shift itself, if need be, to a different one, still maintaining a constancy among variables, as Mathematicians would say, yet adjusting itself to the onward march of Science. Such a Philosophy lives and grows.

BEPINVEHARI ROY

THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUALITY

In the Vaiśeṣika system one of the categories is *viśeṣa* or particularity. The Kantian list includes unity but not particularity (except as involved in plurality). Aristotle's enumeration does not *specifically* include either unity or particularity, but his metaphysical discussions include a study of the determinants of entity, unity, identity, particularity, etc., and his metaphysical bias is, as against Plato, towards the individual and the universal that is in the individuals. Philosophers of all times, again, have felt that no problem is deeper than the one concerned with the relation of the one and the many (where the many is presumably made up of many *individuals*) together with its subsidiary problem as to the apparent similarity of some of this many in respect of some attributes, *i.e.*, the problem of species. The problem of individuality centres round these ideas.

(Aristotle says that there is no difference in meaning between 'numerically one' and 'individual'; and yet God or the Absolute has frequently been regarded as one but not individual as a universal than as an individual, thereby individuality is incomprehensible without finitude and contrast and opposition. But even then God is as absolutely incomprehensible and human thought cannot help investing the Absolute with powers and attributes which serve to characterise it somehow. Positive religions individuate their God with definite attributes and relations and even systems of metaphysics cannot avoid starting with a particular Absolute. Spinoza, Plotinus, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and the *Vedānta* has each a different idea of the kind of Absolute and a different way to explain the origin of the many out of it, whether as emanation or as opposition or as

bifurcation or as dialectic or as illusion. Thus a particularity attaches to the One or Ultimate Principle with which these start or at least to the philosophers' idea of the one without a second. The only consistently non-particulate Absolute (or One) is Being-in-itself, totally unrelated either to a real or to an unreal other, to an internal or to an external plurality—a view met with in Mysticism where contradictory attributes are simultaneously ascribed to the one or else it is roundly declared to be incomprehensible. The most charitable view to take in such cases is not to regard the Absolute as *numerically* one and therefore not to call it an individual. To an undifferentiated Absolute the faculty that corresponds is intuition in a mystical sense or feeling, as Hegel called it.

(Conceptually, every object of thought is a particular in so far as it is a thought.) We generally miss the distinction between a particular in thought and a particular thought, and we accordingly forget that to think is to determine, if not the object of thought, at least the thought itself. The concept of a universal is as much particular as the concept of an individual, and the classification of concepts into higher and lower, genus and species, is really a classification of particular concepts with wider and narrower meanings. No idea as idea proliferates into other ideas either psychologically or dialectically, to imitate the language of James. When the Universal is regarded not as a thought but as a thing, it does not indeed realise itself in a world of particulars, but then it is not of a piece with the particulars but subsists as a principle of growth, entelechy or form and less as an all-encompassing relation or finally as an arbitrary will peopling a void or a necessity-riddled principle of emanation or deduction, each philosopher choosing a Universal of his own liking according to tradition, temperament and training. (Thus some kind of determinateness or particularity is thought into the Universal before the latter bursts forth into plurality (Scotus), whether this universal particularity is looked upon as a mode of

will or as a mode of the Universal's thought or a mode of the Universal's response to an internal or external other (being or law) or simply as an involuted content. A kind of preformationism colours Absolutism, whether the Absolute be One or Being or Substance or Brahman or God or Idea of the good, and whether the particular be substantival or adjectival or purely illusory. Besides, no Absolutism has been able to neglect experience while professing to start with the Absolute and deduce the particulars therefrom. The kinds and gradation of beings are all derived out of experience, and the whole affair of deduction looks like a juggler's art of drawing out a roll of paper or cloth from the mouth into which it has been surreptitiously introduced before. The ascent from the particulars to the unity is far easier than the descent from the One to the Many—as in the fables, all the footsteps lead towards the lion's den but none away from it. No wonder then that Monism has offered more varieties of the possible relation between the One and the Many than Pluralism has done (when it attempted to reach a One at all) !

Many, like Ward, have felt that the more proper way of approach would be to regard the Many as given and instead of beguiling themselves with the determinations of phantom units, cast in their lot with the Pluralists (who would go to the length of pulverising Reality into a multiverse with its lots of eaches) rather than vote for a block universe or any monistic scheme where the hankering after relation might jeopardise the reality of the particulars to be related. Modern philosophy has witnessed the phenomenon of unrelated particulars as also of externally related particulars as protests against overrelated or illusory particulars. It is the independence of the Many that is the primary concern in such philosophies, for if the individual is to be real it must be one in the sense that it is independent. Now, this independence has a static and a dynamic significance ; a unit is statically independent when it occupies a separate position in space (and time)

and is dynamically independent when it can keep out others from its own position (spatial or spiritualistic). Dynamic freedom has been differently viewed as freedom from constraint, a capacity to react in proportion to being acted on, a freedom or capacity to affect others and lastly as a capacity to develop from within without reference to other units. The last, associated with the name of Leibnitz, makes each individual universal in relation to its own modes of growth and lands us either in a solipsism if the monads are really windowless or else makes us grope for a One that makes their mutual mirroring possible. Mere reciprocity of particulars as associated with Lotze commits us to a repeatedly equilibrating universe without progress—a drunken world tottering back in its momentary state of equilibrium only to lose it the next moment. Freedom of action and development, which is another possible supposition, would have to concede either that the individuals encroach upon each other's liberty or else that there is a mass of amorphous material in the world ready to be organised by the activity of developing individuals but incapable of individuating itself (either dualism or mysticism).

Independence, again, admits of both qualitative and quantitative difference, except in rank monism (materialistic or spiritualistic) where qualitative difference is not absolute although quantitative differencee are admitted. There is again the question whether all freedom is freedom from outside constraint or whether (as mostly in spiritualistic pluralism) there is such a thing as the freedom of indetermination—a freedom from inside constraint also. As a matter of fact a convention is growing up of distinguishing particularity from independence and associating the latter with freedom from constraint and with some degree of reality. Some, like Flint, have thought, for instance, that panlogism and pantheism are equal because in a panlogistic scheme the units have intra-unitary particularity but not intra-universal independence. Deism and Pluralism cling tenaciously to life as a popular creed and as a philosophical dogma



because it is apprehended that in relation to a One the Many would be either adjectival or absolutely illusory, mere shadowy particulars and not independent reals. It is quite possible that the instinct of self-preservation plays some part in our definition of the individual and that we sympathetically project our own qualities into the whole of reality and claim independence from constraint not only for ourselves but also for the whole of reality. The ideas of expansion and development are only extraneous accretions round the fundamental core of freedom from constraint. All spiritualistic bias, all belief in the eternity of individual souls (together with a suspicion of pantheism) and all supposition of the unlimited progress of the reals are really due to the instinct of self-preservation and the desire not to be squeezed out of existence at any time. Beginning with freedom from interference from neighbouring finite things we gradually curtail the field of outside control from others till we imagine that the Absolute is no better than a finite thing and that independence must include independence from Divine control (or absorption at the end of a fixed period).

(As a matter of fact the underlying idea is that an individual is truly real when it remains the centre of a system of independent relations.) We do not want to remain distinct as modes of another over-encompassing Absolute—we want to be the central luminary of our own solar system and posit ourselves by our own energy and freewill. The difficulty is to conceive whether this independence is eternal or temporal. Instances are not wanting in our empirical experience of units that once formed part of a bigger system getting detached and initiating an independent system of relations—the power to do so must have remained vested in the units before they actually broke away. A zygote, a branch of a tree or a bud is such a unit: can we say that the individuals were in the Absolute in a similar fashion eternally and that owing to some unknown reasons the ~~unit~~ at one point of time broke away from the Absolute (Schelling) or were realised by Divine will into a compossible

world (Leibnitz) ? There are many who would accept independence as a gift from God (Lotze, Martineau), there are others who would accord to the individuals an existence that is logically dependent on God but temporally coeval with Him (Hegel), there are others again who are for a democracy in which God is either not wanted (McTaggart) or regarded as Impersonal (Fichte in his first period) or conceived only as the President of a spiritual republic without any *absolute* power of control. There are some who would accord independence to all reality by investing it with spiritual attribute, there are others who would admit a duality of matter and mind and accord particularity to matter and independence to mind (Martineau, Lotze).

(But an individual is not only independent but also unique (not forgetting however that in doctrines of metempsychosis and eternal return repetition of the same individual in some form is not unknown). (Do we get individuated by subjective concentration and purpose, as Royce supposes ?) It is evident that an obvious exception is the direct feeling of individuality which each man claims for himself—'the warmth and intimacy' with which we greet our own past experiences being totally absent in the case of our appreciation of other individuals (James). Here the feeling is so direct that it must be regarded as anterior to all purpose *psychologically* ; and this is our most direct way of searching for the individual. Of course, it is always permissible to define the individual from the outside as from the inside and say that it is somebody else's purpose to distinguish it from the rest (whether the purpose of finite or of absolute self). But observe that we refuse to pry into the individuality or particularity of the purpose itself that individuates and take it for granted. Subjectively, we talk of individuality being an indefinable fact which we grasp by personal experience (or intuition), all so-called definitions being only descriptions thereof from a position taken up outside the thing. And we must not only admit that we are able to feel ourselves

as distinct from others but also that we are able to distinguish in a similar fashion all our mental states before we can recognise others as individuals. The counterpart of undifferentiated feeling is, as has been observed before, an undifferentiated Absolute. Does not the Upanishad say that when a man is entering into death and failing to distinguish his friends and relatives he is becoming one with the Absolute?

In spite of its unpalatableness it must be admitted that without the aid of our mental states we are unable to know anything and as such this amount of idealism can never be eradicated from philosophy. When we individuate things we take the help of our own mental states, although some of these are regarded as substantive and others are regarded as transitive and relational and determining the nature of the substantive state with the help of the fringe of context they create. But as this relationing means that the terms are already there to be related and thus assumes the very thing to be proved we take recourse to the other way, viz., to refer everything to the self whose existence we establish by intuition, and starting from this centre of reference, individuate other things by means of subjective concentration and purpose and not by the help of any objective signs. The individuality of purpose we take for granted, why the self takes up an attitude of exclusive affection towards each individual thing is left in the dark and we are left to conjecture whether that attitude is preceded by the postulation of a unique relation between the self and each thing. We are further left in the dark about the way in which different people agree in individuating the same object in a large majority of cases (in spite of their different affections and relations) when the basis of individuation is not experience but affection. (There must be postulated some community of concentration or concourse of purposes that alone can build up a world of objective individuals and not a world of subjective fancies peopled with shadowy individuals which a single self's purpose is likely to bring into existence.) The Absolute purpose is such

a remote determinant for finite spirits that the psychological genesis of individuality is not affected by the Absolutistic thesis that it is determined objectively by the thought or purpose of the Absolute and abides so long as it is needed in the scheme of the whole. As we do not share in the secrets of the Absolute ours is the humbler task of finding out the empirical determinations of individuality of so many diverse types.

Now there is first the obvious fact that we distinguish objects by experience, *e.g.*, perceptual. Here the criterion is a unique present synthesis of experiences, such as may indeed be repeated in future no doubt but not at an identical stage of our mental development. The time-coefficient will vary even if the space remains the same. No two point-events are the same, as Alexander says. But as each subject has the power of remembering and forming concepts each present synthesis gets compared with other syntheses of the same type or different types and in this way gets determined relatively by comparison and contrast. The last stage would be reached when we compare not present concepts among themselves or with past ideas but pure concepts or experiences whose nature we seek to determine with the help of such pure concepts. Idealism does not go beyond these types of experiences in its explanation of the universe—it believes that the whole of reality is expressible in terms of either present experience or possible experience or else in terms of concepts. In so far as the experience of a subject is regarded as many-dimensional (*e.g.*, aesthetic, logical, moral, and utilitarian, according to Croce), the experience need not be purely intellectual and it is possible to build up a world of objects determined by non-intellectual experiences and assigned to an overpersonal world by the same type of inter-subjective intercourse as in constructing a world of concepts (Münsterberg).

Limiting ourselves to the world of intellectual construction we find that from Idealism two ways open out, one to the realistic view of the world and another to the purely abstract

world of concepts. Intersubjective intercourse may lead us to make a distinction between certain personal experiences and others and reify some of them into a world of trans-subjective reality (Ward). In this world all reference to subjective synthesis is dropped and things are individuated by certain objective determinants whose subjective origin is forgotten. When in the materialistic scheme space, time and mass are regarded as the determinants of atomic individuality or *materia signata* of finite spirituality, these are taken as very real things. As a matter of fact, however, these, because of their greater universality and constancy, got detached from the concrete experiences with which they were originally bound up, raised to the status of landmarks or milestones and regarded as determinants of individuality or principles of individuation. In each there is really a trinity of characters—each is at first a part of individual experience, then an abstract concept, and lastly a real something. An experience, a concept, a thing—such is the development of space, time, energy, and such other ideas, as we pass on from individual experience to intersubjective intercourse and thence to absolute experience. (The individual becomes similarly determined in a threefold manner, viz., from the individual-subjective, the conceptual and the universal or absolute standpoint, i.e., from the personal, the social and the absolute standpoint.)

The threefold distinction is so fundamental that even a casual study reveals the fact that individual experience leads the way and that gradually convention displaces personal experience (though not absolutely), and that lastly an overpersonal determination is resorted to. Plato was simply drawing the logical conclusion of conceptual determination when he regarded the ideas as objectively real and thus passed from convention to overpersonality. In our artificial systems of thought, such as economics and law, convention (based on prudence) plays a great part, and even the natural and experiential determinations of individuality are replaced by pure fictions. A

minor is for many purposes not an individual in law. Both in criminal and in civil law he suffers from certain disabilities and enjoys certain advantages. In politics the full right of a citizen is not enjoyed by all. The economic individual is like the horse-power, a pure fiction whose conventional significance is well understood though indefinable. In all such cases, therefore individuality is conceptual or rather social. Society even goes to the length of determining the quantitative worth of different individuals (as when meting out punishments and damages) and builds up a concept of values, which different individuals are supposed to possess in different quantities. Cutting across such conventional individuations we have protests from the communists, socialists and democrats in general that the absolute worth of each individual is the same as that of his fellowmen. (But even among the philosophers themselves there is no agreement as to whether the degree of reality is uniform in the world or whether things possess different degrees of reality and individuality. Thus even overpersonal individuality has been apportioned differentially to different beings till we come to the position of Leibnitz that in the world no two individuals are alike in any way. Each is absolutely unique from the absolute standpoint and thus literally fulfils the condition of individuality. Assimilation of individuals is done when the differences do not count for the purpose in hand. If we keep to Realism we become more or less committed to particulars that are different from one another and individuated by their own external relations. This is no denial of the existence of classes, but a limitation of the idea of natural kinds by the supplementary notion of differential determinations of individual units on the objective plane.

The second abstraction referred to above is the world of concepts at which we may arrive by abstracting from personal experience with no idea of reaching a true knowledge of reality but only to economise thought. Thus, unlike the ideas of space, time, energy, etc., we have the ideas of virtue, quantity,

etc., that are the results of secondary abstraction. Croce makes a distinction between the pseudo-concepts that have no reality and the pure concepts that are the objects of intuition and have an objective reference. Except in Platonic philosophy the class ideas and the abstract concepts have no counterpart in reality and are merely symbols which the mind constructs and arranges in a systematic order without any reference to reality. These concepts are of two types—qualitative and quantitative. They are classified and distinguished by the meanings ascribed to them by the thinking that generates them and are individualised in that way. The distinction is purely conceptual and conventional and the principle in individuation is the meaning-content fixed either by inter-subjective intercourse of remote reference to actual experience or by pure definition.

The generally accepted method is to define the individual in terms of qualitative concepts or class ideas which the individual shares with others. The different attributes (essential and inessential) of a thing are possessed by other things also and what is individual is not the attributes themselves but the number of the attributes and their mode of integration at a particular point, as Gilbert of Poitiers pointed out long ago. All definition that is not genetic fights shy of development and change, and hence the definition of life and mind is far more difficult than that of pure matter. But in our strict definition of an individual the banishment of time is almost fatal as also space; for it will be found that after all the attributes have been mentioned, we can never be sure that that particular assemblage of attributes is nowhere else to be found and then our only conviction will be that at any particular point-instant no two things with an identical synthesis of qualities are possible. The only other way is to talk of subjective concentration and purpose, which really qualify the thing in a unique way as space-time does. The conceptual way of determining things is always indirect and subject to doubt: only a direct experience,

whether of things or of thoughts, can properly individuate ; but then the direct experience has to be regarded as being individuated by itself somehow.

There is no doubt however that the uniqueness of the individual is a disquieting experience, for what we want is predictability and law. Classification is in the core of our being and hence even where the differences are obtrusively prominent we make out the mean, the mode, the median, etc., in order to handle conveniently the data of experience. We make a distinction between the essential and the inessential and think that the essence is like a compound radical which acts as the nucleus of substantiality and individuality and that round about this nucleus other inessential qualities gather and differentiate one thing from another of the same class. In this way we get a list of the concepts that are supposed to lie at the root of all creation at its different levels, *e.g.*, the list supplied by Hegel, and fondly believe that Nature follows the scheme of Thought. The belief is however disappearing slowly from Philosophy and we are gradually coming to believe in the emergence of the new, the unpredictability of the future and the contingency of laws. We are still however absolutely in the dark regarding the qualitative syntheses of Nature, *i.e.*, regarding the possible ways in which Nature can organise things. It must be admitted that all qualities do not synthesise indiscriminately, but that Nature seems to move within certain fixed limits regarding the generation of things. In spite of occasional mutation, as for example in *Oenothera Lamarkiana* and *Drosophila ampelophila*, the species of plants and animals seem to have reached a staticity in number, as if the permutations and combinations in Nature are finite in number and that the individual has not the right to make all possible syntheses but only compossible ones, to quote Leibnitz's words. (It must therefore be admitted that here either Nature or the human intellect has to admit limitation and be satisfied with individuals that share some features with other individuals and are classifiable.)



But lest it should be thought that therefore Nature is partial towards the race and relentless towards the individuals we must hasten to add that Nature knows no absolute identity just as she does not know absolute diversity. Not only is it possible to show that no two individuals possess an identical set of attributes, but it is also possible to show that the quantities of the qualities possessed by the individuals are not identical. The human mind is always reluctant to complicate matters by a consideration of the quantitative aspect of things and would fain remain satisfied with mere quality. But when the other criteria of individuality fail it is the quantitative aspect that serves to prevent confusion in thought. Seriation of some kind, whether of intensity or of worth, is a helpful procedure where qualitative equivalence in other aspects is obtrusive. It is true that the concept of continuity threatens to introduce into our idea of the world infinite diversity, universal flux and consequent scepticism and a slippery foothold on reality, but it does not hide from us the true face of Nature where no quality is without some quantity (Kant) and no two individuals with the identical quantity of identical qualities. If Nature had deigned to produce things with single qualities, these might have been individuated by their quantity. (But Nature has chosen to mingle qualities (although in a limited number of ways) and built classes and these serve generally to individuate.) When however the class-criterion fails, we fall back upon the criteria that quantity supplies and differentiate things in respect of their quantities and not in respect of their qualities. It may also be remembered that according to some ways of thinking all qualities are ultimately derivatives of quantity, that out of the same stuff different qualities emerge at different levels owing to differences in synthesis. Here the criterion of individuality would be the looseness or firmness of the synthesis of the elements in a given position. No less in the formation of character than in the formation of the texture in the plant and the animal, the degree of coherence determines the nature of

the individual. Thus ultimately the determinants of individuality, *viz.*, internal relation, external relation and intimacy of relation, may all be conceived to be present in different quantities in different individuals and thereby individuate them. Locke had indeed talked of a substance underlying the synthesis of attributes (and our ordinary idea of an individual is that it is a substance); but even when we banish this idea, we cannot totally abolish the idea of differential coherence and think of different things as being loosely organised and compactly organised or to arrange the materials of experience in order of their complexity of organisation. Where, as in the inorganic world, the degree of internal organisation is imperceptible, we are loth to use the word individual and talk of particulars; but in the worlds of life and mind individuality and organisation go hand in hand. The rise of Voluntarism and Intuitionism is welcome on account of the fact that the one-sidedness of Intellectualism was prejudicial to the appreciation of the individual as individual and tended to think the individual too much as the representative of a class. Let us rather hold fast to experience and begin with the individual which is the surest and the first by way of knowledge and let us admit that classification is generally a pragmatic phenomenon. Let us admit also that although we are not fully able to explain the criteria of individuality either from the personal or from the social or from the absolute standpoint, the exclusive aspect implied in uniqueness and the inclusive aspect implied in coherence of attributes are present in all individuals. Whether we shall ever be able to get down to unrelated particulars with external relations and be able to individuate still, is a matter of great doubt, for even then space and time will persist and possibly also some determinate substantiality and not bare existence. Whether we shall be able to individuate without personal valuation is equally doubtful, for in spite of all protests Protagoras uttered one of the mightiest truths that Man is the Measure of all things. But there is no reason why

men should not be able to evolve a notion that will be socially acceptable for all practical purposes even though this will involve classification on the one hand and convention on the other. Whether individuality persists beyond death is a question that affects sentient existence in general and has been answered more by faith than by reason. As that hangs with our idea of salvation and our belief in a transmundane order, it raises a question which is beyond the scope of this present paper.

HARIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

IS CHANGE ULTIMATE ?

There is no concept of greater importance in Contemporary Philosophy than the concept of change. Philosophy is generally regarded as a dull subject, which admits of no change, no variation in its assumptions or its aims. Yet after the scientific vogue of evolution, Philosophy seems to have put on a new garb, and breaking away from the static concepts of old philosophy, has become more and more dynamic in character. From the days of Plato onwards in Europe, and the Upanishadic seers in India there has been a definite assumption in the mind of most philosophers, colouring all their thought, that what changes cannot be real. Hence the real was conceived as something that is changeless, something that is perfect. And the phenomenal world of change received the stamp of inferiority by being called *māyā* or the world of mere appearance. Even the Hegelian conception of the Absolute has been interpreted by the most orthodox Idealists as being static, admitting of an infinite number of permutations and combinations among its parts, so long as these leave unaffected the Absolute itself in its immaculate perfection. Bergson's banner of revolt and his planting it at the very heart of reality has given rise to a new outlook on life and to new problems. Italian Idealism, rising as an offshoot of Hegelianism, has joined hands with Bergsonism, and the question is whether this new philosophy helps to solve old problems, and can thus establish its claims to man's allegiance.

Approaching our subject from a definitely Idealistic standpoint we may take it as generally admitted that our experience is finite and relational, and hence incomplete. Nothing in our

finite experience can be self-complete, as it is dependent in all directions and is seen to form a part of larger and larger systems, till it is recognised to be a fragment in the ultimate unity of the Absolute. The Absolute is self-complete and self-contained in the sense there is nothing outside it to be related to. The fragments within the Absolute continue in their eternal dance of change and restlessness according to some law of ordered change, which we may speak of as evolution.

The Absolute, which is nothing if not the unity of its parts, has this evolutionary process going on and gives rise to two possible views.

1. Things evolve, but not the Absolute itself.
2. The Absolute itself evolves.

This second view is not popular with the orthodox Idealists of the type of Bradley and Bosanquet. To them a changing Absolute is a contradiction in terms. Yet if we ask why it should be a contradiction in terms, we only come across an old philosophic prejudice that what changes cannot be real. The difficulty is apparently heightened, when it is asserted that the Absolute is perfect; and if it is so, to say that it evolves or admits of progress is to deny its perfection. Here again it is the ghost of the old theistic ideas, that is haunting the vestibules of philosophy. After centuries of superstition and groping for light, men had come to a monotheism of an exalted type, conceiving an all-perfect God, a God above all change. The difficulties of the theistic position have been the commonplaces of philosophy since the days of Kant. But it seems to have passed on its notions of perfection and changelessness to its philosophical successor: the Absolute. It is hardly necessary for us, however, at this stage of our philosophical development to repeat the Cartesian fallacy of deducing the existence of perfection from the idea of perfection. It would be merely a Cartesian dogma to believe that the idea of perfection suggests itself to us all by itself, for human experience clearly shows that it is our consciousness that things are not as they might

be or as they ought to be, that gives rise to our consciousness of imperfection, and it is this in its turn, which generates in us the idea of perfection. This could be easily illustrated by the progressive evolution of the idea of God or the most perfect Being in the different religions, but it would take us too far afield to adduce these illustrations on the present occasion. It is certainly instructive that the idea of perfection has itself evolved, and that at every stage it stood for something static, and yet in the face of prejudices it has insisted on moving. (It is palpably a vicious circle to argue that something is perfect, because it does not change; and that it cannot change, because it is perfect.)

There is another reason and a more pressing one why the first view, which confines evolution only to phenomena, is unsatisfactory. It renders finite struggles a complete enigma. What for do we strive? What is our destiny? If it be self-realisation, whether as complete absorption in Brahman or as individual immortality, it is a matter of utter indifference to the Ultimate? (If the Absolute or Brahman is not affected by our success or our failure, our success itself is of no ultimate worth. If our finite struggles do not affect the Ultimate, the Ultimate itself will somehow fall outside us, leading us into a dualism, which destroys the unity of the Absolute or of Brahman.)

To put the same difficulty from another standpoint, we may refer here to the problem of evil. Nothing is of more practical importance to us than this, and it seems to us to constitute the very crux of a philosophical theory. Monism, whether of the Spinozistic or the Hegelian type, has again and again to meet the charge that it does not explain evil, and only succeeds in making out that it does not really exist. But nothing is more acutely felt than suffering, the most concrete form of evil. It is possible to show that it is merely a stage in the development of the good, that it is necessary for our spiritual development, and in this sense at least it would be real. That it has at least a phenomenal reality as great as or as little as our physical



body, a tree or a river, can hardly be denied without being guilty of a meaningless paradox.

Our point is that this evil is not apart from the ultimate system of reality. If good as a phenomenon is a part of the Absolute, evil cannot be less so, and the whole significance of evolution is in a progressive preponderance of good over evil. Hence it follows that even the most partial success of good has a meaning for the ultimate reality. Just for purposes of illustration we may make use of theism as an analogy. God is conceived by theism as an omnipotent, omniscient Being, apart from Whom nothing can be and apart from Whose knowledge nothing can happen. Christianity goes so far as to assert that man can do no good without the grace of God. It is notorious that the problem of evil is a hard nut to crack for all pure monotheisms. If God has nothing to do with the evil that men do, either of two alternatives will have to be accepted. Either there is an independent spirit, Angramanyosh, Satan, or Iblis, who is responsible for all the evil, and in that case we have an ultimate dualism, or man has got a real power to be evil and so also to be good, thus limiting the power of God. Either of these positions orthodox monotheism will not accept, though we may find off and on a Schweitzer asserting that all religions must be dualistic. Even granting that man can be good or bad by himself without making God responsible for his actions, surely in theism God should at least be conceived as taking a deep and an almost personal interest in the doings of His creatures, and in that case we shall have a God, who in the words of Mr. Pringle Pattison, "lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares in the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wandering and sorrows and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect." If theism is to hold at all as a philosophical creed, it must boldly hold some such conception as Pringle Pattison's, though it gives a go-by to the popular shibboleths of perfection,

a changeless God, a God that is indifferent to, and is not affected by the improvement or the degeneration of mankind. If theism is to have any moral worth, it must conceive of a God, limited perhaps, but a God whose glory is enhanced by man's each virtuous act or whose glory is affected by man's each sinful act. It is not at all our purpose to defend here any particular type of theism. (Only it seems to us that the theism, which is to be logically coherent and morally stimulating, will have to posit a God, who is not static, but dynamic, progressive, revelling in and partaking of the progress of His creatures)

To revert now to the discussion of the Absolute and its relation to the phenomenal world. If the Absolute is the whole system of the universe, and if the phenomena are part and parcel of that whole, it follows that the changes in the parts cannot but affect the whole. To say that the parts may change without affecting the whole is to say something that is impossible to conceive except in one sense, and that sense is irrelevant to the question in hand. *E.g.*, it is true that all particular mango trees are undergoing a continuous change, and yet it is true that the mango tree as such—as a Platonic Idea—does not change. So too it may be argued that the Absolute cannot change. But this argument can refer only to the idea of the Absolute: something that is conceived *in se*, *per se*, something that is self-complete, something that has nothing outside it. In this sense the Absolute never changes; in fact it cannot change. But this is only the Absolute that is conceived in abstraction. The Absolute we are concerned with is the concrete living system of things, and such an Absolute cannot but partake in the movement of its phenomenal parts. Phenomena are appearances of the Absolute, and unless they have an ultimate meaning, *i.e.*, share in the ultimate significance of the Absolute itself, they may as well have not happened at all.

Against this position it may be argued that etymologically and historically the word "Absolute" has been always used

in opposition to the relative, the changing. Perhaps it is so ; we are not concerned to deny it. But it is an open question whether Hegel, with whom the concept of the Absolute came into vogue, necessarily means by it something static, something above change. We are not sure that Hegel, who was an evolutionist before the days of Evolution, and who sought to discover the philosophy of history, necessarily conceived it in any sense opposed to our own. But even if he did, it would be most strange, if with the growth of our knowledge the significance of the idea were not to change. (We do not see any logical absurdity in the conception of a changing Absolute. The genuine essence of the Absolute is that there is nothing outside it, and that at any moment it is complete within itself and yet continually transcending itself. Our conception of the Absolute fulfils this essential meaning, for if it changes, the change does not come from without. It rather springs from within the depths of its own being. A child is not apart from its parents, it is the manifestation of them. In the last resort everything that happens comes from the Absolute and is within it, and in its own humble way manifests the rich concreteness of the Absolute itself. In a profound sense it is true that everything has its being in the Absolute, and that the Absolute lives in its parts, eternally partaking of their life and their freshness.)

So far we have dealt with change as fundamental in a logical theism and a logical Absolutism. Before closing we may briefly consider the Advaitic position, which perhaps is the most formidable advocate of a changeless Brahman.

While the Absolute of European Philosophy is a system of things, *i.e.*, of relations, the Advaitic Brahman is essentially unrelational. The Absolute revels in its infinite number of concrete manifestations, the Brahman revels in its pure simplicity. A stock argument to prove the oneness and the onliness of Brahman is the analogy of things made out of gold or clay. Gold continues the same in all its forms, whether of

bangles or buttons or plates. So too does clay in all the various forms it is given. Similarly Brahman is the same in all its forms, which are but its accidents, and the essence of knowledge is to see Brahman in everything and everything in Brahman. Everywhere and always Brahman continues the same. Change belongs to the world of māyā. The relation of Brahman and māyā is the most fruitful topic of discussion all over India. The dismissal of māyā as not real has not failed to give rise to hostile reactions even in India, as *e.g.*, in the philosophy of Rāmānujāchārya or Madhwāchārya. Let us briefly see what part the idea of change can play in this system of thought.

It is admitted that in no sense of the term can māyā be said to be the essence of Brahman. But it is equally admitted that it cannot be done away with. Its existence is also eternal. So if it is, it can only be as an attribute of Brahman, for *ex hypothesi* Brahman alone is. If it is appearance, *ex hypothesi* it can only be an appearance of Brahman. The world of māyā is always changing, but it is argued that this change cannot affect Brahman. The Brahman is conceived as being nirguna (qualityless). If it means that it has a nature indescribable and unknowable so far as our finite intellect is concerned, we have a position, which is intelligible, though it has got its own difficulties. If it means, however, that it has got no nature, *i.e.*, no qualities at all, we have a position, which from a metaphysical point of view is nothing better than the abstract Unknown of Herbert Spencer. If it exists at all, it must have got some nature, or else how can we even say it appears as māyā at all? Of course it may be at once conceded that this nature, conceived by itself, *i.e.*, apart from its concrete manifestations, cannot change any more than the Idea of a mango tree can change. But to conceive the Brahman thus in its abstraction—and it is so conceived by the Advaitins of the orthodox type at least—is to conceive it in its utter simplicity, as a sort of compulsory, but an entirely uninterested, substratum for the world of māyā; as devoid of all the rich and

concrete significance of *māyā*. The question resolves itself to this: has the world of *māyā* any significance, any purpose, or is it a mere blind play of forces? If philosophy is a search for significance,—and what else can it be?—it is clear that it cannot accept the second alternative without committing suicide. If then the first alternative comes to be accepted, that significance cannot belong merely to phenomena, it must belong to the core of reality: Brahman itself. Brahman may not be conceived as a system of relations or related things. Let the things be ever so different from one another, they will all find their unity in Brahman, the fountain-head of their being and their activity. Its supreme purpose may be beyond human ken, but how can the reality of this purpose be totally denied without denying the reality—or the phenomenality, if you like,—of everything else? This supreme purpose, unknowable as a whole, yet works itself out in time as evolution. Let us illustrate this from history. The grand panorama of human history discloses the “vanished” glories of old civilisations, and it is pathetically asked: where are the glories of Egypt and Babylon, Greece and Rome? But let us not be deluded by rhetoric. Have these great civilisations really disappeared? Apart from ignorance, is it open to any serious student of history to believe so? In fact these great civilisations spread their culture. The old Babylonian and Persian religion left its indelible stamp on Judaism and through it on Christianity and on Mahomedanism. Nor was Greece left untouched by influences so catching as those of Egypt and Persia. And who but a tyro will say that Greece and Rome are dead, when more than half the structure of European civilisation to-day rests broad-based on Greek art and Greek philosophy, on Roman Law and Roman administration?

The whole universe too moves on in its great course of evolution “ohne hast, ohnerast,” as great Goethe put it. If all this be a mere pageant, which leaves Brahman untouched, surely we may say that not reason, but mockery stands enthroned in the universe, and we may ask why worry about life itself? The

prize that is held out to the jñāni : moksha itself, is not a prize that falls into the lap of every fool. It is a prize attained through a strenuous preparation extending over a series of births and deaths, through suffering and travail. Of what worth is all this, if change is of no ultimate worth, and time could be annihilated ? If the aim of all human existence is absorption in Brahman, and if this aim is unattainable except through the portals of the world of māyā, we submit that the end and the means cannot be divorced, and the reality of the end involves the reality of the means, though of course in a lesser degree.)

A. R. WADIA

THE MONISTIC SPELL IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

In the course of the last three years England has lost four of her greatest philosophers, Bradley, Bosanquet, MacTaggart and Ward. The influence of the first two on English thought was unique. They gave materialistic and matter-of-fact England a taste of monistic religion for the first time in her history. They were not only philosophers, but deeply religious men in their own ways, and with all their differences with popular Christianity, they revered Christ and respected the Christian tradition. Hence they commanded the respect and attention of the religious sections of English society. As the result of their labours during the last half a century or so, the Christianity of England and other English-speaking countries is now a far more rational and profound thing than it ever was. But nevertheless the influence of these philosophers is being gradually felt as a spell,—one fraught with a serious danger to true religion. During the last three decades various attempts have been made in England and America to escape this danger, while retaining what is valuable in Absolutism. These attempts have been only partially successful. The hold of Monism on higher western thought seems too tight to be fully shaken off. I confess unreservedly the power of this spell on me. In my own way I also have been trying to shake it off, but I am not quite sure that I have succeeded. The religious history of our race, our religious and philosophical tradition, predispose us to Monism. India has been more or less monistic ever since the days of the Upanishads. Since the time of Sankara Monism has been supreme in the country. Vaishnavism is commonly represented as a Dualistic system; but the fact is that the earlier Vaishnavascriptions, from the *Mahábhárata* to the *Bhágavata*, are monistic

in their philosophy. Their attempts to teach a doctrine of *Bhakti* are successful only so far as they are inconsistent with their own philosophical creed. The later Vaishnava Puranas, such as the *Brahmavaivarta* and the *Náradapancharátra*, seem to succeed in founding a system of *Bhakti* only by throwing off Vedantism altogether and weaving an imaginary Rádha-Krishna story which drags religious thought into the quagmire of sense. The labours of Vaishnava philosophers like Rámánuja and Nimbárka were successful only so far as they pointed out the difficulties of the Máya theory. They failed to set forth any positive theory of knowledge on which their doctrine of unity-in-difference could be safely built and the interest of true religion properly safeguarded. The same is true of those thinkers who are engaged in criticising the monistic Absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet. They show its difficulties, specially its inadequacy as a basis of religion, but when they proceed to formulate a constructive philosophy of religion, they either fail to do so or draw so largely on the materials supplied by those two philosophers as practically to identify the critics with the objects of their criticism. This is pre-eminently true of the writings of Prof. Pringle-Pattison, the most persistent critic of Absolutism. Its Pluralistic critics like James, Ward and Howison are even more unsatisfactory in this respect.

The fact is that if you emphasise the individuality or separate personality of the finite self and ignore the fact, first emphasised in English thought by T. H. Green and Edward Caird, that the condition of true knowledge is the presence of the Universal in man, you not only have no theory of knowledge, but really lose your hold of all true religion. If the God you worship is anything beyond your idea of a Supreme Person derived from the religious atmosphere around you, it is that in you which connects you with the world, with infinite time and space, with the numberless personalities with which you are surrounded. But to see the Universal in you is to see your unity with it. The consciousness of unity with God sets all doubts at rest

and opens a wide and practically infinite vista of religious experience such as mere believers or dualistic thinkers have no idea of. This is the essence of monistic thought, and to lose it seems the loss of all religion worthy of a thoughtful man. This is the charm which has caused monistic religion to be supreme in India and which has made it powerful in the West during the last half a century. But criticism suggests that if the worshipper and the Worshipped are essentially one, worship ceases to be real. If it is the Creator himself who is or has become the creation and the created self, and who worships himself in all worship, religion is a mere make-believe on the part of God, which is clearly absurd, as the All-wise cannot delude himself. If this criticism is seriously accepted, there is indeed an end of all real religion. But Absolutists and those more or less influenced by Absolutism, do not seriously accept this criticism. It seems to them that somehow or other the reality of one element of experience,—of the finite and the individual—has not been properly emphasized in the Absolutist theory of knowledge or has eluded the attention of its students. There would indeed be no knowledge if the Universal, the Whole, were not in us. But, on the other hand, it is equally true that there would be no knowledge if the finite and the individual were not there to receive the influx of the Universal and the Whole in him. It will not do to emphasise the one element at the expense of the other: both are equally real. In all our thoughts about God, including our devotional exercises, we distinguish the Infinite and Universal from ourselves. If this distinction were not real, but only apparent or illusory, no thought and no religion would be possible. If the infinite were alone, without the finite as related to and thus distinct from him, thought and religion would be impossible even for a moment. The future theory of knowledge and philosophy of religion must proceed on some such line as the one indicated. They must show in the clearest manner possible that if the finite cannot be separated from the infinite, neither can it be merged in it.

In time and in eternity the human self is ever distinct from and yet related to the Divine Self.

Monism in this country and in the West endeavours to show that both 'thought and religion are mere appearances, mere passing forms which Reality assumes by a power inherent in it but inscrutable in its nature. The inscrutability of this power is more clearly recognised in our indigenous philosophy than in that of the West. The latter seems not to have become sufficiently self-conscious to recognise it clearly. Here however lies the weakness of all monistic theories. A reality which is absolutely one, unrelated to anything distinct from it, cannot by its very nature manifest itself in finite and related forms, however transient and illusory they may be. That the Absolute does so, which is acknowledged by both eastern and western Monism, proves unmistakably that the finite and related has a permanent place in it and that therefore it is not an unrelated and solitary Absolute. The postulation of an inscrutable power in it, a power by which it appears to be what it is really not, is no philosophy. To Mr. Bradley, indeed, philosophy itself is an appearance. To our Hindu Monists bondage and liberation and the wisdom which talks of them are all illusory. This reduces Monism to absolute Agnosticism. It makes the Absolute itself an illusion. If philosophy is an illusion, so is the Absolute which it postulates. A mere inscrutable power is not a reality. Power is a definite intelligible reality. We know its nature in exercising the power which we call our own. In all actions it proceeds upon ideas,—the idea of the thing to be done and that of the purpose to be fulfilled by the action. In the absence of such ideas power is not power, or in other words the postulation of power is unmeaning. And all exercise of power has an ethical quality inalienable from it. It proceeds upon an idea of *good* to be achieved. And the idea of good is essentially dualistic. What we mean is that an Absolute unrelated to a finite distinct from it cannot have an idea of good to be achieved. The good

must be for a finite and relative reality. An absolute seeking to achieve a good for itself yet unrealised ceases to be absolute. It is the ignoring of these truths, specially the essentially ethical quality of all action, which lies at the root of all monistic thought both in this country and in the West and the difficulties to which such thought leads us. The apparently transient nature of thoughts—of relational knowledge, the knowledge which implies a distinction of subject and object, of the knower and the known,—seems to indicate that it has no permanent place in ultimate reality. Even our best thoughts are fugitive. They leave the field of our individual consciousness for great lengths of time. Memory, which vouches for personal identity, is one of the most fleeting things in our experience. In sound sleep there is a total collapse of our individual consciousness. These facts seem to indicate an ultimate Reality of which thought and relational knowledge are not essential attributes. But unless what we condemn as "appearances" have a permanent place in Reality, how do they re-appear in our individual consciousness and how did they appear at all in the form of finite consciousness for the first time, supposing there was such a time? What is unreal, mere appearance,—could not have a place in Reality even for a moment. Nothing can come out of nothing. That our finite consciousness, with all its contents, persists in the Infinite even in our hours of sleep and oblivion, is evident from the fact of its re-appearance in re-awakening and memory. And we may also conclude that it so exists in the Infinite eternally, for the Infinite is beyond the flux of time. The further conclusion, therefore, that the Absolute Experience is not unrelational—that it has internal relations, though no relation to anything beyond it—is inevitable. There can be no reasonable objection therefore to conceive the Absolute as thinking or knowing. It knows all things and persons eternally, not in time, as we, finite persons, do. And an Experience which knows persons is itself a person. And as the

Absolute Experience is an Agent,—creating things and persons, manifesting them from his eternal bosom for the first time or re-manifesting them after their dis-appearance in times of our sleep and oblivion, he must necessarily be a moral Being. His actions must be determined by ideas of the good of finite beings. As we have already said, it is the ignoring of these necessary truths which lands us in the extremes of an unethical and ultimately unmeaning Monism. There is need for Philosophy to check its unrestrained course of abstract theoretical speculation, take due cognisance of our ethical and spiritual experiences, and feel after a system which can satisfactorily explain these experiences. A system which cannot explain our love for one another, our love for God, our endeavours after moral, social and political improvement and our faith in the ultimate triumph of truth and righteousness, is not a philosophy, but a passing dream.

SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAN

AN ASPECT OF RELIGION

It is really a difficult task to scrutinise all the meanings religion has assumed. Prof. Leuba¹ enumerates forty-eight definitions of religion from as many great men and adds two of his own. This indicates the many-sided complexity of religion which seems to have blurred the clear vision of many thinkers and as a consequence some aspects of it are over-emphasised and others neglected in their definitions. A critical analysis of most of the definitions that has been proposed for it, reveals that writer although differing in essential spirit have this in common, that they are either intellectualist or affectivist, that is to say, the vital element of religion has been attributed by them either to a particular idea or to a particular feeling or emotion. We have on the one hand the definitions of Spencer, Max Müller, Romanes Goblet d'Alviella and others for whom religion is 'the recognition of a mystery pressing for interpretation' or 'a department of thought' or 'a belief in superhuman being' and on the other hand the formulas of Schleiermacher, the Ritschlian theologians, Tiels, etc., who hold that religion is a feeling of absolute dependence upon God or that pure and reverent disposition or frame of mind we call piety.

These definitions seem to be exclusively one-sided and tend to stand against the accepted formula that every unit of consciousness is psychologically compounded of will, feeling and thought varying in their relative predominance at different moments.

So every religious belief should of necessity have within itself three mental elements, an intellectual element, *i.e.*, the

¹ A Psychological Study of Religion, Appendix.

knowledge which constitutes the object of belief, a volitional element or the tendency which expresses or tends to express itself in the performance of practices, and an emotional state, *i.e.*, the feeling which mediates between the two.

But looking at the history of religion it can be noticed that religion passes through different successive stages in its evolution and gradually attains its intellectual perfection in abstract metaphysical conceptions. In course of this evolution all the constituent elements of religion undergo modifications; intellectually religion tends towards a philosophy, emotionally it being more and more rarefied passes into an intellectual sentiment, while its will-element, instead of being confined to the performance of rituals, takes the form of contemplative activity or social service in accordance with the ultimate intellectual conception of the nature of divinity.

Religious evolution of this kind is particularly marked in Hindu scriptures. The religion which begins with the naturalism of the Vedas is organised and becomes social and moral with Brahmanism and attains a transcendental ideality in the Bhagavad-Gita.

But the same cannot be said of all other religions. There are existing communities with their religious beliefs and practices unchanged for centuries together. The savages have not in the least deviated from their ancestral belief. Amongst them religion has undergone no change in the emotional or intellectual characters. But instead of considering separately different systems of religion as developing in different nations and tribes, if we make a comprehensive survey of the world religions and trace their progressive development in relation to one another we find in them almost an organic unity. For all changes and transformations that can be marked in them are nothing but the results of natural growth and find in it their best explanation. The development of religion and their relation to one another are not arbitrarily based but, on the contrary, they are determined by the character of nations and

races, as well as by the influence of the circumstances surrounding them and also of specially gifted individuals. The earliest history of religion began with Animism². We find hardly any traces of the religion that preceded it. Animism still continues in the form of nature-religions and in the polydaemonistic beliefs of different tribes. Polytheistic religions that prevail among many civilised nations are based upon it and have developed through traditions. But polythism² gave place here and there to nomistic religions based upon law or holy scripture. This development occurred later than polytheism and should be regarded as a further progress in religious evolution. Still further development takes the form of monotheism which² again in logical types of minds, passes over into a kind of philosophy. Considered generally, the polytheistic religions include most of the Indo-Germanic and Semetic religions, the Egyptians and some others. The Nomistic religions comprise Confucianism, Taoism, the Mosaism of the eighth century B.C. the Judaism, Brahmanism and Mazdeism. The universal religions are Buddhism, Christianity and Mohammadanism. These are the three periods which must have preceded one another in the order of religious progress. But in the history of religions it is not to be believed that they are related to one another only in the genealogical sense such as the Vedic to the Aryan, Confucianism to the ancient Chinese religion, Buddhism to Brahmanism, etc., and have remained unaffected by the other to which they are not allied by descent. With the progress of civilisation and the rapid development of the means of communication sufficient facilities were given to the people to come into contact with one another and thus to imbibe the ideas that developed in different spheres of their actions. So religions particularly at higher stages were derived from many different sources though, primarily considered, they had at their basis this or that particular prevailing religion without which they might not have been founded.

Now it is clear that religion first of all originated in

polydaemonism or spirit worship, then in due course it developed and assumed the nomistic forms and at last culminated in monotheism. Thus we find a progressive march of generalisation in religion from an almost unlimited multiplicity up to unity. It stands now clear that animism is the ultimate basis upon which religion has started and later developed with the intellectual progress of the races. But the various races of mankind differ greatly in their powers of abstraction and generalisation, some can scarcely get beyond the concrete while others can well move in the region of the abstract. This difference of aptitude is expressed in their religions also. So, many peoples have never passed beyond polydaemonism. This polydaemonism or animism still prevails in different forms among the existing communities where civilisation has not flourished but even in higher religions too its numerous traces are found and are explained by Prof. Tiele as 'the survival and revival of the older elements.' But 'the survival and revival of the older elements' is no doubt, I think, due, in some measure, to tradition but the tradition cannot by itself continue effective if there was not natural predisposition to accept it.

Now we shall try to make an analytic study of the conception of Animism from which religion has first set out.

Religion is after all a product of imagination. In the higher forms of religion imagination indeed combines greatly with reason and may at every step be influenced by the experiences in this world; while in the lower forms particularly in animism imagination is largely or entirely unrestrained by reference to reality and tends to merge in mere fantasy where the emotional element is all powerful but the rational element altogether vanishes.

The perceptive experience of our ancestors was not the same as ours. We in our everyday experience try to explain everything in terms of mechanical causation. The primitive mind lacked the proper conception of mechanical causation and of natural law. The only kind of causation the primitive people

seemed to be aware of, because of the predominance of volitional and emotional factors in them, was their act of volitional response from the feelings excited in them at the occurrence of striking natural phenomena. The blowing of the wind, the crash of the thunder, the flash of lightning, rain, fire, heat, and light from the sun, growth of vegetation, reproduction, growth of animals and complete darkness—all these things interested the primitive minds otherwise than they do ours. For feeling, instead of intellect, seems to have been the centre of their perceptive experience. They felt and acted in response to the excited feeling to which their belief was due; while their action, expressed in the performance of rites and ceremonies, arising out of this belief favoured and strengthened that belief. Thus the idea and the action as determined by the inner working of an emotive impulse prompted by intense imagination formed almost an ideo-motor circuit which in practice resisted even the slightest interruption. It implies that the very disposition to act in a certain way affords resistance to any deviation from that course. We therefore find people still believing in the fanciful traditions such as that the outbreak of epidemics or the occurrence of earthquakes or of floods is due to the displeasure, incurred by the inhabitants for their crimes or sins, of the presiding deities who are to be appeased by the scrupulous performance of sacrifice and other ceremonies for the getting out of the pest. People are also found to believe that mere performing of certain rites with a purpose brings the purpose to fruition. This is simply an affective belief based on intense and excited imagination. So any interruption or a change in the rites is believed in as invalidating the whole things and when this interruption in the ceremonial performance comes from a different community the feeling underlying the affective belief bursts forth into a fury which often results in communal disasters. But the process that forms the emotive circuit of belief and rites becomes gradually strengthened by the general effect of habit, tradition and prejudice. This emotionally

constituted ideo-motor circuit becomes gradually dissociated through experiences and relatively isolated system of religious ideas is formed which resists comparison and criticism and does not even recognise the principle of contradiction. So incompatible beliefs are seen to have been cherished in the animistic conceptions by the people without their becoming fully aware of their incompatibility. Here their behaviour seems to be similar to that of a child who at one moment sticks pins into her doll, pulls its hair, throws it about and at the next moment gives it her greatest attention by feeding it, dressing it as a mother does a child. Primitive men held that plastic images of objects were as real as the objects themselves. The Chinese regard the images of objects as alter-egos or indwelling souls. The Mandans of North America believe that the pictures are as living as their models. This primitive belief is still prevalent among certain sections of the Indians who refuse to have a picture taken because they think that it will give the man who possesses the picture a power over them. Primitive people regard the name as real and secret and in fact, as a vital part of them, just as much a part of their individuality as their eyes or teeth. So savages have secret names for themselves which must not be known abroad. This is a means of self-protection; for one can gain magical power over another by knowing his name. So the name of a thing especially for the savage is a kind of soul of the thing itself. The primitive man believed that whatever attached to one's shadow attached to one's self. Among West Africans an individual who draws a knife across the shadow of a man is regarded as a murderer and if he is caught he is executed. Primitive men know that for a man to fall into the fire means injury and they think that putting an integral part of him into it will serve the same purpose. From such truths they believe that to injure anything detached from his body will also have the same effects.

So a lock of hair or nail-parings, foot-prints or the clothes of a man are for the purpose of one's action, treated as the man

himself. In case of one's failing to throw his enemy into the fire a lock of his hair is thrown in for the gratification of anger towards him. The survival of similar practices is still found in some parts of India where a lock of hair is stealthily taken from the head of a woman and then some observance made on it either to produce sterility in her or to remove her barrenness. This is all a procedure on illusory analogy and makes for the foundation of the famous maxims of magic. The religious practice that is known as Mana reveals still more clearly the immaturity of the primitive mind. If a man's pigs multiply and his gardens are productive, primitive people believe it is not because he is industrious and looks after his property, but because of the stones full of mana for pigs and yams that he possesses. A hunter enchants his weapons, casts spells upon his expected prey, wears an amulet or stone round his neck or a tuft of leaves in his belt and at the same time he carefully prepares his weapons, patiently tracks his prey, wearily approaches and slays it. But he will not in the least think of his bodily strength and the sharpness of his weapons or of his personal efforts and alertness as causes while incantations and spells though contributing objectively nothing to the event will be all important to him because of his imagined belief in their power to bring in supernatural assistance to his side. This means that some ideas remain so strongly and inseparably associated with certain other ideas (*i.e.*, observances) that a mental circuit seems to be formed of them and the ideas revolve so rigidly in the circuit that no other idea can come into contact with them so as to expose their absurdity and irrelevancy. In short, a state of mental dissociation is established for the system of magical ideas. Physiologically considered the cortical substratum possessed by the primitive people in such magical beliefs must be of the nature in which is rendered impossible the free flow of energy through all organs of the brain, which is absolutely needed for the associability and comparison of all ideas. But this limitation in the flow of neural impulse will

surely indicate a state of inco-ordination in the functions of cortical centres of the primitive brain and also of high synaptic resistance which prevents the new association of neural elements into functional groups. So there will be failure of comparison and therefore of criticism in the primitive minds. And it is for this reason that the validity of the observances such as taboos, omens, mimetic and panto-mimetic practices was not at all questioned by the primitive people but on the contrary they adhered to the traditional beliefs most scrupulously. It is still a practice in India to observe food-rules in daily meals, to recognise the note of a bird or a lizard as indicative of success or failure in some enterprise and also to follow the panto-mimic magic such as in bringing on rain by spilling water or as in avenging oneself on the enemy at a distance by self-display. But the peculiarity of these primitive beliefs is due greatly to the intensity of unrestrained imagination people possessed at the time. They had no conception of natural law and need of explanation hardly acted as a motive in them. It is the intensely excited emotional impulse that determined their judgment and so it happened often for them to believe that things connected in thought were also connected in fact. They were not rational but imaginative beings. So when the primitive people experienced the world of objects they missed the true perspective of it; they imagined in the objects forces which were stronger than themselves and which they believed to be the determining agents of their destinies. So every striking object that took part in their experience became personified and its activity was explained in terms of purpose and desire. So the objects of their experience such as the flash of lightning, the noise of thunder, the destructive power of the flood, etc., no matter whether they are animate or inanimate were believed in as mysterious powers having ultimate control over their interest and destinies. So they were to be appeased in order that they might not interfere with their material well-being. They began to think that all their sufferings



were due to their indifference or actions displeasing to these forces. So different forms of worship and rituals were introduced to please these fearful agents and more or less a bargaining with them in offering sacrifices developed to avoid their anger. It was thus that supernaturalism, instead of naturalism came into existence ; the world became the world of spirits and not of facts and the instruments that developed to please the spirits were those of magic rather than those of scientific method. Now we shall turn to consider the nature of feeling underlying animism.

When the primitive people failed to meet the pressing needs of life in hunting, love, war, agriculture, etc., and grew anxious for the failure but could not account for it, they indulged in unrestrained imagination and believed implicitly that there were mystical powers to be in ultimate control of the natural events and as such these powers were to be propitiated so as to make the circumstances favourable to success in their enterprises. It is still prevalent in India that Ganga, the Goddess of water, is to be worshipped to avoid any catastrophe in the long boat journey or that Indra, the God of thunder should be propitiated so that no rain, thunder and storm might cause hinderance in the celebration of a particular ceremony. So it is for the variety of human interests in life that a number of demons or spirits were conceived so as to preside over them and to direct the affairs favourably or unfavourably according as they were pleased or displeased by the offerings presented to them. So the first ideas of religion arose from a concern with regard to the events of life and fear which actuates the human mind.

Because what man fears but is powerless to control he seeks to appease. Hence is the prominence of devil-worship and of belief in baleful spirits amongst lower races, hence likewise the persistence of kindred beliefs among the ignorant in civilised countries, hence world-wide customs of averting the wrath of gods or of buying their favour by sacrifices, smearing

their images with human blood¹ and wreathing them with human intestines. Hence perhaps is the rise of a special class, medicine men and priests into whose hands all ghostly and ghastly functions fall and who secure dominance over their fellowmen by pretending to be the mouthpiece of the gods, to forgive sins in their name and to make known their will. So fear span out all this fanciful imagery, people dreaded harm from every quarter, particularly from things near at hand whose dire effects touched them closely, as the whirlpool and the breaker, the falling tree, the devouring beast, venomous reptile, but the phenomena further off and less frequent moved them less unless the phenomena were very striking as lightning, eclipse, flood and famine. Polydaemonism had thus its origin in fear but it is not to be meant that the place of fear in animism is then due to its intrinsic qualities; for it is not in virtue of a particular quality or property that fear is the primitive emotional form of religion; it is not to be understood that elements required for the making of religion can only be found in fear and are not present in other emotions. The fact is that the circumstances in which the primitive people lived and the stage of their mental growth were such as to keep fear in the foreground of consciousness. Besides, fear was the first of all organised emotions and still to this day it appears first in the young animal as well as in the infant. So the rule of fear in primitive religion is due to circumstances which make it appear first as a well-organised emotion vitally connected with the maintenance of life. So it is not improbable to think that but for the predominant playing of the fear-instinct in the primitive mind the polydaemonistic form of religion might not have developed, but it does not thereby preclude the possibility of another form of religion developing in the

¹ This is the practice still prevailing in an altered form even amongst the civilised people of India who instead of sacrificing a human being now sacrifice a gourd, which with a human image marked on it is filled with red water as a substitute for the human blood, before the Goddess Durga.



place. It is not unlikely that religion having derived its source primarily from another instinct might have appeared later and from the first in a nobler form.

A question may now arise here: "Is not the Sex-instinct as primitively organised as the Fear-instinct?" and "does it not in any way act in the primitive religion?" The sex-theory seems to have first been advanced in a spirit of contempt for an hostility to religion and it was then opposed by William James in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*. But the Freudian school has later ably laid bare the sexual tendencies as working in religion. Of course it is difficult to refute the Freudian doctrine altogether, but it cannot be a universal principle for all religion. At least polydaemonistic religion is not that type of religion which had its origin in a loving reverence for known gods but on the contrary it began with a vague fear for unknown powers; it is really an attempt to propitiate in dread the evil spirits which signify most important functions and interests of groups. For awe is the distinguishing mark of this religion. Benevolent spirits were more or less unknown to the primitive people. On the *Origin of Civilisation* by Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock, 3rd ed., pp. 212-15), there is an opinion expressed by Scheinfurth 'Among the Bougos of Central Africa good spirits are quite unrecognised.' The tendency seems to be that good spirits, being good, will do them good of themselves just as evil spirits do them harm unsolicited. It is perhaps for this reason that the good spirits were then unrecognised. So the primitive people entered into definite relations first with the evil spirits. But in the gradual development of religious life can be marked the substitution of love for fear such as has occurred in Christianity, Buddhism and others. The sex-element even though not actually participating in Polydaemonism, cannot be said to be entirely absent from all religious practices of the people. For the cult of the phallus, the sacred prostitution and the obscene rites—of varying degrees of rites—of varying degrees of obscurity—prevailed in all primitive

civilisation. The deification of carnal love prevails still in higher civilisation.

In conclusion we are to say that Fear which worked so predominantly in Animistic conceptions does not seem to have been shorn of its entire influence over the religious life of the modern civilised people. Dr. Starbuck has pointed out in his statistical inquiry into religious conversion that 'the central fact in the pre-conversion state is all the sense of sin, while the other conditions are various manifestation of this' (The Psychology of Religion, pp. 58). But the strong back-ground for the sense of sin is well-furnished by fear. Again in the storm and strain experiences he says "Fear comes earliest as was also true in the study of conversion ;.....The sense of sin is next and comes earlier than the feeling of incompleteness (*vide* pp. 221). According to Buddhism life becomes a study of destruction of all desire and effort and interest whatsoever. But is there not a fear-element (such as the apprehension of peril to the soul) involved in the complete surrender of the joys of earth? Does not the feeling of fear in regard to physiological cravings become the only incentive for the ascetics or Bhikshus to adopt extravagant measures that tend to kill the very life they would protect? Do not the horrid pictures of the hell and the increased religious tendency in old age point to the same fact? So Prof. Watson remarks, "I think an examination of the psychological history of people will show that their behaviour is much more easily controlled by fear stimuli than by love, if the fear element were dropped out of any religion that religion would not survive a year."

KSHIRODE CHANDRA MUKHERJI

HINDU PHILOSOPHY ORIENTED TO MODERN SCIENCE

The problem of this paper is to evaluate modernist adjustments of Hinduism in the light of a philosophy of religion oriented to modern science and its effects on social structure. This brief presentation can do little more than suggest a point of view and state in a summary fashion some tentative conclusions, reached by a much more analytic study. The task is a presumptuous one before you who know India so well, and in the face of the vast complexities of historic and contemporary Hinduism, and of India. I do not ignore the numerous considerations and bye-paths other than, and even contradictory to, those I point out. I only attempt to suggest some of the trends of modern Hinduism which give promise of an effective formulation and expression, of a possible scientific philosophy of religion.

My point of view is that of functional psychology, which emphasises the primacy of practical life interests and activities, and the secondary nature of thinking. The given data are psychophysical organisms seeking adjustment in a physical-social environment. Toward this adjustment, consciousness and thinking are functional, probably arising out of conflict situations. Conflict situations, and times of practical, social disorganization may occasion new thought projections, and attempts at re-organization. Accordingly, social change conditions effective thought progress, both as the occasion for it, and as the ultimate test of its effectiveness.

On such a firm ground stands also contemporary psychology of religion. Religion is of practical, human origin and purpose. It arises out of vital human needs, and pursues

progressively the deepest social values and life meanings. Religious philosophies are projections of the values and ideals of any time and people, rooted always in the practical life interests of the people. Now a new would-be scientific day greets the world. At once precious heritages are endangered and new values are promised. Religious philosophies are challenged to conserve and to create. The challenges of modern science are, consistently, from two directions. Primarily, the practical results of science, in discovery, invention, new industry, and communication are radically changing ways of living and working, the world over. They are making of the world one great family, with many new problems the same for all of its members, and yet with their interests and ambitions conflicting the more violently because now they must live so closely. The dangers of extreme materialism loom large; there is dire threat of many folk becoming slaves of machines, or of those who own machines. To save and to guide, philosophers of religion are needed.

Moreover, the second challenge of modern science is that of scientific thought, to philosophies, world-views, religious rationalizations and ideals. The scientific hypothesis of an evolutionary world-view has found man to be the product of an evolving cosmos, which has come to consciousness in man. His functional intelligence only can give purpose to the Universe. The task of a modern philosophy of religion is not only to guide that purpose and project its ideals, but to point out the technique of realizing them. For this task the religious thinker needs to survey the natural, physical resources available to man, and the religious worker needs to appropriate scientific methods, findings, and tools for controlling and using natural environment. But scientific war has demonstrated the need of subjecting the achievements of the physical science to the welfare of all humanity. So with equal care must be surveyed psychical, human resources. The modern religious leader must look to the social sciences to find the technique for

embodying glorious new ideals. These ideals are essentially human: democracy, intellectual and economic freedom, co-operation and internationalism. But only as social expressions and in actual human conduct are such ideals effective. Salvation for humanity must be in terms of social transformation. Her saviours must be social saviours. The great task is universal, and is clearly a human responsibility. Providence must be in terms of a "World Mind, a World Conscience, a World Will." Such is the demand of our day for a humanistic, scientific philosophy of religion. Toward its formulation what promise does India give?

Humble as is my "foreign" attempt to understand historic Hinduism, a very brief statement of my analysis must be preliminary to my evaluation of modernist adjustments. These I take to be the outstanding essentials of the historic social mind of India: Of social forms the core has been caste. Though of vital origin, and rigid and degenerate only in recent centuries, from early times it has recognized the supremacy of the Brahmans, and before our day it had increasingly dictated occupation, and controlled marriage, eating, and social intercourse. All such regulations and many more, I take to be caught up into the minute laws of dharma, which regulate all practical and social life-interests. There are also the accumulations of rites, ceremonies, taboos, and sanctities, with all the emotional attachment and sense of comfort and security which such heritages hold for any people. Welding all together are the universal bonds of tenacious custom, the more unassailable in India because all social dogmas and customs are consistently recognized to be religion.

On this settled, social foundation, sanctioning, rationalizing and justifying it, has risen the superstructure of thought forms. Scriptures have been made the source of the social laws. Karma and transmigration or re-incarnation have rationalized and justified caste and the conditions of life into which one is born. Perhaps their very inexorableness has made the wheel of life

seem wearisome, for from the endless fruits of action there has been a constant search for salvation. This quest has insisted on an eternal unseen Reality, and has tended to depreciate this-worldly, material things. So, historically, renunciation and asceticism have had the highest intellectual and social approval. On the part of the thinkers (though naturally not of the people) there has been a prevailing subjectivity and contemplativeness, other-worldly, in the search for an Absolute Reality. This reality finds its most consistent interpretation in absolute idealism, which, associated with quietistic tolerance and frequent syntheses, again has given the intellectuals a satisfaction with the *status quo* of all classes, for, in their explanation, all roads, suited to their travellers, lead to the same goal. It is to be noted, however, that these thought forms do not constitute, as is sometimes suspected, a negative, nihilistic, or even essentially pessimistic world-view. Rather they assert, with a transcending optimism, the assurance of an Ultimate Reality and meaning, undefinable in sense terms, but attainable. Moreover, there is ever the challenge to an ideal personal achievement in *sat-chit-ananda*. Most important of all, these thought forms, reinforced also by social sanctions, have cherished as a most sacred heritage the deeply spiritual quality of India's soul.

In this complex social mind there are naturally elements both of help and of hindrance to modernist adjustment. The fact that India has understood religion to mean the whole practical, social complex of life-interests and activities, commends Hinduism to the modern socio-religious outlook. But rigid social dogmas, tenacious customs, inertia touched with fatalism, and the hard structure of caste and Brahman supremacy are serious hindrances, re-inforced also by rationalizations. The premium placed on asceticism means renunciation of the social task. Other-worldliness and absolute idealism seek "salvation" elsewhere than in social transformation. Synthetic subjectivity promises little dynamic. Otherwise, Hindu thought forms seem very adjustable to the scientific

outlook, especially because they have themselves been evolutionary in outlook. Moreover "the disdain of material things and the long ages of exaltation of the spiritual, even in ascetic extremes, may be a valuable asset in keeping the stress upon the high life of man in any possible adjustment to the age of science and machines." Mere thought adjustments, however, would mean no new day for India, — Hindu thinkers have always been permitted utter freedom of thought. Social upheaval and progress seem essential to effective modernism in India, and may be the only means of rousing Hindu thinkers from subjectivity to assume the vital tasks of social saviours.

To such social tasks a challenge is most often constituted by a time of social disorganization, — an occasion for progress arising out of intense need of re-organization. Factors of such disorganization in India to-day are obvious. They are those of all the world, primarily, perhaps, the implications of the new industrialism, of the machine age. These are intensified for India by the complications of Imperialism, involving an undeniable degree of exploitation. You know well the social and moral implications, and the disintegrating effects on caste, occupational family, and community bonds. Even more unique for India are the effects, now apparent, of an attempted but futile imposition of Western education and culture. It has involved an inevitable cultural protest, and repudiation of the Imperialistic policy that imposed it. These have been negative effects: lack of technical and industrial training to keep pace with the industrial invasion, lack of inspiration to, and preparation for, social service and reform, and lack of creativity and of appreciation of India's own heritage in art, literature and religion. More positively disintegrating effects have been those arising from the greater freedom and education of women, the all too meagre spread of elementary education, the increasing elevation, education, and self-assertion of the depressed classes. Results for caste, and for many customs and social sanctions are obvious. Political factors and rising nationalism are also

largely social, and are inextricably entangled in economic, educational, racial, and cultural tensions. Nationalistic aspirations force social and economic issues: intemperance, immorality, communal divisions, industrial dependence, caste rigidity and untouchability. Deepest rooted of all is the cultural reaction, intensified also by the horrible example of the Great War. Under the ruthless onrush of industrial imperialism India's soul is being smothered. There are now arising many desperate but culturally consistent efforts to save that spiritual soul. This meagre analysis of the disorganization apace in India to-day is merely suggestive of my hypothesis that the occasion of progress is at hand, and gives rich promise of vital adjustment on the part of Modern Hindu philosophers. Do they accept the challenge?

The remainder of my paper can suggest only in broadest outline the promises I find in modern Hinduism of an effective humanistic, scientific philosophy of religion. There are some significant general tendencies. One is the vast amount of writing by Indian leaders on the present economic and social problems. Also the attention given to a great variety of social service and reform by innumerable agencies is most impressive. This is significant: that nearly every social movement in modern India is avowedly religious, and nearly every religious movement is avowedly social. Even those modern sects which are most conservative in thought systems, face, frankly, social problems, and promote social reform. Every modern movement and leader urges the spread of education,—you are familiar with the wholesome new emphases. There is marked increase in scientific subjects, methods, and research. The social sciences lag, as in the West, but are gaining. There are frequent pleas for the subjection of science and learning to human welfare, and for religious and moral motivation in education. On the other hand religious leaders and movements accept gladly the findings, resources, and methods of the physical and social sciences. I find in modern India no prescription of

"evolution," no serious conflict between scientific education and religion. The combination of education and religion, of saint and teacher-scholar is native to India.

The realization of the vital, practical nature of religion is also old for Hindu thinkers, but their keen sense of responsibility for guiding and transforming socio-religious expressions is a heartening note of the new day. To their advantage also is a very wide knowledge of the history, scriptures, and values of other religions. They continue to appropriate and synthesize, but in more practical, objective terms than of old. When Mahatma Gandhi finds truth and the same God in all religions, draws his ideals from several scriptures and saviours, his is no vague rationalization nor quietism, but a vigorous challenge to human unity, to effect moral, social, and economic regeneration. Rabindranath Tagore would have East and West meet at "humanity's altar," their youth meet at an International University, and the nations meet in a World Federation. There are many pleas for a religion of humanity, universal.

In this setting, rites and ceremonies receive the variety of treatment which would be expected. For the radical they are hindrances to be boldly given up. Many would say with Tagore: "Our only rites and ceremonies are self-sacrificing good works." For many more they are avowedly non-essential but have the value of "historic continuity" and symbolism, and by them are being neatly rationalized. The Arya Samaj, for example, enjoins some daily rites as being "symbolic daily reminders of individual and social duties." By many shraddha are evaluated as marks of respect and emotional expression of dear memories. Very generally the sacredness of the cow is explained on a purely practical, economic basis, but even so to be kept religious. There is marked appreciation of the social value of some observances, but they are to be purified, all agree. None apparently would dodge the implications of education spreading among the people. On asceticism one of our members here writes significantly: "A true ascetic is not one who gives

✓ up home and society to escape the social burden,—but he who with self control and spiritual vision suffers for mankind." Another writes : " What is needed is not estrangement from the world or cessation of activities, but a change of the centre of gravity of one's outlook from the personal to the communal, the racial, the universal, in ever-widening circles." India's modern saint, a Mahatma Gandhi, is a social saviour.

Karma and transmigration, entwined between thought forms and social forms, are touched on both sides. As the conditions in life, caste, status, and occupation are actually being changed, their value for justifying and rationalizing these conditions in the old stagnant society is passing. Again, they are frankly subjected to the tests of a scientific world-view, and are being purged of any taint of fatalism. The new outlook is essentially forward, with emphasis on moral responsibility, social control and consequences, and social and physical heredity. " Man is mightier than his karma." But Karma is still emphasized as a vital moral law, with frank recognition of its evolution, and of its historical and cultural relativity of content and application. With this moral dynamic, and with an evolutionary orientation, transmigration, or its finer form, reincarnation, is also being explained in terms of social and physical heredity. Scientific control is a recognized ally, as in education or the possibilities of eugenics. Transmigration really seems largely absorbed into an evolutionary view, but lends its emotional quality of cosmic memories, and sense of oneness with all life.

It is here too that India's prevalent philosophy, already touched with vitalism,—perhaps a stepping-stone,—gives promise of adjustment to an evolutionary world-view. Oneness with all life has an emotional appeal. With the idea of the unity of evolving life, " the grandeur of cosmic immensities, in whose dance of the ages man has a vital share," the emotional drive of India's absolute idealism may be mediated in a cosmic, evolutionary mysticism. This is most beautifully foreshadowed in Tagore. To be sure, there is a subtle danger of slipping

over into all-inclusive absolutism. But even this danger may be lifted as the situation just surveyed urges the human task, and as the implications of evolution further humanize and socialize reality. This is helped by a realization of the evolution of morals and of human values. India's constant cherishing of spiritual values for human attainment makes natural an emphasis on the creative evolution of human possibilities. Here slips in beautifully the old ideal of sat-chit-ānanda, with new meaning to-day in the evolutionary orientation. Impressive are statements of such human ideals from many writers, and in objectives of organizations. The Arya Samaj aims "to benefit the whole world by improving the physical, spiritual, and social condition of mankind." The Dev Samaj, calling itself "The Science grounded Religion," though avowedly atheistic, seeks to promote the higher moral and spiritual life. A leading modern Jain writer states it: "The aim of religion—is none other than to raise mankind to the supreme status of godhood." "Perfection is the goal of evolution. You are the perfect god yourself." There are few theistic, dualistic, supernaturalistic deterrents for India's thinkers. If reality is being socialized and humanized, the last deterrent which we listed gives hope of making way for an effective modernism.

This, then, is my evaluation of modern Hindu philosophy, in summary. An evolutionary world view, natural to traditional Hindu outlook is being re-stated in terms of modern science. Not all the implications are realized, and there are still many rationalizations of some thought forms. On the whole, however, these promise to make acceptable adjustment to scientific thought. Most promising is the fact that thinkers have been aroused from subjectivity, to assume the new social tasks. For these they accept also the resources of the social and physical sciences. Absolute Reality still hovers in the background, but there are numerous evidences that it is being humanized and socialized. Subjective syntheses tend to become objective syntheses, and absolute idealism tends to become practical

idealism. However, the ultimate test of social transformation is still to be made ; that task is only begun, and is not to be minimized. But pioneers have this in their favour : that India has unusual faith in her leaders and teachers. If they attempt to give social guidance, the masses may follow more readily than is common, especially with the spread of even elementary education, and with the rising tides of social disorganization. It remains yet to be seen what India's thinkers can accomplish if they accept the tasks of social saviours. They now promise to do so. Their realisation of the tasks and their consecration, largely meet, thus far, our challenges to modern philosophy of religion. Time and effort will give the final test of social transformation. This is certain ; India's liberals are now volunteering for a world-wide co-operation in the great modern, scientific, humanistic, religious quest.

ENOLA ENO

SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE, ITS FUNCTION, AND A CRITERION FOR ITS VALUE

I.

By spiritual experience I mean that experience which is possessed when the whole mind or person is compresent with the Universal Reality or, as I would prefer to call it, God. By preferring the term God I do not wish to suggest a Reality which is altogether apart from the Universe. The object of spiritual experience for man must be the power and purpose which man finds in the Universe as a whole. I use the term God because for me it has more intimate associations, and because I am convinced that the ultimate power in the Universe to which I can relate myself is at least personal. Now the object of spiritual experience is the most complete and perfect of all objects, and He cannot be fully known by the intellect alone. Man possesses other powers which must be employed if he is to know God. His emotions must be brought into harmony with God and his will surrendered to Him. Further, the powers of man do not function separately when he concentrates on the apprehension of God. At such times the conscious powers of thought, feeling, and will, together with all those powers in the sub-conscious regions of man's mind which connect therewith, relate themselves as a simple unity to the spiritual object.¹ The relation is akin to that which exists between persons who are most intimate. In this relation all the person's powers are employed, although frequently they are not consciously employed, and knowledge of the object is acquired which transcends the knowledge attained by the understanding alone. In these respects personal knowledge is like the deeper knowledge of God which comes through spiritual experience.

¹ See my article on "Cognition in Religious Experience"—*The Quest*, April, 1925.

In such experiences God is apprehended in a non-sensuous way :
 (a) as a universal spiritual power which transcends, but is immanent within and operates through the person apprehending ; and
 (b) as an existence which gives meaning, value, and purpose to life ; and this knowledge is not accessible to the man who approaches God merely with the understanding.

This may be further explained by reference to one who possessed a markedly full and complete spiritual experience. Jesus of Nazareth was wonderfully gifted with the powers which chiefly characterize the human mind. He possessed a powerful intellect, an immensely sensitive nature, and a strength of purpose which has never been excelled. Jesus has left no written records, but it is not possible to doubt the greatness of his mind. He inherited the ancient teaching and beliefs of his people the Hebrews, and with unerring insight discriminated therein all that was vitally and universally significant. Separating this from what was false, and from those narrowing features which were due to local and temporal conditions, he made it available for all men and for all time. Further no one has ever been more sensitive to human suffering, or to the hopes and fears of simple men and women ; nor has any one possessed a will more resolute. With fixedness of purpose he went towards his goal, allowing neither the counsel of friends nor the threats of enemies to deflect him from his course. Now there appear to be times when Jesus withdrew from his everybody occupations, and concentrated the powers of his very complete and gifted nature on communion with God his Father. At such times all the powers of his mind were employed, although not possibly as they were in the occupations of everyday. The ancient Greeks distinguished contemplation from the more practical activity of the mind. In the latter the mind uses its powers to master the situations with which it is confronted, and to make such changes in these situations as enable it to fulfil its purposes. But in contemplation the mind employs its powers for the apprehension of the eternal Reality. Contemplation was considered by the Greeks to



be the highest function of the human mind. In these condition the mind is active, but with an activity which is directed intensely to knowing and not to doing. So it is with the mind when it communes with God. It is active in the highest degree, but its activity is concentrated on receptiveness. In the presence of God the will is used in the act of self-surrender, and the intellect in apprehending the nature and purpose of God. The result of these periods of communion for Jesus was an assurance concerning the purpose and meaning of life which is never attained in any other way. Jesus knew why he was sent into the world, and he knew also how and for what men ought to live. He was convinced that his teaching was true, because it was not his own but his Father's. He was convinced also of the presence within him of divine power which he believed would eventually overcome the forces of evil in the world. His ordinary activities were suffused with the consciousness of God, which gave meaning and purpose to them all.

There are two further points referring to the nature of spiritual experience that should be noted. First, experience of God presupposes and is interpenetrated by all other experience. In spiritual experience a deeper apprehension of the Universal Reality is attained than is present in any other form of experience, but the greater experience can never contradict the lesser; on the other hand, it is interfused by the latter. If, for example, we study the spiritual experiences of the prophets of Israel, we find that these arise out of reflection upon such national events as the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt, the Exodus, the settlement in Canaan, the founding of the Kingship, relations with foreign powers such as the Assyrians, and the exile into Babylon; together with reflection upon the moral and social condition of the people. Such a prophet as the writer of the first part of the book of Isaiah found God as he pondered on the menace of the Assyrians and the social ills that beset his nation. These were the problems with which he was daily confronted and concerned, and the prophet's knowledge of them

interpenetrated and in a measure determined the nature of his apprehension of God. So also it is in the world to-day. The statesman who is day by day engaged with the affairs of nations, the social reformer whose fire is kindled by the moral and economic condition of his fellow countrymen, the artist who delights in the expressions of beauty, the scientist whose serious and continued study is the physical world ; all carry with them their varied experiences when they bring their whole being into the presence of God and these experiences must interpenetrate and aid their apprehension of God. The knowledge of God does not contradict, but must culminate and perfect human knowledge.

Secondly, the knowledge of God which is given in spiritual experience cannot be disproved by arguments put forward by the human understanding. It has been maintained that God is only apprehended as a power making for righteousness, and as a Reality giving meaning and value to life, when the whole person is sensitive to Him. In the mystic compresence God reveals of Himself to the faithful enquirer that which the unaided human understanding can never find. In this sense it may be said that the apprehension is by faith and not by knowledge, and for this reason it follows, that the understanding which is inadequate to discover God is also inadequate to disprove Him when found. One who does not possess spiritual experience lacks the *data* upon which any valid argument must be built. In making this assertion I do not mean to imply that the knowledge given in the spiritual experience of any man is unsailable. I maintain, however, that such experiences must be modified and perfected by more complete apprehensions of a like nature.

There are three vital characteristics of all true spiritual experience, *viz* :—(1) objectivity, (2) disinterestedness, and (3) universality. First, the spiritual power is always apprehended as an other than self which is *given* to the self and operates through the self. Such a power is just as truly *given* as the



sense qualities of a physical object are given in an act of preception, although not in the same way. The testimony of those who possess such experience confirms this view. Although endowed with great power they are signally humble, because they know that their power is from God. Secondly, the experience must be marked by disinterestedness. It is only possible when the claims of the individual will are surrendered and man has learned to say : " Not my will, but Thine." As St. Catherine of Siena reminds us, the possession of such experience teaches never to say " I will," or " I will not"; and never to say " Mine " or " Our."¹ Baron von Hügel, writing of such experience as he found it in St. Catherine, says that it is characterised by breadth and fulness, *self-oblivion* and dignity, *claimlessness* and spiritual power.² Thirdly, the object apprehended is necessarily universal. This follows from the fact that in the act of apprehending the claims of the individual self are annulled and the mind laid open to receive the experience of God.

In making this statement I am well aware that it is possible to assert the claims of the self as a spiritual experience. History presents innumerable examples of this. During the Great War the German Emperor claimed that his policy of uniting Poland with Germany was supported by a spiritual vision. " I have dreamed a prodigious dream " he writes. " I saw the Holy Virgin who commanded me to save her holy habitation, which was threatened with great danger. She gazed at me with her eyes and I have accomplished her will. Poles, know that those who will be on my side will be largely rewarded. Those who set themselves against me will..... perish. God and the Holy Virgin are with me. She herself has raised the sword to aid Poland."³ Many other instances of the way in which men and nations have claimed the

¹ See " The Mystical Element of Religion," by Baron von Hügel, Vol. I, p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

³ " Russia and the Great War," by Gregor Alexinsky, p. 159.

authority of their God for the brutal assertion of their own will could be quoted. But examples of spurious spiritual experience seem to me only to confirm the principle upon which I wish to insist. They testify to the universality of true spiritual experience. The reason why in such cases the individual represents his own wish as springing from a spiritual experience, is that he hopes that by this means it may be associated in the minds of others with the disinterestedness and universality which characterise true spiritual experience.

II.

I now turn to the consideration of what is described in the title as the function of spiritual experience. Ordinary human experience seems to be characterised by a quality which is the contrary of that which is vital to spiritual experience. I will term this quality *claimfulness*. By claimfulness I mean the assertion of the aims of the individual self, which feature of human experience is the opposite of the acceptance by the individual self as its own, of the will of God. As we look out on the world to-day we find individuals, nations, and other groups of individuals, separated from one another in respect of feeling, ideals, and aims, and often such individuals and groups appear to be in irreconcilable opposition. All such opposition ultimately arises from the feature which I have described as claimfulness.

Claimfulness becomes manifest both in the individual and in groups of individuals. In the individual it is the result of complexes of primary impulses which become reinforced or modified, and develop into finite personality, under all kinds of influences received from his environment. Since the influences affecting individuals are so very diverse, it follows that individuals also are diverse and naturally possess varied, and at times conflicting, claims. For a similar reason also conflicting claims arise within groups of individuals. Such

groups vary in size, and they vary also according to the principle upon which they are formed. They comprise families, races, and nations; the members of societies and institutions, and the adherents of the different religious faiths. From time to time between any such groups, and especially between groups belonging to the same category, conflict may be found, and it seems to me that the principle operating which leads to conflict is in every case the same. I do not wish to discuss here whether or no there is such a reality as a group self, or whether any group is comprised merely of an aggregate of individuals. The fact remains that the ideals and aspirations of each group tend in a certain direction, and that they frequently come into conflict with the ideals and aspirations of other similar groups. International relations since the period immediately preceding the war have presented us, and still continue to present us, with many very striking examples of such conflicts. The reason for this is that the individuals forming any one group possess certain common traditions, come under certain influences, and live under other conditions that are common. There thus emerge interests, aspirations, and ideals that are possessed in general by members of any one group; and these are apt to differ from the common interests, aspirations, and ideals of other groups. Hence the frequent conflicts, some of which often seem to be well nigh irreconcilable.

The question thus arises, how are the conflicts caused by the claimfulness of individuals and of groups of individuals to be overcome? The answer seems clear. They can be overcome only in so far as the individual and groups of individuals surrender the claims which emerge from their limitations, and are prepared to accept as their own the ideals and ends that have their home in Universal Reality. In other words, the solution of these conflicts rests ultimately with those who possess true spiritual experience. If as we have maintained, in spiritual experience man apprehends God as a universal spiritual power which transcends but is present within him; it is evident that

in such experience a force is available which must aid in overcoming not only the conflicts created by the claimfulness of individuals, but also those larger conflicts that are the result of the claimfulness of nations and of other groups of individuals. Much of the failure to solve international problems is due to the fact that frequently the solution is sought by the balancing of contrary claims with a view to effecting some sort of compromise. No permanent solution can be attained in this way. Such can only be found when a point of view is reached which transcends conflicting claims, and this is only possible for him who apprehends ultimate spiritual values and permits these to carry on their disinterested operations through him. Such problems will only be permanently solved when the majority of persons forming national groups arrive at this kind of experience. Plato was not far from the truth when he urged the need for the philosopher king. He alone can rightly rule, and he alone is able to lead his subjects to the attitude of mind from which abiding solutions can be found.

The objection may be raised that all this is futile speculation and consequently of no value to those confronted with the issues of life. In answer thereto I wish only to point to ways in which the operation of this principle is partially, although very effectively, exemplified. It must be admitted that wherever there is the appreciation of enduring values, such as truth, beauty, goodness, a force exists which draws men together and enables them to overcome their differences. The sincere seeker after truth is bound to kindred spirits of all nations and all times. He humbly recognizes his indebtedness to all who are able to aid him in finding the truth, and ceases to be aware of differences that might otherwise divide him from them. A like comradeship exists between those who love beauty in all its forms. Their enthusiastic devotion to common ideals creates a sacred fellowship which has the power to overcome and transcend differences that, under other conditions, might be acutely felt. Now spiritual experience is the most complete of all such



experiences ; and it follows that whenever and wherever it is present, it must be the most powerful of unifying forces.

Another objector may argue that in the past religion has been a frequent source of claimfulness. I admit that this is so ; and for this reason included among the groups between which there might be conflicting claims those created by adherence to various forms of religious belief. But in this connection it is important to distinguish between religious conviction and spiritual experience. The former may be largely the result of those limiting conditions which give rise to conflicts of claimfulness. Inherited practices and beliefs, or it may even be superstitions, differentiate one religious community from another, and may promote irreconcilable antagonism. In so far as this is the case, however, religious conviction is not spiritual experience. It is an assertion of communal claims and not the apprehension of enduring spiritual values. Spiritual experience, and indeed true religion, is this and this alone ; and it is only to experience of this kind that we can look for solutions of the problems of life.

III.

The foregoing considerations make it possible to formulate a criterion by means of which the degree of perfection of any type of spiritual experience can be tested. As we have seen this must, by its very nature, demand the unifying and harmonizing of life in all its relations. This demand is akin to that made by human reason for a coherent explanation of the universe. We are all aware of the fact that any contradiction in an attempted explanation of the world presents a problem to the mind, and of how the mind rejects such explanation as unsatisfactory until the contradiction is resolved and coherence attained. The persistent demand arising out of spiritual experience is of a similar kind, but it is for a much more thoroughgoing unity. Since the demand springs up within man

when he is exercising all his powers, it can never be satisfied with mere coherence, but will persist until conflicts of feeling and of will are also overcome. When considering the lives of those who daily live in communion with God, it seems that this demand first appears as a demand for an inner peace which is found only when the mind is brought into accord with the will of God or with the Universal Reality. But this desire for inner peace does not completely express the nature of the demand. So long as the God-conscious man lives in a world in which conflicts such as we have described exist, he will inevitably make the persistent demand that these conflicts be overcome; and as far as in him lies he will utilize the spiritual power that is at his disposal to this end. Any institution like the League of Nations is a visible expression of this aspect of the demand.

Those who are acquainted with the different religions of the world must be struck with the great variety and oftentimes by the diversity of the religious experience which they present. Further it is apparent that in spite of these differences the representatives of each religion are apt to claim that their particular type of religious experience is at least as valuable as any other. It obviously therefore seems to be necessary that there should be some criterion whereby the unprejudiced investigator can judge the value of the various forms of spiritual experience. I submit that the criterion here explained is the only one by means of which such an estimate can be made. Spiritual experience is true and of value only in so far as it enables us effectively to overcome the contradictions of life.

The criterion may be applied not only to the type of spiritual experience but also to the spiritual experience of any person, and it is necessary to discriminate between the application of the criterion to the type and to the individual. It is quite possible, for instance, that when the criterion is applied to the various religions, it will be necessary to judge any type of religious experience as being higher than another, since it has proved to be a more effective spiritual force in the world. From this,

however, it does not follow that the spiritual experience of any one representative of the higher type is of necessity of greater value than the spiritual experience of any other who represents a lower type. It often happens that the reverse is the case.

Finally, it should be noted that the acceptance of this criterion excludes from consideration what may be described as *external evidence* in forming judgments concerning either the religions of the world or the great figures of spiritual history. Under external evidence I include claims for the divine authority of sacred books, supernatural appearances surrounding the birth of a saint or any other crucial epoch in a saint's life, miracles, assertions of divinity, and so on. The spiritual value both of the saint and of the religion must be estimated solely by the measure of the spiritual power which God, through them, is able to impart to those who are seeking Him.

G. H. LANGLEY

THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY

It is quite intelligible that even amongst writers who have inherited a tradition of implicit obedience to and unreserved reliance upon authority, there should be occasional misgivings as to the ultimate effect of this attitude upon the purity of philosophical speculation. Such writers, because of their loyalty to the philosophical spirit, desire to be free, and yet they appear to be in bondage. It is, therefore, necessary for them to examine that bondage, and see what reconciliation there may be between it and freedom.

The course of development in Indian philosophy is different from that which may be traced in Western lands. In the West one system has succeeded to the place of another, and the later has been built out of the ruins of the former. In India, on the other hand, the same systems have persisted throughout the ages, the main lines of thought have been prescribed by tradition, and development, if any, has consisted in the interpretation and re-interpretation of the existing authorities. Probably the Sūtra literature might be taken as typical of the whole. These exceedingly succinct notes of discussions were unintelligible except to those who had taken part in the discussions. In their effect, therefore, they were esoteric, and in themselves they marked the dominance of authority. They were, however, not only succinct but vague, and so allowed for variety of interpretation, while at the same time, going much further than mere suggestion, they prescribed both the themes for discussion and the limits within which variety of interpretation could be permitted. As bound by the Sūtras, the new thinker could not feel himself at liberty to speculate with complete freedom.

The Sūtras point back to the Upanishads and the Vedas, and the degree of reverence which one of the commentators at least desired to show towards these further sources is indicated in Śaṅkara's Commentary II-1-II. According to him it is only perfect knowledge which can give release, and perfect knowledge, being of universal acceptance, cannot be the result of reasoning in which even the greatest men differ. For perfect knowledge, therefore, we have to go to Scripture. "The nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends, cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts." In another passage he advocates implicit reliance upon the Vedas even in respect of practical guidance. (Cf. III. 1. 26.) "The knowledge of an action being right and another wrong is based on Scripture only." In continuation of the former passage we find also a little further down. "The Veda, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things."

(Implicit reliance upon the Scriptures both for theory and practice could not be more definitely expressed, but the point which we wish specially to emphasise is that from the beginning this reliance upon authority is *more* than mere dependence upon the old or upon the traditional.) It is associated throughout with tendencies towards valuation. There is valuation, first of all, of the ancient seers. They are to be revered, not simply because they are old but because of their transcendent merits. There is here a distinct hint of a transition from the conception of the authority of age to that of the authority of the specialist. There is also valuation from a more subjective point of view. It is felt that (Cf. IV. 3. 14) "the passages of Scripture about the negation of all differences have a meaning which leaves nothing more to be wished for." In other words, these passages are considered to give complete satisfaction to religious and philosophical demands. Here again there is evidence of a transition in thought from the idea of the



the present and not merely in the past, within us rather than external to us. On the other hand, whenever we detach ourselves from the divine, whenever we externalise that authority before which we must bow, whenever we look to a dead past rather than to the living present, we find that authority becomes petrified into a rigid system of doctrine, imprisons the human spirit, and separates us from God instead of strengthening and vivifying our sense of dependence on Him, which ought to be the function and the privilege of all true authority that is worthy of the name.)

W. S. URQUHART

TRANSMIGRATION AND IMMORTALITY

This paper intends to examine the present state of the question of transmigration and immortality.

Materialism has no such question to face ; for, such a question can arise only if the soul is believed to be an entity separate from the body and capable of living without it. With such a belief, however, about the soul, two alternatives are possible :

(a) the soul may be believed to be immortal only from now ; *i.e.*, it had no pre-natal existence ;

(b) the soul is an eternal reality and has had lived before now just as it will live afterwards.

With regard to (b) again, two views are possible : the eternal soul lived in other bodies before and will inhabit others after death here ; or, the present one is the only fleshy mould in which it has to live : it had and will have no other. This second view however is seldom advanced ; the first implies transmigration.

Transmigration is a very ancient belief. Traces of it are found in the literature, sacred and profane, of most countries and in their philosophy too. But it was in the East that it assumed a most comprehensive and elaborate character.

(i) In the Buddhist Jātaka stories, transmigration is taken for granted and minute details are given of the previous births of the Buddha and also of others.

(ii) In the *Gītā*, change of body is compared to a change of clothes (ii. 22).

(iii) In the Hindu theory of moral punishment, assumption of bodies of a lower order, is regarded as a retribution for sins committed (*cf. Viṣṇu-Saṃhitā*, ch. 44-45).

A similar belief is found in Plato also (*Phaedo*. 82a).

(iv) In Yoga Philosophy, transmigration is partly a hypothesis made to explain certain psychical phenomena, and partly it is a conclusion drawn from certain premises. Transmigration is assumed to explain Instinct or '*Samskāra*'; and it is deduced from the Law of *karma*.

The theory of transmigration had the following implications :

(a) Living in a body was not a very desirable existence for the soul, and it ought to make an endeavour to escape it. According to Plato, this escape meant an eternal life in the company of the Gods (*Republic*, 613 ; *Phaedo*, 81, 114c, etc.). And according to Vedāntism, it was a total release from all ties and limitations.

(b) Migration from body to body was ordinarily a continuous process; but through virtuous deeds and spiritual meditation, it might be terminated.

(c) Migration from one body to another implied a temporary submersion of the experiences and tendencies connected with the body left behind. But they were not altogether lost. Favourable circumstances might revive them; and by training, one might even recall them. The Jātaka stories are full of such remembrances. And Plato's theory of knowledge being a reminiscence is also based on this belief.

Transmigration thus is a complicated doctrine with offshoots in different directions. And very often, one or other of these implications even has been taken as a proof. The question has often been begged.

The following are the usual proofs of transmigration :

(a) Birth is followed by death ; death, therefore, must be followed by birth (*Gītā*, ii. 27).

(b) Knowledge is reminiscence. We have ideas in the mind ; therefore, there was an existence before this (Plato, *Phaedo*, 75 ; *Meno*, 85-86). And pre-existence *plus* immortality imply transmigration (Plato, *Phaedo*, 78).

(c) An animal is instinctively afraid of death ; so, it must have tasted it before (*Yoga-Sūtra*, iv. 10.)

(d) Instincts are habits of former lives. Every soul has the instincts proper to the body it dwells in—the animal has animal instincts and man has his own ; so, each of these souls has experiences of a body of this kind before (*Yoga-Sūtra* iv. 9, 10).

This is where ancient thought left the question. In modern times, Schopenhauer is about the only thinker who avows a faith in transmigration. He is professedly seeking to interpret the 'esoteric doctrine of Buddhism.' But he goes on to say that "even empirical grounds support a palingenesis of this kind." (*The World as Will and Idea*—Haldane's Translation, iii. 301.) He refers to the frightful devastation of the Black Death in Europe in the fourteenth century and says that 'a quite abnormal fruitfulness appeared among the human race,' to compensate for the deaths from the disease and to find bodies for the departed souls to dwell in. This is no new argument and was quite known to the thinkers of India. It is needless to say that even when repeated by Schopenhauer, the argument is far from being convincing. With regard to transmigration, therefore, the verdict of philosophy seems to be 'not proven.'

As has been indicated before, the question of immortality is separable from that of transmigration. And there are many thinkers and many creeds which believe in immortality but does not believe in transmigration.

Of immortality, too, as distinguished from transmigration, various proofs have been attempted. They convince some and do not convince others. Whatever their value may be, they cannot be regarded as what in science would be called a demonstration. And difference of opinion exists even as to the nature of this immortality.

Modern biology has advanced a conception of immortality which is hardly distinguishable from the theory of indestructibility of the physical atom. Geddes and Thomson (*Evolution of*

Sex), for instance, talk of the immortality of the *reproductive cells* in the animal organism. Will this satisfy the spiritual need of those who incline to a belief in a life hereafter?

The Idealists who believe in a final purpose deduce immortality from the imperfections of this life. "That this individual life of all of us is not something limited in its temporal expression to the life that now we experience, follows from the very fact that here nothing final or individual is found expressed." (Josiah Royce, the *Conception of Immortality*.) This argument implies a belief in personal identity and also a belief in the existence of final purposes. The argument has long been in existence; and we need not enter into a detailed examination of its value. Many minds, however, find it too abstract to be a sufficient prop for spiritual and moral endeavour.

So long as the Cartesian dualism between mind and matter, soul and body, is not altogether obliterated, the difficulty of any theory of immortality will remain. Pan-psychism attempts in a way to obliterate this dualism and thereby establish a securer theory of immortality. Henry Frank (*Modern Light on Immortality*) conceives the soul of man as "the composite of the physical, vital and psychical forces, inherent in the organic solidarity of infinite lives that constitute his being." And he builds his doctrine of immortality on this conception of the soul. Just as one organism arising out of another, becomes gradually independent of its matrix, so, too, the soul arising out of the co-operation of a number of cells, becomes gradually independent of them all and is fit to live in other combination of circumstances. But the whole point of the argument is that the soul is not purely spiritual and the organism is not purely material in the Cartesian sense of the terms. It may be pointed out in this connection that this conception is very much allied to the Hindu conception of "*Linga Sarira*"; and is supported more or less by similar arguments.

Psychical Research throws some very interesting light on the problem of immortality. Certain phenomena have been brought to light: and a perceptual demonstration of the survival of the soul after death, has been attempted. But has it been successful?

Prof. Richet in a voluminous treatise (*Thirty Years of Psychical Research*) discusses these facts in detail; but is not inclined to admit that the consciousness of the dead persists without a material substratum. He accepts the facts and is yet not prepared to accept the ordinary interpretation of them. "In fine," says he, "I believe that future hypothesis that I cannot formulate, because I do not know it." According to him, therefore, *Psychical Research* has not been able to prove its case yet. So the matter stands, with questioners and doubters still hovering about it.

The belief in immortality has great practical value. In fact, it has been regarded by many as a necessary postulate of practical reason. The disappearance of this belief will necessitate a thorough overhauling of our moral and spiritual life. It is a good thing not only for the individual but also for the race. McComb (*Future Life*) suggests that the disappearance of the faith in immortality implies a "diminishing sense of the worth of the individual" and "the glorification of the State which, in turn, casting aside the trammels of morality, and lifted into a sphere where good and evil cease to have any meaning, provokes the stern antagonism of the world, and calls down irremediable disaster." The reference here is to the case of Germany, but is intended to apply to all cases.

Belief in immortality, for the time being at any rate, has a practical utility. And if practical utility were accepted as the sole criterion of truth, no other might be demanded in this case also. But even fiction may be of use in law as well as in life. Immortality, therefore, cannot on that ground, be regarded as proved.

The question bristles with a host of difficulties. Apart from the evidences of a hereafter, how much of the present life does a man retain beyond the grave? Jesus (Matth., xxii, 30) thought that many of our relations here disappear in the future life. Our loves and affections of this life are perhaps lost. How much of our identity then do we preserve in order to be recognisable? How much *can* we really retain?

This is an aspect of the question which even Psychical Research refuses to tackle. Those who fondly adhere to the belief certainly wish that their dear ones should remain after their departure from here, exactly as they were in this world, and maintain all their old relations intact. On the face of it, this is too much even to *attempt* to prove.

Does this question mark then the limit of human knowledge in one direction? But for some interesting facts being advanced by Psychical Research, one would incline to think that the time has come when the curtain should drop on it. A fresh attack, however, is being directed upon it and it is now being approached from metaphysics, metapsychics and biology. The throbbing of a new hope is being felt. What the upshot of this new endeavour will be, no one knows. The future is yet in the lap of the gods.

UMESHCHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE

"IMMORTALITY."

Introduction.—The remarkable progress of science during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries produced a tendency among educated classes—a tendency which continues to have its hold even to-day—to treat the belief in immortality as a relic of superstition. In order to estimate the full bearing of the glorious age of science upon spiritual problems, we must go back to the Renaissance.

2. The Renaissance in Europe marks the point in the process of time, since which, the thinking European mind began to drift further and further away from the spiritual basis of human life. Under the influence of Greco-Latin culture, the Christian Europe definitely left behind the other worldly outlook. It frankly accepted the mundane standard of values. Educated people became prepared to live in the present and enjoy the present. The concentration of the human mind upon the reason and experiment led to the 19th century triumphs of technical science and scientific rationalism became the fashionable creed of the intellectuals of Europe. Accordingly the radical and uncompromising disciples of science treated all questions pertaining to the invisible either as relics of superstition or mere speculations.

3. *Meaning of scientific rationalism.*—The ideal of scientific rationalism has for its foundation the idea that religion and spirituality on the one side and intellectual activity and practical life on the other are entirely two different things. The votaries of this creed leave God or the Infinite alone on the characteristic ground that it can never be fathomed by the methods of science and they tend to discredit the path-way of direct intuition as a source of knowledge. Hence the ideal of the scientific rationalist to perfect that which he knows and to

beautify the world in which he lives. He orders his life as if it were to end with the grave or as if his thoughts and works here would not follow him beyond the grave. He may have wider sympathies and enjoyments. But he attempts to clutch with avidity at power or at wealth or at the pleasures which are purchased by the possession of power and wealth. His achievements in the field of mechanical inventions have given him self-confidence; and he has become conscious of his power over environment. Then again these scientific triumphs of the last century have given man immense possibilities of profit. In this way the majority of us have lost touch with the central spiritual reality which sustains the universe and are lifted off our feet by the dazzle and glitter of modern life. Here it is necessary to remove a possible misunderstanding. Our quarrel is not with the scientific attitude. In fact it ought to be the attitude of every seeker after truth. But we must deprecate the tendency to ignore the central spiritual principle which makes life on earth possible. Just because science and its methods have enabled man to become master of nature in the sense that he is in a position to employ the forces of nature to make his material life full of splendour and variety, it does not follow that we shall cease asking questions which science cannot solve. Questions about beginnings and ends and meanings and values, in short all spiritual problems proceed from a definite need of human nature. And we cannot accept the verdict of science in respect of these questions, as it has yet to prove that we have no faculties in us higher than the sense-dependent understanding.

4. *Scientific Rationalism and India.*—This wave of scientific rationalism came to India through the medium of English education at a time, when the scientific and the critical mind of our country was absorbed in the enjoyment of a decadent slumber. In the second half of the 19th century, the effect of this wave was profound over educated Indians. They drew away in revolt from mediaeval India, although they looked

upon ancient culture with a sentiment of pride in certain directions. They became completely westernised in their outlook and in all their activities were stimulated by the impatient hope of anglicising India with the velocity which characterized the transformation of Japan, without caring to see if western institutions were suited to our genius, beliefs and culture. It may, therefore, be safely stated that during the latter half of the 19th century, both here and in Europe, educated people as a class treated all spiritual problems with scant attention, though not with open contempt at all times.

5. *Influence of the late war on reflective Humanity.*—The late war proved to many earnest souls all the world over that the alliance between science and militant nationalism is capable of a tremendous harm to mankind. How to reconcile the claims of nationalism with those of humanity is the pressing problem of the 20th century. The true solution appears to lie in a real synthesis between Eastern and Western cultures. In our humble opinion our country, the land of many cultures and many religions, is best suited for the birth of an ideal, which will give the necessary lead to the whole world in the direction of the revival of a spiritual mode of life which will embody within itself all the good wrought by the moment in the cosmic process, known as the age of science. At the present time there is a considerable body of men and women who are devoting their whole energy to combat the breathless pursuit after material wealth and enjoyment. It is an obvious sign of Divine grace that this body is daily gaining in number and in influence. It is the ardent hope of these high-souled persons that the new ideal, without losing the benefits of the age of science, will so transmute the values of life that the generations unborn, though under the necessity of leading a strenuous life, will feel the joyful pulsation of a spiritualised material existence. In these circumstances it becomes an important part of the duty of students of philosophy to raise the discussion of spiritual problems with a view to assist the

materialisation of the new ideal. It is in this spirit that the writer of this paper ventures, though with temerity, to stimulate the discussion and not to solve the problem of immortality.

6. *The perennial interest of the question.*—The question of immortality is one of those questions which can never lose their interest and which from time to time present themselves with force and fascination. It has been the theme of poets and sages and the wonder of philosophers. Kings on thrones have discussed it and beggars in streets have dreamt of it. The best of humanity have approached it and the worst of men have hoped for it. (What is still more remarkable about it is the astonishing unanimity with which man, from the first dim beginning of his planetary history, has refused to see in death the end of his being and activities, in spite of his witnessing death everywhere around him almost every moment of his life. Although we live with one foot in time, we instinctively feel that the other foot is firmly planted in eternity. Side by side with this, there is the equally other astonishing fact that there is a considerable difference of opinion among thinkers in respect of the meaning and the justification of this belief. What does this difference of opinion signify? It clearly shows that the impulse to seek proof of immortality is as strong as the belief in immortality itself. We expect immortality not merely because we desire it, but because the desire itself arises from all that is best, truest and worthiest in human nature.)) Removal of this faith is likely to make pessimism raise its head and human happiness is likely to be considered too paltry to be striven after and human miseries too small to be worthy of being assuaged. Renan is still more emphatic when he says, ("the day in which the belief in an after life shall vanish from the earth will witness a terrific moral and spiritual decadence.")

7. *Justification of the belief.*—It does not require much reflection to realise that the universality of a belief is no guarantee of its truth. For a belief to be reasonable, it is necessary that it should be supported by evidence which a



reasonable man must accept. By evidence here is not meant conclusive evidence; for in that case very few of our beliefs can claim to be grounded on such evidence. Then again if the definite facts of sense-perception are the only kind of evidence that is admissible, then there is very little evidence to support this belief. But this criterion of what is reasonable will rule out almost all of our cherished beliefs and our lives will be on the verge of being 'empty nothings.' (We never claim to hold this belief as a result of particular observation and experiments, but only as a reasonable faith based on certain essential elements in human life which cannot be denied. What then are the elements in the nature of the human self and its manifestation which point to its immortality?)

8. *Elements in normal human life which point to immortality.*—Though ordinarily the normal human being lives as if he is identical with his body, yet in his reflective mood he no longer identifies himself with the body. Nevertheless the body remains for him throughout life the centre from which he speaks, acts and looks out upon the universe. This does not mean however that he is necessarily materialistic. He is conscious of himself as a spirit and is unwilling to regard himself as a mere channel of the "universal will." As self-conscious he is able to distinguish himself from others and from his Maker and at times sets his own will against the Divine. (It is this immediate awareness of our individuality and personal agency from which we must start. Man is rational and in virtue of self-conscious reason feels himself as the free shaper of his own destiny. This fundamental fact of our life is the perpetual miracle which baffles the understanding of the pantheist or the absolutist.)

The soul is man's real self that is at work in all his knowledge and action. (This soul is not a mere on-looking supernatural mechanism, the mere bearer of our life. The soul is self-conscious. It possesses the unique peculiarity of being able to objectify itself. It is not a mere logical subject: not a

mere abstract principle of unity. It is concrete. It is not a mere correlative of experience. It is more than that. It is not in space and time, yet it manifests itself in space and time. It is the spirit, the soul, the "I" of individual experience. Though ever seeking after Ānanda, restlessness is the characteristic of its life here and now. As knowing, it requires the duality of self and not-self, yet it is perpetually trying to get rid of this duality. Then again as moral, it struggles through the divisions of right and wrong or good and bad, yet it endeavours to go beyond good and bad. Thus human life is a process of development through conflict. "We are here to learn the good of peace through strife, of love through hate and reach knowledge through ignorance." Human nature is essentially a combination of warring elements. Man is both rational and irrational, free and bound, good and evil, God and brute. He is at once neither of these alternatives and both. It is his privilege to be always moving from ignorance to knowledge, from wickedness to virtue and from bondage to freedom. (Is it then unreasonable to conclude that an individuality, so real, must be capable of surviving the dissolution of the material form? The body, ceasing to be a living body, may relapse into its elements, when it has fulfilled itself, while the true individual pursues his destiny under new conditions.)

Thus the immortality we hope for is not a mere endlessness or an aimless process of successive lives. We ought to think of an immortal life, not as the simple continuance of a being in existence of all his powers and attainments, but as a progress, in real sense, towards the fulfilment of the purpose of human life—namely realisation of Truth and Universal love which in its perfect state is a streaming outwards of the inmost treasure of the spirit, a consecration of its best activities to the welfare of suffering humanity.

9. *The Pantheistic view of Immortality.*—But there have been thinkers who do not regard this perpetual struggle through opposites as a privilege of the human self. They are

not satisfied either with the ever new insights which are open to man, through this struggle or with the achievements, which seem to carry man near the goal, however slowly. The unending character of the process oppresses them like a burden too heavy to be borne. (Hence personal immortality is to them more a curse than a state of blessedness. They long to transcend this life of finite struggle and endeavour. The individual should recognise, once for all, the importance of his finite striving and surrender all claims to goodness on his own account. Having done so, he should recognise in the same act, his unity with God by faith, and in this state share at once the perfection which as human self he could not win by any striving. In this way it is possible for the human self to experience immortality even in present life.)

This is the view of certain mystics and absolutists. Human self is only a manifestation of God or the Absolute. As such it must change and perish, while God remains unchanged. The most frequent metaphors by which this thought is expressed are those of a drop of water returning to the ocean or of a ray of light returning to the sun.

Granting that such a process of submergence in the divine life is a possibility, the question for us is, whether it implies the total extinction of the individual soul as a self-determining agency. If it does, then what meaning or purpose can be attached to the Becoming, the reality of which cannot be denied? Are we to think of the finite world with all its variety as something that just happens to God or the Absolute? Of course it is impossible for man to fathom the mystery of creation. In all humility we have to accept the verdict of philosophy that our logical intellect is incompetent to reach the One behind the Many. Nevertheless it is not necessary to annihilate one's individuality to feel the push of the Divine presence. It is possible that in the mystical mood the individual soul might sink himself in the universal consciousness and realise his

essential identity with God. But this mood does not last for ever. With the cessation of the ecstasy, the individual soul must return to his finitude, though purer and diviner than before. But to have this divine vision is not to become God. (The individual soul, therefore, must continue the exercise of his birth-right, namely, God-realisation through opposites.) The point of our argument is, that there need not be a fundamental opposition between religion and morality. The function of religion is to give strength and hope to the striving individual soul when he breaks down in consequence of the intensity of the struggle. His religious faith, no doubt, makes a man humble; but in the consciousness of his utter humility, he acquires the strength of a moral Hercules and continues his struggle with renewed vigour, leaving it to God to choose the moment for the liberation of His Bhakta.

The conclusion.—(We do not build the hope of immortality simply on the desire for personal continuance—a kind of instinctive horror for death. We do not long for immortality because we look forward to a time when we shall be living in a place where all hardship shall cease, where no exertion shall be needed. That is to say, we do not claim immortality as a compensation for our struggle here and now. Then again we cannot vindicate immortality simply as a security for the punishment of the wicked, although the desire to see the wrong-doer punished is strong in the human heart. The human self feels itself to be immortal because he feels that he is of God. He is convinced that the Divine spark is firmly involved and implanted in his soul; and what is involved must be evolved.) The evolution of this Divine spark in the man is the law of his being. According to this law he has to see that 'I' which contains all and is contained in all, is the *One*, is universal and not his personal ego. To that he has to subject his ego. *That* he is to produce in his nature and become. *That* is what he has to possess and to

enjoy with an equal soul in all its forms and movements. Thus the survival of the individual soul after the dissolution of the body is the first condition of this development. And God in His infinite goodness and love has given the human soul the capacity for this realisation.

K. H. KELKAR

UNAMUNO'S IDEAS ON IMMORTALITY.

I

Unamuno is one of the few Spanish thinkers whose fame has successfully crossed the Pyrennes. Spanish novelists, like Blasco Ibanez, and dramatists like Benavente, scientists like Cajal, have for a long time enjoyed a European reputation. But modern Spanish Philosophers have not been so fortunate. It may be that Spanish thought has been couched predominantly in a scholastic mould and scholasticism is not at present a passport to success and reputation. Unamuno has broken all the ancient moulds and has given us his thought, fresh from the spring, vigorous, energetic, as his personality is. He philosophizes because he has to. "I have endeavoured," he writes, "in these Essays to exhibit the soul of a Spaniard and therewithal the Spanish soul. I have curtailed the number of quotations from Spanish writers while scattering with perhaps too lavish a hand those from the writers of other countries. For all human souls are brother souls." This is the secret of his success. His book of Essays has been translated into nearly all European languages. It is, indeed, amazing that a recluse—Unamuno had never left his mother-country till two years ago he was sent into exile by the Military Directorate—could have acquired such deep knowledge of all the main literatures of Europe. He specially excels in his command of English literature. One feature of Unamuno's genius is his astounding versatility. He writes poetry and fiction of the highest order. He is a passionate and fearless thinker, in desperate earnest towards the main problems of life. Every page of his Essays is saturated with a feeling of awe, a reverential and religious awe towards life. He dislikes comedy. For him life is a tragedy.

Unamuno has been Rector of the University of Salamanca and Professor of Greek. He is now in exile.

"What is the object of making philosophy, in thinking it and then expounding it to one's fellow?" Unamuno asks at the very outset of his inquiry. And he at once rejects the view which traces the origin of knowledge to the instinct of curiosity, as if this instinct were something primitive and original. Men believe that they seek truth for its own sake, but as a matter of fact, Unamuno argues, curiosity only awakens and becomes operative after the necessity of knowing for the sake of living is satisfied. The primordial instinct is the instinct to persist indefinitely, as Spinoza puts it. "Man only sees, hears, touches, tastes, and smells in so far as is necessary for living and self-preservation. '*Primum vivere, deinde philosophari.*' Truth for truth's sake," he asks and he answers, this is inhuman. The starting point of all philosophising is eminently practical, our endeavour to explain our conduct to ourselves. All our theories are justifications *a posteriori* of our conduct. Metaphysics for him has no value save in so far as it attempts to explain in what way our vital longing can or cannot be realized. We think in order that we may live.

I need not detain you with a particular account of Unamuno's criticism of the arguments, or traditional proofs, as they have been ambitiously called, for the Immortality of the Soul. Unamuno is a bitter enemy of Metaphysics, and rational psychology is for him but "muddy metaphysics." Though reared in the midst of a scholastic tradition, Unamuno has renounced all the sophistries and fallacies which, according to him, encumbered the scholastic philosophy. "The supreme triumph," he sarcastically observes, "of reason, the analytical faculty, is to cast doubt upon its own validity. The stomach that contains an ulcer ends by digesting itself; and reason ends by destroying the immediate and absolute validity of the concept of truth and of the concept of necessity." We might,

however, take note of some of his remarks on the supposed validity of these rational arguments. The Immortality of the Soul has often been derived from its simplicity. If the soul is a simple substance, it has been argued, it cannot be decomposed, for decomposition is the characteristic of a compositum. "Let us suppose," a lucid exponent of scholasticism argues, "that the soul has three parts, A, B, C. I say where does thought reside? If in A only, then B and C are superfluous. If thought resides in A, B, C, then it follows that thought is divided into parts, which is absurd. What sort of a thing is a perception, a comparison, a judgment, a ratiocination distributed among three subjects?" "The unity of consciousness," adds Maher, "is incompatible with multiplicity of elements of whatever kind."

Unamuno's answer to this type of argument is this: "A more obvious begging of the question cannot be conceived. It is taken for granted that the whole, as a whole, is incapable of making a judgment. They begin by supposing something external to and distinct from the states of consciousness, something that is not the living body which supports these states, something that is not I but is within me." I may be allowed in passing to point out the striking similarity between Unamuno's criticism and the line of argument pursued by Pringle-Pattison in his *Idea of Immortality*. "Although the parts of an organism," he writes, "if we regard it physically, are certainly external to one another, it is the very nature of an organism, if regarded functionally, to transcend this mutual exclusiveness. The organism is the first real whole, the first natural unity." And it is this whole that sees and hears and smells. All the efforts to substantiate consciousness, making it independent of extension are sophistical subtleties intended to establish the rationality of faith in the immortality of the soul.

Unamuno turns then to examine the attempts that have been made to find an empirical support for belief in Immortality of the Soul. And he analyses the work of F. W. H. Myers. "In

spite of its critical apparatus," he concludes, "it does not differ in any respect from medieval miracle-mongering."

There is a fundamental defect of logic.

II

The constructive side of Unamuno's work occupies the largest portion of his Essays. I shall endeavour to lead you along the dark and narrow avenues of Unamuno's argumentation—not an easy task, I assure you.

Unamuno starts from the assumption that love, pity and suffering are the essential constituents of personality.

Love is, he says, the most tragic thing in the world and in life. Love seeks with fury, through the medium of the beloved, something beyond, and since it finds it not, it despairs. "As you turn inwards and penetrate more deeply into yourself, you will discover more and more your own emptiness, that you are not what you would wish to be, that you are, in a word, only a nonentity. And in touching your own emptiness, in not feeling your permanent base, in not reaching your own infinity, still less your own eternity, you will have a whole-hearted pity for yourself, and you will burn with a sorrowful love for yourself. Love, from which proceeds pity, is the first element of personality. Dean Inge's thought, we may note in passing, has a striking similarity with that of Unamuno's. "Love," he writes, which is the realisation in experience of spiritual existence, has an unique value as a hierophant of the highest mysteries. And love guarantees personality, for it needs what has been called otherness. In all love there must be a subject and an object, and a bond between them which transcends without annulling their separateness." (Outspoken Essays, 278.)

The second step in Unamuno's argument is that love personalizes everything that it loves. "We only pity, that is to say, we only love that which is like ourselves and in so far as it is like ourselves, and the more like it is the more we love; and

thus our pity for things and with it our love grows in proportion as we discover in them the likenesses which they have with ourselves. Only by personalizing it can we fall in love with an idea." And when love is so great and so vital, so strong and so overflowing, that it loves everything, then it personalizes everything and discovers that the total All, that the Universe, is also a Person possessing Consciousness; a Consciousness which in its turn suffers, pities and loves and therefore is consciousness. And this consciousness of the Universe, which love, personalizing all that it loves, discovers, is what we call God," "We personalize the all in order to save ourselves from nothingness.

The third element of Consciousness is suffering. "Suffering," Unamuno continues, "is the path of consciousness... For to possess consciousness of oneself, to possess personality, is to know oneself and to feel oneself distinct from other beings, and this feeling of distinction is only reached through an act of collision, through suffering more or less severe, through the sense of one's own limits. Consciousness of oneself is simply consciousness of one's own limitations. I feel myself when I feel that I am not others: to know and to feel the extent of my being is to know at what point I cease to be, the point beyond which I no longer am."

From these premises, from these self-evident because felt experiences of life, Unamuno draws two important conclusions: the first is the existence of God, the second is the continuity of our personality. In fact, the two are interdependent "love is a contradiction if there is no God." "It is the furious longing to give finality to the Universe, to make it conscious and personal, that has brought us to believe in God, to wish that God may exist." Unamuno is very emphatic on these points. God is not postulated to justify transcendental police system, neither is God converted into a great Judge or Policeman. We need God in order to save consciousness: not in order to think existence, but in order to live it; not in order

to know the why and the how of it, but in order to feel the wherefore of it. "The problem of the existence of God..... is really identical with the problem of consciousness.....it is none other than the problem of the substantial existence of the soul, the problem of the perpetuity of the human soul, the problem of the human finality of the Universe itself." We have seen how Unamuno is led to the conclusion that suffering is the substance of life and the root of personality. A further explanation of this mysterious power leads us to the very core of Unamuno's argument for the immortality of the soul. You will allow me a somewhat lengthy quotation. "The Universal suffering is the anguish of all in seeking to be all else but without power to achieve it, the anguish of each in being he that he is, being at the same time all that he is not, and being so for ever. The essence of a being is not only its endeavour to persist for ever, as Spinoza taught us, but also its endeavour to universalize itself; it is the hunger and thirst for eternity and infinity. Every created being tends not only to preserve itself in itself, but to perpetuate itself, and, moreover, to invade all other beings, to be others without ceasing to be itself, to extend its limits to the infinite but without breaking them. It does not wish to throw down its walls and leave everything laid flat, common and undefended, confounding and losing its own individuality, but it wishes to carry its walls to the extreme limits of creation and to embrace everything within them. It seeks the maximum of individuality with the maximum also of personality; it aspires to the identification of the Universe with itself: it aspires to God."

The thirst for eternity, the desire to eternalize himself, the frenzied love of life is in Unamuno's conception both the creator of Immortality and its guarantor. Egotism, some will cry; illusion and fantastic dreams, others will argue. Unamuno does not slur over this objection.

What is the guarantee that something objective exists outside us corresponding to this longing and which will satisfy

this longing? Unamuno's answer goes straight to the root of the matter. "What is it, in effect, to exist, and when do we say that a thing exists? 'A thing exists when it is placed outside us, and in such a way that it shall have preceded our perception of it and be capable of continuing to subsist outside us after we have disappeared. But have I any certainty that anything has preceded me or that anything must survive me? Can my consciousness know that there is anything outside it? Everything that I know or can know is within my consciousness. We will not entangle ourselves, therefore, in the insoluble problem of an objectivity outside our perceptions. Things exist in so far as they act. To exist is to act.'"

The selfishness of this longing to perpetuate oneself has been advanced as an argument against Personal Immortality. Egotism and Pride! But Unamuno asks, is it pride to want to be immortal? Unhappy men that we are! 'Tis a tragic fate, without a doubt, to have to base the affirmation of immortality upon the insecure and slippery foundation of the desire for immortality. And in another passage Unamuno asks with Leopardi: Who are we, vile earthworms, to pretend to immortality; in virtue of what? by what right? And he answers by asking, in virtue of what do we live? by what right are we? To exist is just as gratuitous as to go on existing for ever. Prof. Pringle-Pattison expresses the whole argument in clear and forcible words. Desire is an insecure basis to build upon. "So long as it remains simply a desire for personal continuance—an instinctive shrinking from death—we cannot build upon it.....But the belief in immortality is not based by the religious man on any personal claim for himself or even for others: it seems rather, as our argument has suggested, to be an inference from the character of God." Unamuno's argument, as we have seen, is not so much that Immortality is an inference from the character of God, as that the two, namely the existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul, are aspects of the same reality. I believe that one of the deepest

things that Unamuno has said is this which you will allow me to repeat: "And this God, the living God, your God, our God, is in me, is in you, lives in us.....And He is in us by virtue of the hunger, the longing which we have for him. He is Himself creating the longing for Himself." To exist is to act. God exists by creating in us this longing, this desire to persist: the cessation of this desire will therefore imply the annihilation of God. If God exists, we also persist for ever. This I consider to be the gist of Unamuno's argumentations.

III

Unamuno writes most wonderful lines on the apocatastasis, the returning of all things to God. "He shall be all in all," says the first mystic of Christianity. And in this connection I will allow myself a very short quotation: "May it not be that the Universe, our Universe, began with a zero of spirit and an infinite of matter, and that its zeal is to end with an infinite of spirit and a zero of matter?"

Unamuno discusses at length what he appropriately calls the mythology of the beyond. Only one question can be touched at present. The main feature of the life beyond is, according to Unamuno, a continuation of that innermost tragedy of life which, as said above, gives zest to our life here. "If there is an end of all suffering, he says, if there is an end of all desire, what is it that makes the blessed in paradise go on living? If in paradise they do not suffer for want of God, how shall they love him?" For Unamuno as for Browning, whom he so often quotes, man is ever a fighter always facing adventures brave and new. Life is an eternal ascent. There is no happiness in a vacuity of contemplation. Finally, there remains the practical import of the question. The Immortality of the soul has been considered as the basis of all morality and unless the basis be firm, the structure raised on it is bound to collapse. Unamuno has told us that desire

and longing for existence is a slippery and insecure foundation, then how does he attempt to build his system of morality on such basis? "I wish to establish," he says, "that uncertainty, doubt, perpetual wrestling with the mystery of our final destiny, mental despair, and the lack of any solid and stable dogmatic foundation, may be the basis of an ethic." What is the moral proof of the Immortality of the Soul? "We may formulate it thus: Act so that in your own judgment and in the judgment of others you may merit eternity, act so that you may become irreplaceable, act so that you may not merit death." "Our greatest endeavour must be to make ourselves irreplaceable." "Act in such a way as to make your annihilation an injustice." Pringle-Pattison agrees with Unamuno on this point: "Our argument has led us to think that immortality is not something automatically given but essentially something to be won and held....."

We must stop abruptly. Time does not allow further investigation. I have endeavoured to place before you Unamuno's thought and I am sure you will agree with me that the small scraps I have been able to reproduce well prove that his Essays deserve the careful study of all thinkers in all countries

P. G. BRIDGE.

DILTHEY'S 'GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTLICHE' METHOD.

The method which Dilthey has established for the study of mental phenomena was first employed by him for the study of the life and philosophy of Schleiermacher. What Dilthey seeks to do is to supply a logic of the mental sciences to replace the causal logic of the positive sciences.

This is one side of Dilthey's method. But there is another side of it. To understand it we have to show its connexion with the great romantic movement of the early nineteenth century. What is now known as historicism owes its origin to this romantic movement. Romanticism has a great advantage over rationalism in its treatment of history, in that it is not confined to the elaboration of purely logical principles. It can study history from the feeling-side and thus more quickly perceive its essential connexion with religion. For the sake of bringing out the totality of the 'geistlichen Zusammenhänge,' to use an expression of Dilthey, it has a quicker method than rationalism with its cumbrous logical apparatus.

Dilthey has tried to keep "true to the kindred points of heaven and home." He knows full well the one-sidedness and artificiality of the Hegelian world-scheme. But he believes that it would be nothing short of a calamity, if philosophy were to abandon reason altogether. "Philosophy," he says in his excellent article *On the Essence of Philosophy* in 'Systematische Philosophie' "is a 'Doppelwesen.'" "On the one hand, it has to offer a solution of the world-riddle and take into account the findings of the positive sciences. On the other hand, it has to answer the inner searchings of the heart, it has to find a solution of the eternal problems of life." It is a mistake to treat the totality of the world-connexions either as a problem of applied logic or as mere art or religion. Hegel made the former mistake, he tried to "comprehend the world in

its essence through a metaphysical system." The romanticists make the latter mistake: they treat the entire world as a phenomenon of applied art or applied religion. Both are equally mistaken. *

The method of the 'Geisteswissenschaften' is based upon a principle which Dilthey learnt from Schleiermacher. It is *Erlebnis*, experience as lived, not experience as a matter of historical research. • Schleiermacher got this principle from religion, Hölderlin from poetry. Schleiermacher emphasised only the feeling-aspect of this experience. Dilthey showed that this was false abstraction and insisted upon the inclusion of the will-element and the thought-element. Experience, as containing the factors of feeling, willing and thinking as one unitary whole constitutes the *Erlebnis* of Dilthey.

This *Erlebnis* Dilthey exhibits, not like Schleiermacher or Hölderlin in isolated regions, but in the totality of the soul-life. Herein lies the superiority of Dilthey over the romanticists. He has the patience and the courage to exhibit the workings of *Erlebnis* in all spheres of human life and activity. He therefore substitutes for the Hegelian "Phänomenologie des Geistes" an equally, if not more thorough, "Phänomenologie des Erlebuisses." This thorough phenomenology is Dilthey's answer to the mechanical explanation of life.

It is significant that Dilthey always speaks of the *Zusammenhang* and not of the *Einheit* of *Erlebnis*. The reason is, he never forgets that it is a living and not a mere conceptual unity. Such a unity can best be expressed by the term 'Zusammenhang' which brings out clearly the reality and independence of the experiences which are united to form one harmonious totality.

The connexion of experience, as thus conceived, Dilthey calls *Strukturzusammenhang*. This word means nothing but the inner purposiveness which makes our soul-life what it is. It means something more than the 'innere Zweckmässigkeit' of Kant, for it denotes not simply the bare idea of a purpose, but



a living purposiveness—a purposiveness which is *erlebt* and which manifests itself differently in the different regions of art, religion, poetry and philosophy. In fact, the idea of diversity is the essence of a 'Strukturzusammenhang.' This diversity is twofold. On the one hand, each Strukturzusammenhang is a unity of divers purposes. On the other hand, the Strukturzusammenhänge are divers, on account of the diversity of purposes which they exhibit.

The purposive organisations (Zweckzusammenhänge) take place as follows: The psychical organisations of pleasure and pain show themselves in the processes of attention, in the phenomenon of choice and in the activity of the will.* Next there is the purposive organisation of what is experienced into a world-view—what Dilthey calls the "Zweckzusammenhang der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis." Then there is the third purposive organisation of the values of life, by which by means of "our will-actions, we try to guide things, human beings, society and even ourselves." To this third kind of purposive organisation belong all "ends, goods, duties, rules of life, the entire work of our practical life in law, in economics, in the regulation of society and in the conquest of nature."

The subjective and immanent purposiveness of the individual expresses itself in history as development. The order and arrangement of the individual life transform themselves into the order and arrangement of the social life. The work of the mind extends in space, guided by the consciousness of solidarity and progress: thus there arise continuity of social work, increase of the spiritual energy manifested in it and a growing organisation of labour. In all these various ramifications, there arise always out of the structure of life those purposive organisations which Dilthey calls "Systems of culture." "Philosophy can very well be called one of these culture-systems of human society."¹

¹ *Systematische Philosophie*, p. 34

The Geisteswissenschaften rest upon such purposive connexions. These Dilthey calls the organic connexions of inner experience. It is very important to remember that the *Erlebnis* of Dilthey is always an inner experience, an inchoate unity of purpose. This is the fact which distinguishes the 'Geisteswissenschaften' from the positive sciences. In the life of the Spirit what we come across is purposive organisation and not phenomena governed by nature-necessity.

The question, however, arises, What gives unity to these Geisteswissenschaften? To answer this question, Dilthey distinguishes two kinds of unities. On the one hand, there is the universality given by the concept (*Begriff*). This universality is demanded by Philosophy. On the other hand, there is the connexion of experience which gives unity but not universality. All reality depends upon experience, understood of course in the sense of *Erlebnis*, as Dilthey has defined it. A synthesis through '*Begriff*' must also depend for its reality upon an *Erlebnis*. Without such a basis in *Erlebnis*, it becomes a mere abstraction.

Not that Dilthey wants to do away with the '*Begriff*.' The '*Begriff*' builds up one system of culture, namely, philosophy. A connexion of experience through the concept of universality is undoubtedly a valuable connexion for the human spirit. But it is not more valuable than the other great connexions of experience, such as Religion or Poetry. If philosophy pretends to have more value than this, then it becomes metaphysics, which, according to Dilthey, is a false science that tries to arrive at a unity not warranted by experience. If we regret that it is not possible to have a science of universals that gives us a highest unity which comprehends all other unities, Dilthey's answer is that a unity through concepts can only embrace a limited region of our life. The attempt, therefore, to reach an all-embracing unity with the help of concepts is doomed to failure. But though it is not possible to have an all-embracing science of universals, yet we may

have an all-comprehensive universal science in the shape of History, whose method is the method of all the Geisteswissenschaften.

We shall not be justified, therefore, in asserting that the dualism of *Erlebnis* and *Begriff* is anything like the dualism of intelligence and intuition in Bergson. In Dilthey the function assigned to *Begriff* is a very limited one. The distinction between *Erlebnis* and *Begriff* is not a division into two separate aspects of life, such as is denoted by intelligence and intuition in Bergson. In his "Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften" Dilthey has made it quite clear that though there can be no subsumption of the other connexions under the culture-system called philosophy, yet there is nowhere any opposition.

Yet in spite of this and other differences, there is great resemblance between the systems of Bergson and Dilthey. Both the systems are a strong protest against the mechanical view of the world. Both assert the artificial character of the methods of the positive sciences. Both want to replace these methods by others which have a direct contact with reality. The 'intuition' of Bergson, no less than the '*Erlebnis*' of Dilthey, has a direct contact with reality. The method of concepts both these philosophers reject for the same reason, namely, because it takes us away from the heart of reality.

Dilthey's method, however, is superior to Bergson's in this, that it takes into account the entire range of mental activity, whereas Bergson considers only a few stray regions, such as art and music. One very important department of human life, namely, religion, is entirely ignored by Bergson. Dilthey proceeds with a complete phenomenology which is more thorough than even the phenomenology of Hegel. Bergson's treatment lacks method. He picks up isolated regions of human activity, more for purposes of illustration than for carrying out any systematic plan, and shows the hopelessness of approaching them from the standpoint of science.

The ' *Strukturzusammenhang* ' of Dilthey is a more fruitful principle than the ' creative evolution ' of Bergson, for the latter principle, while proving the dynamic character of reality, expressly excludes any purpose in the continuous process of reality. A movement that is not movement towards anything, a flow that is always nothing but a flow fails to give abiding satisfaction to mankind. Its value, therefore, is more or less a negative one. It shows us what we are *not* to expect from a real movement—any unilinear development, any process which can be condensed into a mathematical formula is a sure indication that what we have come across is no real movement but a mere abstraction. This much Bergson tells us, but about the positive characteristics of this eternal process which he calls reality, he is absolutely silent.

It is true that as reality in Bergson's view consists in continuous flow, it is not possible to indicate any destination towards which the flow is directed. For the very idea of a destination is destructive of the conception of eternal flow. But then the question arises : What is the necessity of defining the real as continuous flow? The necessity in Bergson's case is a purely negative one. He has shown, by examining more positive definitions, the danger which besets them all, namely, that of losing the real in the maze of concepts. This danger is no doubt a real one, but the opposite danger is no less real, the danger, namely, of accepting complacently the definition of reality as eternal flow. The view of reality as a flow may be made the starting-point of philosophical inquiry, but to put it forward as the last word of metaphysics—well, the very idea is ridiculous. Bergson must have a very poor conception of humanity to think that its quest for truth will be satisfied by a metaphysics that takes it no further than the fact of universal change.

What Bergson has really succeeded in doing is to make us perceive the necessity of having a thorough-going logic of the real. The Logic of Aristotle, based as it is upon a mechanical

view of the world (I know perfectly well that Aristotle was the founder of the organic view of the world, but his logic is not influenced in any way by it), cannot satisfy us. Nor can the logic of Hegel, though it makes an emphatic protest against the mechanical view. For it is not free from the fundamental bias of mechanism (rather it is more full of it), namely, that it is possible to express the whole essence of reality by means of concepts. Bergson is quite right in classing the Hegelian with the follower of Darwin or Spencer, for they both make the same mistake, namely, that of supposing that the entire process of the world can be condensed into a single formula. A new logic of reality is an absolute necessity—a logic which will take into account the diversity of the world and not attempt to construct any hasty synthesis.

The 'Geisteswissenschaftliche' Method of Dilthey is specially valuable in this respect. It does not give us any immediate synthesis : it rather gives us a number of Struktur-zusammenhänge—connexions of experience and not unities of concept. It would have been a bad thing for the world if Dilthey had tried to give us any immediate synthesis, for the world is quite sick of such hasty solutions. What we want at present is a definite recognition of the complexity of the world and a final abandonment of any triadic rhythm as the solution of the world. The variety and complexity of the Culture-systems of Dilthey bring out clearly the complex nature of the world. The universe, in Dilthey's opinion, is not a universe of *purpose* but a universe of *purposes*, not the triumphal march of an all-conquering thought but the slow progress of a diversely developing experience.

Does this mean, however, that Dilthey's final word is not One but Many? Does he deliver us from the bondage of mechanism, only to plunge us into a still more hopeless pluralism? No doubt there is in Dilthey a pluralism of systems, but there is properly no pluralism of entities, that is to say, no ontological pluralism. There is undoubtedly in Dilthey a

recognition of the independence of the different culture-systems such as Religion, Philosophy or Poetry. He expressly avoids any attempt to bring them under one denominator, for to do this is, in his view, to commit the mistake made by metaphysics. At the same time, he maintains what he calls the "sovereignty of the Spirit," he shows that these Culture-systems are the Culture-systems of the Spirit, that the sciences which are vital for us are all *Geisteswissenschaften*, sciences of the Spirit. The Culture-systems, in fact, are the multiple directions of the evolution of the Spirit. The evolution of the Spirit is never a uni-linear evolution, as represented by Darwin and Spencer or even as represented by Hegel: it is a multiple, polyadic movement extending in divers directions and placing divers ends before it. The Culture-systems mean nothing but these divers directions having divers ends before them. It is the great merit of Dilthey that while maintaining to the fullest extent the spiritual nature of the world, he does full justice to its complexity.

S. K. MAITRA

PLATO ON BEAUTY

Scholars differ as to the view of Plato on beauty. Some hold that according to Plato, "The beautiful is the brightness of the True." According to others, beauty resides in measure and proportion, according to Plato. Bosanquet holds that outside Plato's theory of art, the beautiful is principally spoken of as the manifestation of intelligence. Sully maintains that Plato leans decidedly to the conception of an absolute beauty, which takes its place in his scheme of ideas or self-existing forms. Jowett entertains almost a similar view. In the opinion of Knight, according to Plato, there is one, universal, and absolute archetype of beauty which does not appear or disappear, but which always is, always was, and always will be at the core of things, and at the centre of the universe, which makes all things beautiful. Thus according to the majority of modern thinkers, Plato holds that it is absolute beauty through which all beautiful things are beautiful. Let us now see how the ancients understood Plato's teaching on beauty. Plotinus,—a Neoplatonist (205-270 A.D.) says that "Beauty does not lie in material substance, but in those eternal ideas which material forms very inadequately reflect. It is to be seen, not with the outward, but with the 'inward eye.' In the material world, there are countless dim mirrors of the absolute beauty, which is only partially disclosed (as the immanent underlying essence of things), in the phenomenal forms.¹ Proclus (412-485 A.D.), another Neoplatonist wrote amongst other works on the theology of Plato. In the twenty-fourth chapter of the 1st Book of the same, he writes 'concerning divine beauty, and the elements of it, as taught by Plato.' Proclus says that according to Plato, "a primary super-sensible beauty is the

¹ Knight, *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 31.

cause of all the secondary or derivative beauty of the world, whether seen in mind or matter."¹ Thus we see that two well-known Neoplatonists^{*} in ancient times interpreted Plato's theory of beauty in a similar light. Plato's theory of beauty has no connection with previous Greek thinking, and as such seems to be of foreign origin. Now the question comes: wherefrom has he learnt it? He cannot have learnt it from ancient Egyptians, for ancient Egyptians had no such doctrine. Scholars speak of his travels to India. Let us now see whether any Indian influence can be traced. Mr. Urwick urges: "But I boldly make the claim that Plato's doctrines are not easily understood without reference to the Indian teaching. I will not attempt—it would need a separate volume—to show how the Indian thought may have filtered through to Socrates and Plato; how far it may have reached Plato in his wanderings, how far through Pythagoras, how far, even before the death of Socrates, a direct stream of the Eastern doctrine may have flowed through Asia Minor into Greece."² We may not agree with Mr. Urwick on all points; but it seems to us that Plato's teaching on beauty cannot fully be explained without reference to the Indian teaching. In support of our contention, we cite below two passages, which contain doctrines which are presumably Indian, from the *Phaedrus*—one of the dialogues in which Plato shows, how the soul, using sight, 'the noblest of the senses' is led back from the beauties of earth to the heavenly or absolute beauty—beauty in itself. The passage runs as follows: "And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs. And when she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of beauty, her constraint is loosened, and has no more pangs and pains; and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, and is the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems above all, he has forgotten mother and brethren

¹ Knight, *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 33.

² Urwick, "The Message of Plato," p. 14.

and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property ; the rules and proprieties, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to sleep like a servant, wherever he is allowed, as near as he can to his desired one, who is the object of his worship and the physician who can alone assuage the greatness of his pain." Further, we read in the same dialogue : " But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is mazed when he sees any one having a golden face, which is the expression of divine beauty, and a shudder runs through him, and again, the old awe steals over him ; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god ; then while he gazes on him there is a sort of re-action, and the shudder passes into an unusual heat and perspiration ; for, as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms." ¹

The thought indicated in the passages cited above seems to be Indian. In India, a real spiritual teacher possesses divine beauty and is revered as a god. At the time of the initiation of the disciple in spirit, a sort of re-action takes place, and the shudder passes into an unusual heat and perspiration. For the sake of his *guru*, whom he esteems above all, he sacrifices everything he holds dear. He forgets all earthly interests and is raprion the divine. The vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him ; but they do not see that he is inspired.²

The Indians, like the Greeks, hold that the perception of the beautiful is objective and not subjective. All beautiful things whether of mind, nature or art are beautiful in proportion they express and arouse *rasa*. But wherefrom does the *rasa*

¹ Jowett, Plato's Dialogue, Vol. I, Phaedrus, p. 457.

² Vide Jowett, Phaedrus, p. 457. This reminds us of the Bhāgavat where a true *bhakta* is regarded as an *unmatta* or a mad man.

of the beautiful come? The Taittiriya Upanisad says that the Supreme spirit Paramātmān is the source of all the *rasas*. All things become joyous or beautiful in the proportion that they imbibe His *rasa*.¹

All the great thinkers of the world hold that there is distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. The beautiful is something limited which can be easily embraced by our faculties, but the feeling of the sublime is produced by the contemplation of greatness of any kind. As Cousin puts it, "A beautiful object, we have seen, is something completed, limited, which all our faculties easily embrace, because the different parts are on a somewhat narrow scale. A sublime object is that which, by forms not in themselves disproportionate, but less definite and more difficult to seize, awakens in us the sentiment of the infinite."² Kant puts the same thought in a little different way. "The beautiful calms and pacifies us; the sublime brings disorder into our faculties; it produces discord between the reason, which conceives the infinite, and the imagination which has fixed limits."³ The Indian Scriptures too distinguish between the sentiments of the sublime and the beautiful.

The sublime or *adbhuta rasa* which is roused by the contemplation of something beyond human comprehension (लोकसीमातिवर्त्ती) and the beautiful is something of duly adjusted parts expressing and rousing *rasa*. We read in the Gita when Arjuna saw Visvarupa of Bhagavān, he was seized with fear and awe, and prayed to Bhagavān for the assumption of human body of great beauty. We come across the same story in the Bhāgavat. When Devaki and Vāsudeva learnt that their sons, Rāma and Krisna were *jagadisvaras* they did not embrace them out of fear.⁴

¹ The *rasa* is difficult to translate in English. It literally means what can be tasted or enjoyed. It is doubtful whether it can be rendered by the word emotion.

² "Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good," English Translation.

³ Vide Kant in Weber's History of Philosophy.

⁴ Bhāgavata, 10. 44. 51.

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka we read the story of a *rishi* praying for the revelation of the most beautiful form of God.¹ The Katha says that he who is chosen by the Lord to him the Lord reveals His own body.² The Gita speaks of the 'condensed form of Brahman; we read : "I am the condensed form of Brahman who is eternal and indestructible, of immemorial righteousness, and of unending bliss."³ From the Bhāgavata we learn that Uddhava told Bidura that Bhagavān Srikrishna assumed a most beautiful form, fit for worldly *liṅa*, by means of His *yogamāyā*. That beautiful form which was the richest of all treasures roused His own admiration. Bhakta Bilva-mangala before he actually saw God used to describe the beauty of God in verse. But when he had actual vision, he was almost dumb—his words proved inadequate to describe it. That beauty is above language, above description, something incomparable. He could only say, "Sweet, very sweet is the body of the Lord. Sweet, very sweet is His face. His smile is gentle and full of sweetness. His body is sweet, sweet, sweet." When a bhakta sees the beauty of God, through his inward eye of bhakti, he can describe it as 'very sweet,' 'very beautiful' and nothing more than that. It is like a charming dream dreamt by a dumbman. Thus, according to the Indian theory of beauty, God is both finite and infinite, His finite shape is the condensed form of the infinite. He has a finite shape of infinite beauty which is known as 'Saccidānanda Vighraha.' Devotees spend days after days, years after years in drinking the beauty of His 'Vighraha Mūrti.' As light flows from the sun, so God as Saccidānanda Vighraha makes all things beautiful. Almost similar is the doctrine of Plato on beauty. According to Plato, the perception of the beautiful is objective. All beautiful things express and rouse emotion. The perception of the beautiful gives us 'the sweetest of all pleasures.' He says : "This is

¹ Bṛhadāraṇyaka, 5. 15. 1.

² Katha 1. 2.

³ Gītā 14. 27. The word "Pratistha," occurring in the sloka is explained by Sridhara as धनीभूतोन्नयनं वाङ्म ।

the privilege of beauty that she is the loveliest, and also the most palpable to sight."¹ The "Symposium" treats of love, but it is a love which rises from the lower plane of sense to the vision of what is intrinsically beautiful. Beyond individual beautiful objects, there is "a thing of wondrous beauty, which is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning.....but beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which, without diminution and decrease, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things." "If man has eyes to see the true beauty, he becomes the friend of God and immortal."² In the "Phaedo," Plato says: "Any beautiful thing is only made beautiful by the presence or communication or whatever you please to call it, of absolute beauty. I do not wish to insist on the nature of the communication (on how the communication or participation is effected), but what I am sure of, is that it is absolute beauty through which all things are beautiful."³ In the "Phaedrus," we are told that absolute beauty is discerned by the mind when thrown into ecstasy in its presence. In the 5th book of the "Republic" it has been said that few are able to attain to the vision of the absolute beauty. It is noteworthy that in the "Republic" he employs the great simile of the sun and its light to explain absolute beauty and its manifestation. Thus it seems that absolute beauty of Plato is the same as *saccidānanda vigraha* of the Indian Scriptures. It may be objected that that the infinite can assume a finite form of immense beauty is particularly a Paurānic doctrine. There is evidence to show that most of the Purānas were composed some centuries after Christ and Plato arose some centuries before Christ. So, how is it possible for Plato to learn it from India? We point out in reply that Pargiter, Rapson, and others have held that some of the materials of the Purānas are

¹ Vide Phaedrus, 250.

² Symposium, 210-212.

³ Vide Phaedrus, 250.



very ancient. That the infinite can assume a finite shape of great beauty is the principal theme of every Purāna and as such it must be regarded as very ancient. In these circumstances, is it too much to hold that Plato borrowed the idea of absolute beauty from India ?

ABHAYAKUMAR GUHA

THE NEW SPIRITUAL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY

I am sincerely grateful to you for having afforded me an opportunity to speak to you about the *new spiritual movement in Germany*. It was called, by Dr. Rudolf Steiner, the founder of the movement, by the name of Anthroposophy. To you the term Anthropology is familiar. It deals with man in his physical appearance. Anthroposophy on the other hand, or to translate it precisely, the "sophia," the wisdom concerning man, makes him the centre of its investigations as a cosmico-spiritual unit.

But before speaking about Anthroposophy itself I would like to indicate how this spiritual understanding of man and the cosmos is linked up with and grew out of the philosophical outlook in Germany. I am sure you are anxious to know the connection which exists between Anthroposophy and the philosophical system, known to you as those of Kant, Hegel and others.

The difficulty in approaching any philosophy grown up within self-contained civilisation lies in the two-fold aspect it presents according to whether it is seen from outside, on the surface, or from within, its essence. As a rule, the outsider is struck by the surface, the appearance, so to say, and he rarely succeeds in assimilating the creative impulses, the true inner tendencies. To come into close communion with such a philosophy a pre-existing affinity of souls, a natural participation in the national life are essential. I am sure you will agree with me in this, especially if you think of many a European student of Indian philosophy who in spite of their erudition and school knowledge cannot give you the impression of having grasped the specific quality of Indian thought.

If we then start from the active tendencies in the philosophy of Fichte, the German philosopher, from that inner point

of view which I have tried to indicate, we might take those impulses in his work which are alive and active in Germany of to-day. Somewhere in Fichte's theory of philosophy the remark may be found that it is necessary to develop a new inner organ of perception, in order to rightly understand it. Fichte compares the awakening of this new sense of perception to the gaining of sight by a man born blind, after an operation. With the help of this sense a new world is revealed. He explains that this new sense is that of the "active ego-force" or of the "action ego." The spiritual discovery of Fichte might be called that of the Self as organ of consciousness. German philosophy in its entirety, if understood in its main direction may be defined as an endeavour towards definition of the Self.

Let us now throw a retrospective glance from Fichte towards Kant and then proceed to a definition of Anthroposophy.

Kant, as you know, in his "criticism of pure reason" attempted to demonstrate that it does not lie within human power to acquire any knowledge of the "thing in itself." Man, according to Kant, is in his perception limited to and dependent on appearance, on the world of sense. He is incapable of ever finding what constitutes the root and kernel of this sense world.

This is the so-called doctrine of the limitation of knowledge, or if I may say so, the most un-Indian philosophy imaginable. If an Indian having studied Kant only, were to think that thereby he knew German philosophy, this would be merely surface knowledge. In order to understand Kant, it is indispensable to realise how he has to be understood and how he came to his conclusions. That Kant came to his doctrine of the limitation of knowledge is due to the fact that though Kant was a great thinker, he was one without a Self. This explains his doctrine about the means of knowledge which maintains that the possibilities of knowledge are limited within the sense world. If the thinker separates himself from thought in the abstract and directs his attention only towards the sense world, the inevitable

result is, that instead of finding its ground it will only find its image. Such a thinker is entirely dependent on this material. His powers are exhausted when he has registered and received his object. What the object is in itself he is incapable of understanding.

I trust you pardon me if for the sake of clearness I over-emphasize these distinctions. My purpose is to clearly demonstrate the process of thought and to single out the directing principle. Kant thus may be called a thinker without Self, with whom thinking is a mere category.

In the case of Fichte however, we find that thought has become individualised in order to assert itself against the sense world. Kant is responsible for the splitting up of the sciences into a vast number of subjects and disciplines which lack unity. Fichte, on the contrary, endeavours to create in his theory of philosophy a co-ordinator common to all of them. Fichte realises the power of the thinker over thinking. With him out of the Ego, the Self, emerges the new organ of knowledge, strong enough to vivify and co-ordinate the entire field of scientific thought. His vital discovery was the allocation of equal value to thought and the sense world.

The following epistemological definition may be given: In the case of Fichte an element of will enters into the sphere of thinking, a volitional momentum, of creative origin. In other words: the reason that Fichte maintained to have shown a new direction lay in the fact that he taught that thought inherently possesses forces which also lie at the root objectively. In the philosophy of Fichte the thinker decides thought because thought not only images but participates.

If we now proceed to the philosophy of Steiner we find that with him the thinking Ego has been so focussed that from within it breaks the barriers of perception traced by Kant. The mantle evolution of Europe had to undergo a long and painful struggle before it arrived at the knowledge, so obvious to anybody well versed in Indian mentality, that to a truly trained

mind the first cause of all being is attainable, for Chit and Sat, consciousness and reality, are essentially identical. The nett gain of this struggle never to be lost again, was the experience of the Self, the Ego.

For any one not grown up within the intellectual atmosphere of Europe and not having painfully witnessed himself how terribly it had become obscured it is very difficult indeed to conceive what the Ego really means. It is the form in which Europe has gained its new spiritual experiences and perceptions. This Ego, when it opens itself to the mental world is like a vessel into which the spiritual first cause, the thing in itself, pours itself out.

In this country you see of this Ego as a rule only a caricature tending towards materialism, conquest and greed, but if you realise the energy locked up in this perversion, you may perhaps be able to imagine what it may achieve, if it changes its direction and opens itself towards what is spiritual.

Allow me now, in order to elaborate my view, to throw a quick glance on two figures, Hegel and Bergson.

You surely know that Hegel in his phenomenology of the spirit teaches the doctrine of the antithetic automotion of the objective spirit. Hegel assumes an objective thought which produces itself its own image as an antithesis to itself which it can consequently perceive fully. Nature and history are identified as modes of the thinking of the objective spirit. What carries him beyond Kant, are his assertion and attempt to reproduce in his own mental activity the working of the objective spirit.

This, however, he undertakes only within the sphere of intellectual thought, of which Kant rightly said that it is incapable of approaching the basic spiritual reality, the thing in itself. Hegel's philosophy thus comes to a dead stop within the limits of pure thought and remains outside the true secret which he could not penetrate and from which he was unable to derive creative power.

Let us now see what underlies Bergson's conception of *l' intuition creatrice*. Bergson thought it was possible to arrive at knowledge of what is truly vital by an insertion of sympathetic feeling. He feels that thinking alone is not capable of penetrating the objective creative and living reality. He is of opinion that something else is required to give an impetus to thinking in the manner in which the flower bursts into blossom. This additional element he finds in the power of emotion, which in conjunction with thought he considers capable of creative knowledge. But though much may be found on this way, yet it cannot be overlooked that this manner opens considerable room to subjectivity. Although emotion may prove deeper than thought it nevertheless is dangerous to give it preference. While Hegel is blocked by the limits of thought Bergson is caught in the meshes of his own emotional orientation.

This short reference to Hegel and Bergson purposes to show how far from the point of view of the history of philosophy, Anthroposophy actually contains a new method of knowledge. It is true that both Hegel and Bergson maintain to be able to transcend the Kantian limits of knowledge, but both stop within the domain of metaphysical speculation. Anthroposophy therefore does not differ by its claim of a new metaphysical knowledge but by the use of a new method to attain this.

Anthroposophy postulates that there are hidden and dormant forces in men that can be awakened. It explains that the thought faculties developed in ordinary life do not suffice to transcend the limit of common experience. Yet contrary to theosophical opinion which frequently discards these ordinary means of perception in favour of the development of the so-called higher organs of perception, Anthroposophy maintains that the logically precise and mathematically trained mind is a possession to be preserved, as it is the thought technique which enables the thinker to become conscious of his own self.



This consciousness of the Self gained through thinking becomes the basis for higher knowledge. This consciousness of the Self reveals itself to be a volitional element of a spiritually creative order inspiring thought. When this depth of the Self is reached then only metaphysical speculation is overcome and replaced by a truly intuitive perception.

This reasoning may strike you as strange and prominently occidental, but objectively considered it should meet with immediate response from Indian circles. For here we find as result by occidental method and on an occidental basis a realisation of truth which is in fact truly Indian. Indeed many a truth which for Indians is an inherited possession is here now obtained in the west by slow conquest. As far as I see we have here for the first time a meeting ground where India and Europe can join in full realisation of their individualities. Such a meeting is only possible in true and clear self-consciousness.

As I am nearing the end of my survey allow me to touch on a problem of decided importance to the western philosopher, the problem of the freedom of the will, as it throws light on our subject. You know that the main interest of the western philosophy was focussed on this problem of the freedom of the will. One may even say that the power of each single thinker to commune with consciousness may be tested by his answer to this fundamental question. During the last centuries the answer to this problem has been generally negative. The western mind has no safe anchor within itself to enable it to resist the onrush of materialism. Only after the discovery of the true consciousness of the Self by Anthroposophy, a position has been created to find an answer in the affirmative. Rudolf Steiner's philosophical *magnum opus* is entitled the philosophy of spiritual freedom. In this work the ways are pointed out which form the links and lead from the philosophy of to-day to those exalted and different states of consciousness by which the background of the world and of life slowly



becomes manifest. This new doctrine of a possibility of the expansion of consciousness, which in the west at present time is such a narrowly circumscribed conception, adds new value for us to Indian Philosophy.

If you allow me to express this thought in old Indian terminology I would say that Anthroposophy stands for that phase in the evolution of European philosophy where the knowledge awakens, that both Chit and Sat, the spiritual ground of being as well as of conscious man are identical and approach each other gradually in the process of Self-realisation. Western spirituality experiences this unity in methodical clearness in its supersensuous metaphysical self. The Self passing through its incarnations, realises within itself the consciousness of spiritual freedom.

The Indian seeker of spiritual reality experiences this final moment in the process of self-realisation, when Sat and Chit meet as a merging of his self into cosmic consciousness, a state of bliss, Ānanda.

What this spiritual bliss of Ānanda is to the Indian that the spiritual reality of freedom is to the western mind. That with difference in method and disposition an identical spiritual origin as well as spiritual goal have been found in East and West, seems to me a seal of the Truth.

HANS KOESTER

SOCIAL PERFECTION AND PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

A student of ethics cannot but be struck by some fundamental difference of outlook in the ethics of the East and the West. This has a particular bearing on the problem of the relation of the individual to society. In practice this has given rise to a question of supreme importance to every thinking man: is an individual completely subservient to society, or is society completely subservient to the demands of individuality? *i.e.*, is the *moksha* of any individual impossible till all the needs of society have been completely satisfied, or is an individual to use society merely as a field for his spiritual expansion? There is no doubt a fundamental discrepancy in these outlooks as thus conceived, and the problem is: can we reconcile them?

In the West morality has been always and strictly conceived in terms of society. At the very dawn of scientific ethics in Europe, Plato developed his famous idea that perfect morality in an individual means perfect society. Aristotle accepted the idea. Hence their culminating thought is to be found in their politics, with its elaborate discussion of the ways and means of achieving a more or less stable equilibrium in social life. Even Plato thought that a man can find supreme joy in philosophy alone, yet he taught that even these philosophers should be forced to sacrifice their personal joy, and take their hand at guiding the destinies of their society, or else be condemned to the humiliation of being ruled by inferior men. It is this idea which lingers, though in a diluted form, in the Stoic cosmopolitanism or the Epicurean community of friends. In Christianity the supreme sacrifice of Christ for the redemption of humanity has been an unfailing source of inspiration to his followers. It is true perhaps in the early

history of Christianity the ideal of strict monasticism and a whole-hearted absorption in God did prevail. But it was confined to a few, while it cannot be denied that on the whole the Christian endeavour has been dominated by the idea of bettering humanity so as to establish the Kingdom of God on earth. The chivalry of the knights of the Middle Ages; the intensely practical character of medieval monasteries and convents—which with all their faults were centres of learning, and industry and hospitality, and which did so much for the alleviation of human suffering—and the numerous missions from Europe and America which for centuries have gone forth to every nook and corner of the world with the settled conviction that Christianity is the sole refuge of mankind and an equally settled determination to make other people agree with them—all these certainly point to the strictly social character of Christian morality. European philosophers too—Nietzsche excepted,—however much they have departed from Christian theology, have clung to the spirit of Christian ethics, as may be seen in Kant and Hegel, Green and Bradley, James and Croce, and even the much criticised Hedonists with their emphasis on the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

From this dominant standpoint the goodness of man is measured in terms of the good he does to his fellow-beings, and God himself is not above being moral, since He is Love, which is continually manifesting itself in His infinite solicitude for His creatures. This constitutes the main traditional line of development in European ethics, though in practice there may have been a display of the sterner virtues to a much greater extent than the softer virtues usually associated with the personality and teaching of Christ.

This type of ethics in its religious form has carried with it a belief in the immortality of soul, a life hereafter either in heaven or hell. This has been posited as a dogma, and naturally it has failed to make any appeal whatever to the philosophers in the strict sense of the term. The idea of

eternal reward or eternal punishment to a man, whose average life falls considerably short of three score years and ten, nearly a third of which is spent in sleep, and a further considerable portion of which is spent in the unmoral activities of eating and drinking, is on the face of it disproportionate, while it is certainly impossible to harmonise such eternal punishment with a God so benign as is conceived by Christianity. This difficulty increases still further, if we consider the traditional account of Adam's fall, and the consequent curse, which all mankind is supposed to have inherited thenceforward. However illogical this may in itself be, it serves as a practical conviction to the orthodox believer, though it may be argued that it makes morality utilitarian, a matter of profit and loss extended to eternity. Apart from this a further theoretical difficulty is involved, *viz.*, that any excessive emphasis on heaven and hell glorifies the personal achievement of this or that person irrespective of the fact whether human society as such—*i.e.*, apart from the particular individuals comprised in it—attains the ideal of perfection. This is not a negligible difficulty, if as we have already stated before the essence of Western ethics lies in this perfection of human society.

When we direct our gaze to the philosophical ethics of Europe, we find a full-blooded emphasis on social service, generally in the form of a direct altruism, sometimes in the form of an individualism that is somehow productive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number as in the system of Bentham. It is remarkable how the idea of personal immortality plays a most subordinate part almost an accidental one—in this secular ethics. Nobody emphasises it so much as Kant, and even he finds a place for it only as a postulate. It serves as a concept, a hypothesis, carrying a half-hearted conviction of its reality, without any definite idea of what this immortal life consists of. All their emphasis, all their logic, is centred on discovering the most satisfactory ideal of morality : an ideal, that without unduly sacrificing individuality

somehow makes for the maximum of social efficiency or social well-being.

But society continues imperfect. If so, wherein lies the efficacy of morality? If as with Plato an individual realises his highest destiny only in a perfected society, how can any individual desist from his moral task, till this supreme task is achieved, and how can a man in the short span of three score years and ten achieve this end? It is here that the European ethics is most unsatisfactory, and many an Easterner lays down a European book on ethics with a feeling of supreme dissatisfaction, for he does not find in it what he most craves to find: either a clear account of life immortal, or a clear realisation that after the efforts of countless generations human society is somehow nearing perfection.

It is at this stage that the Indian ideas of *karma* and rebirth afford a connecting link. It is notorious how these ideas are rejected *in toto* by representative European philosophers, while the Indian mind literally gloats over them. What is so intellectually satisfactory in the doctrine of *karma* is the intelligible account it gives of the inequalities of life and of the contents of that life. It portrays a soul perfecting itself in a series of births, till it reaps the rewards of its perfection in attaining *mukti* or freedom from the cycle of births and deaths. This reward comes as the culminating point in the history of a soul extending over centuries, not as the end of a hectic adventure completed in a few decades.

So far so good. But these ideas have had the fatal effect of fostering fatalism in the masses, which, however, is not inherent in it, for *karma* is both causative and effectual; man is expected not merely to be the passive sufferer of his past *karma*, but he can modify it and thus build up his future *karma*. So far as the Indian intelligentsia are concerned there has developed the idea of *moksha*, variously interpreted, but all agreeing that it means cessation from birth and death. As to how this *moksha* is to be practically attained has given rise to two

divergent conceptions of morality, which have not always been sought to be harmonised.

(1) First of all there is an emphasis on the Dharma of status, on the fulfilment of ordinary duties of maintaining family continuity, honouring the parents and the *guru*, and performing the various ceremonies enjoined by the *Sāstras*. These include the duty of charity. But the best friend of India can hardly pretend that this spirit of charity has always found a correct outlet. More often than not it has ended in the erection of temples and costly endowments thereof for the feeding of the priestly classes, and sometimes of the genuinely needy and poor. Even this charity carries with it the idea of religious *punya* so as to lessen the burden of sin and reap the reward in the life hereafter. Buddhism—more than Hinduism, which, however, has absorbed some of the highest elements in Buddhism—affords unsurpassable instances of genuine charity. The life of Lord Buddha and his great imperial follower, Aśoka, struck the keynote of human sympathy, which has shone untarnished in the course of ages. But Buddhism has died out in India, and in its transplanted homes of China and Japan it has lost much of its purity and become mixed with elements of Confucianism and Shintoism. For all practical purposes the Hindu conception of Dharma with its more or less conventionalised prescriptions and duties remains the dominant ethical concept of India. But as we have already suggested above, it is a concept that is definitely subordinated to *mokṣha*.¹

(2) Secondly there is the conception of *vītarāga*, an ascetic isolation, which by itself has the power to close the gates of death and to open the gates of an eternal *ānanda*. The discussion of this ideal is fraught with a particular difficulty inasmuch as there is a conflict of interpretations as to its exact meaning. So far

¹ The morality of Dharma finds its highest manifestation in a Jeevanmukta who is in the world yet not of it, who is moral but without attachment to the fruits of morality.

as my observation goes, I have come to feel that for the average Hindu mind the idea of giving up the world has a fascination, which frankly speaking is incomprehensible to a non-Hindu mind. But one can see it is the legitimate outcome of the view, which regards mundane life as the source of temptation, as a subtle Syren, which makes the *ātman* turn from its divine pursuit and lose itself in the charms of a fickle world. At the bottom of every pious Hindu's mind there is a desire to fly this world with all its loves and allurements. (This interpretation may be challenged by some sects of Hindus, who repudiate the ascetic ideal altogether, but I think it will hold on the whole.) The result is the familiar sight in India: the recluse in the depths of a forest, or on the top of a mountain, living his solitary existence, meditating, till he obeys the call of death—or rather as is said he himself chooses to let his *ātman* out of his body. He may occasionally be seen by a few ardent disciples. But he remains unaffected, whether he is seen or not. Whether such a mode of life can be philosophically justified or not, there is no doubt about the sincerity or the strength of convictions underlying it. He is a genuine coin, that may not have any market value, but the coin rings true. His austerity is awe-inspiring and commands admiration and even respect. It would be irrelevant to pause and discuss the numerous false coins, palpable imitations, that congregate at the temple doors, or go from house to house for alms. They cannot be defended, nor need they be defended.

Now to return to the genuine ascetic. Is his life moral? If morality is essentially social in character, his life has no claim to being regarded as moral. The defenders of this ideal say that as a rule such an ascetic has already lived his Dharma, and having done so it is open to him to give up the ordinary code of morality, for morality is not the highest stage of life. They say the genuine ascetic is indeed not moral simply because he has risen above morality,—not in the sense that he cannot be tainted by immorality, a preposterous claim advanced

in fact by charlatans, trading on human credulity, but in the sense that he has risen above the necessity of observing the Dharma of the ordinary man, which is the only morality that is zealously maintained by the rank and file of Hindus. They justify the right of man to abjure society so soon as it becomes a hindrance to his spiritual development. At a certain stage the *ātman* rises above the necessity of a society. It tires of communing with society. It hungers for a larger field, and it can find no rest till it communes with the spirit of the universe itself, till in fact it finds itself in it. *Ātman* accosts the *Ātman*, and there is peace, *ānanda*, that passeth comprehension. (Cf. Mundaka Upanishad S 1b).

It is at this point that the divergence between the Indian and the Western mind becomes most marked. To the latter morality is always the highest category, and it is because the former denies this that the European finds a moral deficiency in the highest thought of India. Perhaps the charge is true, and the Indian defence is also true, provided we accept the metaphysical conceptions that underlie the conception of a supermoral or even an unmoral Nirguṇa Brahman.

But it seems to me that this historic emphasis on a supermoral asceticism is an aberration due to a perverse interpretation of the original masters. It is certainly noteworthy that the greatest names in the history of Indian Ethics are not of those, who in a mood of sullen disaffection bade goodbye to the world and left the suffering humanity to take care of itself. Rather are they of those, who underwent a silent and a studious preparation in the depths of their soul, and when they understood the mystery of life and death, they did not keep their knowledge as a cherished secret, but came out into the open arena and did not rest, till they had enlightened their fellow-beings. They may have spent several years of their lives in ascetic solitude, but it was only to prepare themselves for their mission in life; not because they thought such an ascetic life as superior to the claims of this work-a-day world, but as a necessary strenuous discipline

fitting them all the better for the conquest of ignorance and evil in their fellow-beings. Buddha and Mahāvīr, Sankara and Rāmānujāchārya, Kabir and Nānak, Dayānand Saraswati and Sri Ramakrishna were all men of austere, but noble and generous character, who in the quest of their own *mokṣa* did not forget the needs of humanity and were ever ready to spend the rich treasure of their spiritual experience for the elevation of mankind. I feel convinced that on the basis of their teaching the Mutts they established were not meant to be rich and merely feeding the pious pilgrim or the stray visitor. They were essentially meant to be missionary institutions keeping alive the true knowledge and teaching the right path to salvation. They were not meant to be the habitations of recluses intent on their personal salvation, but of men, who had conquered their passions and were prepared to give up the ordinary pleasures of life for the supreme pleasure of helping other struggling souls in their upward march. "He who controlling the senses by the mind," says Sri Krishna in the Bhagwad Gita, "unattached directs his organs of sense to the path of work, he, O Arjuna, excels." The ethics of the Gita is nothing if not an ethics of action, stern and rigorous.

Here may conceivably rise the voice of a defender of absolute renunciation: "You lay the burden of action even on the masterly souls. But the world has continued imperfect, and will continue imperfect. Where is the conceivable end of this process? and if it does not end, must the soul of a Sankara or a Rāmānuja, Buddha or Christ be continuously reborn as Sri Krishna promises to do whenever adharma reigns supreme in the universe? But Sri Krishna is God himself, and why should mortals shoulder the burden which God has taken upon himself?"

The difficulty is real, for on the basis of Western ideas no soul can claim rest for itself till the whole human society is elevated to its utmost height. The answer to this difficulty comes from the theory of evolution. Society continues imperfect and

must necessarily continue imperfect endlessly, for there is an endlessly continuous supply of souls that have to win their battles in *samsār*. Hence the perfection of society as a whole becomes endlessly postponed, though it is perfectly conceivable that an individual *ātman* in the course of ages may have so disciplined itself through unselfish social service as to have merited *mokṣa* or *mukti* from further births. This is the point at which the Western emphasis on social service and the Hindu emphasis on *mokṣa* meet and synchronise. The exaggerations of both the viewpoints in their mutual isolation lose their edge. For morality as social service by itself, coupled with the endlessness of social imperfection, does not sufficiently bring out the importance of a soul finding itself, becoming truly itself through the struggles of a moral life. On the other hand a mere emphasis on the development of an individual *ātman* places it outside the realm of pure morality and lends colour to the Western criticism that the highest Indian thought does not emphasise the highest morality. As I have tried to show in this paper this charge cannot hold against the greatest masters of Indian thought and thus morality comes to have its rightful place as the indispensable accompaniment of the highest intellectual and spiritual life of India. As to the particular manifestations of this highest life the East and the West may differ, for the differences of racial psychology and historical traditions do count, but the essential idea of morality—serving society and attuning thereby the individual soul to the universal life—is present and must be present wherever human society, whether in the East or West, lays claim to being genuinely moral.

A. R. WADIA

VEDIC THEORY OF THE COMMON MIND

The most remarkable and important political contribution of Vedic times is the conception of the majesty of the assembly wielding corporate authority. The political consciousness of this period rose to a metaphysical height when the loving devotion to the assembly as the citadel of free national ideals called forth ardent popular prayers, and their two assemblies were personified as positive powers in the life of the community.¹ They were called the "Two daughters of Prajāpat (the god of creation)."² Further idealization identified the majesty of the assembly with the power that is in everything and is universal—it is thus the objective spirit revealing and evolving itself through the assembly. Again it becomes the very spirit operating in worded speech, in sacrificial rites, in devotion of the heart. It is the great unknown that gives validity and dignity to the assemblies, inspiration and vision to the speakers, usefulness to meetings, and attractiveness to consultation. In short, it is the one spiritual principle underlying all the phases of the social mind. In highly figurative language the Vedas have named it Virāj—literally meaning splendour—as they felt the august presence of an inscrutable power in social unity beyond analysis and description. This was how they expressed poetically the operation of the transcendental reason of later philosophy in its practical aspect. A few passages are given below :

"Virāj was at first all this (universe)...
 She mounted up and entered the assembly,
 He who knows this becomes polite and courtly
 And people come as guests to his assembly.

¹ Atharva Veda, 1. 13. 4; XIX, 55.

² *Ibid*, VII, 12.

She mounted up and passed within the meeting,
He who knows this becomes fit for the meeting,
And people come to his hall of meeting.

She mounted up and entered consultation,
Who so knows this is fit to be consulted,
And people come to his consultation."

Again :

"Virāj is speech and earth and air's mid region,
He is Prajāpati (god of creation) and Mrityu (god of death)."

"They call Virāj the father of devotion,
He whom, advancing, sacrifices follow,"

"By whose control and hest the spirit moveth,
He is Virāj in highest heaven, O Sages !
Breathless, moving by breath of living creatures."

"Who hath perceived Virāj's duplications,
Her seasons and her rule and her practice,
Who knows her steps, how oft, how far extended,
Who knows her home and number of dawns ? " 1

Griffith speaks of Virāj as a "mysterious divine being or abstraction evolved by speculation, endowed with creative and other miraculous powers, and the subject of many fanciful allegories." 2 Virāj is both male and female. The Rig Veda traces its birth to *purusha* (the world-being), and later it is identified with him. The commentator Sāyaṇa includes it among the "thirty-four" primary gods of the Vedic pantheon. 3 It is thus equivalent to the Christian conception of "the Word" and "the Holy Spirit" in the context of the passages above, and is partly Platonic and partly Hegelian in character.

The Aryan anticipation of the divine presence, which was revealed by Christ in Himself when He said, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the

1 Atharva Veda, VIII, 9, 10 ; IX, 10.

2 Trans. of the Atharva Veda, Vol. I, p. 416.

3 Vide Rig Veda, X, 55. 90.

midst of them,"¹ is also evident in the import of the passages, for they would mean nothing unless a constructive interpretation is given to them in the light of the general philosophical tendencies of the time. A common purpose in the mind of men as spiritual beings invites the divine, as the common connecting medium that converges all minds into a focus, one with the divine towards a higher realization. In philosophical language it is the common mind which, being interpreted by the speakers, draws the hearers through reciprocal understanding of the object to be mutually evolved. The Aryans perceived it but faintly and vaguely yet truly, and found in the super-human and super-natural splendour a really transcendental principle—something ineffably uniting the speakers and the hearers and all present into a collective body, and making corporate meetings and co-operative consultation possible for the ultimate production of the common good. It is a phase of the same political consciousness which prayed for the unity of the tribes,² and the freedom of the people,³ and the long life of the elders and the assembly itself.

Very easily it can be seen that Virāj is at the start identified with the whole universe pervading it as its principle, much like the world-soul of the Vedānta or of the Platonic and the Stoic philosophy. It is thus a universal principle which only becomes specified in application for political purposes. Its entry into the assembly imports directly that it has some action there and this is but its social aspect ; it is one side of the universal principle. The minds of the members of the assembly are its legitimate sphere as far as its social side is concerned. It creates for them the necessary atmosphere and the medium to play in. Knowledge of its presence or in other words, of this principle makes people polite, etc., *i.e.*, well disciplined, and gives authority to the rules ; otherwise there can be no

¹ Matt. XVIII, 20.

² Atharva Veda, VII, 52.

³ Rig Veda, X, 65. 441.

reason nor need for such parliamentary virtues. Where laws are operative respect and good-will of people are essentially indispensable. All people make it a point willingly to be there as guests and contribute their quota. The whole business in this manner becomes co-operative in character. It is for Virāj that such things are possible. Virāj is the common background for such inter-action between minds.

The meeting is perhaps the most practical phase and consultation is the kernel of it. Here too Virāj plays an important part. The awareness of this fact enables one to approach the meeting in the right spirit and its object is then properly appraised. Such a quality in those who meet is expected to render them helpful to one another. The seriousness of purpose is realised in proportion to the consciousness of the need. Any high concern or calling has from this point of view something divine in it which men feel as super-human in its urge and authority—an intuition standing apart from ordinary intellectual operations. It is often perceived as an objective presence though after all a mere abstraction. A vast meeting for a very serious business inspires such awe and appears simply to be august and separate from those who attend it. It is no wonder that the spirit of the meeting is deified and then personified so that the spirit is said to work out in the meeting.

Remembering that Kantian "pure practical reason" and Rousseau's "general will" are only variations of the one truth of the universal spirit operating in men individually and collectively, the as yet unelaborated Hindu doctrine had the necessary philosophical recognition, though the nature of its utility was uncertain and unknown. All the political thinkers of the world, who left their marks on political science, had something of this metaphysical tendency of idealising the state. The Hindu did it in a strain, which is philosophically not at all different, with regard to the Vedic National Assembly representing the early state. To them it was something

charged or connected with the divine as to Plato it was "the embodiment of a pattern in heaven,"¹ to Aristotle "the greatest of goods,"² to Hobbes "the mortal god under the immortal god,"³ to Hegel "the footsteps of god in the world."⁴ The state is here raised to its ideal position and is shown to be "rooted in man's spiritual nature."⁵ Row has given a suggestive parallel in keeping with the spirit of Hindu thought. "The nation-state has, like the individual, three bodies—for the *Sthula Sarira*, the physical body, the geographical unity, for the *Sukshma Sarira*, the astral body, a common life and interests, for the *Karma Sarira*, the mental body, a conscious sentiment of unity and a centre of governing organ through which the common ego can realise itself and act."⁶

Hillebrandt finds a sanctified aspect given to the assembly as an institution by religious ceremonies, prayers and sacrifices offered on its behalf.⁷ It is true, as has been seen above, from the religious standpoint, but there is yet something more which is metaphysical in character, and which in all probability powerfully influenced later orthodox thought on political authority. A suggestion is worth making here in the way of T. H. Green, in his criticism of Rousseau's "general will," that the Vedic philosophers saw through their assembly, in their conception of Virāj, the inscrutably transcendent splendour, that

"...There's on earth a yet auguster thing,
Veiled though it be, than Parliament and King."⁸

And it is in keeping with their general philosophical outlook that to this "auguster thing," and not to such powers as the assembly and the king that ultimate power is really applicable.

¹ Social Purpose, Muirhead and Hetherington, p. 92.

² Politics, 1, 2.

³ Leviathan, XVII.

⁴ Phil. of Right, Sec. 258.

⁵ Social Purpose, p. 93.

⁶ Dev. of Democracy in India, p. 125.

⁷ Vedische Mythologie, 2, 123-125.

⁸ Green's Political Obligation, p. 82.

Hence they looked upon Virāj as Plato's Reason (Nous), as the source of law and discipline, and prayed to the same Virāj religiously :

"Of her the gods and men said.....
That we may both have life let us invoke her
Thus did they cry to her ;
Come Strength, come Food, come Charmer, come Free-giver !"¹

"The unborn-spirit" of the Atharva Veda,² and the occasions for its actions illustrate further the conception of the objective spirit and its working. It is significantly designated "the working season," "the meeting season," "the conquering season," i.e., the fit occasion for such actions. Thus a parallel is supplied to the famous poem by Oxenham, "Christ is born Again," whenever a brave deed is done, darkness dispelled, and freedom wrought. A crude martial tone will be noticed in the extract below, in place of poetic beauty and refinement of feeling :—

"The man who knows the season called the working
Takes to himself the active fame,
His hated rival's active fame—
The unborn-spirit is this Working Season.

The man who knows the season called the meeting.
Takes to himself the gathering fame,
His hated rival's gathering fame—
The unborn-spirit is this Meeting Season.

The man who knows the season called conquering
Takes to himself the conquering fame,
His hated rival's conquering fame—
The unborn-spirit is this Conquering Season."³

N. C. GANGULI

¹ Atharva Veda, VIII, 10.

² Bk. IX, Hy. 5.

³ Atharva Veda, IX, 5, Griffith's translation, amended after St. Petersburg Dictionary.

THE THEORY OF "MORAL GOODS."

The great question in ethics is in regard to the interpretation of our moral judgments. Are the judgments about some indefinable quality or property, an ultimate notion of value or worth, which is simple and unanalysable and yet which belongs to a large number of objects which are all proper objects of moral judgments? Suppose we say that tending the sick is good; do we mean to say that we are expressing here a simple, unique, further-unanalysable quality connoted by the term good? Do we mean to say that such an action possesses an objective and absolute value, in and for itself?

In other words, it is of fundamental importance to determine whether good expresses a simple indefinable quality—like, say, colour or taste, or, better still, extension, solidity, etc. The apostle of this doctrine of the indefinability of good, Dr. G. E. Moore, learnt it at the hands of Henry Sidgwick who himself, perhaps, learnt it from Kant. Neither in the Greek word "Agathos," nor in the Greek systems of ethics generally is there anything to suggest that the notion of good was regarded by ancient philosophers as indefinable. In Aristotle, especially, good = the realisation of a thing's specific nature, its end or purpose. Hence the highest good for man is the complete and habitual exercise of the functions which make him a human being, *i.e.*, self-development. Good therefore in Aristotle is not a simple indefinable quality, but a complex notion containing two or more distinctly intelligible ideas. The definition of good as the object of desire would also stultify its alleged simple nature and render it significant only in relation to something else.

Dr. Moore's arguments in support of his position may briefly be examined. His admission at the very beginning of that "admirable ethical algebra"—*Principia Ethica*—that the

substantive "the good" is definable (p. 9) is unintelligible on the assumption that the adjective 'good' is not so. Secondly, to suggest simply that good belongs to that class of simple, ultimate notions which admit of no definition, and yet which are intelligible enough, is to assume without proof that good is one of them. To say, again, that no one (of the many offered) of the definitions of good can be taken as ultimate is merely to show that, good being related to life and consciousness, the standpoint of experience itself differs. Nor is the threat of the so-called naturalistic fallacy any more serious either. Having admitted that the substantive, the good, is definable (and, be it remembered, in all cases of defining good it is really the substantive that is being defined, for otherwise the fallacy would not arise at all), Dr. Moore bases this possibility on the discovery of "some true proposition of the form,—Intelligence is good and intelligence alone is good" (p. 9). Now intelligence being as much a natural object as pleasure or desire, this definition is on a par with other definitions of good, *e.g.*, pleasure and pleasure alone is good in respect of the commission or avoidance of the fallacy in question. Lastly, when we have exhausted the whole notion of goodness itself by identifying it with something else, to ask of the latter whether it is itself good is surely absolutely meaningless.

Good therefore is not indefinable, nor is it primarily an ethical concept. As a substantive it stands for the specific nature of an object which becomes the supreme object of its desire (Pleasure is the good), and as an adjective it signifies that the thing so qualified is conducive to the realisation of the object denoted by the substantive (This drama is good).

The idea of the objectivity of goodness as a unique notion of value or worth has vitiated the whole of European ethics appearing under many forms, in some as good indefinable (Moore, Rashdall, Sidgwick, Mackenzie, etc.), in others as value impersonal (Bosanquet, Sorley, Windelband, Münsterberg), yet in others as the Categorical Imperative. One form of it,

especially,—as the distinction between 'good-in-itself' and 'good-as-means'—is so universally held that it may be desirable to draw attention to it. To facilitate the discovery of objects *per se* good, Dr. Moore proposes to employ 'the method of isolation' (P. E., pp. 84, 93) consisting in isolating the given thing from all its possible relations and consequences and then asking of the remainder, whether it is itself good. I would, in this connection, employ also 'the method of opposite effects,' which consists in supposing that a given thing produced, not its usual consequences, but just their opposites, and then asking whether we would then pronounce that thing to be good. * I feel certain that all unsophisticated minds, when asked, Is there any such thing in the world as a good-in-itself apart from all its possible consequences upon beings in the world? will return a negative answer by an honest employment of the aforesaid two methods.

Good-in-itself, value impersonal, Categorical Imperative, or Fitzi-Putzi, if you like : in whatever form, it is a witness of the triumph of Kant in the sphere of the Practical Reason while he failed to mesmerise modern thought by the ghost of the 'thing-in-itself' in the field of Pure Reason. Is it not high time to waken ourselves to the truth that good is always significant only as expressing a relation to some sentient beings, and that to speak of anything as *per se* good in our world is, to invert Kant's form, to apply a *transcendental* 'category' to the sphere of the phenomenal?

For to think of good as an objective, absolute existence is to search for the various things in this world which are 'good-in-themselves,' which possess an ultimate value of their own, which consequently admit of being appropriated, possessed, and, as if it were, enjoyed. The good comes to be looked upon as consisting of various 'goods' such as pleasure, happiness, virtue, knowledge, love, art, beauty, etc. The ideal becomes a life full of the richest contents—various 'goods' realised to their fullest extent possible. (Rashdall: Theory of

Good and Evil, chs. on 'Ideal Utilitarianism' and 'Rational Utilitarianism.')

With this doctrine of the good as consisting of 'organic goods' is necessarily connected the doctrine that the morality of an action depends upon its consequences (*ibid*, Vol. II, p. 41), a view common to all forms of hedonism and utilitarianism.

Without offering to advance all the criticisms usually urged against such a system of ethics, I shall only try to illustrate one or two consequences—difficulties, I should say, of holding such a view. The first relates to the well-known doctrine of the commensurability of all values, which implies that when we have to choose between a higher and a lower good we can compare them and pronounce that one possesses more value than the other. Accordingly, bribery, unfaithfulness, disloyalty could be justified if we could thereby achieve some greater 'hedonistic good.' It may sometimes even be necessary for the moral agent to adopt a morally degrading profession for the sake of producing a higher good! Nor should he "try to purchase his own moral purity at the cost of other people's well-being" (*ibid*, Vol. II, pp. 43-47). The end justifies the means. To do a great right we must do a little wrong. A charity of a hundred rupees is morally superior to one of ten rupees, for the former produces more hedonistic good. All is fair in love and war: why, all's well that ends well.

Who is to decide, however, what this social good is? How are we to ascertain which of two sets of consequences possesses the more value, especially if valuation is to be properly conducted along Moore's lines? (P. E., pp. 22-23, and *Ethics*, pp. 18-20.)

Another difficulty would arise in regard to the incompatibility of the various 'goods.' How can we get over the 'dualism' in morality, reconcile the conflict between self-development and self-sacrifice, so ably portrayed for us by Bradley? Neither Rashdall nor Bosanquet (Suggestions in

Ethics, Chs. II and III) is able to give us a satisfactory answer to this question except by saying that in all such cases of conflict "Reason clearly pronounces" for self-sacrifice. (Theory, of Good and Evil, Vol. II, pp. 85-95.) The idealistic doctrine of the common good in which the individual can find his true good also does not mend matters either, for though it is generally true that my good as a whole can be secured only by subserving the interests of society at large, it is absurd to suggest that there can possibly be no cases in which I as an individual can stand only to gain by following a particular line of action harmful to the majority of the community I live in. What ought to be my conduct in such cases, *and why?* Reason always pronounces for self-surrender, but *how, why?* Is it merely a case of *ipse dixit*? It is unfortunate that the pronouncements of reason—so unequivocal to the mind of Dean Rashdall—do not appear to be so to other minds.

Yet another sorry feature of this system of ethics is revealed in the competitive character of the various 'goods.' This competition is two-fold. Since it is not possible to realize all the available goods—knowledge, virtue, pleasure, contemplation of beauty, art, etc., in an individual life, the individual has to choose between them and select those most after his heart or capacity. There is thus a competition amongst the goods themselves as for their own individual acceptance and realisation. (Imagine for instance, a great scientist called upon to serve in the army.) According to Rashdall, however, every life in which one or more of the goods remain unrealised is, *pro tanto*, devoid of 'true blessedness,' and no life therefore can be said to attain the true end of its being. Secondly, competition enters amongst the individuals for the possession of the largest possible share of these goods both in number and quantity. This phase of the question needs no elaboration (Theory, of Good and Evil, Vol. II, pp. 98-101). Sidgwick recognises this competitive character even more expressly than Rashdall (Lectures on the Ethics of Green, etc.,

pp. 65-68). There is no gainsaying the fact that any system of ethics based on the conception of good as an objective fact, as consisting of various intrinsically valuable goods, *ipso facto* renders the ideal competitive in character. And the admission of competition in the ethical field, in the appropriation of the goods—leads, as Sidgwick himself recognises (*ibid*, p. 70), to moral lapses no less grave than those involved in economic competition.

This brief examination of certain of its features should suffice to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with a system of ethics based on the conception of good as involving various 'goods.' This is as much true of the several forms of hedonism and utilitarianism as of the theories of perfectionism—not even excluding Green's—which imply that realisation of art and science, of knowledge and beauty, love and happiness, etc., is to be our ideal. It is significant to observe that almost all European ethicists arrive at the same description of the ideal however cautiously they may begin their ethical studies (*cf. e.g.*, G. C. Field, Dr. Moore, Profs. Mackenzie and Taylor, A. K. Rogers, and Paulsen). If we are to write and read volumes on ethics in order to arrive at such an ideal, why not at once go to the end of things and declare that the moral ideal for humanity is everything that is desirable in the universe and that in an ideal state? Of what value is such a conception of the ideal for practical ethics? Justly does Rogers exclaim that such a view tends only "to encourage an illusory conviction that all things work together for good" and "makes impossible demands upon our powers of calculation and prevision" (Theory of Ethics, p. 175).

It is clear that what we have been examining till now is not ethics proper but "the Science of Human Life, or Human well-being." And of course it is true that the 'goods' necessary for this well-being are to be found not only in the field of ethics but in that of economics, of arts, of the sciences—everywhere, in fact. Surely there is a confusion here between the science

of morality and that larger science of human welfare which may possibly include the ethical view-point also but which certainly cannot be comprehended by that standpoint alone? May I trace this confusion to what B. Russel calls the Westerner's instinct of "Possessiveness" and his lack of faith in other standpoints—*e.g.*, the religious—which also undertake to safeguard human well-being? Ethics certainly ought not to become formalistic or contentless (as in Kant), but in our search for the contents of moral life let us see to it that morality is not substituted for by the standpoints of economics, of the arts and the sciences, etc. As it is, the employment of 'Good' as the fundamental ethical concept has been the source of all this trouble: the doctrine of values in ethics is most mischievous and misleading. Instead, I should like to employ a concept which is, at any rate, free from the suggestions of economic, artistic, and scientific utilities as having a bearing on man's moral excellence—the concept of right, *e.g.*, I should hold that while 'right' expresses the purely moral character or point of view, 'good' may be retained to express the contents of moral life.

And I think that the path of life advocated in the Bhagavad-Gita appears to reconcile the two view-points. Insisting as it does upon the importance of all the three well-known 'Yogas' or 'mārgas,' it holds forth the ideal of "Jñānabaddha Bhaktiyuta Karmayoga." Those who are so very much 'possessed' with the idea of 'social good' and consequently accuse Indian ethics—through imperfect acquaintance of course—of anti-socialism, otherworldliness, and worse, ought to contemplate upon such phrases as: "Sarva Bhūta Hitam Param"; "Yadbhūta Hitamatyantam tat Satyamiti dhāranā," etc. The greatest good of all sentient creatures—not merely of the greatest number of human beings—is the *ultima thule* of consequences contemplated by it of any moral action. "Dharma is what produces well-being"; "Rules of right and wrong are enacted for securing good both here and hereafter" (The Mōksha-Dharma Parva, the Anusāsanika Parva, and

several other sections of the Mahābhārata dealing with Dharma). In fact, the word 'Dharma' itself in one of its primary senses signifies 'that which supports society,' and, considering the importance which the conception of 'Dharma' plays in Indian thought, it cannot well be said that Indian ethics is anti-social or neglects social good.

But while insisting so strongly on the outward effects of our actions, Indian ethics insists more on the state of the mind of the agent who performs *karma*. The ideal of the "Sthita-Prajña"—there is no space here to expatiate on it—ought to be the *beau ideal* of all people striving to evolve a straight moral path while working for human uplift. Three characteristics of the Sthita-Prajña may, however, be noted: (1) He is spontaneously moral and absolutely "niṣkāma" or unattached to the fruits of his actions—not merely a case of 'disinterested action' or 'doing duty for duty's sake' but one which involves deep metaphysical issues which may all be comprehended, however, under the general term 'Gnostic.' (2) His actions *of necessity* produce the greatest good of the whole universe. Thus perfect morality goes *pari passu* with universal good in the Sthita-Prajña: 'right' and 'good' are at last reconciled in him. (3) For himself, there is not that sense of "fruitlessness futility," "disappointment and dissatisfaction" which, in Prof. Taylor's opinion and (Problem of Conduct, p. 409) is the necessary consequence of all moral life; he is all contentment and happiness—pure bliss or Ānanda. He does not "sit down in a cool hour" and calculate the respective good for self and others, but he simply acts the right and the right in its own nature produces the good. He alone is capable of being truly moral. Hedonism, Rationalism, Utilitarianism, Perfectionism—all are harmoniously blended in the Sthita-Prajña, and the ethics of values, ends or the conscious production and possession of 'goods' must give place to the "Ethics of Nishkāmya karma" or "Gnostic Activism."

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD COMMON TO THE BHAGAVAD GITA AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.

A brief episode of the Mahabharata, containing only 700 out of its 100,000 slokas, and about the size of the Gospel of St. John, the Hindu philosophic poem which we know as the Bhagavad Gita, has long been recognised as presenting points of view strikingly similar in ideas and expression to much of the teaching of the New Testament. This is not the time or place to discuss the many critical and historical problems that emerge from a study on modern and historical lines of the Gita and the New Testament. It is a common procedure to resort to the theory of borrowing for the explanation of the existence of affinities, but conclusive proof is often extra-ordinarily difficult, particularly with literature of uncertain date. A German scholar, Dr. Lorinser, attempted to maintain in an elaborate treatise on the subject that the author of the Gita borrowed many of his ideas and expressions and his most characteristic doctrine of Bhakti from the New Testament, while the American Orientalist, Professor Hopkins, has sought to prove, from a considerable body of internal evidence, that the author of the Gita was acquainted with the Gospel of St. John. Mr. K. T. Telang on the other hand claimed for the Gita an antiquity extending as far back at least as the fourth century B.C., and in that case there would manifestly be the possibility of borrowing on the other side. Scholarship is even more divided on the date of the Gita than it is in regard to particular books of the New Testament. Scholars like Weber, Lassen and Davies have sought to show that the Gita could not have been written before the third century A.D. Professor Garbe maintains that the Gita is a composite work, and considers that the original Gita containing the theistic elements dates from the first half of the second



century B.C., while the Vedantic additions belong to the second century A.D. Oldenberg confutes Garbe's standpoint as too subjective, but himself considers that the last six chapters of the Gita are an addendum. An American Orientalist, Professor Edgerton, in his recently published book on the Gita remarks, "We cannot date the Gita with any accuracy; all that we can say is that it was probably composed before the beginning of our era, but not more than a few centuries before it." I am inclined to believe that this is the safer view; moreover I think modern scholars need to bear in mind that the authors of oriental religious works like the Gita and the books of the New Testament were not professors of Tübingen, Yale, Oxford or Calcutta, and so did not attach the same importance to rigid logical consistency in their utterances as we do to-day, for in the realm of religious life and feeling there is a power that transcends logic. The theistic elements common to the Gita and the New Testament are more satisfactorily explained by a recognition of the fact that the human spirit everywhere is essentially religious, beset with the same needs, and filled with the same spiritual longings and aspirations after a living, personal, self-revealing God. Moreover both the Gita and the New Testament are one in seeking the truth, not because of its abstract interest, but because they believe that a full realisation of the Truth will in some way or other solve all human problems, and make men free, free from all the troubles of this life and the life to come. The thoughts of the Gita like those of the New Testament, find their roots in the older literature. In the special efficacy assigned to sacrifice, and the identification of God with the sacrifice, the Gita goes back in the Vedas and Brahmanas; in describing the nature of the self, individual and supreme, it has recourse to the Upanishads and the philosophy of the Vedanta. In the prominence it assigns to Prakriti, and its antithetical relation to Puruṣa it has been influenced by the Samkhyan philosophy. In its distinctively theistic teaching, and the prominence it lays on ascetic practices

as a means of attaining to the divine, it is indebted to the Yoga system. In putting forward Kṛiṣṇa as the God-man, the incarnation of the Supreme Being, it absorbs the Vasudevic theology, and in admitting a relative value to the worship of the numerous gods of the popular faith, it built upon the polytheistic tendencies of the masses of the people, while some important aspects of its ethical teaching, especially that relating to ahimsa, or abstention from injury to living beings, may perhaps be regarded as Buddhistic. But the great contribution of the Gita to the religious thought and life of India is that aspect of its teaching which is paralleled in the New Testament, *viz.*, the idea of Bhakti or devotional faith, and the conception of "a sin-forgiving, love-demanding Saviour-God in human form." Professor Cowell long ago pointed out how nearly Bhakti corresponds to St. Augustine's definition of faith: "What is it," asked Augustine, "to believe in God? By believing to love Him, by believing to be devoted to Him, by believing to enter into Him, and by personal union to become one with Him." This Christian view of faith is essentially the view of Bhakti held by all the great Vaisnava sects, from the time of the Christian era to our own day, and it is always associated with the idea of an incarnate Saviour God. So far as Christianity is concerned the conception of a sin-forgiving, love-demanding Saviour God in human form as put forward in the New Testament is but the culmination of the Messianic hope as progressively developed through many centuries by Jewish religious teachers. The New Testament writers agree in recognising Jesus, the prophet of Nazareth, as the perfectly righteous king and redeemer for whom devout souls had been yearning through the ages, the love of God incarnate, for to see and know Jesus, was to see and know the Father.

Is it possible to frame a comprehensive definition of God as conceived in common in both the Gita and the New Testament? I believe a definition on the following lines fairly expresses the common element contained in both. "God is the

absolute all-perfect spirit, both transcendent and immanent, and is eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, ethical and compassionate ; the creative source, sustainer, and Sovereign Director of the Universe who in self-revealing love has become incarnate for the world's salvation, and for restoring men to eternal union with Himself."

It would require a treatise to justify this definition with detailed references, and exposition from both of our sources. I can deal with only a few of the more important features of the common definition.

(1) Both the Gita and the New Testament think of God as the all-perfect personal Spirit. It must be remembered that the Gita is admittedly a philosophical poem, the philosophy of which is expounded in the interests of religion. On the other hand the philosophy underlying the New Testament teaching is pre-supposed rather than definitely expounded, while even its religious doctrines are expounded not so much from the standpoint of a theological system, as from the bearings of the doctrines on the practical life of men. From the philosophical point of view, the doctrine common to both may perhaps be regarded as a spiritual monism according to which spirit itself is the one true and sole substance of which all things are the manifestation and matter appears not as the opposite of spirit, but rather the other side of it—the manifested side, the symbol, the instrument, the expression of the spiritual in its finite or conditioned form. Noteworthy in this connection is the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, in which a distinction is made between God in His absolute eternal being, and God as He reveals Himself in creation and history. The Logos is spoken of as the medium of God's action in creation and all things come into being by means of Him. This distinction between God as self-existing and God as self-revealing, God as unconditioned and God as conditioned, come out also in the Gita.

Avyaktam vyaktam āpannam manyante mām avuddhayaḥ
Param bhāvam ajānanto mamāvyayam anuttamam.

"Men of no understanding deem me who am unperceived to have become perceptible knowing not my absolute, changeless and highest nature." •

But both our sources agree in ascribing personality to God, thinking of the Divine Being on the basis of what is perceived in the human consciousness. Throughout the Gita and the New Testament, God is represented in countless passages as knowing, loving and helping man. In the Gita a true knowledge of God is regarded as the one thing needful for spiritual emancipation.

Janma karma ca me divyam evaṃ yo vetti tattvataḥ,
Tyaktvā dehaṃ punarjanma naiti mām eti sorjuna.

"He who knows in truth my divine birth and work having abandoned the body, cometh not to birth again. He comes to me, O Arjuna."

Many similar passages make it clear that knowledge is thought of not as external knowledge of vedic rites, nor as a metaphysical perception of the nature of the absolute, but rather as a spiritual communion of the human spirit with the divine. It is that identity of thought and nature in relation to God that is attained by the soul which finds its one exclusive source of delight in the Divine. The God of the Gita is thus not the absolute of the Vedanta beyond the range of speech or thought, but a Being who is regarded as capable of being in truth known, loved and adored, not a Being absolutely inaccessible to human thoughts and words, but the God of whom Jesus spoke, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength" (Mark 12:30). Men have everywhere found it natural to conclude that the Supreme Power directing the Universe must be the same in His essential nature as their own higher selves. The Universe is from such a standpoint interpreted

in terms of the highest we know, not of the lowest, in terms of the personal or supra-personal and not in terms of the impersonal. But if there be justification for thinking of God as spirit, with a personality similar in essence to the personality of man, it will be generally admitted that it is a necessity of our nature to think of Him only as spirit entirely free from all the imperfections pertaining to the human spirit, and so both the Gita and the New Testament represent God as the all-perfect spirit. This is the fundamental idea underlying the notable passage in the tenth chapter of the Gita beginning with the words :

Param brahma, param dharma, pavitraṁ paramaṁ bhavān,
Puruṣaṁ śāśvataṁ divyam, ādidevam ajaṁ vibhuṁ.—12.

“Thou art the supreme Brahma, the supreme abode, the supreme means of purification, the primeval male, eternal, divine, the first God, the unborn, the all-pervading.”

In the course of this passage the various phases of existence are enunciated, and what is highest and most essential in such phases of existence is God. Thus among lights He is the radiant sun, among the senses, He is the mind, among the mountains He is Meru, among men, He is king. There may be a pantheistic flavour about many passages in the Gita, for the author lived in a pantheistic atmosphere. But the passage in question does not assert God's identity with, or confinement within, such existences. Underlying the verses is very much the same thought as there is in the attribution to the Christian Messiah of such names as Lion, Sun, Morning Star, King, Lamb. The author of the Gita, pervaded as he is by a spirit of ardent personal theism, refuses to associate the all-perfect spirit with anything that bears the stamp of inferiority or imperfection. Significant in this direction is the last clause of the passage—

Viśvabhyāham idaṁ kṛtsnam ekāṁsena sthito jagat

“Having pervaded the whole universe with one fragment of myself I remain.”

The power and excellence of all existences is due to the animating energy of the Supreme Spirit, who conditions himself in them so far as is necessary for their maintenance and development, without being absorbed thereby. Every theistic religion governed by the concept of an all-embracing God has its difficulties with the problem of evil, and the Gita, loyal to the moral instinct at the expense maybe of logic and consistency, in more than one passage definitely rules out evil from God's nature. To a passage in the seventh chapter suggestive of pantheism, it adds the significant verse :

Balaṃ balavatāṃ cāhaṃ kāmarāgavivarjitaṃ,
Dharmāviruddho bhutesu kāmo smi bharatarṣabha.—⁷₁₁.

"I am the strength of the strong, free from lust and passion, I am desire in beings that is not contrary to law." Throughout the Christian scriptures, God is before all things the personal God, whose characteristic quality is holiness or holy love. What at first signified perhaps little more than a supernatural aloofness, came in the progress of revelation to connote the highest ethical qualities—purity, truth, and mercy. "Be ye holy for I am holy." "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect," and throughout the New Testament conceives the perfections of God in terms of their incarnate expression in the historical Jesus, who went about doing good.

(2) Both the Gita and the New Testament think of God as transcendent and immanent. It is often popularly supposed that Semitic religion represents God as transcendent, while Indian religion represents him as immanent. The only element of truth in this is that Semitic religion has a tendency to emphasise the divine transcendence, while Indian religion has a corresponding tendency to emphasise the divine immanence. While the reflective mind of India has always loved to dwell upon the Divine Immanence, there have never been lacking powerful voices in the history of Indian religious thought

that proclaimed the reality of the divine transcendence and among such voices is the Gita ; and while the more practical mind of the Hebrews and of the Christian nations of the West have chiefly thought of God as transcendent and so absolutely supreme Director of the moral life of man and the destinies of nations, yet throughout the Jewish and Christian Scriptures it is evident that the thought of the Divine Immanence is clearly grasped, and in the course of development of Christian theology, the Christian Church has always had its School of Mystics and with the exception perhaps of one or two short periods noted for their barren externalism there have always been powerful teachers of recognised standing who have ably emphasised both aspects of the Divine character and nature, transcendence and immanence. In view of the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Spirit, this could hardly be otherwise, but it must be noted that Christian theologians in accordance with the practical character of Christianity, have generally used not the philosophic terms, Transcendence and Immanence, but the less technical terms Supremacy and Omnipresence. The Gita takes particular care in various passages to emphasise the truth that God is not limited by or imprisoned in the Universe. "All things abide in me. I abide not in them. Nor yet do all things abide in me ; my self, producing the beings, supports the beings, yet it abides not in the beings." The idea that God or the First Principle is more than all existent things, that the Universe is only a part thereof is at least as old as the Purusha hymn of the Rigveda in which the entire Universe is derived only from one quarter of the Cosmic Purusha. If we regard pantheism as teaching that there is no room for God, independently of the Universe, but only within it, the term God and the Universe become synonymous. The Gita in its essential teaching is thus emphatically not pantheistic. Similarly its teaching is by no means in accord with the idealistic monism of the Vedanta, which denies the reality and existence of the Universe, and asserts that God alone and

nothing besides him is real. The Gita recognises the reality of matter and the material Universe as an eternal phase of the Supreme Being, as conditioned. In the New Testament the operations of nature and the whole life of man are directly ascribed to God, in whom we live and move and have our being. The New Testament too emphasises the conception of God's spirit as the immanent energy that directs the moral life of man. "Know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and that the spirit of God dwelleth in you?" (1 Cor. $\frac{3}{16}$.) The emphasis that the New Testament lays on the conception of God as Creator and Sovereign who is over all, and through all and in all (Eph. $\frac{4}{6}$) shows that while it recognises the idea of God as immanent in the Universe, and in man, it carefully avoids His confusion with and confinement within the Universe in any pantheistic sense. Jesus spent most of His time in seeking to imbibe his disciples and others with the great conception of a kingdom of God whose sphere of operation was the human spirit. He wished men to realise that God ruled, not so much as a transcendent external power, as an immanent and vivifying spiritual energy in the hearts of men. On being asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God cometh, He answered them and said "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation, neither shall they say, go here or there! for lo, the Kingdom of God is within you (Luke, $\frac{17}{20, 21}$). Noteworthy too as further emphasising the fact of the divine immanence are the Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Spirit. The New Testament regards the life of Christ as in some special way a supreme manifestation of the life of God in human form, a tabernacle of God among men; and it regards the Holy Spirit as God approaching as a spirit the human spirit, and abiding there as an immanent quickening, sanctifying power.

While the Gita and the New Testament give no warrant for the view that there is any existence independent of God yet they both insist with equal assurance, that sin is to be

ascribed to the individual and not to God. They make no attempt to solve the grave problem of sin and evil from the standpoint of philosophy and we are left to fall back on our own experience which suggests that as we are continually conscious of thoughts and feelings which come into our consciousness, and which yet we do not make our own, so "there may be an absolute consciousness of the universe without any need for supposing that all the contents of the universe actually belong to it. (W. L. Walker, *Christian Theism and Spiritual Monism*, p. 196.) In any case, it is assumed that we cannot do violence to that which we know to be the highest within us. No amount of philosophical argument can quench the authority of the divine voice within me which I know to be my highest self, and which tells me that the Divine Being who claims me for Himself and whose presence is more real to me than life itself, is a holy Being, totally free from all taint of moral evil, the inexhaustible fountain of all that is true, beautiful and good.

(3) Both our sources represent God as in self-revealing love *becoming incarnate* for the world's salvation, and for restoring men to eternal union with Himself.

Seeing that both the Gita and the New Testament think of God not so much in terms of the abstract absolute of Philosophy, as in terms of personal Religion, Love becomes the dominant element in his Being. Love on God's part has been defined as "God's desire to impart Himself and all good to other beings, and to possess them for His own in spiritual fellowship." In all true love there are two fundamental impulses, the desire to possess and the desire to impart, and we have in both our sources these impulses represented as elements in the Divine love. So far as the Gita is concerned there is the well-known passage on incarnation

Yadāyadā hi dharmasya glānirbhavati Bhārata,
abhyūtthānam adharmasya tadātmānam srijāmyaham

Paritrānāya sādhanām vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām
Dharmasamsthapanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge.—^{7, 8.}

“For whenever there is a decay of the law, and an ascendancy of lawlessness, then I create myself. For the protection of the good, and the destruction of evil-doers, and for the establishment of the law, am I born age after age.” The fundamental thought of this passage clearly is that God imparts Himself to men from time to time, becomes incarnate as man, so that men may be saved from sin, and find their eternal refuge in the Divine. The expression “for the destruction of evil-doers” must be interpreted in connection with the context and the whole tenour of the teaching of the book. In the verses immediately following the passage I have quoted it is stated that all who take refuge in Him, and are thus freed from passion fear and wrath, may enter His being. Then too we cannot ignore in this connection the very notable passage in the ninth chapter:—

“Even if one of very evil life worships me with exclusive devotion, he shall be deemed good, for he is rightly resolved. Soon he becomes of virtuous nature and attains to eternal peace. O Kaunteya, recognise that no devotee of mine is lost. For taking refuge with me, O Pārtha, even those who are of sinful birth, women, Vaiśyas and Sūdras reach the supreme goal!”

When Kṛiṣṇa therefore says that he is come into the world not only for the protection of the good, but for the destruction of evil-doers, it can only mean for the destruction of those who are persistently perverse and impenitent.

Then too final emancipation in the Gita is not to be conceived, after the manner of the Sāṅkhya as a condition of redemption involving individual existence with the loss of all consciousness, nor is the nirvāṇa mentioned in the Gita to be interpreted in its Vedantic or Buddhistic sense, for the simple reason that the conception of God in the Gita is fundamentally

different from these systems, and religious terms are used with quite a different meaning. The parallelism suggested in such passages as worshippers of gods go to gods, my devotees come to me ($\frac{7}{5}$) suggest that an entering into Kṛiṣṇa as God is not understood in the sense of complete absorption into the Absolute with the loss of all individual consciousness. There are two passages to which reference may be made—

Idaṃ jñānamupāśritya mama sādharṇyam āgataḥ
Sarge pi nopajāyante pralaye na vyathanti ca.— $\frac{14}{2}$.

“They who resorting to this knowledge have attained likeness of nature with me, are not born at the creation and are not disturbed at the dissolution.”

And again—

Yāḥ sāstravidhim utsriyā vartate kāmakārataḥ
Na sa siddhim avāpnoti nasukham na parāṃ gatim.— $\frac{16}{23}$.

“He who abandoning scriptures’ ordinances, acts in accordance with his desire does not attain perfection, nor happiness, nor the highest goal.” In the former passage “sādharṇya” does not indicate like “aikātmya,” identity of essence, but likeness of nature, and in the latter passage, perfection and the highest goal are evidently regarded as synonymous with and including “happiness,” and thus involving the continuation of personal consciousness. The great passage in the New Testament corresponding to the one I have quoted from the Gita is “God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have eternal life (St. John $\frac{3}{16}$). The tenour of the New Testament is that God giving His son, is equivalent to God giving Himself, for “God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself.” (2 Cor. $\frac{5}{19}$.) It is the Living God Who is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe (1 Tim. $\frac{4}{10}$).

The Gita speaks of successive incarnations, but the New Testament speaks of one. Yet the Christian scriptures by no means think of Jesus as the only human representative of God upon earth. He is rather the culmination of the self-revelation of God in human life. "God having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son whom He appointed heir of all things." (Heb. 1st). So the Christian theologian seems quite justified in thinking of all the great prophets of old as incarnations of God in a partial and limited degree, while Christ alone is the fulness of the Godhead bodily. A distinction on similar lines is often made between the partial incarnations of Viṣṇu, and the full Incarnation as realised in Kriṣṇa. Then too the New Testament regards all who have become united in living faith to Christ as embodiments or incarnations of the Divine Christ. Said St. Paul, "I have been crucified with Christ, yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." (Gal. 2^o.) So in the Gospel of St. John we find Christ praying "that they may all be one, even as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." (St. John 17th.) The Incarnation of Christ as set forth in the New Testament is not the absolutely isolated event it is sometimes represented to be in certain phases of a superficial Western theology. It is something that must be repeated in a very real and vital way in every disciple of Christ, so that he may be able to say "For me to live in Christ." The only Christianity that can be regarded as the genuine thing is that in which Christ is repeated in the lives of His followers. To incarnate Christ is to be His disciple.

Both the Gita and the New Testament seem to entertain no doubts as to the possibility of incarnation. If there be an impassable gulf of difference in nature between God and man, then indeed incarnation is inconceivable; but if there be kinship between God and man in the sense that God is the

all-perfect personal spirit, a living conscious personality, as the Gita and the New Testament represent Him to be, then the idea of incarnation is by no means in itself incredible.

(4) There are intimations in both the Gita and the New Testament that God is to be conceived of as *Triune*. The great passage of the Gita in this connection is worthy of quotation :—

Dvāvimau puruṣau loke kṣaraścākṣara eva ca
Kṣaraḥ sarvāni bhūtāni, kūtaṣṭho' kṣara ucyate
Uttamaḥ puruṣastvanya paramātmetyudāhṛitaḥ
Yo loka trayam āviśya bibhartya vyaya īśvaraḥ
Yasmāt kṣaram atito ham, akṣarād api cottamaḥ
Ato smi loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ.

XV, 10-18.

“These two beings there are in the world, the perishable and the imperishable. The perishable is all living things. The one set on high is called the imperishable. But the highest being is another called the ‘supreme-self,’ the changeless Lord, who having pervaded the three worlds sustains them. Since I am beyond the perishable, and higher than the imperishable, therefore am I celebrated in the world and in the Veda as the best of beings.”

Here it is to be noted that puruṣa, commonly used for spirit, is used to denote perishable matter. This would indicate that the author of the Gita spiritualises matter in this connection and regards it as a spiritual manifestation or expression of the Divine. Thus we have three existences :

- (1) The absolute spirit in his unconditioned form.
- (2) The world-soul, the spirit animating the world of nature and man.
- (3) Material creation, regarded as the spiritual expression of the Divine.

There is here a very real parallel to the intimations of God as *Triune* that we find in the New Testament :

(1) God the father in His absolute eternal being.

(2) The spirit, regarded in the Old Testament rather as the impersonal energy of the Divine, brooding on the face of the waters in creation, and influencing the lives of men and nations, and in the New Testament viewed more and more personally as God working in man, as the Holy Spirit. Christ is also regarded as becoming incarnate through the agency of the Spirit.

(3) Christ is looked upon as the crown of the creation, the first-born of all creation (Col. $\frac{1}{16}$) and in view of his incarnation in human life a new sanctity is assigned to humanity and the whole material creation. He is regarded in many passages as truly one with God.

He that hath seen me hath seen the Father (John $\frac{14}{9}$).

I and the Father are one (John $\frac{10}{30}$).

Then too the sanctified Church is continually regarded by St. Paul as the body of Deity, and accordingly the goal of spiritual aspiration is that humanity "may be filled with the fulness of God." (Epp. $\frac{3}{19}$). The ultimate incarnation is therefore, according to St. Paul's view, ideal humanity, the purified Church of God, spiritualised creation. The Trinitarianism of early Christianity is the product of a great religious experience which led the early Christian disciples to a conception of the Divine Being richer than that which characterised the bare monotheism too typical of their day. As they came in contact with the living and risen Jesus they became aware of a new and rich stream of influence which they knew to be essentially divine in character. In the historic and rise Christ they came to see and feel God under human conditions. As a result of their contact with Christ they felt too that they were brought into closer touch with God as an indwelling presence, a spirit of Holiness, the Holy Spirit in the soul. So they began to speak of the Revelation of the Divine in their



lives in a three-fold way, the love of God the Father, the grace of the Lord Jesus, and the communion of the Holy Spirit. So it happens that most thinking minds to-day in the Christian Church regard the trinitarian doctrine not as a blot upon the Christian faith, but as one of the bulwarks of our common Catholic Christianity saving us on the one side from the perils of a bare unitarianism, and on the other side from the perils of an exuberant polytheism. God is no lonely and isolated being standing apart in eternal and splendid isolation from the world. There is no eternal gulf revealing a fundamental difference of nature between divinity and humanity. There is an element of humanity in divinity, and divinity in humanity, and the gulf has been bridged in the Divine Man in whom we attain divine Sonship through the Spirit. I have tried to limit myself strictly to the subject of my paper—the common elements in the Theology of the Gita and the New Testament. There are many points of agreement and difference, theological and ethical, to which I could refer, but this outstanding lesson they teach in common, that true religion is no mere code of laws, or a system of ethics, philosophy or worship, but true religion in its abiding essence, is God as an incarnate personality, transforming our individual lives and the environment in which we live and move and have our being.

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